WP/27770/1997 of Smt. Varalakshmi Bhupal Vs State of A.P. on 28 December 2007

ORDER:

1 This writ petition is filed to declare the action of the first respondent i.e.State of A.P. represented by its Secretary, Revenue Department, in initiatingproceedings in Memo No.3 S/9599/97-7 as arbitrary, illegal and withoutjurisdiction.

2 The averments, in brief, in the affidavit of the General Power ofAttorney holder of the petitioner, filed in support of the writ petition, are 8916sq. yards of land in S.No.20/4 of Somajiguda village was purchased by herfrom Smt. Varkatunnisa Begum, the recorded Pattedar and possessor of thesaid land in the revenue records from 1923 onwards, under a registered saledeed dated 03-05-1967 after satisfying herself with the title of her vendor, andhas been in continuous possession and enjoyment thereof from 1967onwards by paying A.P. Non Agricultural Land Assessment Tax for that landfrom 1972 onwards. In 1976 she filed a declaration under the provisions ofthe Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act 1975 (the Act). In 1983 theauthorities under the Act informed her that the said land is recorded in theTown Survey Land register (TSLR) as Government land. As she, onverification, came to know that that land was recorded as government land inTSLR she made an application for rectification of the said error in TSLR,whereupon she was informed that inasmuch as the Town Survey wasconcluded in 1978 itself, her request for rectification of TSLR cannot beconsidered. As no notice of survey was served on her, she was not awareof the proceedings relating to survey. So she gave a detailed representation for rectification of the TSLR, whereupon the District Collector, Hyderabad(third respondent), after getting the said land surveyed and conducting a spotinspection, was convinced with her possession and enjoyment over that landas her patta land and sought permission of the Commissioner of Survey,Settlements and Land Records (second respondent) to correct the entries inthe TSLR. Second respondent, after verification, permitted the thirdrespondent to make appropriate corrections and so the third respondentmade the necessary corrections in the TSLR and the connected records,and issued certified copies of those corrected records to her in 1994. Longsubsequent thereto she received the memo impugned in the writ petition,without any other papers, to appear before the Minister for Revenue on23.05.1997. When she appeared before the Minister for Revenue andinformed him about her not receiving any documents along with the memoserved on her, the Hon’ble Minister gave a direction to the third respondent tofurnish copies of all the documents to her. But copies of some of thedocuments only were furnished to her by 19.07.1997 and copies of theremaining documents were furnished only on 23-09-1997. Thereafter shecame to know that the Hon’ble Minister passed an ex parte order of interimsuspension of the order correcting the entries in the relevant registers,thereby depriving her legitimate right to the property purchased by her.Inasmuch as the first respondent has no power to review the order of thesecond respondent correcting the relevant entries in TSLR and otherrecords, she filed the writ petition questioning the memo issued by the first respondent.

respondent.

3 The Law officer working under the third respondent filed his counteraffidavit on behalf of the respondents inter alia contending that Khairtabadvillage, which was a Sarfekhas village, was initially surveyed in 1324 Fasli(1915 AD). Thereafter during 1917 Somajiguda village was carved out from apart of S.No.227 of Khairtabad village and was surveyed independentlyretaining a part of old S.No.227 in Khairtabad Revenue village. During theyears 1968 to 1970 Town Survey of Somajiguda village was conductedunder the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Survey and Boundaries Act,1923 (APSAB Act) whereat S.No.227 of Somajiguda was correlated toT.S.No.43/3, Block-E, Ward No.87 and was classified as GovernmentGairan land covering an extent of 13,678 sq. meters. As per the WasoolBaqui of 1353 Fasli (1944 AD) S.No.20 of Somajiguda village, whose totalextent is Ac.17-37 guntas, was classified as patta land and was split into foursub divisions i.e. 20/1 consisting Ac.3.02, 20/2 consisting Ac. 1-11, 20/3consisting Ac.1-28 and 20/4 consisting Ac.11-36; Old S.No.20/1 to 4 ofSomajiguda village are given different town survey numbers 1 to 6, 8/1, 17,18, 19/1, 20/1 and 20/3, whose total extent came to Ac.21.36 guntas, whilethe original extent of old S.No.20/1 to 4 was only Ac.17-37 guntas. Thenames of writ petitioner, her brother and her general power of attorney areshown as owners of 2,532 Sq. Meters in T.S.No.39, 2,840 Sq. meters inT.S.No.37 and 3,144 sq. meters in T.S.No.38 respectively. The writ petitionerand her family members are in possession of old S.No.218/1 and 2 part,223/part, 225/part of khairtabad village. The title deeds of the writ petitioner indicate that she purchased the land in S.No.20/4 of Somajiguda village. Asold S.No.218/1 and 2 part, part of S.No.223, and part of S.No.225 ofKhairtabad village correlate to new Town Survey Nos. 37, 38 and 39 in BlockE of Ward No.87, it is clear that the writ petitioner is in possession ofS.Nos.218/1 and 2 part, part of S.No.223 and part of S.No.225 of Khairtabadvillage, which are different from S.No.20/4 of Somajiguda village. Inasmuchas the results of the survey operations were published in A.P. Gazette No.60dated 25-09-1976 as per Section 13 of APSAB Act, the entries made thereinbecame final and as any person aggrieved by those entries would have tofile a suit within 3 years from the date of Gazette publication questioning thesurvey, and as no such suit was filed petitioner is not entitled to any relief.On the application of the petitioner for correction of entries, the thirdrespondent, under a misapprehension of law and facts, sent proposals to thesecond respondent for correction of the entries in respect of T.S.No.43/3Block-E, Ward No.87 (Old S.No.20/4) Somajiguda in favour of the writpetitioner to an extent of 2706 sq. meters, and sought permission forcorrection of the entries in respect of the land covered by T.S.No.19/2 andpart of T.S.No.20/1, Blcok-F, Ward No.87, though he has no such power todo so under the APSAB Act. Petitioner, after purchasing the land inS.No.20/4 of Somajiguda, a patta land, had encroached upon the land inS.No.227 of Khairatabad village, which is a government land. Payment ofnon-agricultural land assessment tax, allegedly made by the petitioner, wouldnot confer any title to the land which does not belong to her. Inasmuch as

T.S.No.43/3, Block-D, Ward No.87 is classified as government land notice ofproposed survey was served on the registered holder i.e. Tahsildar, UrbanDistrict on 28.05.1974. After noticing that government land in T.S.No.43/3,Block-E, Ward No.87 and T.S.No.20/1, Block-F, Ward No.87 is changed aspatta land, third respondent sent a factual report to the first respondent totake necessary action for protecting the interest of the government.Therefore, the first respondent issued the impugned notice dated 23.05.1997to the petitioner to represent her case. As the third respondent requested thefirst respondent to suspend the orders of the second respondent dated09.05.1994, interim suspension was granted by the first respondent. All thepapers on which the third respondent is relying on were served on thepetitioner. Since the prayer made in this writ petition, in effect and insubstance, is to declare the title of the petitioner, which relief can only begranted by a civil Court after trial, and as the survey proceedings undertakenas per the provisions of the APSAB Act had become final, petitioner is notentitled to any relief.

