WP/8537/2015 of SHRI ATUL TUKARAM PATIL Vs THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS. on 23 December 2015

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAYCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION NO. 8537 OF 2015

Atul Tukaram Patil]Age – 45 years, Occup- Sarpanch]Residing at A/p- Rashiwade]Taluka – Radhanagari,]District – Kolhapur.] ..Petitioner

V/s.

1]The State of MaharashtraThrough its Secretory, Social Justice Department,Mantralaya, Mumbai–400 032.Through its Secretory, Social Justice Department,Mantralaya, Mumbai–400 032.

] ]]]

2]Divisional Caste Certificate]Scrutiny Committee No.2,]Through its Chairman having ]its office at Dr. Babasaheb]Ambedkar Samajik Nyaya]Bhavan, 2[nd] Floor,]Vichare Mala, Kolhapur.]

3]The CollectorDistrict – Kolhapur.District – Kolhapur.

4]Pandurang Daji Dhandure

]]]

5]Bapuso Narshinha Gogane]Adult, Occup- Sarpanch,]R/at A/P-Rashiwade,]Taluka – Radhanagari,]District - Kolhapur.] ..Respondents

…...

Mr. U. P. Warunjikar i/b. Mr. D. B. Shinde, Advocate for thePetitioner.

Mr. P. P. Kakade, AGP for Respondent Nos.1 to 3.

Mr. A. Y. Sakhare, Senior Counsel i/b. Mr. P. D. Dalvi, Advocatefor Respondent No.4.

CORAM : NARESH H. PATIL ANDS.B. SHUKRE, JJ.

JUDGMENT RESERVED ON

: 17.12.2015

JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED ON

: 23.12.2015

JUDGMENT (Per S. B. Shukre, J.):

Heard.

2. Rule.

3. Rule made returnable forthwith.

4. Heard finally by consent.

5. This petition challenges the legality andcorrectness of the order dated 13[th] August, 2015, passed byrespondent no.2 – Divisional Caste Certificate ScrutinyCommittee No.2, thereby invalidating the caste claim of thepetitioner as belonging to “Kunabi” caste.

6. The petitioner, claiming himself to be belonging tothe caste “Kunabi” falling in the category of Other BackwardClass (hereinafter referred to as “OBC” for short), contestedthe election for the post of Member of Gram Panchayat from ward no.6 of village Rashiwade, Taluka – Radhanagari, District– Kolhapur which ward was reserved for the OBC category andwas declared winner, having secured highest votes.Respondent nos.4 and 5 doubted the caste claim of thepetitioner and, therefore, they filed a complaint withrespondent no.2, the Divisional Caste Certificate ScrutinyCommittee No.2, Kolhapur alleging that the petitioner wasfrom a general category and belonged to the “Maratha” caste.Respondent no.2 took cognizance of the complaint anddirected an inquiry of its vigilance cell into the allegationsmade against the petitioner. The vigilance cell, following theprocedure prescribed under the Maharashtra ScheduledCastes, Scheduled Tribes, De-notified Tribes (Vimukta Jatis),Nomadic Tribes, Other Backward Classes and SpecialBackward Category (Regulation of Issuance and Verification of)Caste Certificate Act, 2000 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act2000”, for short) and the Maharashtra Scheduled Castes, De-notified Tribes (Vimukta Jatis), Nomadic Tribes, OtherBackward Classes and Special Backward Category (Regulationof Issuance and Verification of) Caste Certificate Rules, 2012(hereinafter referred to as “the Rules 2012”, for short),submitted its report to respondent no.2. Thereupon, notice wasissued to the petitioner calling upon him to address the issuesraised in the report of the vigilance cell and mentioned in thenotice. The petitioner replied to the same and thereafter an inquiry was conducted. Respondent no.2 came to theconclusion that the petitioner could not establish his castestatus as belonging to the “Kunabi” caste and therefore passedorder on 13[th] August, 2015, invalidating the caste certificatedated 2[nd] June, 2012, issued to him by the Additional Collector,Radhanagari Division, Kolhapur and directed its forfeiture.Not being satisfied with the same, the petitioner hasapproached this Court by filing the present writ petition.

