WP/4973/2002 of A.P.JOHN Vs THE VICE CHANCELOOR on 9 December 2003

:ORDER

The petitioner seeks to challenge the appointment of sixth respondentas a Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy in the second respondentUniversity in the proceedings of the second respondent University, dated8.11.2000 vide No.D.1(A & B)/TE/2000/3091. The petitioner also seeks for adirection to appoint him in the said post, in the place of the sixthrespondent.

2. The brief facts, which led to the filing of the writpetition can be traced as under:- The second respondent University published an advertisement in Englishdaily "The Hindu", dated 7.7.2000, calling for applications from the eligiblecandidates for the post of Lecturers in the various Departments of theUniversity. One of the posts related to two vacancies in the post ofLecturers in the Department of Philosophy. Out of the two posts, one wasmeant for Scheduled Caste candidates and another one was for General Category.It is for that post, namely, the one meant for General Category, the contestcame to be made by the petitioner along with the sixth respondent. It isclaimed that 43 candidates applied for the two posts and on scrutiny, 41 werefound to be eligible, including the petitioner, for interview.

3. In the interview, the sixth respondent came to be recommended for the post of Lecturer in the General Category, who came to beultimately appointed in the said post. The challenge of the said appointmentof the sixth respondent is made by the petitioner on the ground that the sixthrespondent did not satisfy the qualification meant for the said post, viz.,Lecturer in the Department of philosophy. According to the petitioner, as perthe notification dated 7.7.2000, the general essential qualification is a goodacademic record with 55% of marks at the Master's level apart from qualifyinghimself in the National Eligibility Test (NET) or an accredited test and atthe discretion of the University, Ph.D holders from NET or to require NET intheir case, either as a desirable or essential qualification, to be exempted.The petitioner contended that the sixth respondent herein did his Master'sdegree from an unrecognised institution, viz., Jnana Deepa Vidyapeeth, Pune and therefore, he did not have the required qualification to join M.PhilCourse, though he was allowed to join M.Phil Course by the second respondentUniversity earlier in 1990 who was also allowed to do his Ph.D thereafter.

4. The petitioner would therefore contend that the sixth

respondent, not having possessed Master's degree from a recognised institutionof the second respondent University, irrespective of his M.Phil and Ph.D withNET, cannot be treated to be a qualified candidate to apply for the post ofLecturer in the Department of Philosophy. It is therefore contended that whenthe second respondent lacked in having the basic qualification, hisappointment by the impugned proceedings dated 8.11.2000, is not valid andtherefore the same is liable to be set aside. Reliance was placed upon theJudgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in Director, A.I.I.M.S v. NikhilTandon, reported in AIR 1996 SUPREME COURT 3161, in support of the abovesubmissions made on behalf of the petitioner.

5. As against the submissions of the petitioner, the learned Advocate General, appearing on behalf of the second respondent University, in the firstplace contended that the petitioner has no locus standi to question theappointment of the sixth respondent. According to the learned AdvocateGeneral, the petitioner earlier filed a Public Interest Litigation inW.P.No.21923 of 2000, which came to be dismissed by the Division Bench of thisCourt and in the circumstances, he cannot be allowed to question theappointment of the sixth respondent in this petition. It was then contendedthat the petitioner himself is not qualified, inasmuch as he does not possessNET or an equivalent accredited test and therefore, on this ground as well, heis not entitled to question the appointment of the sixth respondent.

6. Without prejudice to the above contentions, the learned Advocate General contended that in the case of the sixth respondent, by virtue of thepowers of the Syndicate as available under Section 19 of the Madras UniversityAct, while permitting the sixth respondent to pursue his M.Phil course in thesecond respondent University, the P.G. degree obtained by him from JnanaDeepa Vidyapeeth, Pune was recognised as equivalent to the P.G. degree of theMadras University and in the circumstances, such an exemption once granted infavour of the sixth respondent, would entitle him to seek for the appointmentto the post of Lecturer, as notified in the Notification, dated 7.7.2000.According to the learned Advocate General, once an exemption is granted, suchexemption would hold good for all time to come and it cannot be held that suchan exemption should be restricted only for the admission of the sixthrespondent to the M.Phil Course in the year 1989.

7. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the sixth respondent, it was pointed out that the sixth respondent passed his M.Ph. in Philosophyin I class in 1987 from Jnana Deepa Vidyapeeth, affiliated to PontificialAtheenam, Pune, that he passed M.Phil in 1990 and also Ph.D in Philosophy in1995 from the University of Madras. It was further pointed out that theeligibility of the sixth respondent to pursue his M.Phil Course wasscrutinised by the Board of Studies, which submitted its remarks through itsChairman on 8.11.1989, which was placed before the Statutory Sub Committee ofSyndicate in its meeting held on 11.6.1990, which recommended the admission of the sixth respondent to pursue his M.Phil Course as a special case, which wasapproved by the Syndicate in its meeting held on 21.6.1990.

8. The learned Advocate General relied upon an earlier Order of thisCourt, dated 10.11.2003 in W.P.No.4370 of 2000 (T.Jeyasingh and others v. TheTamil Nadu Water Supply and Drainage Board, rep. by its Managing Director andothers), wherein this Court followed the Division Bench Judgment of thisCourt, reported in 1982 MLJ 294 (The Government of Tamil Nadu, rep. bySecretary to Govt., Commercial Taxes and Religious Endowment Department,Madras-9 and another v. M.N. Raghunathan), which Judgment was also followedby another Division Bench in W.A.No.327 of 1990 by its Judgment dated25.4.1990, which was also confirmed by the Honourable Supreme Court inS.L.P.Civil No.9479 dated 21.9.1990.

9. Mr.Antony Kennedy, learned counsel for the sixth respondent alsomade his submissions in tune with the submissions made by the learned AdvocateGeneral. The learned counsel placed reliance upon the Judgment reported in'Km.Neelima Misra v. Dr.Harinder Kaur Paintlal and others' (AIR 1990 SUPREMECOURT 1402); 'Osmania University rep. by its Registrar v. Abdul Razyees Khanand another' — All India Services Law Journal III — 1997(1) and 'TheChancellor and another v. Dr. Bijayananda Kar and others' (AIR 1994 S.C.579), wherein it has been held that in academic matters, the Courts should beslow in interfering with the appointments made.

10. Having heard the counsel for the parties, I am of the view thatthe submissions made on behalf of second and sixth respondent meritsacceptance.

11. Though on behalf of the second respondent, the petitioner's locusstandi was questioned on the ground that the Public Interest Litigationpetition, earlier preferred by the petitioner, came to be rejected by theDivision Bench in respect of the appointment of the sixth respondent itself, Ifind that in the said proceedings, the petitioner, representing himself asPresident of one National Integration Council, challenged the selection of thesixth respondent. Nevertheless, the said Writ Petition in W.P.No.2193 of 2000came to be disposed of by the First Bench on 22.11.2000 with a direction tothe second respondent University to dispose of the representation madechallenging the appointment of the sixth respondent.

12. Pursuant to the direction of the Division Bench, the representation of the said petitioner is stated to have been rejected on10.1.2002. Therefore, in fact, the earlier writ petition, preferred by oneNational Integration Council, in which the petitioner is said to be itsPresident, was not disposed of on merits dealing with the various contentionsraised by the said petitioner. In such circumstances, I am of the view that the disposal of the said writ petition by the Division Bench on 22.11.20 00need not stand in the way of considering the contentions of the petitioner inthis writ petition.

13. As far as the other submission, namely, that the petitioner

himself was not qualified to aspire for the post of Lecturer, inasmuch as hedoes not hold NET or accredited test, here again, I do not wish to deprive thepetitioner of his rights to question the validity of the appointment of thesixth respondent, as it is common ground that the petitioner's claim for thepost was also considered by the second respondent and was found to be notsatisfying enough to be appointed over the claims of the sixth respondent. Inother words, the candidature of the petitioner was not rejected on the groundthat he was not qualified, but on his own merits. Therefore, once thequalification prescribed in the Notification itself states that at thediscretion of the University, persons having Ph.D can be exempted from holdingNET or its equivalent, the consideration of the claims of the petitioner forthe post of Lecturer by the second respondent, can be taken to mean that thepetitioner was found to be qualified to be considered for being appointed andin such circumstances, the petitioner's challenge to the appointment of thesixth respondent can be examined in this writ petition. Therefore, de horsthe above stand taken on behalf of the second respondent, I wish to deal withthe contentions of the petitioner raised in this writ petition as against theappointment of the second respondent.

