Kerala High Court

RP/936/2021 of XXXXX Vs XXXXX on 28 October 2022

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COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE & THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.S.DIAS FRIDAY, THE 28TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2022 / 6TH KARTHIKA, 1944 RP NO. 936 OF 2021 AGAINST THE JUDGMENT in Mat.Appeal 89/2020 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA REVIEW PETITIONER/S: XXXXX X

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

PRESENT

THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE

&

THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.S.DIAS

FRIDAY, THE 28[TH] DAY OF OCTOBER 2022 / 6TH KARTHIKA, 1944

RP NO. 936 OF 2021

AGAINST THE JUDGMENT in Mat.Appeal 89/2020 OF HIGH COURT OFKERALA

REVIEW PETITIONER/S:

XXXXXXBY ADVS.BABU KARUKAPADATHP.U.VINOD KUMARARYA RAGHUNATHVAISAKHI V.T.M.MUHAMMED MUSTHAQMOHAMED HISHAM PKARUKAPADATH WAZIM BABUP.LAKSHMIAISWARYA ANN JACOB

RESPONDENT/S:

XXXXXXBY ADV. P.NARAYANAN

THIS REVIEW PETITION HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON29.07.2022, THE COURT ON 28/10/2022 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:

A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE & C.S.DIAS, JJ.

------------------------------------------ R.P.No.936 of 2021

IN

MAT.APPEAL No.89 OF 2020

------------------------------------------O R D E R

Dated this the 28[th] day of October, 2022

A.Muhamed Mustaque, J.

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1. This is a typical review portraying that Muslimwomen are subordinate to the will of their malecounterparts. This review does not look innocuous atthe instance of the appellant, but rather appears tohave been fashioned and supported by clergies and thehegemonic masculinity of the Muslim community who areunable to digest the declaration of the right ofMuslim women to resort to the extra-judicial divorceof khula, unilaterally. The appeal from which thisreview arises was filed challenging a divorce decree

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granted to a Muslim wife under the Dissolution ofMuslim Marriages Act, 1939. The appeal was filed bythe husband. In the appeal, we noticed the existenceof the right of Muslim women to resort to the extra-judicial divorce of khula, allowing her to terminateher marriage. Thereafter, the appeal was disposed of,recording khula and also delineating the differentmethods of extra-judicial divorce applicable toMuslim spouses. We declared that the right toterminate the marriage at the instance of a Muslimwife is an absolute right, conferred on her by theholy Quran and is not subject to the acceptance orthe will of her husband. In the review petition filedby the husband, he does not dispute the authoritygiven to the Muslim wife to invoke khula, but ratherraises, as a ground of review, the procedureacknowledged by this Court to invoke the remedy ofkhula by the Muslim wife. We declared that khulawould be valid if the following conditions aresatisfied:

i.A declaration of repudiation or termination of marriage by the wife.

ii. An offer to return dower or any other material gain received by her during maritaltie.

iii.An effective attempt for reconciliation was preceded before the declaration of khula.

2. The review petition, though, was filed bythe husband, the courtroom was filled with personswho have shown an interest in the outcome and we allowed all those interested to make submissions.Accordingly, we had the advantage of hearing a Muslimscholar turned lawyer, Adv.Hussain C.S.

3. According to the learned counsel for the review petitioner and Adv. Hussain C.S., the Courterred in recognising the procedure in effecting khula. According to them, if a Muslim wife wishes toterminate her marriage with her husband, she has todemand talaq from her husband and on his refusal, shehas to move the qazi or Court. According to them, though a Muslim woman has a right to demand divorce of her own will, she has no absolute right topronounce khula like the right of her counterpart to

pronounce talaq. It was submitted that, as aconsequence of the declaration of law by this Court,a large section of Muslim women are resorting tokhula in derogation of the Sunnah. It was also arguedthat the Court is not competent to decide onreligious beliefs and practices and the Court oughtto have followed the opinion of Islamic Scholars. Itwas submitted that almost all across the globe, it isrecognised that on demand of the wife to terminatethe marriage, the husband has to pronounce talaq,obliging her demand. In countries where qazis arerecognised, on refusal of the husband, the qaziswould terminate the marriage. It was argued thatnowhere in the world, a Muslim wife is allowed tounilaterally terminate the marriage. It was furthersubmitted that in the absence of qazis, the competentcivil court in India has to terminate the marriage.

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4. In the holy Quran, Chapter II, verse 229, theright of Muslim wife has been explicitly referred to,which reads thus:

The divorce is twice, after that, either you retainher on reasonable terms or release her with kindness.And it is not lawful for you (men) to take back (fromyour wives) any of your Mahr (bridal money given bythe husband to his wife at the time of marriage) whichyou have given them, except when both parties fearthat they would be unable to keep the limits ordainedby Allah (e.g. to deal with each other on a fairbasis). Then if you fear that they would not be ableto keep the limits ordained by Allah, then there is nosin on either of them if she gives back (the Mahr or apart of it) for her Al-Khul’ (divorce). These are thelimits ordained by Allah, so do not transgress them.And whoever transgresses the limits ordained by Allah,then such are the Zalimun (wrong-doers, etc.).

5. The limit of moral authority postulated in the above verse alongside the legal right providing a remedy for a Muslim woman, may require delineation todecide on the question involved. The moral injunctionthat one has to be contended with is perhapsreiterated with a warning of the life hereafter, by pointing out that they shall not transgress thelimits set by the Almighty. The intersection of the moral injunction and the legal right shows theaccountability to the Almighty in the life hereafteras per the faith, but it cannot be a determination ofthe validity of the legal right in a court of law ina secular country. The moral injunction sostipulated in the above verse has to be read in thecontext of the Prophet’s warning to the believersthat divorce is “the most hated of the permissiblethings to Allah” {See Sunan Ibn Majah, Book onHadith,2018,Vol.3 Ch.1, Book 10 (English Translation)}.