7. We have heard Mr. Warunjikar, learned counsel forthe petitioner, Mr. P.P. Kakade, learned AGP for Respondentnos. 1 to 3 and Mr. A. Y. Sakhare, and learned senior counselfor respondent nos. 4 and 5, who were the originalcomplainants. With their assistance, we have carefully gonethrough the paper book of this petition.

8. Mr. Warunjikar, the learned counsel for thepetitioner has submitted that no effective opportunity ofsubmitting final argument by the petitioner has been given byrespondent no.2 as his counsel could not remain present on therescheduled date of final hearing; that the birth and the deathentries in the revenue record in respect of paternal aunts ofthe petitioner Sau Dnyanoba Aapa and Ranu Bapu DnyanobaAapa dating back to 1901 and 1903 as well as the schoolleaving certificate of Tukaram Dnyanoba Patil, father of the petitioner, showing his caste as Kunabi which pertains to a pre-independence period have not been appreciated properly, thatno proper procedure has been followed by the vigilance cellwhile making domestic inquiry, in particular provisions ofClauses (b), (c) and (d) of Rule 13 of Rules 2012 have not beenfollowed; that statement of political rivals of the petitionerhave been accepted wrongly and that the affidavits filed beforethe scrutiny committee by the petitioner have been ignored inviolation of law. Learned Counsel, therefore, submits that theimpugned order be set aside and the matter be remandedback to respondent no.2, for its consideration afresh.

9. Learned AGP submits that the roznama maintainedby respondent no.2 committee would show that effectiveopportunity for making final submissions before the scrutinycommittee has been given; that the pre-independencedocuments on which reliance is said to have been placed bythe petitioner, being doubtful in nature, have been rightlyrejected by respondent no.2; that the report of domesticinquiry would show that the procedure prescribed in Rule 13 ofRules 2012 has been followed in true letter and spirit; that thescrutiny committee has not passed its order entirely on thestatements of residents of village Rashiwade and hasconsidered all the relevant material and evidence broughtbefore it and, therefore, the impugned order cannot be said to have been passed in breach of law or arbitrarily.

have been passed in breach of law or arbitrarily.

10. Mr. Sakhare, learned senior counsel appearing forthe complainants submits that roznama maintained byrespondent no.2 – scrutiny committee would show that properand effective opportunity of hearing has been given to thepetitioner; that no specific grievance about the contents ofroznama has been made in the petition; that the pre-independence documents have been properly appreciated bythe scrutiny committee; that the vigilance cell report wouldshow that proper procedure has been followed, particularly theprocedure prescribed in Rule 13 of Rules 2012; that even pastand present police patil's statements have been recorded bothof whom have stated that the petitioner belongs to caste“Maratha” and not caste “Kunabi”; that reply given by thepetitioner in respect of the notice issued to the vigilance cell,does not say that the vigilance cell's report is bad in law fornon-compliance of Rule 13 of Rules 2012 and therefore, nowthe order of the scrutiny committee cannot be assailed on thisground; that the affidavits on which reliance being placed bythe petitioner in any case do not support the caste claim of thepetitioner; that under Section 8 of the Act 2000, the burden ofproof is entirely upon the petitioner which the petitioner hasfailed to discharge and that the impugned order has not beenshown to be perverse or arbitrary or illegal. On these grounds, the learned senior counsel urges that no interference with theimpugned order is warranted.

11. As regards the first objection of denial ofopportunity of hearing, though learned Senior Counsel submitsthat it is absent in the body of petition, we find that it isgenerally raised in the petition, but has no foundation in thefacts of the case. A careful perusal of the roznama maintainedby the scrutiny committee discloses that final arguments wereheard by the Committee on 12[th] February, 2015, and the casewas closed for orders. However, the case was again reopenedfor final hearing, as submitted by the learned counsel for thepetitioner and about which there is no dispute either, therebeing change in the composition of the scrutiny committee andthe case was kept for final hearing on 14[th] July, 2015. On thatday, the petitioner was present and so the complainants were.The roznama of 14[th] July, 2015 discloses that the learnedcounsel for the petitioner was not present. It further showsthat the petitioner as well as the complainants were heard andthe matter was closed for orders. The learned counsel for thepetitioner submits that the counsel of the petitioner could notremain present as the petitioner was not aware as to for whatpurpose, he was called upon to be present before thecommittee on 14[th] July, 2015, and the petitioner was onlyintimated through SMS that he was required to attend the