14. After clearing the abovesaid hurdles, when the claim of thepetitioner in the writ petition is considered, the sole challenge to theappointment of the sixth respondent is on the ground that he did not have thebasic qualification, namely, P.G. degree in order to be considered for thepost of appointment of Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy. In thiscontext, if the powers of the second respondent University and its Syndicate,as provided under Section 19 of the Madras University Act is considered,Section 19(p) is to the following effect:- "to make Ordinances regarding the admission of students to University orprescribing examinations to be recognised as equivalent to Universityexaminations." (emphasis added)

15. By virtue of the abovesaid power vested with the Syndicate, theSyndicate is stated to have permitted the sixth respondent to do M.Phil degreecourse, though the P.G. degree obtained by him from Jnana Deepa Vidya Peeth,Pune was not one recognised by the University Grant Commission or by thesecond respondent University. Therefore, the question is whether such apermission granted would enure to the benefit of the sixth respondent even toapply for the post of Lecturer, as notified in the Notification dated7.7.2000.

16. The proceedings relating to permission so granted by the secondrespondent University, through its Syndicate, were placed before this Court bythe second respondent University. A perusal of the abovesaid proceedingsdisclose that after the sixth respondent made an application, dated 5.4.1989for getting himself admitted to do M. Phil (Philosophy) in the academic yearcommencing from June, 1989, as per the rules, he also applied for theEligibility Certificate from the second respondent University, inasmuch as hisbasic qualification was M.Ph.(Philosophy) from Jnana Deepa Vidya Peeth, Pune,which was not a recognised one of the University Grants Commission.

17. The sixth respondent was called upon to submit the various

Statutes and Ordinances of Jnana Deepa Vidya Peeth, Pune and also the Handbookand Calendar of the said Institution, which conferred the degree of M.Ph. tothe sixth respondent. Thereafter, the case of the sixth respondent was placedbefore the Courses Committee of the Syndicate by the second respondentUniversity, which held its meeting on 17.7.1989, where the case of the sixthrespondent was considered. It was thereafter deferred to be considered, whichwas again taken up for consideration in its subsequent meeting. Ultimately,the Syndicate referred the matter to the Board of Studies and the Board ofStudies considered the case of the sixth respondent with reference to thevarious materials placed before it and ultimately, in its meeting, held on8.11.1989, resolved that the sixth respondent should be held to be eligiblefor admission in M.Phil. Course, inasmuch as the perusal of the recordsshowed that the sixth respondent had taken papers of subjects both in Indianand Western Philosophy, which were common with the M.A. Degree of Branch V-Aand V-B conducted by the Madras University. Accordingly, the Board of Studiesalso recommended for granting permission to the sixth respondent to pursue hisM.Phil. Course.

18. Still thereafter, the Courses and Curriculum Development Committeeof the Syndicate, in its meeting held on 9.2.1990, considered the eligibilityof the sixth respondent, who had passed M.Ph. ( Philosophy) degreeexamination from Pontificial Atheenam, Pune, for admission to M.Phil(Philosophy) course in the second respondent University and approved theeligibility certificate to be issued to the sixth respondent for admission toM.Phil (Philosophy) course in the second respondent University. Subsequently,a communication was received from the University Grants Commission, dated8.2.1990, received by the University of Madras on 14.2.1990 stating thatPontificial Atheenam, Pune was not established either by an Act of StateLegislature or Central Legislature and therefore it was not competent to awarddegrees/ diplomas and therefore it was not recognised by University GrantsCommission and the question of recognition of degrees/diplomas awarded byPontificial Atheenam, Pune did not arise.

19. In such circumstances, the resolution of Courses and CurriculumDevelopment Committee of the Syndicate, held on 9.2.1990, was placed beforethe Syndicate on 17.2.1990, in the light of the subsequent communicationreceived from the University Grants Commission, dated 8.2.1990. However, theSyndicate of the second respondent University, in its meeting held on17.2.1990, resolved to approve the Minutes of the meeting of the Courses andCurriculum Development Committee of the Syndicate held on 9.2.1990. Thus, theSyndicate of the second respondent University, on a detailed analysis of thecase of the sixth respondent, with particular reference to the coursesunderwent by him in Jnana Deepa Vidya Peeth, and after much deliberations,resolved to accept the M.Ph. (Philosophy) secured by him from Jnana DeepaVidya Peeth, Pune in order to permit him to pursue his M.Phil. Course in thesecond respondent University and thereafter, the sixth respondent alsocompleted the Ph.D in the second respondent University in the year 1995.