WPMP No.2207 of 2006

4 Before referring to the contentions of Sri Challa Seetharamaiah,learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner and the learnedAdvocate General appearing for the respondents I feel it appropriate todispose of WPMP No.2207 of 2006, filed by the respondents in the writpetition, to receive the documents filed therewith as additional materialpapers.

5 In the affidavit filed in support of this miscellaneous petition, which is sworn to by the third respondent, he alleged that the law officer attached tohis office had, in the counter affidavit filed in the Writ Petition on behalf of therespondents, failed to mention all the essential facts required for adjudicationof this writ petition. In pursuance of the notification under section 5 of theAPSAB Act relating to conduct of the town survey in the Municipalcorporation limits of Hyderabad and Secunderabad issued by theGovernment on 04.05.1960 and published on 19.05.1960, notification underSection 6 of that Act was issued by the survey officer on 30.06.1960 andwas published in the prescribed manner on 29.09.1963, inviting all thepersons having interest in the lands in the areas of Hyderabad andSecunderabad Municipal Corporation to attend survey either in person orthrough an agent, and notices to all the owners, who owned lands adjacent togovernment lands were issued for determination of the boundaries, as laiddown by Section 9(2) of the APSAB Act. Though that notice was receivedand acknowledged by the petitioner and others on 03.07.1975, they failed toraise any objection. After completion of the demarcation notification, ascontemplated by Section 13 of the APSAB Act, was issued in the DistrictGazette on 25.09.1976, which became final as the petitioner did not avail theremedy of appeal within three years. Petitioner filed this writ petitionsuppressing the service of notice under Section 9(2) of APSAB Act on her.As the papers filed along with the miscellaneous petition are relevant fordisposal of this writ petition they may be received as additional materialpapers on behalf of the respondents.

6 The General Power Of Attorney of the writ petitioner filed her counteraffidavit inter alia alleging that inasmuch as the deponent to the counteraffidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the writ petition admitted thatAc.17-37 guntas in S.N.20 of Somajiguda, which is classified as patta land,was split into four sub divisions and that “Statutory notices have been served on theregistered holders i.e. Tahsildar, Urban District on 28-05-1974 since S.No.43/3 Block – E, WardNo.87 has been classified as Government land”, the allegations in the affidavit filed insupport of this WPMP that notice under Section 9(2) of the APSAB Act wasserved on the petitioner in respect of the land involved in this writ petitioncannot be true, because the report of the third respondent dated 19.12.1996also shows that notice under Section 9(2) of APSAB Act was served only onthe Urban Tahsildar in respect of T.S.No.43/3 of block-E of Ward 87 on28.05.1974, as it was recorded as government land in TSLR. Since copiesof the notices allegedly served on the petitioner are not filed, and as thesignatures found in the register produced, as one of the additional materialpapers, are not the signatures of the petitioner or her family members,additional material papers sought to be filed with a view to show that thepetitioner received notices of survey are but concocted and so the petition isliable to be dismissed.

7 The deponent to the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondentsin the writ petition filed his reply affidavit in W.P.M.P. alleging that inasmuchas the counter affidavit filed by him in the writ petition was prepared as perthe records available in the Collectorate, and as the factum of service ofnotice under Section 9(2) of the APSAB Act on the petitioner and her family members came to light only after the records from the Director of Surveyand Land Records were called for, after he filed his counter affidavit in theWrit Petition, he could not mention the factum of service of notice of surveyon the petitioner and others in his counter affidavit filed in the Writ Petition. Sothe entire original record pertaining to the survey and subsequentproceedings of the Collector and the Commissioner of Survey andSettlement are being placed before the Court for its perusal. So they may bereceived as additional material papers on behalf of the respondents.

8 This WPMP seeking leave of the court to receive additionaldocuments, obviously is filed in view of Rule 12(iii) of the Writ ProceedingRules 1977. As the deponent to the counter affidavit in the writ petition,through his reply affidavit in this WPMP, swore to the fact that the counteraffidavit in the Writ Petition was prepared on the basis of the record availablein the Collectorate only and without verifying the records in the Surveydepartment, and as it is stated that the records received from the Surveydepartment show that notices under Section 9(2) of the APSAB Act wereserved on the petitioner and her family members, and as judicial notice canbe taken of the fact that government officials arrayed as respondents in WritPetitions, if they are successors in office of an officer whose action ischallenged therein, usually give instructions for preparation of the counteraffidavits without taking pains to go through the entire record, either due tolack of patience or lethargy or for other reasons like it is not they but theirpredecessors in office or other officers that had dealt with the file earlier, and feel that it is not their responsibility to put forth all the facts before the Court, as it is the action of some other officer that is being questioned in that writ petition, I accept the explanation given by the deponent to the reply affidavit filed inthis WPMP. For that reason and since it would be appropriate to dispose ofthe writ petition on the basis of all the relevant records, WPMP No.2207 of2006 is allowed and additional material papers filed therewith are received for perusal by the Court.

