EP/20/2009 of Regu Maheshwara Rao Vs Vyricherla Kishore Chandra Suryanarayana Deo on 31 December 2010

1. (1969) 3 SCC 238 23.(1980) 3 SCC 169

2. (2009)10 SCC 541 24. (2003) 8 SCC 204

3.1987 (supp) SCC 93 25.1984 (SUPP)SCC77

4. (2006) 4 SCC 98 26. (1995) 4 SCC 32

5. AIR 1969 SC 597 27. (2003) 8 SCC 613

6. AIR 2001 SC 393 28. AIR 1972 SC 608

7. (1996) 3 SCC 576 29. (1981) 1 SCC 80

8. AIR 1965 SC 183 30. AIR 1954 BOM 305

9. AIR 1954 SC 139 31. AIR 1956 MAD 226

10. AIR 1957 SC 857 32. AIR 1956 SC 59311. AIR 1973 SC 626 33. AIR 1967 SC 25612. AIR 1964 SC 880 34. AIR 1995 SC 16713. AIR 1963 SC 1633 35. 1988 (1) ALT 91514. AIR 1968 SC 1413 36. AIR 1983 BOM.115. AIR 1971 SC 1865 37. (2010) 9 SCC 71216. AIR 1971 SC 2548 38. (1982) 2 SCC 20217. AIR 1983 AP 181 39. (1994) 6 SCC 24118. AIR 2000 SC 426 40. (2008) 2 SCC 18619. AIR 2000 SC 285720. AIR 2001 SC 253221. AIR 2006 KAR 23122.2005 AIR SCW 6197

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE K.C.BHANU

ELECTION PETITON NO.20 OF 2009

DATED: 31stDAY OF DECEMBER, 2010

Between

Regu Maheswara Rao

And

1. Vyricherla Kishore Chandra Suryanarayana Deoand 11 others … Petitioner …Respondents THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE K.C.BHANU

ELECTION PETITON NO.20 OF 2009

ORDER;

This petition is filed under Section 81 r/w Section 5 (a), 100 (1)(a) and(d) (i) of the Representation of the People, Act, 1951 (for short ‘the Act1951’) to declare the election of the 1[st] respondent to 18 Araku Lok Sabha(S.T.) Parliamentary Constituency to be void and set aside the same andfurther direct the respondent No.12 to initiate proceedings for recovery ofamount from 1[st] respondent for the period enjoyed by him as Member of LokSabha.

2. Brief facts, that are necessary for disposal of the present petitionmay be delineated as follows:

The election petitioner is challenging the election of 1[st] respondent to18 Araku Lok Sabha (S.T.) Parliamentary Constituency. The election to thesaid Parliamentary Constituency was held on 16-04-2009 and 1[st] respondentwas fielded from Indian National Congress Party. Respondents 2 to 11 arethe other contesting candidates from different parties and as independents.The results of the said election was declared on 16-05-2009 and in the saidelection, the 1[st] respondent was declared elected as Member of Lok Sabhafrom 18 Araku Lok Sabha (S.T.) Parliamentary Constituency. The electionpetitioner is a registered voter and an elector from Ward No.2, Booth No.36,Sl.No.841 of Salur Municipality, Salur Assembly Constituency, which comesunder Araku Lok Sabha Parliamentary Constituency. The 1[st] respondent isa permanent resident of Fort Kurupam, Kurupam Mandal, VizianagaramDistrict. He hails from a Kshatriya family. The family is also of a Zamindar.It was known in the entire district of Vizianagaram and also in the north

coastal districts that the 1[st] respondent and his Vyricherla family belongs toKshatriya caste and they were treated in the districts as Kshatriya otherwiseknown as Rajus only. There is another family by name Shatrucharla inVizianagaram District, which also belong to Kshatriya caste. Both thefamilies are related to each other. The Vyricherla family is also related toPoosapati family of Vizianagaram district, which also belong to Kshatriya caste. To the knowledge of the petitioner, neither the 1[st] respondent nor anymember of his family has any marital or other relations with any one of thefamily belonging to Scheduled Tribes in either Vizianagaram District or anyother agency area in the State of Andhra Pradesh.

The 18 Araku Lok Sabha (S.T.) Parliamentary Constituency is reservedfor Scheduled Tribes in the elections held in the year 2009 afterdelimitation. Since the Constituency is reserved for Scheduled Tribes, onlya member belonging to any one of the Scheduled Tribes can only contestthe election. Since the 1[st] respondent does not belong to Scheduled Tribe ofVizianagaram District or for the matter in any other parts of India, he is notqualified to contest from the 18 Araku Lok Sabha (S.T.) ParliamentaryConstituency. Under Section 5 (a) of the Act, 1951, the 1[st] respondent isnot qualified to be chosen to fill a seat in a Legislative Assembly in the Stateof Andhra Pradesh, since he is not a member of any of the tribes in theState of Andhra Pradesh and contested in a seat reserved for the Scheduled Tribes. Since the 1[st] respondent was declared elected from the saidConstituency and there is a disqualification against him from contestingfrom the said constituency, the election held to the said constituency hasthus become null and void.

The petitioner having come to know that the 1[st] respondent does notbelong to any one of the Scheduled Tribe community, lodged a petitionbefore the District Collector, Vizianagaram on 01-12-2005 to conductenquiry about the social status of 1[st] respondent. Before filing the saidpetition under A.P. (SC,ST & BCs) Regulation of Issue of CommunityCertificate Act, 1993 (Act No.16 of 1993), the election petitioner gatheredinformation both oral and documentary to establish that the 1[st] respondentbelongs to Kshatriya caste, but not to any one of the Scheduled Tribecommunity. In the registered documents No.3 of 1901, 125 of 1902 and 127of 1902, on the file of the Sub Registrar, Parvathipuram, VizianagaramDistrict executed by Raja Vyricherla Surya Narayana Raja Bahadur, who was the grand father of 1[st] respondent, the executant of the documentdescribed himself as belonging to Kshatriya caste. In the decree, dated 31-03-1938 in O.S.No.3 of 1935 on the file of the Subordinate Judge,Srikakulam filed by Raja Vyricherla Surya Narayana Raja Bahadur, who wasthe grand father of 1[st] respondent, Plaintiffs 2 and 3 were the father anduncle of 1[st] respondent and they described themselves as belonging to

Kshatriya caste. In the registered document No.1870 of 1949 and thedocument executed on 28-04-1950 on the file of the Sub Registrar,Parvathipuram, Vizianagaram District executed by Vyricherla DurgaprasadVirabhadra Deo Bahadur, who was the father of 1[st] respondent, theexecutant of the document described himself as belonging to Kshatriyacaste. All these documents are executed either by the grand father or fatherof 1[st] respondent and they are public documents. In these documents boththe grand father and father of 1[st] respondent described themselves asKshatriya caste. Thus it is established that family of 1[st] respondent belongsto Kshatriya caste and the same is not included in any one of the ScheduledTribes in the State of Andhra Pradesh. Under the said circumstances, the1[st] respondent is not qualified to contest the election from 18 Araku LokSabha (S.T.) Parliamentary Constituency. The petitioner also made arepresentation to the President of India on 06-06-2006 for the samepurpose. As the District Collector, Vizianagaram, did not choose to conductenquiry against the social status of 1[st] respondent, the petitioner filedW.P.No.27205 of 2008 in this Court seeking mandamus and this Court byorder, dated 28-01-2009, issued direction to the District Collector to take final decision inthe matter on or before 15-05-2009. The petitioner also filed objections atthe time of scrutiny on 30-03-2009 before the Returning Officer to 18 Araku Lok Sabha (S.T.)Parliamentary Constituency (Respondent No.12) challenging the nominationof 1[st] respondent to the said constituency since he does not belong toScheduled Tribe. Respondent No.12 rejected the said objection filed by thepetitioner.

The 1[st] respondent thus played fraud on the Constitution of India andon voters of the 18 Araku Lok Sabha (S.T.) Parliamentary Constituencystyling himself as a person belonging to Scheduled Tribe, knowing fully wellthat he is a Kshatriya and does not belong to any one of the ScheduledTribes Community. In a case, the Supreme Court directed the concernedauthorities to recover the amounts drawn by the elected candidates towardsallowances and other perks from persons who make false claims regardingthe social status. Thus 1[st] respondent was also liable for recovery of theemoluments drawn by him for the entire tenure enjoyed by him as a memberof Lok Sabha not only in the year 2009 but earlier also.

Article 366 (25) of the Constitution of India describes who are theScheduled Tribe. According to the said definition ‘Scheduled Tribe’ meanssuch tribes or tribal communities or parts of or groups within such tribes ortribal communities as are deemed under Article 342 to be Scheduled Tribesfor the purposes of this Constitution. Under Article 342 (1) of theConstitution of India, the President may with respect to any State or UnionTerritory, and where it is a State, after consultation with the Governor

thereof, by public notification, specify the tribes or tribal communities orparts of or groups within such tribes or tribal communities which shall forthe purpose of this Constitution be deemed to be Scheduled Tribes inrelation to that State. In the schedule part-I relating to the State of AndhraPradesh, under the Scheduled Castes ad Scheduled Tribes Orders(Amendment) Act, 1976, the caste Kshatriya is not included. In Annexure-Ito A.P. (SC,ST & BCs) Regulation of Issue of Community Certificate Act,1993, the list of Scheduled Tribe Community is enumerated and in the saidlist, the caste Kshatriya is not included. In the earlier list prepared in theyear 1950 also, the caste of Kshatriya is not included in the Scheduled Tribecommunity. Thus the caste Kshatriya cannot be treated as ScheduledTribe. Hence, the election petition.