6. The legal conundrum in this case, is not an isolated one. It has evolved over the years as thescholars of Islamic studies, who have no training inlegal sciences started to elucidate on the point oflaw in Islam, on a mixture of belief and practice.Islam has a code of law, apart from laying down rulesrelating to beliefs and practices. Legal norms arethe cornerstones of creating a social and cultural

order within the Muslim community. The dilemma thatpersisted, in this case, is, perhaps, more related tothe practice that has been followed for years,overlooking the mandate of the legal norm conferringon Muslim women the right to terminate the marriagewithout the conjunction of the husband. The Courtin such circumstances is expected to look at thelegal norm, if the same relies upon Quraniclegislations and the sayings and practices of theProphet (Sunnah). The underlying distinction betweenFiqh and Shariah needs to be stressed here. Fiqh hasbeen loosely translated to English as Islamic law andliterally means ‘the understanding of what isintended’. Shariah means ‘a straight path’. Fiqhrefers to the science of deducing Islamic laws fromthe evidence found in the sources of Islamic law.(See the distinction of Fiqh and Shariah in the book,'The evolution of Fiqh' by Dr. Abu Ameenah BilalPhilips). Ordinary scholars and the Islamic clergy,who have no formal legal training find it difficult to deduce Islamic law from its sources. Fiqh denotes the true intentions and objects of Islamic law. Itrequires a legal mind to deduce Islamic law from thesources. The dilemma faced by the Islamic clergy inunderstanding triple talaq was based on the practicefollowed in society for centuries, on the footingthat a single pronouncement of triple talaq wouldconstitute a valid talaq. This was related to thedecree of the Caliph Umar, who was one of thesuccessors to the caliphate, after the demise of theProphet Mohammed. Noting the misuse of the authoritygiven to the husband, who invariably invoked talaqand revoked talaq thereafter, causing miseries andhardships to the women; on a complaint made by thewomen and acting on their behalf, the Caliph decreedthat such pronouncement of talaq would be a validdivorce. This decree, though, does not look in tunewith the Quranic legislation that refers to cyclicpronouncement of talaq at different intervals,wasdevised to meet a particular situation in the societyat that point in time. Caliph Umar resolved to exercise his executive power to meet a particular exigency, to redress the grievances of women. Thispower of the ruler is akin to the power exercised bythe executive in the modern State. That executive power was so exercised, to tide over a particularsituation. This practice, allowed at a particular time, was relied upon by the Islamic clergy tojustify instantaneous triple talaq, overlookingQuranic injunctions. The Islamic clergy failed todistinguish between the legislative authority of theQuran and the executive power of the Islamic ruler tomeet particular contingencies. We have narrated theabove aspect only to bring home the point that theIslamic clergy who have no legal training orknowledge in legal sciences, cannot be relied upon bythe Court to decide on a point of law involved,relating to the personal law applicable to the Muslimcommunity. The Courts are manned by trained legalminds. The Court shall not surrender to the opinionsof the Islamic clergy, who have no legal training onthe point of law. No doubt, in matters related to beliefs and practices, their opinion matters to the

Court and the Court should have deference for theirviews.

7. The Quranic verse relating to khula found in

Chapter 2, verse 229, in unequivocal terms, declaresthat a Muslim wife has the right to terminate hermarriage. The problem, presented before us today, isbased on a reported Hadith, illustrating an instanceof termination of marriage at the instance of a wife during the lifetime of the Prophet Mohammed. Inalmost all the authorities related to Islamic law,this instance of divorce by a Muslim wife has beenreported. We have also referred to the abovereported Hadith in our judgment under review. We again, in this review, refer to the Hadith.-- OneThabit had two wives. One of them was Jamilah.Jamilah did not like the looks of Thabit. She approached the Holy Prophet. She said, “Messenger ofAllah! Nothing can keep the two of us together. I donot dislike him for any blemish in his faith or hismorals. It is his appearance that I dislike. I wantto separate from him.” The Prophet replied, “Will you give him back the garden he gave you?” She replied, “I am prepared to give him the garden hegave and even prepared to give more”. The Prophetsaid, “You only need to give him the garden”. Thenthe Prophet summoned Thabit and told him to acceptthe garden and divorce Jamilah. (See for more readingon this, 'The Rights and Duties of Spouses', 7thedition, by Maulana Sayyid Abul A’la Maududi, page49). Relying on this, the counsel for the petitionerand Adv. Hussain C.S. argued that the Prophet hasprescribed a procedure for divorce in the above manner at the instance of a Muslim woman andtherefore, it is not open for the Court to prescribe the procedure in a different manner. According tothem, on the demand of the wife, the husband has topronounce talaq. We are called upon to decide as tothe true procedure to be followed for divorce at theinstance of the wife (khula).

ELABORATION OF THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE COUNSEL:

8. Relying upon Article 25 of the Indian Constitution read with the Shariat Act 1937, Adv.

Hussain C.S. argued that the Muslim Personal Law is the rule of decision in questions relating to marriage, dissolution of marriage, maintenance, etc.

of the Muslim community.

9. Citing numerous judgments, the counsel vehemently submitted that the verses of the Quran cannot be the subject matter of interpretation ofsecular courts.

10. He submitted that the Shariah is based on four sources, namely, the Quran, Sunnah, Qiyas (analogy) and Ijma (consensus). When the Quran issilent on any aspect, attention must be turned to theSunnah of the Prophet, thereby using it to supplement the verses of the Quran. He quoted the verses of theQuran and the Hadeeth to buttress this point.

Sura Al Hahr, verse 7 reads:

“Whatever the Messenger gives you, accept it; andwhatever he forbids you, abstain from it.”

The Prophet once said to his followers: “So long asyou hold fast to two things which I have left amongyou, you will not go astray; God’s Book, and HisMessenger’s Sunnah.”

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11. According to him, although the Quran grantswomen the right to obtain khula (verse 2:229), it does not prescribe a procedure for the same. In suchan instance, the learned counsel submitted that thecorrect procedure for khula can be evidenced from the Hadith of Thabit. Relying upon the verses of theQuran and the Hadith, he contended that the followingmandate flows in respect of khula:

i. Although undesirable but where there is a fear of violation of the limits set by Allah,khula can be obtained;

ii. A woman must part with money if she wishesto obtain khula;

iii. khula is legally effective only when the

husband accepts the wife’s offer of payment anddivorces her.

12. The counsel submitted that all Muslim scholars, irrespective of their schools of thought, are unanimous in their opinion that khula is a divorce by mutual consent or agreement, with the acceptance of the husband being an essential elementfor a valid khula.

13. Submitting that although khula is an extra- judicial form of divorce, when the husband refuses togive consent, it takes the form of faskh (a judicialdivorce), thereby forcing the woman to seek theintervention of a qazi (judge). The learned counselthen, however, went on to submit that the judge hasno discretion in the matter and has to give effect tothe khula, if the wife insists.

14. The learned counsel cited numerous judgmentsto fortify his submissions on the nature of khula. Weare not referring to any of the judgments for thereason that none of the judgments have decided uponthe question involved in this review. All thedecisions of foreign courts and domestic courts referto the practice and form of khula exercised. In thejudgment cited of the Apex Court in Juveria AbdulMajid Patni v. Atif Iqbal Mansoori and another[(2014) 10 SCC 736], the court had adverted to theform of khula followed, to decide upon a question arising under the Protection of Women from DomesticViolence Act, 2005.