9The long and short of the contentions of Sri Challa Seetharamaiahlearned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner are as nonotice of survey under the provisions of the APSAB Act was served on thepetitioner, survey proceedings allegedly undertaken by the respondents donot bind the petitioner, and as there is no specific denial of the averment inthe affidavit filed in support of the writ petition that no notice of survey wasserved on the petitioner or any of the members of their family in the counteraffidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the writ petition, where it isstated that notice of survey was served on the Tahsildar Urban District on28.05.1974, inasmuch as S.No.43/3 Block E Ward 87 is classified asgovernment land, it should be taken that respondents impliedly admitted thatno notice of survey was given to the petitioner, and as they thought it fit to filea petition to receive additional material papers on their behalf only after hemade all his submissions, and came out with a reply affidavit at a verybelated stage that notice of survey was served on the petitioner and herfamily members, it is easy to see that the record now produced by therespondents as additional material papers, could or might have been broughtinto existence by the respondents for the purpose of this petition, and so thatrecord should not be taken into consideration for disposal of this petition, and since the title of Smt. Varkatunnisa Begum, the vendor of the petitioner to theproperty purchased by the petitioner under the registered sale deed dated03.05.1967 is not disputed, and as the petitioner came into possession of8,916 Sq. yards in S.No.20/4 under that sale deed, and inasmuch as thenames of the vendor of the petitioner and the petitioner were recorded in therevenue registers as pattedars of that land, and as the petitioner has beenpaying the non-agricultural land assessment tax also in respect of the landpurchased by her, and as the petitioner had immediately after her coming toknow about her land being recorded as government land in the revenueregister made an application to the first respondent for correction of thoseentries in the revenue registers, and as the third respondent, after verifyingall the records and ground realities, submitted a report to the secondrespondent, and as the second respondent also, after having satisfiedhimself that there was a mistake in the survey, permitted correction of theentries in the relevant registers, necessary corrections were made in thesurvey and other registers, but the successor in office of the thirdrespondent, for reasons best known to him, seems to have addressed aletter to the first respondent for reviewing the decision of his predecessor inoffice and the third respondent correcting entries in pursuance of the saidrepresentation of the petitioner. It is his contention that in view of Section9(2) of the APSAB Act and Rules 5 and 10 of the Rules framed under theAPSAB Act, which read Section 9(2): Notice to Registered holders of lands affected:-Notice of every decision of the survey officer under Section 9(1)shall be given in the prescribed manner to the registeredholders of the lands the boundaries of which may be affected bythe decisions.

Rule 5: The notice issued under Section 9(2) shall, except in thecase of street surveys and boundary surveys, be in the form ofan extract from the field register relating to the holding, and shallstate the time within which and the officer to whoman appealmay be presented and shall be accompanied by a printed formof acknowledgement which shall be signed and dated in tokenof the receipt of the notice and returned to the officer who issuedit. (Underlining mine)

Rule 10: When the registered holder or other person on whomany of the notices or communications referred to in theforegoing rules is to be served is absent, service may beeffected by delivering the notice or communication to someadult male member of his family at his usual place or of abodeor to his authorized agent or by affixing it on some conspicuouspart of his last known residence or on some conspicuous part ofthe land to which the notice or communication relates, or bysending it to him at his last known place of residence byRegistered Post Acknowledgement Due. When service iseffected by so affixing the notice, the serving officer shall not themethod of service on the printed form of acknowledgementwhich is returned to the officer issuing the notice orcommunication.

it is mandatory for the survey authorities to give notice in printed form to theaffected parties informing them as to before whom they may present anappeal against their decision, and inasmuch as the respondents did notproduce such printed form of notice served on the petitioner, and as there isnothing on the record to show that the petitioner was informed the name ofthe officer to whom an appeal can be preferred by her, it is clear that there isno proper compliance with the provisions of the APSAB Act, and inasmuchas service of notice on the registered holder is mandatory under the APSABAct, proceedings of the survey conducted without notice to her would notbind the petitioner, as her land was included in another survey numberwithout any notice and relied on Poomangalalorakath Mariyam Karamavathi[1]and others Vs. Palakkotanantakath Ummer Kutti and othersin support of thesaid contention. Relying on Secretary to Government of Karnataka Vs. V.Harishbabu[[2]],where the apex Court, while considering the question whethernotice under Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act 1940 is mandatory for thelimitation to run had, after adverting to the observations in Indian Rayon Corporation Ltd. Vs. Raunad and Company Pvt. Ltd[[3]]reading “The fact that the parties have notice to the filing of the award, is not enough. The notice must be served by the Court. Wereiterate again that there must be (a) filing of the award in theproper Court; (b) service of the notice by the court or its office tothe parties concerned; and (c) such notice need not necessarilybe in writing. It is upon the date of service of such notice that theperiod of limitation begins and as at present under clause (b) ofArticle 119 of the Act, the limitation expires on the expiry of the30 days of the service of that notice for an application for settingaside of the award. The importance of the matter, which need beemphasised, is the service of the notice by the Court”

Conclusion

“The issuance of a notice under Section 14(2) of the Act bythe Court is a mandatory requirement though the section doesnot prescribe any formal mode for the service of the notice. Whatis essential under the said provision is that there must beservice of notice or intimation or communication of the filing ofthe award by the Court to the parties, the mode of service ofsuch notice being immaterial. It is the substance and not theform of the notice which is relevant and hence it is establishedthat a notice or communication or information of the filing of theaward has been issued by the Court and served on the partyconcerned, the statutory requirements of Section 14(2) of the Actwould stand satisfied. Keeping in view the difference in thephraseology of Section 14(1) and 14(2) of the Act, it follows thatthe notice from the Court under Section 14(2) of the Act neednot be in writing. It can be oral also but what is necessary is thata notice, communication or information to the effect that anaward has been filed in the Court must be given by the Court tothe parties concerned. Notice to the pleaders of the parties, whoare representing the parties before the Court, would of coursebe sufficient compliance with the requirements of Sub-Section(2) of Section 14 of the Act. A notice by the arbitrator under Sub-Section (1) of the Act is not a substitute for the notice which theCourt is enjoined upon to issue under Sub-Section (2) ofSection 14 of the Act.”