3. The 1[st] respondent filed counter affidavit denying the averments inthe election petition. It is stated that the election petitioner filed this electionpetition at the instance of political rivalries of this respondent, who areinimically disposed against him. This respondent belongs to Kshatriyacommunity and does not belong to Scheduled Tribe is totally incorrect,baseless and untenable and there is no basis for the allegation and it iswithout cause of action and is liable to be dismissed. He did not disputeabout the election held to the said constituency and he fielded as acandidate of the Indian National Congress Party. He did not dispute that heis a permanent resident of Kurupam, Kurupam Mandal, VizianagaramDistrict. Kshatriya denotes warrior class and it is not a caste. So alsoZamindar is not caste and it is only a status. Zamindar further signifies hisvocation, but not his status. Admittedly, there are only a few Zamindarsthroughout the State. Therefore, it differentiate himself from the other ryots from whom he collects the land revenue. So, the ancestors of the 1[st]respondent being the class of persons conferred with the said status andenhanced their family prestige as a warrior. Thus, the attempt of thepetitioner trying to draw inferences from the descriptions in the documentsetc do not in any way establish the fact that he does not belong to a notifiedScheduled Tribe. It is true that 18 Araku Lok Sabha (S.T.) ParliamentaryConstituency is reserved for Scheduled Tribes in the elections held in theyear 2009. As he belongs to Scheduled Tribe community, he is lawfullyentitled to contest the election from the said constituency. It is true that thepetitioner lodged a complaint before the District Collector, Vizianagaram toconduct enquiry about his social status. Pursuant to the said applicationand after following the procedure, the District Collector, Vizianagaram, afterconducting enquiry held that he belong to ‘Konda Dora’ community and byhis proceedings, dated 21-04-2010, issued a notification in terms of A.P. (SC,ST & BCs) Regulationof Issue of Community Certificate Act, 1993. The District Collectorexamined the documents and rejected them. It is not known in whatcircumstances, the recitals in the documents were made and they do not inany way establish that he belong to Kshatriya caste. He belongs to Konda Dora community, which is one of the listed Scheduled Tribes in the State ofAndhra Pradesh and as such, his election do not in any way suffer from anylegal infirmities.

It is further stated that he is the present incumbent of KurupamZamindar family of Vizianagaram District, being the descendent ofVyricherla Sanyasi Dora, the founder of Kurupam Zamindari. He belongedto ‘Konda Dora’ community, one of the hill tribes of the then VisakhapatnamDistrict. The details of the said Zamindari is vividly discussed in a manualof Vizianagaram District in the Presidency of Madras compiled and editedby D.F.Carmichael, M.C.S. 1869 and in Madras District Gazette,Vizianagaram in 1907, which clearly show that the Andhra and KurupamZamindaries were handed over to Garaya Dora and Sanyasi Dora and thatthey belonged to the Konda Dora tribe. These are historical facts noted andpublished by the authority of the Government. He did not dispute about thepetitioner filing petition before the District Collector for conducting enquiryon the social status and filing writ petition in this Court. As regards thesocial status of the respondent, it is beyond dispute that he belonged toScheduled Tribe community and there is no basis for the petitioner to allegethat the emoluments drawn by him for the entire tenure as a member of theLok Sabha not only in the year 2009 but also earlier is a statement withoutany basis, besides being false and frivolous. He did not dispute thatKshatriya caste is not included in Scheduled Castes and Scheduled TribesOrders (Amendment) Act, 1976 and in A.P. (SC,ST & BCs) Regulation ofIssue of Community Certificate Act, 1993 and the said fact has no relevanceto the case. The original and intrinsic name of the Zamindars of theKurupam ended with ‘DORA’ which was replaced by the suffix ‘RAJU’. Similarly, the grand father of this respondent was married to a woman fromTalcher, Orissa, who expired at the age of 29 years. Then, her sidemanaged the Zamindari for some time and consequently their title of ‘Deo’came to be retained by the family. A tribal has no religion and he can followany religion he likes. Admittedly, the founder of Kurupam Zamindari is not aKshatriya and perhaps the description of Kshatriya, which is a social statuson the ruling classes of Zamindars and Kings was added to signify that theyare warriors and it do not have the attributes of a caste. Perhaps in the saidcontext and the draftsman might have described the parties to a documentfor the purpose of identification, since one of them happens to be aZamindar/King. When under a document property is conveyed to apurchaser, the issue of caste does not form part of the document. Similarly,neither the prefix Vyricherla nor the suffix Raju or Deo indicate any caste orcommunity. The decision of the Governor-in-Council clearly establishes thefact that the Zamindars of Kurupam belong to hill tribes.

It is further stated that social status certificates have been issued tothe members of the Kurupam Zamindari family in various occasions formany decades stating that they belong to Scheduled Tribe community. A life

certificate is also issued by the Competent Authority after conducting adetailed enquiry as per the procedure laid down in 1993 Act. The M.R.O.Kurupam, in his report dated 19-08-2006 has stated that the genealogicaltree clearly indicates the fact that the present Zamindars of Kurupam are thedescendents of Vyricherla Sanyasi Dora, a Konda Dora of an Urya Stock,who first established this ancient chiefdom. Recently another enquiry wasconducted by the M.R.O. Kurupam and a report has been submitted by himas well as by the R.D.O. Parvathipuram confirming the original findings ofthe enquiry held in the year 1999. The tribal family has been observing therequisite rites in all of their family functions which are known as the tribalpractices. They worship the village goddess and celebrate the festival.Zamindars of Kurupam are not related to the Zamindars of Chinamerangi orSalur. The documentary evidence that has been referred along withcustomary practices that are in vogue are in controvertible and conclusiveproof of the present status. It is essential to note that all Konda Doras arenot chiefs, but chiefs from among the Konda Doras were referred to asKonda Raju/Razu.

It is further stated that another enquiry was conducted by the DistrictLevel Scrutiny Committee on 22-05-2009. In connection with this enquiry,the M.R.O. and R.D.O. Parvathipuram submitted reports to the DistrictLevel Scrutiny Committee, Vizianagaram. The District Collector andMagistrate, Vizianagaram, in his proceedings, dated 21-04-2010 confirmed the findings which reads that in exercise of thepowers conferred under sub-rule 7 of Rule 9 of A.P. (SCs, STs & BCs)issue of Community, Nativity and Date of Birth Certificates Rules, 1997communicated vide G.O.Ms.No.58 SW (J) Department, dated 12-05-1997read with Section 5 (1) of A.P. (SC/ST/BC) Regulation of issue ofCommunity Certificates Act, 16/93, Sri Vyricherla Kishore ChandraSuryanarayana Deo of Kurupam Mandal of Vizianagaram District is herebydeclared as belong to Konda Dora (ST). At page 6 of Encyclopedia of IndianTribes Series-2 titled ‘Tribes of Andhra Pradesh’ edited by PadmashriS.S.Shashi, who was Director General of Publications Division in theMinistry of Information & Broadcasting, Government of India, held that thencame Konda Doras and Mukha Doras into prominence. They got themselvesestablished as tribal chiefs claiming loyalties of the tribals inhabiting theirterritories. Thus emerged China Merangi, Kurupam, Andhra and Pachipentaestates. The first three were the seat ruled by Konda Doras, which the lastwas held by Mukha Doras. They ultimately became tributaries to theMaharaja of Jeypore or Vizianagaram. The territories of these tribal estatescovered by the present day Parvathipuram and Salur taluks of SrikakulamDistrict. These territories were then almost exclusively inhabited by tribalswho belonged to Jatapu, Khond, Gadaba,Manne Dora and Savara tribes. Therefore, he prays to dismiss the election petition with exemplary costs asit is frivolous, vexatious and aimed to harass this respondent.

4. Basing on the above pleadings, the following issues are settled fortrial:

1. Whether the 1[st] respondent belongs to Konda Dora Tribe or not?

2. To what relief?

5. On behalf of the petitioner, P.Ws. 1 to 3 are examined and Exs.P1to P12 are marked. On behalf of the 1[st] respondent, R.Ws. 1 and 2 areexamined and Exs.R1 to R4 are marked.