UNDERSTANDING THE TRUE MEANING OF KHULA:

15. In order to understand the true meaning of khula and the procedure to be followed, we need to trace back the evolution of the right of women toobtain a divorce, from the pre-Islamic periodonwards. This period was referred to, in the Holy Quran, as the period of ignorance. Many of the lawsthat were in existence in the pre-Islamic period weremodified, adapted or abrogated during the Islamic period. Marriage in pre-Islamic Arabia was arecognised institution for creating a family whichwas the primary unit of society. Without marriage,there would be no family and no ties to unitedifferent members of a community. Marriage in pre-Islamic society was one way to increase thestrength of the tribe, by begetting more children whowould be the next generation of the tribe. (Quotedfrom ‘Changing the position of women in Arabia underIslam during the early 70th Century’, Research Thesis submitted by Farya Abbas Abdullah Sulaimani,University of Salford 1986). The author refers to theexistence of payment of dower by the bridegroom to

the bride in pre-Islamic Arabia. The author alsorefers to the existence of the right to divorce inpre-Islamic Arabia, for both men and women. The manhad the right to divorce whenever he liked withoutrestrictions and conditions. The right of the wifeto dismiss the marriage also has been referred to bythe author. The author says that women used todismiss their marriage at their will. He narratesthe procedure as follows: “If they lived in a tent,they would turn round, so that if the door had facedeast, it now faces west, and when the man saw this,he knew that he was dismissed and he did not enter.”A similar kind of divorce has also been referred toin the book titled 'Women and Gender in Islam'written by Leila Ahmed [pg. 44].

Divorce and remarriage appear to have been commonfor both men and women, either of whom could initiatethe dissolution. Kitab al-aghani reports: "The womenin the Jahilia, or some of them, divorced men, and their [manner of] divorce was that if they lived in atent they turned it round, so that if the door hadfaced east it now faced west ... and when the man sawthis he knew that she had divorced him and did not goto her." Divorce was not generally followed by the‘idda, or "waiting period' for women beforeremarriage- an observance Islam was to insist on- andalthough a wife used to go into retirement for aperiod following her husband's death,the custom, ifsuch it was, seems to have been laxly observed.

Abdur Rahim in his book, ‘The Principles of IslamicJurisprudence’ [pg. no.10], refers to another form oftermination of the marriage at the instance of wife.

The wife among the Arabs had no corresponding right torelease herself from the bond of marriage. But herparents by a friendly arrangement with the husbandcould obtain a separation by returning the dower if ithad been paid or by agreeing to forgo it if not paid.Such an arrangement was called khula lit. stripping,and by it the marriage tie would be absolutelydissolved.

Thus, it is clear that the woman exercised theauthority to divorce unilaterally even during thepre-Islamic period.

16. In the post-Islamic period, Islam

emphasised on conciliation as the preferred mode of resolution of all disputes between the believers.

The believers, at the first instance, will have to resort to conciliation, before resorting to theauthority given to them to terminate any sort of legal relationship. In Surah Al Hujurat Chapter 49, verses 9 and 10 read thus:

9. And if two parties or groups among the believersfall to fighting, then make peace between them both,but if one of them rebels against the other, thenfight you (all) against the one that which rebels tillit complies with the Command of Allah; then if itcomplies, then make reconciliation between themjustly, and be equitable. Verily! Allah loves thosewho are equitable.

10. The believers are nothing else than brothers (inIslamic religion). So make reconciliation between yourbrothers, and fear Allah, that you may receive mercy.

17. In Chapter 4, verses 35 and 128, the Quran particularly refers to marital disputes and commands

the believers to follow proper conciliation to resolve disputes.

35. If you fear a breach between them twain (theman and his wife), appoint (two) arbitrators, one fromhis family and the other from her’s; if they both wishfor peace, Allah will cause their reconciliation.

Indeed Allah is Ever All-Knower, Well-Acquainted withall things.

128. And if a woman fears cruelty or desertion onher husband’s part, there is no sin on them both ifthey make terms of peace between themselves; andmaking peace is better. And human inner-selves areswayed by greed. But if you do good and keep away fromevil, verily, Allah is Ever Well-Acquainted with whatyou do.

The authority given to the women in Chapter 2, verse 229, must be read in the above background.

18. Now, we will come back to the procedure illustrated in the reported Hadith of Jamila demanding divorce from Thabit. The Prophet had different roles during his lifetime. He was the messenger of God, he was a mediator and conciliator.He was also an arbitrator/adjudicator. In 'From Prophetic Actions To Constitutional Theory:A Novel Chapter In Medieval Muslim Jurisprudence' [Int. J.Middle East Stud. 25 (1993), 71-90.] the author, Sherman A. Jackson has discussed the various roles ofthe Prophet.

According to al-Qarafi, the Prophet functioned in four distinct capacities: (1) messenger, (2) mufti, (3)

judge,and (4)imam or head of state. His actions thusconstituted either(1)verbatim communications from God,(2) fatwas, (3) judicial rulings (ahkam; sing. hukm),or (4) discretionary injunctions (tasarrufat;sing.tasarruf) enjoined by the head of state.

M.H. Kamali, in his book, 'The Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence' [pg. 54], discusses the different capacities in which the Prophet acted.

The legal Sunnah (Sunnah tashri'iyya) consists of theexemplary conduct of the Prophet, be it an act,saying,or a tacit approval, which incorporates the rules andprinciples of Shari'ah. This variety of Sunnah may bedivided into three types, namely the Sunnah which theProphet laid down in his capacities as Messenger ofGod, as the Head of State or imam, or in his capacityas a judge.

These roles cannot be overlooked while adverting tothe true meaning of the procedure followed by theProphet for terminating the marriage between Jamilaand Thabit, at the instance of Jamila. The directiongiven by the Prophet to Jamila to return the garden,is on an equitable consideration. In a unilateraldivorce invoked by her, she has to return what shehad received from her husband. This part constitutes the substantial law as far as khula is concerned.

Talaq is considered as a unilateral termination by the husband. The Quran therefore casts an obligation upon the husband to provide fair provisions for thewife’s future, subject to his means. (See the verses 236 & 241 of Chapter 2, Quran)

236. There is no sin on you, if you divorce womenwhile yet you have not touched (had sexual relationwith) them, nor appointed unto them their Mahr (bridalmoney given by the husband to his wife at the time ofmarriage). But bestow on them ( a suitable gift), therich according to his means, and the poor according tohis means, a gift of reasonable amount is a duty onthe doers of good.