held that service of notice is mandatory and contended that in the absence ofservice of notice under the provisions of the APSAB Act to the petitioner thefact that the petitioner had notice of survey subsequently through othermode, would not validate the invalid survey made without notice to her.Relying on the observations of the apex Court in Dattaram S. Vichare Vs.[4]Thukaram S. Vichare and othersa case arising under Maharashtra Housingand Area Development Act, 1976, he contended that the action of therespondents in correcting the entries in the survey registers without notice tothe writ petitioner is wholly without jurisdiction. Relying on HyderabadPotteries Pvt. Ltd Vs. Collector, Hyderabad District and another[[5]]where it isheld that survey is intended for identification of lands and fixation ofboundaries and that it is not a record of rights and that the entries in TSLR,

though are relevant, are not conclusive, contended that entries correctedduring survey without notice to the petitioner would not have any effect onher title to the land purchased by her. With regard to correction of entries inthe survey and other records by the third respondent, after obtaining consentfrom the second respondent it is his contention that as per the provisions ofthe APSAB Act an appeal against the decision of the survey authorities hasto be preferred to the Board of Revenue, and as the Board of Revenue wasabolished by the Board of Revenue (Replacement by Commissioner) Act,1977 and as the second respondent is constituted as the appropriateauthority to decide the appeals arising under APSAB Act, as per that Actappeal against the order of Survey Officer has to be preferred to the secondrespondent, and inasmuch as the mode in which the appeal reached theconcerned appellate authority for his decision is irrelevant, when the appealin fact reaches the concerned appellate authority, the representation sent bythe petitioner to the government has to be treated as an appeal to the secondrespondent against the proceedings of survey conducted without notice toher or her family members, and as the period of limitation for preferring anappeal against an order passed without notice does not commence till thatorder comes to the notice of the effected party, the effected party can preferthe appeal after coming to know the adverse order passed against him andso the order passed by the third respondent in pursuance of the permissiongiven by the second respondent on the representation sent by the appellant,should be treated as an order in the appeal preferred by the petitioner and sothat order cannot be said to be an order without jurisdiction. His contention isthat inasmuch as the order of the second respondent, as the appellateauthority, is binding on all and as no power of review is conferred on the firstrespondent by the APSAB Act, the order of the second respondent is notamenable to review by anybody. Relying on the following passages at pages880 and 881 of London & Clydeside Estates Ltd. Vs. Aberdeen District Council and another[[6]]

and another[[6]]

“...........This provided that the time within which the relevantcertificate was to be issued by the respondents was to be ‘theperiod of two months from the date of receipt’ of the relevantapplication, and from this the Second Division were of opinionthat the respondents had no remaining power to issue acertificate in the form required by the second conclusion of theappellants’ summons. In passing, I should remark that the pointwas a novel one before the second Division, the respondentshaving conceded before the Lord Ordinary that the twoconclusions stood or fell together, and having withdrawn thisconcession on the reclaiming motion in the Second Division. It will be convenient to deal with the points raised in what Iconceive to be their logical order rather than the order in whichthey were argued by the respective counsel.On the basis, the first question for consideration is theconsequence of what was admitted to be a defect in thepurported certificate of 22[nd] October 1974, namely the failure bythe predecessors of the respondents to include in the certificateinformation in writing as to the appellants’ rights of appeal to theSecretary of State. Was this requirement, which has theauthority of Parliament behind it, mandatory or was it in somesense director only? I have no doubt that it was mandatory, andthat the failure to include this information was fatal to thecertificate. In the course of argument counsel for therespondents candidly conceded that the only purpose of therequirement was to inform the applicant of his rights of appeal,including the time limit within which they should be exercised.The present appellants aver that they were misled by this defectand that it was as a result of this that their appeal was out oftime. The averment has never been put to the proof, and one ofthe respondents’ alternative arguments was that, in the event ofotherwise total failure, the appellants should be put to the proofof this. But in my view this argument is without foundation. Thevalidity of the certificate itself is in question, and if, as I believe,the requirement is mandatory the certificate falls independentlyof whether the appellants were in fact misled. I find it impossibleto accept that a requirement by an instrument of statutory forcedesigned for the very purpose of compelling a public authority toinform the subject of his legal rights can be treated as simplyregulatory if the requirement is not complied with. If I requiredauthority for this proposition I would refer to Agricultural,Horticultural and Forestry Industry Trading Board V. Kent (1970)1 All ER 304, (1970) 2 QB 19) Rayner V. Stepney Corpn{ (1911)2 Ch 312 } and Brayhead (Ascot) Ltd V. Berkshire CountyCouncil (1964)1 All ER 149, (1964) 2 QB 303 notwithstandingthat it relied on Edwick V. Sunbury-on-Thames Urban DistrictCouncil (1961) 3 All ER 10, (1962) 1 QB 229 which wasdisapproved in James V. Secretary of State for Wales (1966) 3All ER 964, (1968) AC 409, which was decided on an argumentirrelevant to the present appeal. However, I am content to asserta general principle to the effect that where Parliamentprescribes that an authority with compulsory powers shouldinform the subject of his right to question those powers, primafacie the requirement must be treated as mandatory.........”

and the observations in para 10 of the apex Court in State of Gujarath Vs.

Salimbhai Abdulgaffar Shaikh and others[[7]]reading “10. Sub-section (4) of Section 34 of POTA provides for an appeal too the High Court against an order of the Special Courtgranting or refusing bail. Though the work “appeal” is used bothin the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Code of CivilProcedure and in many other statues but it has not been definedanywhere. Over a period of time it has acquired a definiteconnotation and meaning which is as under:

“A proceeding undertaking to have a decision reconsideredby bringing it to a higher authority, especially the submission ofa lower court’s decision to a higher court for review andpossible reversal.

An appeal, strictly, so-called, is one in which the question is,whether the order of the court from which the appeal is broughtwas right on the material which the court had before it.

An appeal is removal of the cause from an inferior to one ofsuperior jurisdiction for the purposes of obtaining a review orretrial.

An appeal, generally speaking is a rehearing by a superiorcourt on both law and fact”

and the passages in American Jurisprudence reading “The term ‘appeal’ is a word used with very indefinitemeaning. It is some times used to denote the nature of appellatejurisdiction, as distinguished from original jurisdiction, withoutregard to the particular mode by which a cause is submitted to areviewing court. Even when applied to the method by which thecase is taken from the lower court to the reviewing court,‘appeal’ is indefinite in meaning. It may have the meaning ithad in equity of being a trial de novo, or it may be used todesignate what is in substance an error proceeding. Thetendency at the present time is to use it in the later sense. Evenin equity cases and in some jurisdiction which maintain thedistinction between law and equity, an appeal does notuniformly mean a trial de novo in the appellate court; it isessentially an error proceeding. ‘Appeals’ even in law cases,may be as to questions of fact or as to questions of law. Thetendency, however, is to limit appellate courts of final jurisdictionin the consideration of questions of fact.”

and the meaning of ‘appeal’ in ‘Words and Phrases’ by West Publishing Company reading “Invoke aid of An ‘appeal’ to superior Court from decision ofadministrative board is not an appeal in the sense of a transferof jurisdiction from one court to another, but is a process forinvoking judicial power to determine legal injury complained of,or legality of an act done by officers of another department. Colonial Beacon Oil Co. V. Zoning Board of Appeals of City ofHartord, 23 A.2d 151, 152, 128 Conn. 351.