6. Mr. Bojja Tarakam, learned senior counsel appearing for thepetitioner contended that 1[st] respondent is a permanent resident of FortKurupam, Kurupam Mandal, Vizianagaram District, that he hails from aKshatriya family, that the family is also of a Zamindar, that it is known in theentire district of Vizianagaram and also in the north coastal districts that the1[st] respondent and Vyricherla family belong to Kshatriya community andthey are treated in the districts as Kshatriya community otherwise known asRajus, that there is another family by name Shatrucharla in VizianagaramDistrict, which also belongs to Kshatriya community, that both the familiesare related to each other, that Vyricherla family is also related to Poosapatifamily of Vizianagaram district, which also belongs to Kshatriya caste, that the 1[st] respondent nor any member of his family has any marital or othersocial relationship with any one of the families belonging to ScheduledTribes in either Vizianagaram District or any other agency areas in the State of Andhra Pradesh, that as the 1[st] respondent does not belong to ScheduledTribe of Vizianagaram District, he is not qualified to contest from the 18Araku Lok Sabha (S.T.) Parliamentary Constituency, that the certifiedcopies of registered documents Exs.P5 to P8 would clearly go to show thatcommunity of the parents of the 1[st] respondent or the 1[st] respondent wasshown as Kshatriya, that similarly the admission register of the 1[st]respondent in the school in Madras relating to the year 1963 would alsoshow that the community of the 1[st] respondent is Kshatriya, that the DistrictLevel Scrutiny Committed cancelled the caste certificate issued in favour ofthe 1[st] respondent, that the document Ex.P3 is of the year 1901, Exs.P4 andP5 are of the year 1902 whereunder the ancestors of 1[st] respondent weredescribed as Kshatriya community and those documents have not beendenied or disputed and therefore, the contents therein can be relied upon toshow the community of 1[st] respondent, that similarly the decree in O.S.3 of1935 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Srikakulam would clearly go toshow that community of the 1[st] respondent’s father is shown as Kshatriya,that the evidence of P.W.1 would go to show that 1[st] respondent hails fromKshatriya community, that the 1[st] respondent is having close maritalrelations with Poosapati family which is also Zamindari family, that one Vijaya Rama Raju, who is related to 1[st] respondent contested for Nagoorconstituency and his election was set aside by the Supreme Court, thatP.W.1 filed objection before the Returning Officer stating that the 1[st]respondent does not belong to Scheduled Tribe, but the same was rejectedby the Returning Officer arbitrarily and without assigning any reasons, thathe also filed Writ Petition before this Court to conduct an enquiry with regardto social status of the 1[st] respondent, that during the course of enquiry, the1[st] respondent himself made a statement under Ex.P12 that he belongs toKonda Raju caste, which is equivalent to Konda Dora, that on his ownadmission, Konda Raju is not included as one of the Scheduled Tribes in theConstitution (Scheduled Tribe) Order, 1950, that therefore, it is nothing butplaying fraud on the Constitution by the 1[st] respondent and hence, he praysthat the election of the 1[st] respondent has to be declared as void.

7. On the other hand, Mr. B.Adinarayana Rao, learned seniorcounsel appearing for the 1[st] respondent contended that the 1[st] respondentbelongs to Konda Dora tribe which is recognized as Scheduled Tribe, thathe previously contested in the elections held in 1977 to 1984, 1989, 1991,1999 and 2004 as a Scheduled Tribe, that his social status was never inissue before any authority, that Kshatriya is not a community, it is a warriorclass, that his ancestors were tribal chiefs and Zamindars of Kurupam, thatthe original founder of Kurupam belongs to Konda Dora tribe, which can beseen from the Madras District Gazette, that the tribal community are havingno religion, that the registered documents filed by the petitioner are said tohave written by the Diwan which are meant for identification of individual,that therefore, the issue of caste or community as noted in the documents cannot be taken in deciding the community of 1[st] respondent, that merelybecause the community of 1[st] respondent is shown as Kshatriya in thedocuments Exs.P5 to P8, the same cannot be a sole basis for determiningthe community of a person, that the manual of Visakhapatnam shows thatancestors of 1[st] respondent belongs to Konda Dora tribe and those tribeswere found in the Vizianagaram District, that his paternal ancestor was oneSanyasi Dora who was a tribal chief, that the social status certificates wereissued for Kurupam Zamindaries as belonging to Scheduled Tribe in variousoccasions, that a detailed enquiry was conducted by the competent revenue officials, which would clearly reveal that 1[st] respondent belongs to KondaDora, that he never played fraud on the constitution in obtaining socialstatus certificate, that mere marking of the documents by the petitionerdoes not amount to proving the contents therein, that the contents thereincannot be said to be conclusive proof of the facts stated therein, that theschool admission register Ex.P9 is not shown to have been maintained as authorized by any statute, that burden of proving that the 1[st] respondentdoes not belong to Konda Dora is heavily on the petitioner, that the oralevidence of P.W.1 and the documents Exs.P3 to P9 would not conclusively prove that 1[st] respondent belongs to Kshatriya community and the chargeagainst the 1[st] respondent has not been proved beyond all reasonable doubtand hence, he prays to dismiss the election petition.

8. Both the learned counsel relied upon several decisions, which willbe referred to at appropriate time.

9. ISSUE NO. 1:

Under Section 80 of the Act, 1951, no election shall be called inquestion except by an election petition presented in accordance with theprovisions as mentioned in Chapter 2. Section 81 of the Act, 1951 providesfor presentation of election petition, which reads thus:

“81 Presentation of petitions:- (1) An election petition calling in question any election may be presented on one or more of the grounds specified insub-section (1) of Section 100 and Section 101 (High Court) by any candidateat such election or any elector within forty five days from, but not earlierthan, the date of election of the returned candidate, or if there are more thanone returned candidate at the election and dates of their election aredifferent, the later of those two dates).

10. Section 82 of the Act, 1951 deals with parties to the electionpetition, whereas Section 83 of the Act,1951 deals with contents of theelection petition, which reads thus:

“83 Contents of petition:- (1) An election petition- a)shall contain a concise statement of the material facts on which thepetitioner relies;petitioner relies;

b)shall set forth full particulars of any corrupt practice that thepetitioner alleges, including as full a statement as possible of thenames of the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt practiceand the date and place of the commission of each such practice; andpetitioner alleges, including as full a statement as possible of thenames of the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt practiceand the date and place of the commission of each such practice; and

c)shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner laiddown in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) for theverification of pleadings.down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) for theverification of pleadings.

Provided that where the petitioner alleges any corrupt practice, thepetition shall be accompanied by an affidavit in the prescribed form insupport of the allegation of such corrupt practice and the particularsthereof.petition shall be accompanied by an affidavit in the prescribed form insupport of the allegation of such corrupt practice and the particularsthereof.

(2) Any schedule or annexure to the petition shall also be signed by the petitioner and verified in the same manner as the petition.

The grounds to challenge the election of a returned candidate areprescribed in sub-section (1) of Section 100 and 101 of the Act, 1951.Clauses (1) and (2) of Section 83 of the Act, 1951 make it mandatory on thepetitioner to furnish concise statement not only material facts necessary toconstitute cause of action, but also the necessary particulars to put thereturned candidate in notice of the details of the charge, he is calling uponto meet. If vague, ambiguous or bald statements are made in the electionpetition, they do not satisfy the requirements of the said provision.

11. As seen from the arguments advanced by the learned counselappearing for the petitioner, the only ground taken to challenge the election of the 1[st] respondent is under Section 100 (1) (a) of the Act, 1951, whichreads thus:

“100. Grounds for declaring election to be void:- (1) Subject to theprovisions of sub-section (2) , if the High Court is of opinion-provisions of sub-section (2) , if the High Court is of opinion- (a)that on the date of his election a returned candidate was not qualified,or was disqualified to be chosen to fill the seat under the Constitutionor this Act;or was disqualified to be chosen to fill the seat under the Constitutionor this Act; From the above provision, if the High Court is of the opinionthat onthe date of his election a returned candidate was not qualified, or wasdisqualified to be chosen to fill the seat under the Constitution of India orunder the Act 1951 or under the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963,it shall declare the election of the returned candidate to be void.

12. In SAMANT N.BALKRISHNA AND ANOTHER V GEORGE FERNANDEZ ANDOTHERS[[1]]with regard to showing in the election petition the concisestatement of material facts with reference to Section 83 of the Act, 1951,wherein it was held thus:

“The Section is mandatory and requires first a concise statement of materialfacts and then requires the fully possible particulars. What is the thedifference between material facts and particulars? The word ‘material’ showsthat the facts necessary to formulate a complete cause of action must bestated. Omission of a single material fact leads to an incomplete cause ofaction and the statement of claim becomes bad. The function of particularsis to present as full a picture of the cause of action with such furtherinformation in detail as to make the opposite party understand the case hewill have to meet.”

13. In RAM SUKH V DINESH AGGARWAL [[2]] on the ground that what arethe material facts with reference to the election law, wherein it was held thus (para 15):“AT this juncture, in order to appreciate the real object and purport of thephrase "material facts", particularly with reference to election law, it wouldbe appropriate to notice distinction between the phrases "material facts" asappearing in clause (a) and "particulars" as appearing in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 83. As stated above, "material facts" are primary orbasic facts which have to be pleaded by the petitioner to prove his cause ofaction and by the defendant to prove his defence. "particulars", on the otherhand, are details in support of the material facts, pleaded by the parties.They amplify, refine and embellish material facts by giving distinctive touchto the basic contours of a picture already drawn so as to make it full, moreclear and more informative. Unlike "material facts" which provide the basicfoundation on which the entire edifice of the election petition is built,"particulars" are to be stated to ensure that opposite party is not taken bysurprise.”