241. And divorced women shall be provided for,equitably—a duty upon the righteous The verses 236 and 241 would establish that the husband is legally bound to ensure fair provisions for the protection of the wife who would be separated, on pronouncement of talaq by the husband.It is particularly required to advert to, here, thatthe right to invoke talaq or its validity is not dependent on the acceptance or acknowledgment of theprovisions for her future.

19. The Prophet was approached by Jamila as shehad no knowledge of the procedure of divorce, at her instance. The Prophet responded to her request,asking her to return what she had obtained fromThabit. She agreed and thereafter, Thabit was askedto pronounce talaq. In another instance of khula,referred to in the book 'the Rights and Duties ofSpouses', 7th edition,by Maulana Sayyid Abul A’laMaududi, relating to the second wife of Thabit,Habeeba; she was also granted divorce in a similarmanner. In another case, during the period of theCaliph Umar, a woman pleaded for khula. Umarcounseled her to patch up the differences. She wasadamant. Then Umar ordered that she be kept alone ina cell for three days, after which, she was producedbefore him. She did not budge from her demand. Onproduction, she said that those were the three nightsof peace she had in years. Umar summoned her husband and delivered the judgment and granted herseparation. The same author, Maududi, refers to another instance of separation of Rubay’ah, daughter of Muawwiz. She sought for separation from her husband, in return for all her property. The husband did not accept the deal. The case was brought before Caliph Osman who accepted the woman's plea andordered the separation. In all these cases, there was a third party intervention, of the Prophet or Caliph (ruler of Arabia). In these cases, on the intervention of the Caliph, the husband pronouncedtalaq, accepting the return of the property given tothe wife. This procedure is being cited as the procedure to be followed for extra judicial divorceby khula at the instance of the wife.

20. We have to differ on the point of

procedure cited by the counsel for the reviewpetitioners and the others. We cannot ignore the situations in these illustrated cases. The obligation of the wife to return the property sheobtained from the husband forms part of thesubstantial law. The mandate of conciliation and the involvement of third-party, as referred to in the various instances noted above by us, cannot be

overlooked. It was more of a conciliatory situationwhere the prophet or ruler, as the case may be,decided the termination of marriage at the instanceof the wife, as it also involved the return ofproperty to the husband. In those circumstances, theintervenor could demand that the husband pronouncetalaq and terminate the marriage. The pronouncementof talaq by the husband partakes the acknowledgmentof the materials he is entitled to receive in return,bringing an end to the marital tie. No doubt, thisprocedure is most desirable for believers to followfor termination of marriages at the instance of thewife. However, the point is whether this procedure isitself the law for effecting khula. To understandthis, one needs to distinguish between Hadith andSunnah. Hadith refers to the narration of the conductof the prophet in a situation. Whereas, Sunnah refersto the law deduced from it. See 'The Principles ofIslamic Jurisprudence' by M.H. Kamali [pg. No 49].

Hadith differs from Sunnah in the sense thatHadith is a narration of the conduct of the Prophet whereas Sunnah is the example or the law that isdeduced from it. Hadith in this sense is the vehicleor the carrier of Sunnah, although Sunnah is a widerconcept and used to be so especially before itsliteral meaning gave way to its juristic usage. Sunnahthus preferred not only to the Hadith of the Prophetbut also to the established practice of the community.But once the literal meanings of Hadith and Sunnahgave way to their technical usages and were bothexclusively used in reference to the conduct of theProphet, the two became synonymous. This was largely aresult of al-Shafi'i's efforts, who insisted that theSunnah must always be derived from a genuine Hadithand that there was no Sunnah outside the Hadith. Inthe pre-Shafi'i period, 'Hadith' was also applied tothe statements of the Companions and their Successors,the tabi'un. It thus appears that 'Hadith' began to beused exclusively for the acts and sayings of theProphet only after the distinction between the Sunnahand Hadith was set aside.

Further, the distinction between legal and non-legalSunnah is equally relevant. Shah Abdul Hannan in thebook ‘Usul Al Fiqh’ writes:

A very important classification is legal and non-legalSunnah. Legal Sunnah (Sunnah tashriyyah)consists ofthe Prophetic activities and instructions of theProphet (sm) as the Head of the State and as Judge.Non-legal Sunnah (Sunnah Ghayr tashriyyah) mainlyconsist of the natural activities of the Prophet (Al-

afal-al-jibilliyyah), such as the manner in which heate, slept, dressed and such other activities which donot form a part of Shariah. This is called adat(habit) of the Prophet in the Nurul Anwar,a text-bookof Usul. Certain activities may fall in between thetwo. Only competent scholars can distinguish the twoin such areas. Sunnah which partake of technicalknowledge such as medicine, agriculture is not part ofShariah according to most scholars. As for the actsand sayings of the Prophet that related to particularcircumstances such as the strategy of war, includingsuch devices that misled the enemy forces, timing ofattack, siege or withdrawal, these too are consideredto be situational and not a part of the Shariah..(Khallaf:.'ILM - Usul al Fiqh', Mahmud Shalutat: AlIslam, Aqidah wa Shariah)

21. The procedure delineated and relied upon only refers to the settlement of a demand and the husband obliging thereon, by accepting return of thematerials by pronouncing talaq, at the intervention of a third-party. That procedure adopted in a particular situation cannot itself be made a generallaw relating to khula while analyzing the right ofthe wife to obtain divorce. The general law has to beunderstood from the purport of the authority givenand not with reference to the situation or

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circumstances under which it was exercised. In Islamic law, it is desirable that all kinds ofdisputes are resolved amicably between believers,either themselves or with the assistance of the Ruler. If the matter is resolved by the Ruler or withthe intervention of a third party, that procedureitself cannot be cited as the procedure for thedetermination and validity of the right conferredunder the Quranic legislation. The right itself hasto be understood from the scheme of the law.We arenot invalidating the procedure of arriving at asettlement between spouses on demand of the wife, asabove. We reiterate that that procedure is mostdesirable for parties. We also clarify our judgmentto that extent. However, we cannot hold that thatprocedure followed situationally, be treated as a lawwhen parties are not able to arrive at such asettlement. If the procedure itself is understood asthe law, that would derogate from the rightconferred on a Muslim wife, under Quranic legislation, to terminate the marriage at her will.