“Appeal”, as used in Mansf.Dig. 5687, creating a board forthe equalization of taxable values in each country, andproviding that any party aggrieved by the action of the boardmay ‘appeal’ there from to the country court, should not beconstrued in its technical sense of a removal of the case from aninferior to a superior court for review, but in its popularsignification of ‘Invoke the aid of”, Prairie Country v. Mtthews, 46Ark. 383, 386.”

and the observations in Nagendra Nath Dey Vs. Suresh Chandra Dey

“There is no definition of appeal in the Code of Civil Procedure, buttheir Lordships have no doubt that any application by a party to anAppellate Court, asking Subordinate Court, is an appeal within theordinary acceptation of the term... Similarly in Raja of Ramnand v.KamidRowthen, 53 Ind App 74 = (AIR 1926 PC 22) a civil revision petition wasconsidered to be an appropriate form of appeal from the judgment in asuit of small causes nature. A Full Bench of the Madras High Court inP.P.P. Chidambara nadar V. C.P.A. Rama Nadar, AIR 1937 Mad. 385had to decide whether with reference to Article 182(2) of the LimitationAct 1908 the term ‘appeal’ was used in a restrictive sense so as toexclude revision petitions and the expression ‘appellate Court’ was tobe confined to a Court exercising appellant, as opposed to, revisionalpowers. After an exhaustive examination of the case law including thedecisions of the Privy Council mentioned above the Full Benchexpressed the view that Article 182 (2) applied to civil revisions as welland not only to appeals in the narrow sense of that term as used in theCivil Procedure Code. In Secretary of State for India in Council v.British India Steam Navigation Company, (1911) 13 Cal LJ 90 an orderpassed by the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction underSection 115, Code of Civil Procedure, was held to be an order made orpassed in appeal within the meaning of Section 39 of the Letters Patent.Mookerji, J., who delivered the judgment of the Division Bench referredto the observations of Lord Westbury in Attorney General V. Sailem,(1864) 10 HLC 704 and of Subramania Ayyar, J., in Chappan V. Moidin,(1898) ILR 22 Mad 68 at p. 80 (FB) on the true nature of the right ofappeal. Such a right was one of entering a superior Court and invokingits aid and interposition to redress the error of the Court below. Twothings which were required to constitute appellate jurisdiction were theexistence of the relation of superior and inferior Court and the power onthe part of the former to review decisions of the latter.

which are followed in Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar Vs. Krishnaji Dattatraya Bapat[[9]]observing

“There is no definition of appeal in the Code of CivilProcedure, but their Lordships have no doubt that anyapplication by a party to an Appellate Court, asking SubordinateCourt, is an appeal within the ordinary acceptation of the term...Similarly in Raja of Ramnand v.Kamid Rowthen, 53 Ind App 74= (AIR 1926 PC 22) a civil revision petition was considered tobe an appropriate form of appeal from the judgment in a suit ofsmall causes nature. A Full Bench of the Madras High Court inP.P.P. Chidambara nadar V. C.P.A. Rama Nadar, AIR 1937Mad. 385 had to decide whether with reference to Article 182(2)of the Limitation Act 1908 the term ‘appeal’ was used in arestrictive sense so as to exclude revision petitions and theexpression ‘appellate Court’ was to be confined to a Courtexercising appellant, as opposed to, revisional powers. After anexhaustive examination of the case law including the decisionsof the Privy Council mentioned above the Full Bench expressedthe view that Article 182 (2) applied to civil revisions as well andnot only to appeals in the narrow sense of that term as used inthe Civil Procedure Code. In Secretary of State for India inCouncil v. British India Steam Navigation Company, (1911) 13Cal LJ 90 an order passed by the High Court in exercise of itsrevisional jurisdiction under Section 115, Code of CivilProcedure, was held to be an order made or passed in appealwithin the meaning of Section 39 of the Letters Patent. Mookerji,J., who delivered the judgment of the Division Bench referred tothe observations of Lord Westbury in Attorney General V.Sailem, (1864) 10 HLC 704 and of Subramania Ayyar, J., inChappan V. Moidin, (1898) ILR 22 Mad 68 at p. 80 (FB) on thetrue nature of the right of appeal. Such a right was one ofentering a superior Court and invoking its aid and interposition to redress the error of the Court below. Two things which wererequired to constitute appellate jurisdiction were the existenceof the relation of superior and inferior Court and the power onthe part of the former to review decisions of the latter.

and the following observations in Uday Shankar Triyar Vs. Ram Kalewar Prasad

[10]

Singh and another

“17. Non-compliance with any procedural requirementrelating to a pleading, memorandum of appeal or application orpetition for relief should not entail automatic dismissal orrejection, unless the relevant statute or rule so mandates. Procedural defects and irregularities which are curable shouldnot be allowed to defeat substantive rights or to cause injustice.Procedure, a hand-maiden to justice, should never be made atool to deny justice or perpetuate injustice, by any oppressive orpunitive use. The well recognized exceptions to this principleare:-

i)where the Statute prescribing the procedure, alsoprescribes specifically the consequence of non-compliance.

ii)Where the procedural defect is not rectified, even after itis pointed out and due opportunity is given for rectifying it;is pointed out and due opportunity is given for rectifying it;

iii)Where the non-compliance or violation is proved to bedeliberate or mischievous,deliberate or mischievous,

iv)Where the rectification of defect would affect the caseon merits or will affect the jurisdiction of the court.v)In case of Memorandum of Appeal, there is completeabsence of authority and the appeal is presented without theknowledge, consent and authority of the appellant.

he contended that inasmuch as the order of the survey authorities correcting entries in the revenue survey register without notice to the petitioner is anullity, even assuming that the order of the second respondent rectifying themistake in survey registers was made without jurisdiction, that order whichhad the effect of setting at naught an irregular and unsustainable surveymade by the survey officials, cannot be set aside by the first respondent inview of the ratio in Mohammad Swalleh and others Vs. Third Addl. District

Ratio decidendi

[11]Judge, Meerut and anotherand Maharaja Chintamani Saran Nath Shahdeo[12]Vs. State of Bihar and othersand contended that in any event since thefirst respondent cannot decide its own title to the property as held in SreePancha Murthy Co-op. House Building Society Ltd. Vs. Govt. of A.P. and [13]othersand Sree Pancha Murthy Co-op. House Building Society Ltd. Vs.