14. In DHARTIPAKAR MADAL LAL AGARWAL V RAJIV GANDHI [[3]],wherein itwas held thus (para 14):

“BEFORE we consider various paras of the election petition todetermine the correctness of the High Court order we think it necessary tobear in mind the nature of the right to elect, the right to be elected and theright to dispute election and the trial of the election petition. Right to contestelection or to question the election by means of an election petition isneither common law nor fundamental right instead it is a statutory rightregulated by the statutory provisions of the Representation of the People Act,1951. There is no fundamental or common law right in these matters. This is

well settled by catena of decisions of this Court in N. P. Ponnuswami v.Returning Officer 1952 SCR 218: (AIR 1952 SC 14), Jagan Nath v. JaswantSingh AIR 1954 SC 210, Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal (1982) 3 SCR 318 : (AIR1982 SC 983 ). These decisions have settled the legal position that outsidethe statutory provisions there is no right to dispute an election. TheRepresentation of the People Act is a complete and self contained Codewithin which any rights claimed in relation to an election or an electiondispute must be found. The provisions of the Civil Procedure Code areapplicable to the extent as permissible by S. 87 of the Act. The scheme of theAct as noticed earlier would show that an election can be questioned underthe statute as provided by S. 80 on the grounds as contained in S. 100 of theAct. Section 83 lays down a mandatory provision in providing that anelection petition shall contain a concise statement of material facts and setforth full particulars of corrupt practice. The pleadings are regulated by S. 83and it makes it obligatory on the election petitioner to give the requisitefacts, details and particulars of each corrupt practice with exactitude. If theelection petition fails to make out a ground under S. 100 of the Act it mustfail at the threshold. Allegations of corrupt practice are in the nature ofcriminal charges, it is necessary that there should be no vagueness in theallegations so that the returned candidate may know the case he has to meet.If the allegations are vague and general and the particulars of corruptpractice are not stated in the pleadings, the trial of the election petitioncannot proceed for want of cause of action. The emphasis of law is to avoida fishing and roving inquiry. It is therefore necessary for the Court toscrutinise the pleadings relating to corrupt practice in a strict manner”

15. The word ‘Schedule Tribe’ is defined under Article 366 (25) of theConstitution of India, which means such tribes or tribal communities orparts of or groups within such tribes or tribal communities as are deemedunder Article 342 to be Scheduled Tribes for the purposes of thisConstitution. Article 342 (1) of the Constitution of India reads that, thePresident may with respect to any State or Union Territory, and where it isa State, after consultation with the Governor thereof, by public notification,specify the tribes or tribal communities or parts of or groups within suchtribes or tribal communities which shall for the purpose of this Constitutionbe deemed to be Scheduled Tribes in relation to the State or UnionTerritory, as the case may be. The object of the above provision is toprovide additional protection to the members of the Schedule Tribe havingregard to the economic, social and educational backwardness from whichthey suffer. To specify the tribes, the President has authorized to limit thenotification applicable to the certain areas and inclusion of certain tribes. Therefore, the list of Tribes or Tribal Communities is now contained in theConstitution (Schedule Tribe) Order, 1950 as amended from time to timehas to be taken as final. Once an entry is made in the presidential order inrespect of a tribe after consultation with the Governor by a publicnotification specifying the tribes which shall be for the purposes ofconstitution be deemed to be a Schedule Tribe in relation to that State. Once a particular Tribe is included in the list of presidential order inpursuance of the law made by the Parliament, it is not open to any authorityincluding Court or State Government or Central Government to make anyaddition or subtraction of list of tribes from the presidential order. In STATEOF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS V MANA ADIM JAMAI MANDAL [[4]],wherein it washeld thus(para 9):

“IT is now well settled principle of law that no authority, other than theParliament by law, can amend the Presidential Orders. Neither the StateGovernments nor the courts nor the Tribunals nor any authority can assumejurisdiction to hold inquiry and take evidence to declare that a caste or atribe or part of or a group within a caste or tribe is included in PresidentialOrders in one entry or the other although they are not expressly andspecifically included. A court cannot alter or amend the said PresidentialOrders for the very good reason that it has no power to do so within themeaning, content and scope of Articles 341 and 342. It is not possible tohold that either any inquiry is permissible or any evidence can be let in, inrelation to a particular caste or tribe to say whether it is included withinpresidential Orders when it is not so expressly included or exclude aparticular caste or tribe or group of castes or tribes when they are expresslyincluded”

In PARSRAM AND ANOTHER V SHIVCHAND AND OTHERS[[5]], it was held thus:

“These judgments are binding on us and we do not therefore think that itwould be of any use to look into the gazeteers and the glossaries on thePunjab castes and tribes to which reference was made at the Bar to find outwhether mochi and chamar in some parts of the State at least meant thesame caste although there might be some difference in the professionsfollowed by their members, the main difference being that Chamars skindead animals which mochis do not. However that may be, the question notbeing open to agitation by evidence and being one the determination ofwhich lies within the exclusive power of the President, it is not for us toexamine it and come to a conclusion that if a person was in fact a mochi, hecould still claim to belong to the scheduled caste of chamars and be allowedto contest an election on that basis” “

In STATE OF MAHARASHTRA V MILIND AND OTHERS[[6]], it was held thus:

“IN the light of what is stated above, the following positions emerge :-

1. It is not at all permissible to hold any enquiry or let in any evidence todecide or declare that any tribe or tribal community or part of or groupwithin any tribe or tribal community is included in the general name eventhough it s not specifically mentioned in the concerned Entry in theConstitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950.

2. The Scheduled Tribes Order must be read as it is. It is not evenpermissible to say that a tribe, sub-tribe, part of or group of any tribe ortribal community is synonymous to the one mentioned in the ScheduledTribes Order if they are not so specifically mentioned in it.

3. A notification issued under Clause (1) of Article 342, specifying ScheduledTribes, can be amended only by law to be made by the Parliament. In otherwords, any tribe or tribal community or part of or group within any tribe canbe included or excluded from the list of Scheduled Tribes issued underClause (1) of Article 342 only by the Parliament by law and by no otherauthority.

4. It is not open to State Governments or Courts or tribunals or any otherauthority to modify, amend or alter the list of Scheduled Tribes specified inthe notification issued under Clause (1) of Article 342.

5. Decisions of the Division Benches of this Court in Bhaiya Ram Munda v.Anirudh Patra, (1971) 1 SCR 804 : (AIR 1971 SC 2533) and Dina v. NarayanSingh, (1968) 38 ELR 212, did not lay down law correctly in stating that theenquiry was permissible and the evidence was admissible within thelimitations indicated for the purpose of showing what an entry in thePresidential Order was intended to be. As stated in position (1) above noenquiry at all is permissible and no evidence can be let in, in thematter.”

16. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner relied upon adecision reported in NITYANAND SARMA AND ANOTHER V STATE OF BIHAR

AND OTHERS[[7]], wherein it was held thus:

“ IN view of the respective contentions, the question that arises forconsideration is: whether the Court can give declaration of the social statusas a Tribe or declare Lohars as Scheduled Tribes in the Act and theSchedule of the Act? Clause (24) of Article 366 defines "scheduled Castes"and clause (25) of Article 366 defines "scheduled Tribes". The latter means"such tribes or tribal communities or parts of or groups within such tribes ortribal communities as are deemed under Article 342 to be Scheduled Tribesfor the purpose of this Constitution" (Emphasis supplied ). Article 341 (1)empowers the President, in consultation with the Governor of the concernedState to specify Scheduled Castes by public notification. Equally, Art. 342 (1)empowers the President "with respect to any State or Union territory, andwhere it is a State, after consultation with the Governor thereof, by publicnotification to specify the Tribes or Tribal communities or parts of or groupswithin tribes or tribal communities which shall for the purposes of theConstitution be deemed to be Scheduled Tribes in relation to that State orUnion territory, as the case may be". Art. 342 (2) empowers the Parliament,by law, to include in or exclude from the list of Scheduled Tribes specifiedin a notification issued under clause (1), any tribe or tribal community orpart of or group within any tribe or tribal community, but save as aforesaid anotification issued under the said clause shall not be varied by anysubsequent notification. In other words it is the constitutional mandate thatthe tribes or tribals communities or parts of or groups within such tribes ortribal communities specified by the President, after consultation with theGovernor in the public notification, will be Scheduled Tribes subject to thelaw made by the Parliament alone, which may, by law, include in or excludefrom the list of Scheduled Tribes specified by the President. Thereafter, itcannot be varied except by Parliament. The specification is for the purposeof the Constitution. “

17. It is not in dispute that the election petitioner is a registered voterand elector from Ward No.2, Booth No.36, Sl.No.841 of Salur Municipality,Salur Assembly Constituency, which comes under Araku Lok SabhaParliamentary Constituency. The election to the 18 Araku Lok Sabha (S.T.)Parliamentary Constituency was held on

16-04-2009. The 1[st] respondent contested on behalf of Indian NationalCongress Party. Respondents 2 to 11 are other contesting candidates fromvarious parties and also as independents. The result of the said electionwas declared on 16-05-2009, whereunder the 1[st] respondent was declaredas member of Lok Sabha from the said constituency. The election petitionerin order to succeed the petition must establish the charge leveled againstthe 1[st] respondent beyond all reasonable doubt. In election trial, however,intriguing may be facts and circumstances of the case, the charges madeagainst the returned candidate must be proved beyond all reasonable doubtand the requirement of proof cannot lie in the realm of surmises andconjectures. In a election trial, the degree of proof is stricker than what isrequired in a civil proceeding. The test beyond reasonable doubt is reallythe estimate, which a prudent man makes of the probabilities, having regardto what must be his duty as a result of an estimate. In each case whetherthe proof of the case for the election petitioner or proof of defence set up byreturned candidate, it is the estimate of probabilities arrived at from hispractical stand point by a prudent man. Reasonableness of the doubt must be commensurate with the nature of the charge to be enquired during trial. On this aspect it is pertinent to refer to the decision reported in JAGDEVSINGH SIDHANTI V PRATAP SINGH DAULTA[[8]], wherein it was held thus:

“IT may be remembered that in the trial of an election petition, the burden ofproving that the election of a successful candidate is liable to be set asideon the plea that he was responsible directly or through his agents for corruptpractices at the election, lies heavily upon the applicant to establish hiscase, and unless it is established in both its branches i. e. the commissionof acts which the law regards as corrupt, and the responsibility of thesuccessful candidate directly or through his agents or with his consent forits practice not by mere preponderance of probability, but by cogent andreliable evidence beyond any reasonable doubt, the petition must fail. Theevidence may be examined bearing this approach to the evidence in mind.