The Quranic verses are in unqualified termsrecognizing that right. Deduction of law from aparticular conduct of the Prophet is not easy as theProphet acted in different and varied capacitieseither in isolation, or in combination of thosedifferent capacities. This has resulted in differentunderstandings of the Sunnah among Islamic scholars.This difference has extended to beliefs and practicesas well. The existence of different schools ofthought among the Muslim community would vouch for this. We, in our judgment under review, alsoadverted to the different ways of effecting khulaacross the globe.

22. Many Islamic scholars, while distinguishingthe features of legal and non-legal Sunnah, have adverted to the following aspects ['The Principles ofIslamic Jurisprudence' by M.H. Kamali, pg. no 57]:

To distinguish the legal from non-legal Sunnah, it isnecessary for the mujtahid to ascertain the originalpurpose and context in which a particular ruling ofthe Sunnah has been issued and whether it was designedto establish a general rule of law. The Hadith literature does not always provide clear informationas to the different capacities in which the Prophetmight have acted in particular situations, althoughthe mujtahid may find indications that assist him tosome extent. The absence of adequate information andcriteria on which to determine the circumstantial andnon-legal Sunnah from that which constitutes generallaw dates back to the time of the Companions. Thedifficulty has persisted ever since, and it is duemainly to the shortage of adequate information thatdisagreement has arisen among the ulema over theunderstanding and interpretation of the Sunnah”.[45.Ghazali, Mustasfa, II, 51; Badran, Bayan, pp. 41-42;Mutawalli, Mabadi', p. 38.]

THE FALLACY OF THE ARGUMENT THAT WOMEN HAVE NO RIGHTTO TERMINATE MARRIAGE ON HER OWN:

23. According to the learned Adv. Hussain C.S.,if the husband refuses to pronounce talaq on therequest of the wife, a qadi has the power to pronounce talaq, and in the absence of a qadi, themodern Courts can exercise the power of qadi. A qadican act as a conciliator, mediator and also asguardian. A qadi, in Islamic law, has the followingpowers and functions [See Engy Abdelkader, 'To Judgeor Not to Judge: A Comparative Analysis of Islamic

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Jurisprudential Approaches to Female Judges in theMuslim World (Indonesia, Egypt and Iran)', FordhamInternational Law Journal, Volume 37, Issue 2(2014)].

“Notably, the pre-modern Muslim judge functioned in amanner wholly distinct from his modern Westerncounterpart.

As an initial matter, mediation figured prominently inresolving disputes arising in pre-industrial Islamicsocieties. These disputes encompassed quasi-legalmatters as well as those arising between siblings orspouses.

In addition to resolving disputes, the judge’s typicalactivities included supervising charitable trusts;acting as a guardian over orphans; attending to publicworks; and leading Friday prayers and funeral prayers(an exclusively male province), among otherresponsibilities. Notably, the courts also functionedas judicial registries.

Notably, the Quran and Hadith literature do notprovide explicit provisions setting forth necessaryqualifications or credentials concerning service inthe judiciary—although Islamic scholars will laterdraw upon both of these textual sources to supportopinions on the subject.”

A qadi cannot be equated with a Court in the modernState. Apparently, the reference to the qadi in thiscontext is to exercise his authority as a guardian

rather than an adjudicator. It is acknowledged byIslamic law that the Muslim wife has the right todemand termination of marriage. The argument that ifthe husband refuses, she has to move the Court staresat us. For what purpose she has to move the Court,begs the question. The Court is neither called uponto adjudicate nor called upon to declare the status,but simply has to pronounce termination of marriageon behalf of the wife. The Court in our country isnot a guardian of an adult and able woman. If thereis nothing for a Court to adjudicate, the Courtcannot assume the role of a guardian and pronouncetermination of marriage at the instance of a woman.Conferring authority upon the court is an exercise infutility, inasmuch as the court cannot entertain therequest as there is no dispute to be resolved betweenthe parties. The relief of declaration of statusbased on divorce can be given only when divorce iseffected through an extra judicial method. If thecourt treats such a request for termination in thelike manner of faskh, there would be no obligation on the part of the wife to return the materials sheobtained from her husband. It is to be rememberedthat in judicial divorce in the nature of faskh, thecourts are deciding the cause on the premise offault. If the arguments of the review petitioner is accepted that the court will have to pronouncetermination of marriage, then the claim for khulawould turn on fault. The very nature of khula hasalways been recognised as a mode of divorce on ano-fault basis. This is exactly the reason, in the judgment under review, we interpreted that theresiduary ground as referred under Section 2(ix) ofthe Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 cannot be equated with khula. Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act only contemplates dissolution ofmarriage at the instance of Muslim women on faultgrounds. If the Qur'an, in unequivocal terms, permitsspouses to terminate their marriage on their ownwill, it cannot be said that the Sunnah further qualifies it, subjecting it to the will of thehusband, in the case of khula.

primary legislation.[See'The Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence' by M.H. Kamali, pg. no. 60]

As Sunnah is the second source of the Shari'ah next tothe Qur'an, the mujtahid is bound to observe an orderof priority between the Qur'an and Sunnah. Hence inhis search for a solution to a particular problem, thejurist must resort to the Sunnah only when he fails tofind any guidance in the Qur'an. Should there be aclear text in the Qur'an, it must be followed and begiven priority over any ruling of the Sunnah which mayhappen to be in conflict with the Qur'an. The priorityof the Qur'an over the Sunnah is partly a result ofthe fact that the Qur'an consists wholly of manifestrevelation (wahy zahir) whereas the Sunnah mainlyconsists of internal revelation (wahy batin) and islargely transmitted in the words of the narratorsthemselves. The other reason for this order ofpriority relates to the question of authenticity. Theauthenticity of the Qur'an is not open to doubt, itis, in other words, qati, or decisive, in respect ofauthenticity and must therefore take priority over theSunnah, or at least that part of Sunnah which isspeculative (zanni) in respect of authenticity. Thethird point in favor of establishing an order ofpriority between the Qur'an and the Sunnah is that thelatter is explanatory to the former. Explanation orcommentary should naturally occupy a secondary placein relationship to the source, 55. CE. Shatibi,Mawagfagar, IV, 3, Badran, Usad, p. 101.1 Furthermore, the order of priority between the Qur'an and Sunnah isclearly established in the Hadith of Mu'adh b. Jabalwhich has already been quoted. The purport of thisHadith was also adopted and communicated in writing by'Umar b. al-Kattab to two judges, Shurayh b. Harithand Abu Musa al-Ash'ari, who were ordered to resort tothe Qur'an first and to the Sunnah only when theycould find no guidance in the Qur'an. 156. Shatibi,IV, 4; Siba'i, Sunnah, p. 377; Badran, Usal, p. 82.Shatibi adds that two other prominent Companions, 'AbdAllah b. Mas'ud, and 'Abd Allah b. 'Abbas are onrecord as having confirmed the priority of the Qur'anover the Sunnah]

There should in principle be no conflict between theQur'an and the authentic Sunnah. If, however, atconflict is seen to exist between them, they must bereconciled as far as possible and both should beretained. If this is not possible, the Sunnah inquestion is likely to be of doubtful authenticity andmust therefore give way to the Qur'an. No genuineconflict is known to exist between the MutawatirHadith and the Qur'an. All instances of conflictbetween the Sunnah and the Qur'an, in fact, originatein the solitary, or Ahad, Hadith, which is in any caseof doubtful authenticity and subordinate to theoverriding authority of the Qur'an. 158. Cr. Badran,Usaf, p. 102.]