[14]where it is observed that

Govt. of A.P. and others

“.........The sum and substance of all the decisions is that the findingof Survey Officer under Section 13 is not final as regards the titleand even regarding the boundary the same is final only when theparty is put on notice and participates in the enquiry. Any enquiry ordecision given under Survey and Boundaries Act, are only confinedto the correctness of the boundary and it cannot determine thequestion of title. Admittedly, in the instant case, no individualnotices were issued as required under Section 9 of the Act and thedecision was also not communicated to the concerned individuals.Further, as per the decisions referred to above, out would be onlyfinal as regards the boundaries of the survey numbers, but it has nothe effect of either investing or divesting the title. ............. It is also tobe noticed in this regard that the Government itself is declaring thatland is a Government land and a substantial defence is put up bythe petitioners tracing out the history right from Sarfekhas records. In such a situation, it would not be appropriate for the governmentto declare for itself that the land belongs to the Government. Itcannot decide the title for itself, some authority under the Act or thecivil Court has to decide the same.”

first respondent in any event, by entertaining the letter written by the thirdrespondent, cannot pass any order adverse to the petitioner. It is hiscontention that the order passed by the third respondent as per the directionsof the second respondent, can only be questioned in a civil court, but not byfiling a petition for review before the first respondent, by relying on M/s. EastIndia Commercial Co. Ltd Calcutta and another Vs. Collector of Customs,Calcutta[[15]]andCalcutta Discount Co. Ltd., Vs. Income Tax Officer, CompaniesDistrict I, Calcutta and another[[16]]in support of the said contention. He alsorelied on Calvin V. Carr and others[[17]]and contended that first respondentcannot review the order passed in favour of the petitioner.

10. The contention of the learned Advocate General is that inasmuch as aperson aggrieved by the determination of any boundary in a surveyconducted under the provisions of the APSAB Act, as per Section 13 of thatAct has to institute a suit within 3 years from the date of notification either to

set aside or modify the said determination, and as the petitioner did not fileany such suit though the record available with the respondents show thatshe and her general power of attorney were served with notice of the saidsurvey, and as neither the second respondent nor the third respondent havethe power or authority to order correction of entries made in the correctedsurvey registers, and as the third respondent, basing on the representationmade by the petitioner to the Government referred to him for verification, gotthe land resurveyed and addressed the second respondent to rectify thesurvey and land records and the second respondent agreed for correction ofthe entries in the registers though he has no authority or jurisdiction to makesuch correction, the successor in office of the third respondent, having foundout the mistake committed, addressed a letter to the first respondent basingon which a notice was issued to the petitioner for hearing on the validity ofthe correction made by the third respondent, and as the petitioner filed thispetition without waiting for the orders to be passed by the first respondent,this petition, which is in the nature of a writ of prohibition prohibiting the firstrespondent to entertain the proceedings for review or revising the order of thesecond respondent passed without jurisdiction, is premature. Relying on[18]S.Govindameenan Vs. Union of Indiaand Ishabeevi and others Vs. TaxRecovery Officer[[19]]and Tirumala Tirupathi Devasthanam and another Vs.Thallapaka Ananthacharyulu and others[[20]]he contended that no writ ofprohibition can be issued against an executive action unless there is totalabsence of jurisdiction and inasmuch as it is not the case of the petitionerthat any of the principles of natural justice are violated by the firstrespondent, who has a right to review all or any of the actions of respondents2 and 3, who are but its subordinates, at any time in the interests of the larger public as held in Y.Konda Reddy Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and others[[21]]

following the observations made in A. Sanjeevi Naidu Vs. State of Madras and another[[22]]and R.R. Verma and others Vs. Union of India[[23]], petitioner is notentitled to the relief sought in this petition, more so because she, in anyevent, has a right to question the decision of the first respondent, if it isadverse to her. Relying on Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapoor and others Vs. State of Punjab[[24]]where it is held that though it may not be possible to give anexhaustive definition of what ‘execution function’ means and implies,ordinarily ‘executive power’ connotes the residue of governmental functionsthat remain after legislative and judicial functions are taken away, hecontended that first respondent as the higher supervisory body of the generaladministration of the State has the jurisdiction to correct the errors, if any,committed by its officers, and in any event as the petitioner who receivednotice under Section 9(2) of APSAB Act on 03.07.1975, came to Courtalleging that no notice was served on her, there are lack of bona fides on herpart and as a division bench of this court in Ibiza Industries Limited andanother Vs. Union of India and others[[25]]held that doctrine of Uberrima fides’are applicable to the fullest extent to applications under Article 226 and thatthe Court will not grant relief to a person who does not come to Court withclean hands, petitioner, who did not come to court with clean hands, in anyevent, is not entitled to the relief sought for in this petition.11 The memo impugned in the writ petition reads:

REVENUE (SS) DEPARTMENT

Memo No.3S/9599/SS1/97 Dated. 2-6-1997

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sub:- Land – Hyderabad District Secunderabad Mandal Somajigudavillage correction of wrong entries in respect of S.No.37, 39and 43/3 in Block and RS No.1 and 20/1 Block F of Ward 87-Hearing on 14-6-97 at 11.00 AM in the chambers of Minister(Revenue) in the Secretariat premises – Intimation – Reg.village correction of wrong entries in respect of S.No.37, 39and 43/3 in Block and RS No.1 and 20/1 Block F of Ward 87-Hearing on 14-6-97 at 11.00 AM in the chambers of Minister(Revenue) in the Secretariat premises – Intimation – Reg.

Smt. Srelatha Bhupal W/o. Sri Krishna Ram Bhupal and Smt.Varalaxmi Bhupal D/o Sri Krishna Ram Bhupal are informed that their cases on the above subject is posted for hearing on 14-6-97 at11.00 AM in the chambers of Minister for Revenue, 8[th] Floor, ‘J’Block, Secretariat.

2. They are therefore requested to attend the hearing on theabove date and time either in person or through an Advocate, alongwith the material.