18. According to the evidence of P.W.1, the 1[st] respondent hails fromKshatriya family, that the 1[st] respondent was having close marital and socialrelationship with Poosapati family, which is also Kshatriya family, that the1[st] respondent family in Kurupam Mandal is not belonging to any one of theScheduled Tribes and Exs.P3 to P5 which are the certified copies ofregistered documents executed by the grand father of 1[st] respondentwhereunder the executant described himself as Kshatriya community. Healso stated that in Ex.P6-decree in O.S.No.3 of 1935 on the file of theSubordinate Judge Court, Srikakulam, which was filed by the grand fatherand father of the 1[st] respondent, wherein they were shown as plaintiff Nos. 2and 3 and that 1[st] plaintiff therein was the paternal uncle of the 1[st]respondent herein. All the plaintiffs in the said suit described themselves asKshatriyas. Similarly, in Exs.P7 and P8, which are the certified copies ofregistered documents executed by the father of the 1[st] respondent,whereunder he described himself as Kshatriya. He also filed Ex.P9, whichis school admission of 1[st] respondent, whereunder the community of the 1[st]respondent was shown as Kshatriya at relevant column. All thesedocuments were marked subject to objection with regard to admissibility,relevancy and proof.

19. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that thesedocuments are of more than 30 years old and execution of those documentshave not been specifically denied or disputed, the contents of documentsare proof of fact stated therein. The evidence of R.W.1 shows that Diwan ofKurupam Zamindar might have described community of his grand father inthe document as Kshatriya and that cannot be taken as a conclusive proofof the contents therein.

20. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner relied on a decisionreported in BISWAMBHAR SINGH AND OTHERS V STATE OF ORISSA ANDANOTHER[[9]], wherein it was held thus:

admitted the existence and contents of the Ekarnama, secondly evidence is,strictly speaking, admissible under section 65 (b) of the Indian Evidence Act.It may also be mentioned here that in the grounds of appeal set forth in thepetition for leave to this Court no grievance was made that secondaryevidence of the contents of the Ekrarnama had been wrongly let in. In thecircumstances, this appellant cannot now be heard to complain ofadmission of inadmissible evidence as to the terms of the Ekrarnama. Apartfrom this, the recital of the Ekrarnama and its terms in an ancient publicdocument like the Rubakari whose authenticity has not been, nor indeedcould be doubted furnishes evidence of the existence and genuineness ofthe settlement arrived at by the parties.”

In the above decision the contents of the documents are in disputenamely with regard to the payment of fixed annual rent. No objection istaken as to the admissibility on the ground that Ekarnama is merelysecondary evidence of the document. Hence, it is held that Ekarnamafurnishes the evidence of existence. But in this case the contents of thecertified copies of the documents are not relying upon by the petitioner, butthe petitioner filed the certified copies of Exs.P3 to P9 for the purpose of showing the community of the 1[st] respondent or his ancestors. Therefore,the above decision has no relevancy in the case of Election Petition.

21. He further relied on a decision reported in MUBARAK ALI AHMED V STATE OF BOMBAY[[10]], wherein it was held thus:

“Learned counsel objected to this approach on a question of proof. We are,however, unable to see any objection. The proof of the genuineness of adocument is proof of the authorship of the document and is proof of a factlike that of any other fact. The evidence relating thereto may be direct orcircumstantial. It may consist of direct evidence of a person who saw thedocument being written or the signature being affixed. It may be proof of thehandwriting of the contents, or of the signature, by one of the modesprovided in ss. 45 and 47 of the Indian Evidence Act. It may also be provedby internal evidence afforded by the contents of the document. This lastmode of proof by the contents may be of considerable value where thedisputed document purports to be a link in a chain of correspondence, somelinks in which are proved to the satisfaction of the court. In such a situationthe person who is the recipient of the document, be it either a letter or atelegram, would be in a reasonably good position both with reference to hisprior knowledge of the writing or the signature of the alleged sender, limitedthough it may be, as also his knowledge of the subject matter of the chain ofcorrespondence, to speak to its authorship.”

There is no possibility to adduce evidence with regard to execution ofdocument by the parties thereto. An objection was taken for marking Ex.P3and Exs.P5 to P9. There is no dispute about the ratio laid down by the apexCourt with regard to proof of handwriting of the contents or the signature asby way of one of the modes prescribed under Sections 45 and 47 of theIndian Evidence Act, 1872.

22. He further relied on a decision reported in SMT. PREM LATA V

ARHANT KUMAR JAIN[[11]], wherein it was held thus:

“MR. O. P. Verma, the learned counsel for the appellant, contended that thetrial Court as well as the appellate Court had wrongly placed the burden onthe appellant to prove that she had good grounds to leave the husband's house and because of that erroneous approach those courts have come to awrong conclusion. The question of burden of proof has no importance atthis stage. Both parties have adduced evidence and the trial Court and theappellate Court have appreciated that evidence.”

23. He further relied on a decision reported in KALVA DEVADATTAM

AND OTHERS V UNION OF INDIA[[12]], wherein it was held thus:

“The question of onus probably is certainly important in the early stages of acase. It may also assume importance where no evidence at all is led on thequestion in dispute by either side; in such a contingency the party on whomthe Onus lies to prove a certain fact must fail. Where however evidence hasbeen led by the contesting parties on the question in issue, abstractconsiderations of onus are out of place; truth or otherwise of the case mustalways be adjudged on the evidence led by the parties.”

The ratio laid down in the above decisions has no application to thepresent facts of the case especially in case of dispute challenging theelection of returned candidate.

24. He further relied on a decision reported in MADAMANCHIRAMAPPA AND ANOTHER V MUTHALURU BOJAPPA[[13]], wherein it was heldthus:

“AGGRIEVED by the decree passed in his appeal by the District Court, therespondent moved the High Court under S. 100 C. P. C. , and his appeal washeard by Sanjeeva Rao Nayudu J. The learned Judge emphasised the factthat no sale-deed had been produced by the appellants to prove their title,and then examined the documentary evidence on which they relied. He wasinclined to hold that Ext. A-8 have not been proved at all and could nottherefore, be received in evidence. It has been fairly conceded by Mr. Sastrifor the respondent before us that this was plainly erroneous in law. Thedocument in question being a Certified copy of a public document need nothave been proved by calling a witness. Besides, no objection had beenraised about the mode of proOf either in the trial Court or in the DistrictCourt. The learned Judge then examined the question as to whether the saiddocument was genuine, and he thought that it was a doubtful document andno weight could be attached to it. A similar comment was made by him inrespect of the cist receipts on which both the courts of fact had acted. In hisopinion, the said documents were also not genuine and could not beaccepted as reliable. He then referred to the fact that the appellants hadoffered security in proceedings between the respondent and his judgmentdebtor Boya Krishnappa, and held that the said conduct destroyed theappellants' case; and he also relied on the fact that the lease-deedsproduced by the appellants had been disbelieved and that also weakenedtheir case. It is on these considerations that the learned Judge set aside theconcurrent findings recorded by the courts below, allowed the secondappeal preferred by the respondent and directed that the appellants' suitshould be dismissed with costs throughout. It is the validity of this decreewhich is challenged before us by the appellants and the principal ground onwhich the challenge rests is that in reversing concurrent findings of factrecorded by the courts below, the learned Judge has clearly contravened theprovisions of S. 100 of the Code.”

In this case also, it is not in dispute that certified copies of the publicdocuments are filed. An objection has been taken at the time of markingExs.P3 to P9.

25. He further relied on a decision reported in GOPALA KRISHNAJI

KETKAR V MOHAMMED HAJI LATIF[[14]], wherein it was held thus:

“We are unable to accept this argument as correct. Even if the burden ofproof does not lie on a party the Court may draw an adverse inference if hewithholds important documents in his possession which can throw light onthe facts at issue. It is not, in our opinion, a sound practice for thosedesiring to rely upon a certain state of facts to withhold from the Court thebest evidence which is in their possession which could throw light upon theissues in controversy and to rely upon the abstract doctrine of onus ofproof.”

That is a case where the attachment of immovable propertiesbelonging to the joint family of one Nagappa as Nagappa did not pay the tax.In that context, it was held that the evidence was let in by both the parties.The abstract doctrine of onus of proof is out of place. But in Election Laws,the Election Petitioner must prove the charge as required to be proved in acriminal case.

26. He further relied on a decision reported in SAIT TARAJEEKHIMCHAND AND OTHERS V YELAMARTI SATYAM AND OTHERS[[15]],wherein it was held thus:

“THE plaintiffs wanted to rely on Exhibits A-12 and A-13, the day book andthe ledger respectively. The plaintiffs did not prove these books. There is noreference to these books in the judgments. The mere marking of an exhibitdoes not dispense with the proof of documents. It is common place to saythat the negative cannot be proved. The proof of the plaintiffs' books ofaccount became important because the plaintiffs' accounts were impeachedand falsified by the defendants' case of larger payments than those admittedby the plaintiffs. The irresistible inference arises that the plaintiff's bookswould not have supported the plaintiffs.”

There is no dispute about the proposition of law laid down by the apexCourt. Even this decision would not come to the aid of petitioners case asmere marking of documents does not dispense with the proof of documents.