20. In such circumstances, the ultimate resolution of the Syndicate,

20. In such circumstances, the ultimate resolution of the Syndicate, in its meeting held on 21.6.1990, approving the qualification of the sixthrespondent as the basic Post Graduate qualification to be eligible for pursuing his M.Phil. Course in the second respondent University became finaland conclusive. As far as the said action of the Syndicate of the secondrespondent is concerned, the same was well within the powers of the Syndicate,as provided under Section 19 (p) of the Madras University Act, 1923. Whensuch a statutory power, vested with the Syndicate of the second respondent,having been exercised in accordance with the provisions of the MadrasUniversity Act and such exercise having become final and conclusive andthereby, the basic qualification of the sixth respondent, namely, his PostGraduate qualification, thus having been recognised by the second respondentUniversity, equating the same to the Post Graduate qualification in Philosophyof the second respondent University itself, it is too late in the day for thepetitioner to contend that the sixth respondent was lacking in holding thesaid basic qualification for the post of the Lecturer in the Department ofPhilosophy. It will have to be held that the recognition accorded by thesecond respondent University to the sixth respondent permitting him to pursuehis M.Phil. Course, would hold good for all time to come and the same cannotbe restricted to the pursuance of his M.Phil. Course alone.

21. In fact, the said question has been thoroughly examined by the Division Bench of this Court in two Division Bench Judgments, namely, the onereported in 1982 MLJ 294 (cited supra) as well as the one rendered in theunreported decision in W.A.No.327 of 1990 dated 25.4.1990, which was alsoconfirmed by the Honourable Supreme Court in S.L.P.Civil No.9479 dated21.9.1990. In the Division Bench Judgment, reported in 1982 MLJ 294 (citedsupra), the Division Bench has stated in para 7 to the following effect."....This shows that the authorities thought it fit that the respondent evenwithout passing Parts I and III of the Revenue Test is proficient in handlingsuch subjects and that is why the exemption was granted while the respondentwas appointed as Assistant. It is clear from the Annexure IV that for thepost of Assistant also a person must pass Parts I, II and III of the RevenueTests. Once he acquires the knowledge in the said subject, and that has beenrecognised by the Government by granting the exemption, it is too much on thepart of the Government to state that the respondent must again pass the saidtest to qualify himself to the post of Superintendent......"

22. The principles set out in the abovesaid decision of the DivisionBench when applied in the light of the power vested with the Syndicate underSection 19(p) of the Madras University Act, it can be safely held that theprinciples set out therein would equally apply to the case of the sixthrespondent also. The very purpose of evaluating the sixth respondent's Ph.Ddegree obtained from Jnana Deepa Vidya Peeth, Pune, while permitting him topursue his M.Phil Course and thereby equating it with the P.G.Degree of theMadras University, should be taken to mean that such a recognition so made bythe Syndicate of the second respondent University should enure to the benefitof the sixth respondent also for the future pursuance of his academic career.It would be wholly unjustified and irrational to state that such a recognitionand exemption, after a detailed evaluation, cannot be extended for the futureappointment of the sixth respondent.

23. The acquisition of qualification of a person is not for meremental satisfaction alone. Such an acquisition of qualification, once

recognised by a Statutory Body, especially, in the educational field, shouldbe permitted to be utilised by the person who acquired such qualification, tobe made available and made use of by others, who could also share hisknowledge and experience gained by the acquisition of such specialqualifications. To hold otherwise would be wholly illogical and defeat thevery purpose of enabling the Syndicate to grant such a recognition or makesuch decisions an illusory one, which cannot be allowed to take place. Asstated by me earlier, the Syndicate, before granting its permission inexercise of its power under Section 19(p), did not exercise the said power ina casual manner. On the other hand, a detailed examination of the coursematerials of the sixth respondent, undertaken by him while doing his P.G.Course in the Jnana Deepa Vidya Peeth, Pune, was studied by the Syndicate, bycalling upon the Board of Studies, as well as, the Courses and CurriculumCommittee of the Syndicate and after a report submitted by the abovesaidBodies, the Syndicate, in its decision, held on 21.6.1990, decided to approvethe sixth respondent's admission to M.Phil Course, though the Post Graduatedegree possessed by him as on that date, was from an unrecognised Institution.

24. In such circumstances, I am unable to accept the stand of thepetitioner that the recognition of the sixth respondent's M.Ph qualificationfrom Jnana Deepa Vidya Peeth, Pune can be treated as equivalent of secondrespondent University's P.G. course only for the limited purpose of pursuinghis M.Phil course and the same cannot be accepted for his appointment for thepost of Lecturer.