So it is clear that it is only a notice of hearing of the case before the firstrespondent, which is akin to a show cause notice but not a decision by thefirst respondent. It is well known that this Court usually does not interferewith show cause notices. For that reason only this petition is liable to bedismissed as premature because no right of the petitioner to her propertycan be said to have been infringed by the notice impugned. But withoutdismissing the petition on that ground I wish to make my observations on theimportant contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties, clarifyingthat those observations are being made only for the purpose of disposal ofthis petition and that they should not be taken as my findings on the pointsraised before me.

12 The sheet anchor of the case of the petitioner, as seen from thecontentions of the learned senior Advocate, is that as she had no notice ofsurvey all the proceedings taken subsequently if not valid or not binding onthe petitioner. The specific case of the respondents, as seen from thedocuments produced along with WPMP No.2207 of 2006 is that notice ofsurvey in fact was given to the petitioner and her family members. It is truethat respondents filed the said WPMP No.2207 of 2006, long subsequent tothe learned senior counsel for the petitioner making his submissions, aftertaking several adjournments. The record produced by the respondents alongwith WPMP No.2207 of 2006 discloses service of notice on the petitionerand the members of her family. It is the contention of the petitioner thatthose documents are brought into existence or are concocted in order to get over the plea taken by the petitioner. Whether the signatures on thedocuments relied on by the respondents are true or not cannot be decided inthis petition. Be that as it may, I find force in the contention of the learnedAdvocate General that this petition is filed under an apprehension that the titleof the petitioner may be in jeopardy if the first respondent were to review theorder passed by respondents 2 and 3 correcting the entries in surveyregister, and so this petition which is akin to an advance appeal on anassumption that the first respondent is going to pass an adverse orderagainst the petitioner, is but a writ of prohibition. So, the principles laid downby the apex Court in S.Govindameenan case (18 supra) and ThallapakaAnanthacharyulu case (20 supra) apply. Therefore, this petition cannot beentertained unless the first respondent totally lacks jurisdiction to entertainthe application sent by the third respondent for revising the order passed byhis predecessor on approval by the second respondent. For the reasons tobe mentioned below, as I am not agreeing with the contention of the learnedsenior Advocate appearing for the petitioner that first respondent has nojurisdiction to review or revise the order of respondents 2 and 3 this petitionis liable to be dismissed.

13 Respondents are not disputing the fact that petitioner and her familymembers have some land near Government land. It is their case that takingadvantage of the fact that there is Government land adjacent to her landpetitioner encroached into the Government land and is claiming title thereto.From the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in the writpetition it is clear that respondents admit that petitioner and her familymembers have title to 2846 Sq. meters in T.S.No.37; 3144 Sq. meters inT.S.No.38 and 2532 Sq. meters in T.S.No.39. Whether those extents werepurchased by the petitioner under the sale deed dated 3.5.1967 relied on bythe petitioner or whether the said extents are apart from the land purchasedby the petitioner under the sale deed dated 3.5.1967 can be decided only by going through all the documents of title of the petitioner and her familymembers and the application for corrections made by them. So the actualextent of land purchased by the petitioner and the actual extent of land in herpossession, and if she encroached in the Government land cannot bedecided in a Writ Petition because they are all questions of fact relating towhich evidence has to be taken. For that reason also this petition is liable tobe dismissed.

14 For the purpose of this petition I assume that the survey wasconducted without notice to the petitioner. Since petitioner admittedly cameto know about the survey and made application for correction of the entries inthe survey and other registers. I am unable to agree with the contention thatthe survey proceedings are a nullity because if the petitioner felt that thesurvey proceedings were null and void for want of notice to her, there was noneed for her to make an application for review and could have ignored thatsurvey on the ground that it is a nullity. The affidavit filed in support of theapplication is vague as to which of the respondents petitioner made anapplication for review, because in several paraghaphs of the affidavit filed insupport of the application it is vaguely stated that petitioner made application“to the respondents” without specifying to which respondent she made theapplication for review of the entries lin the survey records. So I assume thatas an after thought petitioner took a plea that the application for review filedby her has to be treated as an appeal under the provisions of the APSABAct.

15 Be that as it may, it should be kept in view that first respondent issuedthe notice impugned in this petition to the petitioner only on the basis of theletter No.B3/265/94 dated 19.12.1996 addressed by the third respondent tothe first respondent. The relevant portion thereof reads:

“3. The facts of the case are as follows:

i)Smt. Srilatha Bhupal claiming to be a G.P.A. holder has filed a representation before the Chief Minister on 20-4-1993 wherein shehas stated that her earlier representations given to the Collector,Hyderabad for rectifying the errors in respect of Sy.No.43/3 BlockE Ward 87 and T.S.No.20/1 Block F Ward 87 have not beencorrected by the Collector. Representations were communicated tothe Collector from the C.M’s office for rectifying the errors and toissue the orders. The Collector, Hyderabad after examining therepresentations vide his D.O.Rc.No.B2/385/83 dated 22-6-93addressed to the Special Secretary to the Chief Minister hasconcluded that the legal, technical and administrative hurdles arecoming in the way of entertaining the representation of Smt.LataBhupal. He has suggested that the applicant may be advised toapproach the City Civil Court since T.S.No.43/3 block E Ward 87has been correlated to Sy.No.227 of Khairatabad vg. Which isclassified as Government land.

ii)Again Smt. Sreelatha Bhupal filed two applications to theCollector, Hyderabad District on 19-2-1994 for correction of entriesin Town Survey records pertaining to T.S.No.39 and 43/3 of BlockE ward No.87 and T.S.No.20/1 Block F Ward No.87. She filedcertain sale deed documents in support of her claim over the saidlands.”

In Para 4 of the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition it is stated

4. It is respectfully submitted that I have clearly indicated theland in the declaration filed by me under Urban Land CeilingAct in the year 1976. When the declaration filed was underconsideration before the U.L.C. authorities, we were informed,in 1983, by the ULC authorities that the land admeasuring 8916sq. yards purchased by me under a Regd. Sale Deed in sy.No.20/4, Somajiguda (v) has been recorded in the Town SurveyLand Register as Government land. I immediately approachedthe respondent authorities that there was an error in the TownSurvey Land Register, wherein the land purchased by me wasrecorded as Government Land. I have made detailedapplication to the respondent authorities for rectification of theerror in the year 1983 itself. I was informed by the respondentauthorities that Town Survey was concluded in the year 1978,wherein the land purchased by me was recorded asgovernment land.