Procedure

proceedings before the scrutiny committee on 14[th] July, 2015.He submits that had he been properly intimated about thepurpose, the petitioner would have been in a position to remainpresent along with his counsel before the committee. Hefurther submits that after closing the case for orders on 14[th]July, 2015, about which the petitioner had no idea, suddenlythe impugned order was passed on 13[th] August, 2015, and thisis how there has been denial of effective opportunity of hearingto the petitioner. The argument, however, cannot be acceptedfor two reasons. Firstly, intimation was received by thepetitioner which ought to have put him on guard and made himseek assistance of his lawyer. Secondly, after the closure of thecase for orders on 14[th] July, 2015, a period of almost one monthwas available before the final order was passed and this periodcould and should have stood in good stead for the petitioner tomake an application before the committee praying for giving ofan opportunity to make his final submission through hislearned counsel. But, the petitioner did not avail of thissubsequent opportunity as well. The conclusion is irresistible.It leads us to believe that now the ground of denial of adequateopportunity of hearing is being taken by the petitioner only byway of an afterthought and so we reject it.

12. There has been another objection voiced by thepetitioner that documents were not properly appreciated.However, upon carefully going through the vigilance cell report, the impugned order and also the original recordproduced before us, we find that the objection is devoid ofsubstance for the reasons given in forgoing paragraphs.

13. Respondent no.2 has observed in the impugnedorder that in the school leaving certificate of father of thepetitioner, Tukaram Dnyanoba Patil, there is alteration at theplace where the word “Kunabi” is written and at this very placethe paper has worn out and turned whitish. It is furtherobserved that there is a yellowish spot on the reverse side ofthe school leaving certificate, just behind the word “Kunabi”.As regards the birth entry of Sau Dnyanoba Patil, claimed to bepaternal aunt of the petitioner, respondent no.2 committee hasfound that the word “Sau” appeared to be written twice andthat the ink used for writing the word “Aajari” (vktkjh) in theremark column was darker in shade than the ink used forwriting the remaining material. Respondent no.2 also foundthat though the petitioner claimed that Ranu Dnyanoba Patiland Sau Dnyanoba Aapa Patil were his paternal aunts, nosatisfactory evidence was produced by the petitioner toestablish his relationship with Sau and Ranu.

14. Now, in order to ascertain if these observations,really speaking the findings on facts, are founded upon factualsettings of the case or not, we called for the original record

and examined it. It has, along with consideration of materialavailable on record, led us to form a view that what has beenobserved by the scrutiny committee on the basis of thevigilance report cannot be said to be entirely incorrect. Theschool leaving certificate of the father of the petitioner isindeed blotched at the place where the word “Kunabi” iswritten. This word appears in such a manner that it gives animpression that it may have been written subsequently throughsome kind of alteration. It is true that this document beingunder the custody and control of the school authorities, theonus to explain the speckled nature of the entry would lie uponthose authorities, unless there is some evidence suggestingotherwise. There is no evidence available on record whichshifts the burden from school authorities to somewhere elseand therefore, no blame for such a blemished entry can beplaced upon the shoulders of the petitioner. At the same time,fact remains that the entry is suspicious and therefore, noreliance could be placed on it. Such a doubtful entry cannot beread in a manner as giving advantage to the petitioner. Thereason for this observation has to be attributed to Section 8 ofthe Act, 2000 which casts a mandatory burden of proof on theclaimant. It lays down that in any enquiry conducted by thescrutiny committee under the Act, 2000, the burden of proofshall lie on the person who claims to be belonging to any of thecastes, tribes or categories mentioned therein. Obviously, the petitioner was required to clear the air of suspicion about thesaid entry by furnishing some other reliable evidence. Thepetitioner, however, did not do so.