27. He further relied on a decision reported in DATTATREYA V

RAGHUNATH GOPALRAO KAWATHEKAR[[16]], wherein it was held thus:“What facts and circumstances have to be established to prove theexecution of a document depend on the pleas put forward. If the only pleataken is that the executant has not signed the document and that thedocument is a forgery, party seeking to prove the execution of a documentneed not adduce evidence to show that the party who signed the documentknew the contents of the document. Ordinarily no one is expected to sign adocument without knowing its contents but if it is pleaded that the partywho signed the document did not know the contents of the document then itmay it certain circumstances be necessary for the party seeking to prove thedocument to place material before the court to satisfy it that the party whosigned the document had the knowledge of its contents.”

That is a case where the point arises for determination is whether theexecutant has signed the deed with the knowledge of its contents. When aperson who signed the document pleads ignorance in certaincircumstances, it may be necessary for the party seeking to prove thedocuments to satisfy the Court that the executant had knowledge of itscontents. Therefore, the above decision may not be applicable for the purpose of deciding the issue here.

28. He further relied on a decision reported in SMT. VIJAYA KARI V

SMT.KONDAMURI SWARNALATHA[[17]], wherein it was held thus:“Under the Educational Rules every school is obligated to maintain registerof admissions with the prescribed particulars and such records can beconsidered as official records admissible under Sec 35 of the EVIDENCEACT, 1872. Section 35 of the EVIDENCE ACT, 1872 provides that thedocument or record maintained pursuant to any legal obligation is an officialdocument admissible under section 35 of the EVIDENCE ACT, 1872. In viewof the fact that the registers are maintained in every school in view of thestatutory compulsion they can be considered as official records andadmissible under Sec. 35 of the Evidence act and as such Section 35 doesnot forbid the admissibility of Ex. B 6 in the instant case”

In view of the above decision, it is clear that a register is maintainedas enjoined by Madras Educational Rules whereunder a private school isrequired to keep register of admissions. Therefore, such register comeswithin the meaning of Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. That is acase where with reference to the relevancy and admissibility of date of birthmentioned in the school register. Therefore, it is contended by learnedcounsel for the petitioner that Ex.P9 can be used as evidence in view of thefact that it has been proved by the Head Master of the school. To whatextent the contents in Ex.P9can be taken as evidence is required to be seenwith reference to the other surrounding facts and circumstances of the case.

29. He further relied on a decision reported in ISHWAR DASS JAIN VSOHAN LAL[[18]], wherein it was held thus:

“The mode of proof of documents required to be attested is contained inSections 68 to 71 of the Evidence Act. Under Section 68, if the execution of adocument required to be attested is to be proved, it will be necessary to callan attesting witness, if alive and subject to the process of Court and iscapable of giving evidence. But in case the document is registered thenexcept in the case of a will it is not necessary to call an attesting witness,unless the execution has been specifically denied by the person by whom itpurports to have been executed. This is clear from Section 68 of theEvidence Act. It reads as follows :"section 88 : If a document is required by law to be attested, it shall not beused as evidence until one attesting witness at least has been called for thepurpose of proving its execution, if there be an attesting witness alive, andsubject to the process of the Court and capable of giving evidence :Provided that it shall not be necessary to call an attesting witness in proof ofthe execution of any document, not being a will, which has been registeredin accordance with the provisions of the Indian Registration Act, 1908,unless its execution by the person by whom it purports to have beenexecuted is specifically denied.”

30. He further relied on a decision reported in ROSAMMALISSEETHEENAMMAL FERNANDEZ V JOOSA MARIYAN FERNANDEZ[[19]],wherein it was held thus:“THE aforesaid pleading leaves to no room of doubt about denial ofexecution of the said documents. The pleading records, that defendants Nos.1 and 2 forged the signature of the father after influencing the sub-registrar.The denial cannot be more stronger than what is recorded here. Once whenthere is denial made by the plaintiff, it cannot be doubted that the proviso willnot be attracted”

That is a case with regard to relevancy and admissibility of copy ofthe deed of mortgage and with regard to proving of execution of anydocument which is required by law to be attested and in such a case, oneattesting witness has to be called as a witness. Therefore, the abovedecisions have no application to the present facts of the case.

31. He further relied on a decision reported in STATE OF HARYANA VRAM SINGH[[20]], wherein it was held thus:

“SECTION 51a of the Act is to the same effect. In Land Acquisition Officerand Mandal Revenue Officer v. V. Narasaiah, (2001 AIR SCW 867 : AIR 2001SC 1117) (supra), it was held that by virtue of Section 51-A, a certified copy ofa document registered under the Registration Act, 1908 including a copyunder Section 57 of the Act may be accepted as evidence of the transactionrecorded in such documents. It is open to the Court to accept the certifiedcopy as reliable evidence and without examining parties to the documents.This does not however preclude the Court from rejecting the transactionitself as being mala fide or sham provided such a challenge is laid beforethe Court.”

The above decision has no application to the present facts of the casein view of the fact that by virtue of Section 51-A of the Land Acquisition Act,the Court can accept the certified copy as a reliable evidence. Even underEvidence Act, also a certified copy of the registered sale deed is admissiblein evidence in certain circumstances and does not need to be proved bycalling a witness.

32. He further relied on a decision reported in BHIMAPPA ANDOTHERS V ALLISAB AND OTHERS[[21]], wherein it was held thus:

“It has to be established by producing documents under which he isclaiming title, most of the time under a registered document. Insofar asdocuments are concerned Section 61 of the Evidence Act mandates that thecontents of documents may be proved either by primary or secondaryevidence. Primary evidence means the documentary evidence produced forinspection of the Court. Therefore, when a particular fact is to be establishedby production of documentary evidence there is no scope for leading oralevidence and there is no scope for personal knowledge. What is to beproduced is the primary evidence, i. e. , document itself”

There is no dispute about the fact that when original document isfiled, proving of document by examining the persons who are well versedwith the document or by examining the attesting witnesses or the executantof the document does not arise.

33. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed strong reliance on thedecision reported in SATRUCHARLA VIJAYA RAMA RAJU V NIMMAKA JAYA

RAJU AND OTHERS[[22]], wherein it was held thus:

“LEARNED senior counsel for the appellant made a strenuous attempt tocontend that the learned Judge of the High Court had wrongly placed theburden of proof in the case. We cannot agree. The trial judge has rightlyproceeded on the basis that the initial burden was on the election petitionerto establish his plea that the appellant did not belong to a Scheduled Tribe.Though in a prior statement an assertion in one's own interest, may not be

evidence, a prior statement, adverse to one's interest would be evidence. Infact, it would be the best evidence the opposite party can rely upon.Therefore, in the present case, where the appellant is pleading that he is aKonda dora, the statement in the series of documents, pre-constitution andpost constitution, executed by his ancestors and members of his familyincluding himself describing themselves as 'kshatriyas', would operate asadmissions against the interest of the appellant in the present case. Theseadmissions also strengthened the admission of the appellant that in hisschool leaving certificate also, he is described as a 'kshatriya' and hispaternal uncle's son is also described as a 'kshatriya' in his school leavingcertificate and that uncle's son was also held to be a 'kshatriya' on anenquiry made in that behalf. Therefore, in our view, the trial judge wascorrect in holding that the election petitioner had discharged the initialburden placed on him and the burden shifted to the appellant to establishthat he belonged to the 'konda Dora' Tribe.”

34. He also relied on a decision reported in SMT. RADHA BAI

ANANDA RAO V S.SUVARNA CUMAR AND ANOTHER[[23]], wherein it was heldthus:

“IT would thus appear that documents Ex. A 4 (c), B 8, B 5 and B 7, whichwere recorded during the period 2/06/192 4/09/1944, show that the elderbrother of the appellant as well as her younger lister and brother wererecorded as belonging to the 'koya' scheduled tribe in the school registers.The appellant was a child when entries Exs. A4 (c) and B 8 were made, andshe was quite a young girl when entries Exs. B 5 and B 7 were made, andshe could not possibly have thought that there was any advantage inrecording the tribe of her brothers and sister as 'koya' during that period,which was long before the issue of the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes)Order, 1950”

The documents filed by election petitioner therein to show thecommunity of returned candidate appear to have not denied or disputed. Inthat context, it is observed by Supreme Court that Exs.A2 to A11 read withEx.A23 and oral evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 8 and Exs.C1 to C10 therein, theburden shifts to the returned candidate to establish that he belongs to KondaDora community. But in this case specific objection was taken with regardto marking of Exs.P3 to P9. Therefore, the contents with regard tocommunity of ancestors of 1[st] respondent in these documents cannot beread as evidence. At best the contents with regard to community of 1[st]respondent mentioned therein can be used to support other evidence if any,on record.