25. As far as the reliance placed upon the Judgment of the HonourableSupreme Court, reported in AIR 1996 SUPREME COURT 3161 ( cited supra), thesame is clearly distinguishable. That was a case, where one Mr.Tandon, whoapplied for the post of Assistant Professor ( Medical) was found qualified byAll India Institute of Medical Sciences, in short A.I.I.M.S, though as amatter of fact, he did not have the superspeciality qualification, namely,D.M. The contention of Mr.Tandon was that he did the Ph.D in CambridgeUniversity , which course consisted of three years and in the first two yearsof the said course, he did whatever subjects which were meant for thesuperspeciality course of D.M and therefore, the recognition of the same byA.I.I. M.S, while accepting his candidature, cannot be found fault with.When his appointment was challenged in the High Court of Delhi, the same cameto be accepted both by the learned single Judge as well as by the DivisionBench. When the matter went before the Honourable Supreme Court, theHonourable Supreme Court, while considering the Recruitment Rules of A.I.I.M.S., which is to the following effect:- "A post-graduate qualification e.g. MD/MS or a recognised qualificationequivalent thereto......"held as under in para 12.

"12. We are of the opinion that the two years training at CambridgeUniversity undergone by Tandon while working for his Ph.D cannot be treated asa qualification recognised as equivalent to D.M. Schedule-I to the A.I.I.M.S.Recruitment Rules speaks of D.M.qualification or a qualification recognised asequivalent thereto. It is not mere equivalence that is enough. It must alsobe recognised as equivalent. Recognised evidently means recognised by theInstitute or at least by the Medical Council of India. Admittedly, neither

has recognised the said research work/training for two years in the CambridgeUniversity as equivalent to D.M. It is agreed before us that the degreesawarded by the Cambridge University are not recognised in India since 1978.This means that even if Tandon had obtained his Ph.D. qualification fromCambridge University on or before October 7, 1992, it could not have beenrecognised as a qualification equivalent to D.M. If so, it isununderstandable how the two years research/training put in by Tandon whileworking for the said qualification can be counted as a qualificationrecognised as equivalent to D.M. It may be equivalent; it may be more. Butthe question is whether it is recognised - and admittedly it is not. We arenot impressed by the argument of Shri Jaitley that the words, "M.D. inMedicine with two years special training in Endocrinology" in theRecommendations of Medical Council of India with respect to the post ofProfessor in Endocrinology means two years' special training in Endocrinologyanywhere in the world. The said words have to be read and understood in thecontext of the A.I.I.M.S. Recruitment Rules and the First Schedule thereto.The submission based upon the contrast in the language used in describing thequalifications for Professor in endocrinology and Professor in the departmentof Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation is unnacceptable. Sri Jaitely couldnot point out any such requirement against any other qualification in the saidRecommendations. Based upon the use of the words, "in any approvedInstitution in India" in the qualifications mentioned for one among theseveral posts in the Recommendations, it is not possible to hold that thequalifications awarded by Institutions which are not recognised by the MedicalCouncil of India or the training undergone in such Institutions has becomerecognised. The acceptance of this argument would mean that thequalifications not recognised by the Institute or Medical Council of Indiabecome recognised in this indirect manner. We cannot countenance such anargument."

26. Therefore, as against the stipulations contained in RecruitmentRules of A.I.I.M.S., the power of the Syndicate as contained in Section 19(p)of the Madras University Act varies in all respects. While, as per theRecruitment Rules of A.I.I.M.S., the A.I.I.M.S can only accept a recognisedequivalent educational qualification, as per Section 19(p) of the MadrasUniversity Act, the Syndicate of the second respondent University itselfpossess all the powers to recognise a qualification as equivalent to theexaminations of its own. In other words, while the Syndicate of the secondrespondent University has the statutory power to equate even an unrecogniseddegree or Post Graduate degree based on examination held by an Institution asequivalent to the examination of the second respondent University andconsequently, recognise such a degree or Post Graduate degree for all itsconsequential purposes, such a power was not available with the A.I.I. M.S inits Recruitment Rules. The reading of the Recruitment Rules itself disclosesthat it can only act based upon any such recognition already made by any othercompetent Board. In such circumstances, the ratio of the said decision of theHonourable Supreme Court is totally inapplicable to the facts of this case.27. Therefore, looked at from any angle, the challenge of the petitioner tothe appointment of the sixth respondent in the impugned order on the abovesaidbasis, cannot be countenanced. The writ petition, therefore, fails and thesame is dismissed.

Index: Yes.Internet: Yes.vksTo1. The Vice ChancellorUniversity of MadrasChennai-600 005.

2. The Registrar, University of Madras,Chennai-600 005.

3. The Chairman,University Grants Commission,Bhadurshah's Zafar MargNew Delhi-110 002.

4. The Chairman,Board of Studies of PhilosophyHead of Department of PhilosophyUniversity of MadrasChennai-600 005.

5. The Secretary to Government ofTamil Nadu,Department of Higher Education,Secretariat, Chennai-600 009