15. Learned senior counsel for the complainants haspointed out that no reliance could be placed even on the birthand death entries of two girls namely Sau and Ranu for thereason that these certificates fairly indicate that these twogirls were born in the year 1901 with a gap of just about sixmonths at the most in between their births. This has beendisputed by the learned counsel for the petitioner. However,we find merit in the submission of the learned senior counselfor the complainants. The date of birth of Sau has been shownto be 12[th] June, 1901 in the birth entry maintained by therevenue authorities. The entry of death maintained by therevenue authorities in respect of Ranu Bapu Dnyanoba Aapaindicates that she died in the year 1903 when she was twoyears old. This would fairly suggest that the girl Ranu wasborn in the year 1901. Since the girl Sau was born in June1901, even if the month of birth of the girl Ranu is taken asJanuary 1901 or December 1901, the gap between the births ofthese two girls would not be more than six months, whichbiologically appears to be a remote possibility. Even if thepossibility was there, having regard to the stage ofdevelopment of medical science in those days, there was very little possibility of survival of a premature child born in theyear 1901 till the year 1903. Then, the word “Sau” appears tohave been over written. Having regard to all these facts, weare of the view that the birth and death entries of the girls Sauand Ranu cannot be relied upon, even though both theseentries indicate that their caste was “Kunabi”.

16. There is yet another reason why these birth anddeath entries cannot be considered as strengthening the casteclaim of the petitioner. There is a missing link between thesetwo girls and the petitioner in the sense that their kinship withpetitioner is not forged. The petitioner has not produced beforethe scrutiny committee any satisfactory evidence showing hisrelationship with the said girls. There is one affidavit sworn bySindhutai Eknath Patil, a relative of the petitioner, which hasbeen submitted before the committee. In this affidavit,Sindhutai has given the genealogy of the family of thepetitioner showing that Sau and Ranu to be the daughters ofthe common ancestors Dnyanoba Aapaji Patil and Chandrabai.The genealogy so submitted before the scrutiny committeecannot be accepted as worthy of credit, unless the petitionerhas given a satisfactory explanation about the failure tomention the names of the girls Sau and Ranu as his bloodrelatives in the genealogy submitted by him during the courseof vigilance inquiry, which was the earliest possible opportunity afforded to the petitioner. The explanationsubmitted by the petitioner in his reply dated 18[th] January,2014 given to the notice of the scrutiny committee dated 7[th]January, 2014 is not at all satisfactory. In the reply, thepetitioner has stated that the names of Sau and Ranu were notincluded in the first genealogy as at that time no documentaryproof was available with him and that no sooner thedocumentary proof was secured by him than he submitted arevised genealogy showing inclusion of their names before thescrutiny committee. Such an explanation defies logic. Therecan be no manifest relation between non-inclusion of names ofblood relatives in the genealogy at the first availableopportunity and non-availability of documentary proof, as theblood comes first and the documents later. We must say, inlaw, an inescapable duty has been placed upon a personundergoing verification of his caste claim to make true andcorrect disclosure of all the information including adverseentries or materials which would have a bearing upon his castestatus. Rule 17(12) of the Rules 2012 is clear in this regardand it reads thus:

“17 (12)Notwithstanding anything contained inthese rules, it is incumbent on the applicant todisclose all the true and correct information,including disclosure of adverse entries or material;failing which, it shall be lawful for the ScrutinyCommittee to draw adverse inference.”these rules, it is incumbent on the applicant todisclose all the true and correct information,including disclosure of adverse entries or material;failing which, it shall be lawful for the ScrutinyCommittee to draw adverse inference.”

The petitioner did not fulfill such an obligation when hesubmitted his first genealogy and the subsequent explanationgiven by him for non-inclusion of the names of Sau and Ranu inthe first genealogy was not at all satisfactory. The petitioneralso did not submit any other reliable evidence in this regard.The result is that the petitioner has been rightly held byrespondent no.2 to have not established his kinship with thegirls Sau and Ranu. This is apart from the fact that the birthand death entries of these two girls maintained by the revenueauthorities being what they were could not be taken to meanthat the girls were the paternal aunts of the petitioner,especially for the doubts pointed out earlier.

17. It is also the argument of the petitioner that therehas been violation of the procedure prescribed under Rule 13of Rule 2012 in making an inquiry by the vigilance committee.The petitioner has placed reliance upon the observations of theDivision Bench of this Court made in the Judgment dated15[th] October, 2013 delivered in Writ Petition No.4763 of2013[1]. The Division Bench has held that functioning of thevigilance cell is not to only verify the correctness andgenuineness of the documents produced by the applicant, butalso to hold inquiry as contemplated under relevant clauses

18. There can be no two opinions about following ofRule 13 procedure by vigilance cell as a matter of course whileconducting an inquiry. It is also true that the petitioner shouldhave raised the grievance about non-compliance with Rule 13procedure in his reply to notice issued to him by respondentNo.2, which he did not. So, the inference would be that thepetitioner has already waived the objection, which is ofprocedure and not of law, and now cannot be allowed to rake itup again. Even otherwise, upon a careful consideration of thereport of the vigilance cell in the instant case, we find itdifficult to agree with the contention of the petitioner that Rule13 procedure has not been followed while making an inquiry.The vigilance cell had visited the place of residence of thepetitioner and also the concerned school. It had also verifiedthe official record and the documents. It had recordedstatements of respected and responsible persons from theconcerned area. We find such an effort on the part of thevigilance committee to be substantial compliance with theprocedure prescribed under Rule 13.