So it is clear that the petitioner, who came to know about the rectification ofthe entries in the survey records in pursuance of the survey even in 1983,failed to explain why she did not question the survey allegedly made withoutnotice to her, immediately in 1983 or in 1984. Here I feel it relevant to statethat in letter Lr.No.B3/265/94 dated 29.03.1994 addressed by the thirdrespondent to the second respondent (filed as one of the material papers bythe petitioner in support of her case) the subject and references mentioned are Sub: LAND – Hyd. Dist. – Secunderabad Mandal Somajiguda village Corporation of wrong entries in respect of T.S.No.37, 38, 39 & 43/3 in Block E and T.S.No.19/2 & 20/1 Block F

of Ward 87 – Proposals submitted – Regarding.

Ref: 1. A/o Smt. Sreelatha Bhupal dt.24.5.93 addressed to government.

2. A/o. Smt. Sreelatha Bhupal dt.19-2-94 addressed to District Collector, Hyderabad.

3. Govt. Memo No.15765/Asn.11024/94-1 dt.4-3-94 from Secretary to Government, Revenue (Asn.III) Department, A.P. Secretariat Hyd.

In view thereof, it can be inferred that the petitioner, for the first time, made arepresentation to the Government in 1993, though she came to know aboutthe correction of the entries in 1983. Why she waited for 10 long years,without questioning the survey, allegedly made without notice to her, is notexplained by her in the affidavit filed in support of this petition.

16 Though there appears to be force in the contention of the learnedSenior Advocate for the petitioner relating to the power of the appellateauthority to entertain appeal that reached him from a different source, in viewof the ratio in the decisions relied on by him, the fact remains that thatrepresentation, which can be treated as an appeal, should have to be madewithin the period prescribed for appeal after knowledge of the adverse order,though it might have reached the appropriate appellate authority longsubsequent to the expiry of the period of limitation. Period of limitation forpreferring an appeal, admittedly, commences from the date of knowledge ofthe adverse order appealed against. In this case petitioner did not produceany document to show that she in fact made an application or representationto any of the respondents seeking correction of the entries in the surveyregister, within the period of limitation from the date of her knowledge about

the survey in 1983. So even assuming that the representation made by thepetitioner to the Government in 1993, which was referred to the thirdrespondent and which ultimately reached the second respondent can betreated as an appeal by the petitioner to the second respondent against thecorrection of entries as per the survey, the same, prima facie, is an appealfiled beyond the period of limitation. So the power of the second respondentto pass orders, as an appellate authority, in the deemed appeal preferred by the petitioner long subsequent to the period of limitation, is doubtful.

17 In para 12 of Sanjeevi Naidu case (22 supra) the apex Court held When a civil servant takes a decision he does not do itas delegate of his Minister. He does it on behalf of theGovernment. It s always open to a Minister to call for anyfile in his ministry and pass orders, he may also issuedirections to the officers in his ministry regarding thedisposal of Government business either general or asregards in any specific case and subject to over all powerthe officers designated by the rules or the standing orderscan take decisions on behalf of the Government and thusthe officers are the limbs of the Government and not itsdelegates.

In R.R. Verma case (23 supra) also the apex Court held “Administrative decisions are always open to review andthe decision taken after review is subject to judicial reviewof all grounds on which an administrative decision may bequestioned in Court.

In view of the above observations of the apex Court it cannot be said that the first respondent has no jurisdiction to entertain an application for reviewing the decision taken by the second respondent on the basis of therecommendations made by the earlier incumbent to the post of thirdrespondent, by his successor in office.

18 The order passed by the third respondent, on the basis of thepermission given by the second respondent to correct the entries in thesurvey and other registers, prima facie is not in accordance with the provisions of the APSAB Act. That action of respondents 2 and 3 in orderingcorrection of the entries in the survey register is only an administrativeaction, but not a judicial or quasi judicial action. So it is amenable for reviewby the Government i.e the first respondent. Therefore, as stated above itcannot be said that first respondent lacks jurisdiction to review the order ofrespondents 2 and 3 who are but its subordinates.

19 In view of the ratio in Hyderabad Potteries Limited case (5 supra), itcannot be said that the entries in TSLR are not conclusive, as TSLR is not arecord of rights. In view thereof, if the petitioner feels that there is a cloud onher title in respect of the property purchased by her in 1967 in view of theentries made in the survey register, she can, if so advised, approach a civilcourt and seek appropriate relief, if the first respondent in the proceedingspending before it were to pass an order adverse to her interest or can evenquestion the order of the first respondent itself, if it is adverse to her. Whatorder the first respondent is going to pass on the report sent by the thirdrespondent is not known. For that reason also it cannot but be said that thispetition is premature. In view thereof I feel it is not necessary to express anyopinion on the other contentions raised by the learned senior advocate andthe learned Advocate General, because those contentions can be raisedbefore the first respondent, who shall dispose of the case before himuninfluenced by the observations made in this order.

20 Before parting with the case I place on record my appreciation for thevery able assistance rendered to this Court by Sri Challa Seetharamaiah andthe learned Advocate General in disposal of this writ petition.

21 For the above reasons, I dismiss the petition with a direction to the first respondent to dispose of the case before him as expeditiously as possible,

after giving an opportunity of hearing to both sides. Both parties are directedto maintain status-quo as on today in respect of the land in dispute till thedisposal of the case by the first respondent. No order as to costs.

-------------------- -12-2007

kvsn

[1]AIR 1952 Madras 852[2]1996 (6) Supreme 27[3]1988 (4) SCC 31[4](1999) 6 SCC 764[5]2001 (3) ALT 200[6]1979 (3) All. E R 876[7](2003) 8 SCC 50[8]AIR 1932 PC 165 at p. 167[9]AIR 1970 SC 1[10]2005 AIR SCW 5851 at page 5857[11](1988) 1 SCC 40[12](1999) 8 SCC 16[13]2000 (3) ALD 520[14]2000 (3) ALD 520[15]AIR 1962 SC 1893[16]AIR 1961 SC 372[17](1979) 2 ALL ER 440[18]AIR 1967 SC 1274[19]AIR 1975 SC 2135[20]AIR 2003 SC 3290[21]AIR 1997 AP 121[22]AIR 1970 SC 1102[23]1980 (3) SCC 402[24]AIR 1955 SC 549[25]1998 (5) ALD 565