35. He also relied on a decision reported in PUNIT RAI V DINESHCHAUDHARY[[24]], wherein it was held thus:

“THE case of the parties is clear from their pleadings and the evidence adduced bythem as indicated above. The petitioner challenged the status of respondent Dineshchaudhary as a Scheduled Caste person belonging to the S. C. community.Precisely what was indicated in support of that case is that father of DineshChaudhary and Naresh chaudhary is Bhagwan Singh who is Kurmi by caste marriedto Jago Devi, also a Kurmi lady. The High Court has also observed that a personborne in a Kurmi family normally would be presumed that he is Kurmi by caste. Inthis background the initial burden of the petitioner would stand discharged and itwould shift upon the respondent to prove his case which, in normal course ofthings, would be and is within his special knowledge. A case which has been set upby the respondent through his witnesses as well that his father had taken a fancy fordeo Kumari Devi, a resident of village Adai, who is Pasi by caste and married herwho gave birth to two children including the respondent, would normally be not inthem as indicated above. The petitioner challenged the status of respondent Dineshchaudhary as a Scheduled Caste person belonging to the S. C. community.Precisely what was indicated in support of that case is that father of DineshChaudhary and Naresh chaudhary is Bhagwan Singh who is Kurmi by caste marriedto Jago Devi, also a Kurmi lady. The High Court has also observed that a personborne in a Kurmi family normally would be presumed that he is Kurmi by caste. Inthis background the initial burden of the petitioner would stand discharged and itwould shift upon the respondent to prove his case which, in normal course ofthings, would be and is within his special knowledge. A case which has been set upby the respondent through his witnesses as well that his father had taken a fancy fordeo Kumari Devi, a resident of village Adai, who is Pasi by caste and married herwho gave birth to two children including the respondent, would normally be not in the knowledge of people in general particularly when according to the case of therespondent himself Jago Devi lived in another village and she was never broughtfrom there by Bhagwan Singh. More so, when Bhagwan Singh, a Kurmi by caste, isliving with his wife Jago Devi, also a Kurmi, in their village Jahanabad. The bestevidence, as also according to the High Court to prove the case of the respondentwas, to produce bhagwan Singh and Deo Kumari Devi but they have been withheldafter being cited as witnesses for the respondent. These facts clearly make out acase for drawing an adverse inference that in case they had been produced theywould not have supported the case of the respondent. AIR 1961 SC 1316 Kundan Lalrallaram vs. Custodian, Evacuee Property, Bombay, AIR 1917 PC 6 T. S. Murugesampillai vs. M. D. Gnana Sambandha Panrdara sannadhi and Ors. and 1977 (3) SCCpage 540 Thiru John and Anr. vs. The Returning officer and Ors. may also bereferred on the point.”

36. He also relied on a decision reported in R.PALANIMUTHU V

36. He also relied on a decision reported in R.PALANIMUTHU V

RETURNING OFFICER AND ANOTHER[[25]], wherein it was held thus:“THE above documents show that the second respondent and his fatherVenkata Reddy and grandfather Perumal Reddy belong to the Hindu Reddiarcommunity. The appellant gave notice under O. 12 R. 5 of the Code of CivilProcedure to the second respondent for admitting certain facts. One of thefacts he was required to admit is that Hindu Reddiar community is not aScheduled Tribe community. The second respondent had admitted that theHindu Reddiar community is not a Scheduled Tribe community and statedthat he had obtained the certificate dated 25-10-1977 from Tahsildar ofThuraiyur taluk to the effect that he belongs to the Konda Reddy community,and that he had applied on an earlier date for the grant of that certificate inorder to enable him to apply for a job. Faced with the aforesaid documentswhich clearly show that the second respondent and the members of hisfamily belong to the Hindu Reddiar community which is admittedly not aScheduled Tribe community the second respondent has sought to get overthe difficulty by saying that Konda Reddy community is a sub-caste of theHindu Reddiar community. This explanation cannot be accepted havingregard to the facts and circumstances of the case.”

37. The decision relied on by the learned counsel for the petitionerreported in DIRECTOR OF TRIBAL WELFARE, GOVT. OF A.P. V LAVETI GIRI

AND ANOTHER[[26]] has no application to the present facts of the case vis-à-vis certain guidelines are issued for issuance of social status certificates,their scrutiny and their approval.

38. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the 1[st]respondent relied on a decision reported in HARIKRISHNA LAL V BABU LAL

MARANDI[[27]], wherein it was held thus:

“The success of a winning candidate is not to be lightly interfered with. Theburden of proof lies on the one who challenges the election to raisenecessary pleadings and adduce evidence to prove such averments aswould enable the result of the election being set aside on any of the groundsavailable in the law. In an election petition if nobody adduces evidence it isthe election petitioner who fails.”

That is a case where the election of Jharkand Legislative Assemblyfrom 23, Ramgarh Assembly Constituency was under challenge. In thatcontext, it was held that the burden of proof lies on the election petitioner toraise necessary pleadings and adduce evidence.

39. He further relied on a decision reported in P.C.PURUSHOTHAMA

REDDIAR V S.PERUMAL[[28]], wherein it was held thus:

“BEFORE leaving this case is necessary to refer to one of the contentionstaken by Mr. Ramamurthi, learned Counsel for the respondent. Hecontended that the Police reports referred to earlier are inadmissible inevidence as the Head Constables who covered those meetings have notbeen examined in the case. Those reports were marked without anyobjection. Hence it is not open to the respondent now to object to theiradmissibility - see Bhagat Ram v. Khetu Ram, AIR 1929 PC 110.

IT was next urged that even if the reports in question are admissible wecannot look into the contents of those documents. This contention is againunacceptable. Once a document is properly admitted, the contents of thatdocument are also admitted in evidence though those contents may not beconclusive evidence.”

That is a case where the police reports are marked without anyobjection before the High Court in a Election Petition. In that context, it washeld that when the document is properly admitted, the contents of thedocuments are also admitted in evidence, but they are not conclusiveevidence.

40. He further relied on a decision reported in RAMJI DAYAWALA AND

SONS (P) LTD V INVEST IMPORT[[29]], wherein it was held thus:“Undoubtedly, mere proof of the handwriting of a document would nottantamount to proof of all the contents or the facts stated in the document. Ifthe truth of the facts stated in a document is in issue mere proof of thehandwriting and execution of the document would not furnish evidence ofthe truth of the facts or contents of the document. The truth or otherwise ofthe facts or contents so stated would have to be proved by admissibleevidence, i. e. by the evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for thetruth of the facts in issue”

From the above decision, it is clear that the contents of the documentare to be proved by admissible evidence.

41. He further relied on a decision reported in MADHOLAL SINDHU V

ASIAN ASSURANCE CO. LTD. AND OTHERS[[30]], wherein it was held thus:“This proposition sounded to me a novel one. I had in fact never heard anysuch argument before. Section 67, Evidence Act only permitted the proof ofthe signature or handwriting of the person signing or writing the documentto be given and considered it to be sufficient in those cases where theissue between the parties was whether a document was signed or writtenwholly or in part by that person. It did not go so far as to say that even if itwas proved that the signature or the handwriting of so much of thedocument as was alleged to be in the handwriting of the person, was in hishandwriting, it would go to prove the contents of that document. No doubtthe proof in so far as it was sought to be given in the evidence of BalkrishnaBhagwan Dekshmukh of the signature or handwriting of the said variousdocuments could have established that those documents were signed orwritten in the handwriting of Deshpande, Paranjape or Jamnadas, but thematter could rest there and would carry the plaintiff no other.

It certainly could not prove that the contents of those various documentswhich were thus proved to have been signed or written by Deshpande,Paranjape or Jamnadas were correct, and unless the plaintiff succeeded inproving the correctness of the contents of those various documents, hewould not advance any step towards proving his case. Mr.Taraporewalla forthe bank an Jamnadas supported Mr.Somjee in his submission. He submitted that once the signatures were proved the letters as a whole wereroved, through the Court might say that the contents thereof were notproved in the sense that they were true. He submitted that the Court couldadmit those documents in evidence with that reservation, a reservationwhich to my mind went to the root of the whole matter and deprived thedocuments of all value whatsoever even if they might be admitted by theCourt in evidence.”

42. He further relied on a decision reportedin RANGAYYAN AND

ANOTHER V INNASIMUTHU MUDALI AND OTHERS[[31]], wherein it was held thus:

“The words of S.11 are very wide, and it may be safely laid down that allevidence which would be held to be admissible by English law would beproperly admitted under this section of the Act. Collateral facts which, byway of contradiction, are inconsistent with a fact in issue or anotherrelevant fact i.e., which makes the existence of a fact in issue or a relevantfact impossible or highly improbable, or which, by way of corroboration areconsistent with existence of a fact in issue or a relevant fact i.e., tend torender the existence of a fact in issue or a relevant fact highly probable arethemselves made relevant by the present section.”

That is a case with regard to recitals of the boundaries in a documentbetween the parties, which is a joint statement made by the parties to thedocuments. It is relevant against all of them. Such an admission is againstthe stranger, which is not admissible.

43. He further relied on a decision reported in NAGUBHAI AMMAL AND

OTHERS V B.SHAMA RAO AND OTHERS[[32]], wherein it was held thus:“AN admission is not conclusive as to the truth of the matter stated therein.It is only a piece of evidence, the weight to be attached to which mustdepend on the circumstances under which it is made. It can be shown to beerroneous or untrue, so long as the person to whom it was made has notacted upon it to his detriment, when it might become conclusive by way ofestoppel.”

That is a decision with regard to admission made by a party. When itis clear and unambiguous, the presumption is it is correct. But such anadmission is not conclusive as to the truth of the matters.

44. He further relied on a decision reported in MAHANTI SHRI

SRINIVAS RAMANUJ DAS V SURJANARAYAN DAS AND ANOTHER[[33]], wherein it was held thus:

“IT is urged for the appellant that what is stated in the Gazetteer cannot betreated as evidence. These statements in the Gazetteer are not relied on asevidence of title but as providing historical material and the practicefollowed by the Math and its head. The Gazetteer can be consulted onmatters of public history.”