19. Learned counsel for the petitioner insists that thevigilance cell ought to have collected information regardingthe sociological and anthropological moorings; ethnological

kinship, and genetic traits of the persons belonging to thecaste “Kunabi”, as required by clause (d) of Rule 13 andsubmits that this has not been done by the vigilancecommittee. But, reading Rule 13 as a whole gives animpression that collection of information including that aboutsociological, anthropological and ethnological moorings andkinship and genetic traits would be necessary only when thecommittee finds that the material collected by the committeehints that the person under verification may belong to any ofthe reserved categories mentioned in clause (d) and this factwould require further corroboration from additional sources.If the inquiry made by the vigilance cell in accordance withClauses (a) and (b) or Clause (c) reasonably reveals that theclaimant does not belong to any of the reserved categoriesmentioned therein, we do not think, there would be anyoccasion for making any further effort to collect informationabout sociological moorings, anthropological and genetic traitsand ethnological kinships, and even if the effort is made, it isdoubtful, if it would be meaningful in the absence of relevantdata yielded in inquiry under Clauses (a) to (c) of Rule 13. Inthe instant case, the material collected by the vigilancecommittee reasonably indicated that the petitioner wasbelonging to the caste “Maratha” and not “Kunabi” and,therefore, there was no occasion for scrutiny committee tocollect any information regarding sociological and anthropological moorings or genetic traits by way of furtherassurance. Need for collection of such an information or atleast making of an effort in that direction, as stated earlier,would be necessary when an occasion arises for the vigilancecommittee to reassure itself about the material collected by it.

20. In the case of Barkha Rajesh Manik (Supra)reliance on which has been placed by the petitioner, theDivision Bench of this Court had found that no domesticinquiry at all, as contemplated under Rule 13 of Rules 2012,was made and the report of the vigilance cell was based onlyupon the documentary evidence produced by the petitioner.Such is not the case here and the vigilance cell did complysubstantially with the procedure prescribed under Rule 13.Therefore, in our view, the case of Barkha Rajesh Manik(Supra) gives no assistance to the case of the petitioner in thiscase.

21. About the argument that statements of politicalrivals of the petitioner have been wrongly accepted byrespondent no.2 committee, we must say that the argument isdevoid of any substance. While there is no doubt about thefact that one of the persons, Sangram Vasantrao Patil, whosestatement was recorded by the vigilance committee, was anadversary of the petitioner in a civil suit pending between them

in respect of a property dispute, this fact by itself would notmake the statements of other persons as unreliable. DinkarVisnu Patil, a resident of village Waghawade, is a personholding additional charge as police patil of village Rashiwade,which is situated five kilometer away from village Waghawade.He being the incharge police patil of village Rashiwade, can besaid to be having intimate knowledge about the residents ofvillage Rashiwade and their places in the social structure ofthat village. Same can be said about Mahadev Vishnu Patil, aresident of village Rashiwade, who had been its police patilduring the period from 1996 to 2012. Both of them havestated that petitioner belongs to caste “Maratha” and not“Kunabi”. Their statements cannot be disbelieved just becausethe petitioner vaguely says that these two persons apart fromthe other two persons are his political rivals, unless thepetitioner produces some material to probabalize his such acharge. The petitioner has not produced any material in thisregard. We, therefore, find no infirmity in the reliance placedupon these persons in the impugned order.