Sunnah is the second source of legislation. The firstand primary source is the Quran itself. The Sunnahcannot be interpreted in such a way as to either abrogate or reduce the scope of the command of theLawgiver in the primary legislation. To understandthe scope of discussion in this, it is necessary tounderstand the nature and varieties of law given inthe primary legislation.

25. The nature of law given in the Quran is

classified as defining law and declaratory law. Thereare varieties of sub-classes of law under theseheadings. M.H. Kamali in his book, 'The Principles ofIslamic Jurisprudence' [pg. no 279-280] , refers to defining law as follows:

Hukm shar'i is divided into the two main varieties ofal-hukm al-taklifi (defining law) and al-hukm al-wad'i(declaratory law). The former consists of a demand oran option, whereas the latter consists of an enactmentonly. `Defining Law' is a fitting description of al-hukm al-taklifi, as it mainly defines the extent ofman's liberty of action. Al-hukm al-wad'i is rendered'declaratory law', as this type of hukm mainly declaresthe legal relationship between the cause (sabab) andits effect (musabbab) or between the condition (shart)and its object (mashrut)[5. Cf. Abdur Rahim,Jurisprudence, p. 193, for the use of Englishterminology.].

Defining law may thus be described as a locution orcommunication from the Lawgiver which demands themukallaf to do something or forbids him from doingsomething, or gives him an option between the two. Thistype of hukm occurs in the well-known five categoriesof wajib (obligatory), mandub (recommended), haram(forbidden),makruh(abominable)andmubah(permissible). Declaratory law is also subdivided intothe five categories ofsabab(cause),shart(condition), mani' (hindrance), `azimah (strict law)as opposed to rukhsah (concessionary law), and sahih(valid) as opposed to batil (null and void).[6. Khallaf,`Ilm, p. 101; Qasim, Usul, p. 213.]

As stated above, defining law, is a locution orcommunication from the law-giver addressed to Mukallaf (accountable/responsible person) whichconsists of a demand or an option; it occurs in thefive varieties of wajib (obligatory), mandub(recommended), haram (forbidden), makruh (abominable)

and mubah (permissible). The learned author definesdeclaratory law as a communication from the Lawgiverwhich enacts something into a cause, a condition, ora hindrance to something else. The nature ofclassification as above, indicates that the right toexercise talaq or khula would form part of defining law and the sub-category of mubah (permissible).M.H. Kamali, in another book, 'Shariah Law Questionsand Answers' [pg.nos.66-67] has further discussed these categories:

Human actions are categorised according to a scale ofFive Values, namely those that are obligatory (wajib),recommended (mandub, also mustahab), permissible(mubah, also ja'iz), reprehensible (makruh) andforbidden (haram). The first and last of these, namelythe wajib and the haram, are legal categories in thatthat they are binding and may also be justiciable.These two categories mainly originate in the decisiverulings of Qur'an and hadith and are fairly limited inscope, whereas the remaining three categories occupy amuch wider space, as they are also largely developedthrough juristic interpretation and ijtihad. Theijtihadi conclusions and rules concerning theevaluative labeling of human conduct into thesecategories are, on the whole, instructive and oftenrationally undisputable yet not binding - unless theyare also upheld and endorsed by general consensus(ijma'), in which case they become a part of theactionable ruling (hukm) of the Shariah and acquire abinding force. These five values, known as al-ahkamal-khamsah, constitute the main bulk of the practicalor positive law, the ahkam amaliiyyah, and the mainsubject matter of fiqh. The Scale of Five Valuesconsists mainly of identifiers of the value attachedto practical conduct of competent persons. The wajiband haram pertaining especially to human relations and muamalat are also enforceable in the courts ofShariah, but those which pertain to the purelyreligious and devotional aspects of Islam, such asperforming the prayer or haj, normally do not giverise to legal action. The other three categories arenot enforceable and basically fall outside the ambitof law enforcement. They are matters mainly ofpersonal choice and may consist of advice,encouragement or discouragement, etc., that should befollowed, in the case of recommendable/mandub, andshouldbeavoided,inthecaseofreprehensible/makruh, whereas the permissible/mubah istotally neutral and may or may not be acted upon. Theadvice contained in these three categories may havecultural import and consequences and may also affectaspects of personal piety, customary and socialrelations, but it is not actionable in the way thewajib and the haram are.

In ‘Imam Al-Shatibi's Theory of the Higher Objectivesand Intents of Islamic Law’, the author, Ahamd Al-Raysun [pg nos. 148-149] has extensively discussed the sub-category of mubah (permissible):

The first thing which al-Shatibi concludes in hisdiscussions of the category of mubah is that "thatwhich is permissible, insofar as it is permissible, issomething which one is neither required to do norrequired to refrain from."181 He then proceeds toexpress the same thought in the language ofobjectives, saying, "...As far as the Lawgiver's intention is concerned, it makes no difference whetherone performs such an action or refrains from it." 182

What we are speaking of here is the essential meaningof the category of mubah, or permissible.' Scholarshave described actions which fall into this categoryas neutral in the sense that there is an equalpreference, if you will, for performing them orrefraining from them, and that one is free to choosebetween these two options. This, then, is the meaningof the term 'permissible' when considered is isolationfrom all attendant circumstances and influences.Viewed from this perspective, the Lawgiver intendsneither that we perform such an action nor that werefrain from it, and as such, neither choice isrequired of us, for if we are required either toperform it or to refrain from it, then it will fallinto one of the other four categories of actions andcan no longer be classified as 'permissible.'