22. The petitioner submitted before the scrutinycommittee affidavits of three persons namely:- (1)Bajirao NanaPatil; (2) Vishnu Dnyanoba Patil; and (3) Sindhubai EknathPatil. In these affidavits, it is stated that the petitioner is“Kunabi” by caste. We have already discussed one aspect of the rpa 19/22 wp8537.15.odtaffidavit of Sindhutai, which was about revised genealogy ofthe petitioner and, therefore, it is not necessary to again referto it. These affidavits have not been considered by respondentno.2 by following the ratio of the case of Sudhadevi Vs. M.P.Narayanan[2]. Relevant observations of the Supreme Courthave also been reproduced in the impugned order and upongoing through the same, we find that the ratio of this casecould not have pressed into service by respondent no.2, as theprinciple of law laid down relates to operation of rules ofprocedure prescribed under the Code of Civil Procedure. Theprocedure that the scrutiny committee has to follow has beenlaid down in Rules 2012, in particular Rule 17. Sub Rule (6) ofRule 17 requires scrutiny committee to appreciate not only thestatement of applicant or claimant, submitted in the form ofaffidavit, but also other evidence and documents furnished bythe applicant or claimant. The explanation “other evidenceand documents” in our view is wide enough to take in its foldthe affidavits submitted by the applicant or the claimant. Wemust note that strict rules of evidence are not required to befollowed while making verification of the caste claims by thescrutiny committee. This has been made clear by the ApexCourt in the case of Kum. Madhuri Patil and other Vs.Additional Commissioner, Tribal Development and

others[3], when it observed that the inquiry to be made by thescrutiny committee should be such as would be expedient tothe situation. This observation would suggest that the scrutinycommittee would have some leeway in following the procedurefor making an inquiry. Therefore, we find that the scrutinycommittee has committed an error in refusing to consider theaffidavits submitted before it by the petitioner. It is, however,a different thing that these affidavits, upon their dueconsideration do not make any difference to the overall case ofthe petitioner. These affidavits, except for setting a wordagainst word, do nothing. According to these deponents, thepetitioner is “Kunabi” by caste; while the other deponentsswear by “Maratha” caste of the petitioner. These threedeponents are relatives of the petitioner, and the otherdeponents barring Sangram, are independent persons and twoof them are past and present police patils. Word of these otherdeponents, especially the police patils, being of independents,would carry more weight than the word of said threedeponents, being not independents.

23. Lastly, we must say, the school leaving certificate ofthe petitioner produced by he himself finally closes thechapter. It discloses that his caste is “Maratha”. Nosatisfactory explanation in this regard has been given by the 31997 Vol.V SCC 437

petitioner except to say that his father was illiterate andtherefore did not mention his caste as “Kunabi” at the time oftaking admission of the petitioner to the school. The schoolleaving certificate of the petitioner shows that he was admittedto school on 2[nd] June, 1975 and was relieved from the school on26[th] June, 1979. It further discloses that his caste in columnno.3 has been shown to be “Hindu-Maratha”. Such caste of thepetitioner has been admittedly written at the instance of thefather of the petitioner. If petitioner's father was illiterate,who would not, due to illiteracy, disclose caste of his son as“Kunabi”; for the same reason, he would also not disclose casteof his son as “Hindu-Maratha”; after all an illiterate father doesnot understand importance of such earthly things. But, theilliterate father of the petitioner specifically mentioned hiscaste to be “Hindu-Maratha”. Such an act on the part of thefather of the petitioner would only show that he disclosed thecaste as it was, truly and innocently, without thinking of whatbenefits it would offer or refuse to the petitioner. Theexplanation given by the petitioner about this entry, therefore,cannot be accepted and would rather impel us to draw aninference that caste entry in the school leaving certificate ofthe petitioner reasonably seals the fate of the case of thepetitioner, which is obviously against him.

In the circumstances, we find that the impugned order is neither perverse nor arbitrary nor does it show anynon application of mind to the relevant facts. In the case ofMadhuri Patil (Supra), Supreme Court has held that theHigh Court can interfere with the findings of the scrutinycommittee only when it finds that there is an error of law ornon application of mind on the part of the scrutiny committeeto the relevant facts. Such is not the case here. The petitiondeserves to be dismissed. The petition is dismissed. Rule isdischarged.

25. After pronouncement of the order, learned counselfor the petitioner prays for continuation of ad-interim reliefgranted earlier. The request is opposed by the learned counselfor the respondents.

26. No adverse order be passed against the petitioneron account of dismissal of petition for a period of four weeksfrom today.

(S. B. SHUKRE, J.) (NARESH H. PATIL, J.)