‘permissible’ action, to the Muslim wife who seeks toexercise the option of terminating her marriage. Thisreflects the autonomy of choice exercised by thewife. The will of the wife so expressed cannot berelated to the will of the husband who has notexpressed his choice to terminate the marriage. Thevery idea of categorization under the law, of an

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action as permissible, is to retain that actionwithin the domain of the person who exercises theoption, by relating it with his or her autonomy.Extending such actions to the will of another wouldcertainly keep the action out of the category of ‘permissible’. The law being categorized so, itcannot be whittled down or constricted by the will ofher husband upon whom no authority is conferred toenforce such permission. It is relevant to note that,there is no qualifying obligation on the husband inthe form of the five categories of defining law,either in the Quran or the Sunnah, to accept orrepudiate the will expressed by the wife to make thepermissible activity contingent or dependant upon anyqualifying factors.

JURISTIC SOLUTION TO THE DILEMMA OF THIS NATURE IN

ISLAM

27. The review petitioner would admit thatneither the Quran nor Sunnah has provided anyguidance in the event the husband refuses to pronounce talaq. As already noted, the invocation ofkhula in the cases referred by the differentauthorities all refers to the intervention of a thirdparty, like the ruler. Islam itself has provided theguidance to overcome situations like this where alegal vacuum is created.

28. Muslim women in India are confronted withthe situation where no solution would be available tothem to effectuate this right, conferred on her asper Quranic legislation, if the arguments of reviewpetitioner are accepted. We note that these argumentshave been raised on the footing that the traditionsand practices that have been followed have becomepart of faith. In the light of the above argument, weare also looking at a different dimension of thequestion from the perspective of those who conform tothe faith.

29. Istihsan is an Arabic term for juristicdiscretion. In ‘Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence’,M.S Khamali [pg. nos. 218-220] refers to Istihsan afollows:

“The jurist who resorts to istihsan may find the lawto be either too general, or too specific andinflexible. In both cases, istihsan may offer a meansof avoiding hardship and generating a solution whichis harmonious with the higher objectives of theShari'ah.”It has been suggested that the ruling ofthe second caliph, `Umar b. al-Khattab, not to enforcethe hadd penalty of the amputation of the hand fortheft during a widespread famine, and the ban which heimposed on the sale of slave-mothers (ummahat al-awlad), and marriage with kitabiyahs in certain caseswere all instances of istihsan.[5. Umm al-walad is a femaleslave who has borne a child to her master, and who is consequently freeat his death. A kitabiyah is a woman who is a follower of a revealedreligion, namely Christianity and Judaism.] For `Umar set asidethe established law in these cases on grounds ofpublic interest, equity and justice.[6. Cf. Ahmad Hasan,Early Development, p.145.]

“The Hanbali definition of istihsan also seeks torelate istihsan closely to the Qur'an and the Sunnah.Thus according to Ibn Taymiyyah, istihsan is theabandonment of one legal norm (hukm) for another whichis considered better on the basis of the Qur'an,Sunnah, or consensus.”

“But the Maliks view istihsan as a broad doctrine,somewhat similar toistislah, which is lessstringently confined to the Qur'an and Sunnah than theHanafis and Hanbalis have. Thus according to Ibnal-'Arabi, 'istihsan is to abandon exceptionally whatis required by the law because applying the existing

-:43:-

law would lead to a departure from some of its ownobjectives.'”

30. In ‘Istihsan The Doctrine of Juristic Preference in Islamic Law’ by Saim Kayadibi, theauthor says that during the early Islamic period, theterm Istihsan was neither known nor directly definedand therefore, when it was applied in judgment it wasapplied without giving any specific definition orapplication. Support of Istihsan considered the fundamental principle of ease and avoidance ofhardship as the sole basis of Istihsan. The rightsand obligations conferred upon believers, in Islam,cannot be denied for want of a system as envisaged inShariah.

31. In ‘Shari’ah Law An Introduction’, by M.H.Kamali [pg. nos. 274- 275], the author discusses the various instances when the principle of Istihsan was put into practice by the Caliphs to remedy the injustice caused by the strict application ofShariah.

Some instances of obvious imbalance in thedistribution of inheritance can also be addressed, I

believe, by recourse to the principle of istiḥsān(juristic preference), especially in cases wherestrict enforcement of the existing law leads to unfairresults in the distribution of family wealth. In suchsituations, istiḥsān authorizes the judge and thejurist to find an alternative and a preferablesolution to the case before them which would realizeconsiderations of equity and fairness. Notwithstandingthe existence of valid precedent on this as reviewedbelow, Muslim jurists and judges have not made aneffective use of the resources of istiḥsan. Withoutwishing to enter into details, I may refer herebriefly to the renowned case of al-mushtarakah (theapportioned) which was decided by the caliph 'Umar b.al-Khaṭṭāb. In this case, a woman was survived by herhusband, mother, two germane and two uterine brothers.The Qur'anic rules of inheritance were strictlyapplied but the result was such that the two maternalbrothers received one-third of the estate and the twofull brothers were totally excluded. This is becausethe former are Qur'anic sharers (dhawu'l-furüd)whereas the latter belong to the category ofresiduaries ('asabah). The former must take theirshares first and what is left is then distributedamong the residuaries. The full brothers complained tothe caliph and forcefully pleaded with him about thejustice of their case. According to reports, the fullbrothers addressed the caliph in the following terms:suppose our father was a donkey (which is why the caseis also known as alhimariyyah), we still shared thesame mother with our maternal brothers. The caliph washesitant to act in the face of the clear Qur'anic mandate, yet he decided on equitable grounds, after amonth of consultation with the leading Companions,that all the brothers should share equally in the one-third.

Unfair results of a similar type can occasionallyarise, sometimes due to technical reasons, which couldbe addressed by recourse to istihsan, and the judgesshould not hesitate to do so when istihsan can beinvoked to serve the ideals of equitable distribution.To give an example, suppose that a deceased person issurvived by a son and a daughter. During the lifetimeof his father the son had bad relations with him anddid not bother to seek his forgiveness even during themonths of his last illness, while the daughter tookthe responsibility and spent much of her hard-earnedincome on her father's medical bills before he died.When this happened, however, the son was quick toclaim double the share of his sister in inheritance.This would be the kind of case, in my view, whereistiḥsan can be invoked to remedy the unfair outcomethat is anticipated from a strict conformity to thenormal rules of inheritance. This is the basicrationale of the doctrine of istiḥsān, to remedyunfair results which may arise from a strictapplication of the existing rules of Shari'ah. Yet tothe best of my knowledge, Muslim countries have notintroduced enabling legislation that would authorizethe judges to apply istiḥsän to remedy suchsituations. Istiḥsan admittedly does not seek tointroduce new law. It is rather designed so as toaddress case by case situations where strict

implementation of the existing law may lead to unfairresults. Istiḥsān in this way offers some potential tovindicate the cause of equity and fairness when thismight present a compelling case for reconsiderationand review. For this to become reality, we needlawmakers, judges and jurists of great professionalfortitude to make laws and adjudicate cases that breakaway with the prevailing mindset of taqlid.

32. In this light, it is also important to give due consideration to the maqasid (goals and purposes)

of Shariah. M.H. Kamali, in his book, “Shariah LawQuestions and Answers” [pg. nos. 204-205] refers tomaqasid and its importance in understanding theShariah:

A) The maqasid (plural of maqsad - goals and purposes)of Shariah, or the higher purposes of Islamic law(henceforth maqasid) refer to the meaning, purpose andwisdom that the Lawgiver has contemplated in theenactment of Shariah laws. Maqasid thus refer to thehigher purposes of the law, which are meant to besecured through the implementation of that law, andthey give the law a sense of direction and purpose. Italso means that the rules of Shariah, especially inthe spheres of human relations and muamalat, are notmeant for their own sake but to secure and realisecertain objectives. When the dry letter of the law isapplied in such a way that it does not secure itsintended purpose and fails, for instance, to secure the justice and benefit it is meant to secure, or whenit leads, on the contrary, to harm and prejudice, thelaw is most likely reduced to a purposeless exercise,which must be avoided. The laws of Shariah aregenerally meant to secure justice and the interestsand prosperity of the people both in this world andthe hereafter. But the detailed rules, commands andprohibitions of Shariah also have their specificpurposes, which are often identified in the text ofthe law, or by recourse to interpretation and ijtihad.

33. The maqasid of Shariah can be arrived at by the process of ta’lil (ratiocination). The significance of the process of ta’lil in matters not pertaining to worship has been elaborated by the author, M.H.Kamali in the book, “Shariah Law AnIntroduction”[pg. no. 55]:

3. Ta'lil is not valid with regard to 'ibādāt, butoutsidethisareatheShari'ahencouragesinvestigationandenquiryintoitsrules.Ratiocination in the Qur'an means that the laws ofShari'ah are not imposed for their own sake, nor forwant of mere conformity, but they aim at realizationof certain benefits/objectives. This also tells usthat when there is a change of a kind whereby aparticular law no longer secures its underlyingpurpose and rationale, it must be substituted with asuitable alternative. To do otherwise would meanneglecting the objective of the Lawgiver. According to al-Shāṭibi, the rules of Shari'ah concerning civiltransactions and customary matters (mu'amalat wa'ādāt) follow the benefits (maṣāliḥ) which theycontemplate. We note, for instance, that the Shari'ahmay forbid something because it is devoid of benefit,but it permits the same when it secures a benefit. Adeferred sale, for example, of dirham for dinar:forbidden because of the fear of usury (riba) therein,but a period loan is permitted because it secures abenefit (deferment is harmful in one and beneficial inthe other). Similarly fresh dates may not, inprinciple, be sold for dry dates for fear ofuncertainty (gharar) and usury (ribā) but the Prophetpermitted this transaction, known as 'arāyā, becauseof the people's need for it.

Moreover, instances of abrogation in the rulings ofQur'an and Sunnah which took place during the lifetimeof the Prophet can properly be understood in theseterms. Instances are also found in the precedent ofCompanions where some of the laws of Shari'ah weresuspended because they no longer secured the benefitwhich they had initially contemplated. Since the'illah and rationale on which they were premised wereno longer present they were suspended or replaced withsuitable alternatives. We note, for example, that thecaliph 'Umar b. al-Khaṭṭäb suspended the haddpunishment of theft during the year of the famine. Thecaliph also stopped distribution of agricultural landto Muslim warriors in Iraq despite a Qur'anic rulingthat entitled them to war booty; he also suspended theshare of the pagan friends of Islam (the 'allafat al- qulub) in the revenues of zakah. These were persons ofinfluence whose co-operation was important for thevictory of Islam. The Qur'an had assigned a share forthem (9:60), which the caliph later discontinued onthe ground, as he stated, that 'Allah has exaltedIslam and it is no longer in need of their support'.The caliph thus departed, on purely rational grounds,from the letter of the Qur'an in favour of its generalpurpose and 'his ruling is considered to be in harmonywith the spirit of the Qur'an'.

34. In the absence of any other method in the manner suggested by the counsel for the reviewpetitioner and others,to effectuate the rightconferred on Muslim women being prevalent in thiscountry, the Court’s authority in conferring uponMuslim women the right to invoke khula at her ownwill, will have to be respected. The Quran lays emphasis on the power of the authority and directsthe faithful to follow the authority in Chapter 4:59of the Quran by commanding believers as follows:

59. O you who believe! Obey Allah and obey theMessenger (Muhammad), and those of you (Muslims) whoare in authority. (And) if you differ in anythingamongst yourselves, refer it to Allah and HisMessenger, if you believe in Allah and in the Last

Day. That is better and more suitable for finaldetermination.

Al Haj A.D. Ajijola in the book ‘What is Shariah?’

[pg. no. 161] has discussed the power vested in theauthority to enact laws:

Strictly in theory in Islam, the authority to enactlaws primarily belongs to God, and He alone has thesupreme legislative power in the Islamic system. TheCaliph, or the Executive Head of the MuslimCommonwealth has no sovereign power nor any royalprerogative, he is theoretically simply the principalmagistrate to carry out the injunction of the Qur'anand the ordinances of the Prophet. He has nolegislative functions as God alone is the Legislatorin Islam. Thus according to Muslim concept of law andthe popular belief, there is technically nolegislative power in the state. But in reality theserefer only to the basic law expressed or implied inthe Qur'an or accepted Hadith. In any case, thisactually means that any law made by Muslim communitymust not be repugnant or be in conflict with theprovision of the Qur'an and the accepted Prophet'stradition. Otherwise, a Muslim state like a non-Muslimstates has unlimited power to make law for theprotection and the good of the community.

adopt and apply, if there are no other methods to streamline the rights conferred on believers to actupon. So, assuming that the argument of the reviewpetitioner holds good, in the absence of anymechanism in the country to recognize the terminationof marriage at the instance of the wife when thehusband refuses to give consent, the court can simplyhold that khula can be invoked without theconjunction of the husband.

36. We, therefore, find no reason to review thejudgment. We record our deepest appreciation toAdvocate Hussain C.S who is not a practitioner beforethis court, having argued the case with meticulouspreparation, despite the fact that we cannot accepthis views and opinions.

Sd/-

A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE, JUDGE

Sd/-

C.S. DIAS, JUDGE

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