45. He further relied on a decision reported in BALA SHANKAR MAHA

SHANKAR BHATTJEE AND OTHERS V CHARITY COMMISSIONER, GUJARAT

STATE[[34]], wherein it was held thus:

“We find no force in the contention. It is seen that the Gazette of the BombayPresidency, Vol. III published in 1879 is admissible under S. 35 read with S.81 of the Evidence Act, 1872. The Gazette is admissible being official recordPresidency, Vol. III published in 1879 is admissible under S. 35 read with S.81 of the Evidence Act, 1872. The Gazette is admissible being official record evidencing public affairs and the Court may presume their contents asgenuine. The statement contained therein can be taken into account todiscover the historical material contained therein and the facts stated thereinis evidence under S. 45 and the Court may in conjunction with otherevidence and circumstances take into consideration in adjudging the disputein question, though may not be treated as conclusive evidence.”

The above decisions have no application because the Gazette cannotbe relied upon as evidence of title, but only to prove the historical practicefollowed. If the Gazette comes within the meaning of Section 35 of theEvidence Act, it can be presumed that the contents therein are genuine.Hence, it is not applicable to the present facts of the case.

46. He further relied on a decision reported in VEDANTHAMSATYAVATHI V P.VENKATARATNAM[[35]], wherein it was held thus:

“The Evidence Act lays down the rules for proving a document. The proof ofa document consist of two parts. Its genuineness and the contents of thedocument. So far as the genuineness is concerned, it is dealt in Sections 67to 73 of the Act. So far as the contents are concerned, the rules are embodiedin Section 61 to 66. If the document is sought to be proved the signature andalso the handwriting must be proved. That is the rule laid down in Section67. There are other modes of proving the signature either by expert evidenceas provided in Section 45 or by producing the evidence of a person who isacquainted with the signature as envisaged by Section 47. Sometimes theinternal evidence also may furnish proof of genuineness of the document aslaid by the Supreme Court in Mubarik Ali Ahmed v State of Bombay (2 supra).The first rule of proving the contents of document is producing the documentitself. Its contents can be proved either producing the document itself whichis the primary evidence or by secondary evidence as contemplated underSections 62 to 66. This is the mode of proving the contents of the documentand genuineness of the document.”

From the above decision, it is clear that the contents andgenuineness of the documents may be proved in accordance with provisionsof Sections 62 to 66 of the Evidence Act. Even the parties to the documentor writer has not examined, it cannot be said to be inadmissible in evidence.It may be relevant, but its probative value is very weak.

47. He further relied on a decision reported in OM PRAKASH BERLIA

AND ANOTHER V UNIT TRUST OF INDIA AND OTHERS[[36]], wherein it washeld thus:

“Secondly, Ss. 61 and 62 read together show that the contents of a documentmust, primarily be proved by the production of the document itself for theinspection of the Court. It is obvious that the truth of the contents of thedocument, even prima facie, cannot be proved by merely producing thedocument for the inspection of the Court. What it states can be soestablished.”

The above decision also shows that the contents of the documentmay be proved either by primary or secondary evidence. The expression toSection 61 of the Evidence Act means what the document states, but not thetruth of what the document states.

48. He further relied on a decision reported in M.CHANDRA VM.THANGAMUTHYU AND ANOTHER[[37]], wherein it was held thus:“We do not agree with the reasoning of the High Court. It is true that a partywho wishes to rely upon the contents, and only in the exceptional cases willsecondary evidence be admissible. However, if secondary evidence isadmissible, it may be adduced in any form in which it may be available,whether by production of a copy, duplicate copy of a copy, by oral evidenceof the contents or in another form. The secondary evidence must beauthenticated by foundational evidence that the alleged copy is in fact a truecopy of the original. It should be emphasized that the exceptions to the rulerequiring primary evidence are designed to provide relief in a case where aparty is genuinely unable to produce the original through no fault of thatparty.”

There is no dispute about the proposition of law laid down by the apexCourt. When the documents are not in possession of the parties, thecertified copies of the documents can be admitted in evidence in exceptionalcases, but only thing is that it is the true copy of the original.

49. Under Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, where anydocument purporting or proved to be 30 years old is produced from anycustody which the Court in the particular case considers proper, the Courtmay presume that the signature and every other part of such document,which purports to be in the handwriting of any particular person, is in thatperson’s handwriting, and, in the case of a document executed or attested,that it was duly executed and attested by the persons by whom it purportsto be executed and attested. If a document produced is copy admissiblesecondary evidence under Section 65 of the Evidence Act and is producedfrom proper custody and is that 30 years old, then only the signaturesauthenticating the copy may be presumed to be genuine. The production ofthe copy is not sufficient to raise the presumption of due execution of theoriginal. From the above provision, it is clear that presumption can only bedrawn with regard to attestation and execution of the document, but not tothe contents of the documents.

50. For application of Section 90 of the Evidence Act, there are twopre-requisites viz., firstly that the document is 30 years old and secondly,the same is produced from proper custody. If these two conditions arefulfilled, then the Court is required to raise a presumption whether it is a fitcase or not. If the Court finds that it is a fit case for exercising jurisdictiondiscretion and raises a presumption, in that event only, the presumption ofdue execution or attestation can be raised and thereafter, necessity offormal proof that document is waived. Therefore, the contents of thedocument has to be proved may be either primarily or secondary evidence.Since the documents Exs.P3 and P4 are more than 100 years old, Exs.P6and P7 are more than 60 years old and Ex.P9 is more than 50 years old, thecontents are required to be proved under Section 65 of the Evidence Act.Section 57 of the Registration Act, 1908,shows that when secondaryevidence has in any way been introduced, a copy certified by Registrar shall be admissible for proving the contents of the original without other proofthan the certificate of the contents of the copy. But the copy does notthereby become eligible to be given in Evidence without other evidence tointroduce it. As such, certified copy may be produced in proof of thecontents of the original document or part of the original documents of whichthey purport to be copies. Documents in question being the certified copiesof public documents need not have been proved by calling a witness andpractically, it is not possible to call the parties to the documents orwitnesses or attestors of the documents of more than 100 years old. UnderSection 65 of the Evidence Act, secondary evidence may be given of theexistence condition or contents of a document in respect of inter alia statesthat when the original is a public document within the meaning of Section 74,certified copy of the document, but no other kind of secondary evidence isadmissible. Therefore, a certified copy of the registered deed may beadmissible under Section 65(e) of the Evidence Act as secondary evidence,but that does not dispense with the proof of the contents of the document.The copy of the public document does not become eligible to be given inevidence without other evidence to introduce it. Where the sale deeds whichwere primary evidence of interest sold, that were said to be registereddocuments and the certified copies thereof could be adduced as secondaryevidence. The recitals in the documents with regard to the community orcaste of a person who sold the property and who purchased the property arenot required to be noted in the sale deeds. Even the community of a personis noted in the documents, it is of fragile value.

51. According to both the counsel, the community of the parties to thesale transaction is noted for the purpose of identification of person. Therefore, the main purpose of sale transaction, is a transfer of ownershipin exchange for the part paid or promised or part paid and part promised. Therefore, the purport of obtaining a registered sale deed in purchasing theimmovable property where the value is more than Rs.100/- by way ofregistered instrument is only for the purpose of transfer of right, title andinterest in respect of a immovable property. The essential elements of thesale are Therefore, the main purpose of sale transaction, is a transfer of ownershipin exchange for the part paid or promised or part paid and part promised. Therefore, the purport of obtaining a registered sale deed in purchasing theimmovable property where the value is more than Rs.100/- by way ofregistered instrument is only for the purpose of transfer of right, title andinterest in respect of a immovable property. The essential elements of thesale are

1) parties 2) subject matter, which must be transferable immovable property3) actual transfer or conveyance and not a mere promise or contract forsale 4) price or consideration and 5) registration of the instrument wherevalue of tangible immovable sold is Rs.100/- or upwards. Such is the case,there is no need or necessity to mention the caste or community of a personin the sale deed. Even assuming for a moment that caste or community ismentioned in the sale deed, it does not necessarily lead to draw anirresistible conclusion that the party to the document belongs to theparticular community as described in the document. Therefore, the recitalsin the sale deeds cannot be taken as a conclusive proof of the evidence ofthe fact that a particular person named in sale deed belongs to a particularcaste or community. At best, in the opinion of this Court, it can be taken as3) actual transfer or conveyance and not a mere promise or contract forsale 4) price or consideration and 5) registration of the instrument wherevalue of tangible immovable sold is Rs.100/- or upwards. Such is the case,there is no need or necessity to mention the caste or community of a personin the sale deed. Even assuming for a moment that caste or community ismentioned in the sale deed, it does not necessarily lead to draw anirresistible conclusion that the party to the document belongs to theparticular community as described in the document. Therefore, the recitalsin the sale deeds cannot be taken as a conclusive proof of the evidence ofthe fact that a particular person named in sale deed belongs to a particularcaste or community. At best, in the opinion of this Court, it can be taken as one circumstance so as to support the other acceptable evidence, if any,available on record. Therefore, the probative value of the factum ofcommunity as mentioned in the sale deeds is very weak piece of evidence.

52. Similarly with regard to Ex.P6, which is the certified copy of thedecree in O.S.No.25 of 1938 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Chicacole,whereunder the community of the grand father of the 1[st] respondent in thedecree is shown as Kshatriya. Order VII Rule 1 CPC reads that plaint shallcontain particulars inter alia name, description of place and residence of theplaintiff. Therefore, the term ‘description’ includes the name of the plaintiff,his age, father’s name and the place of residence etc., So O.VII Rule 1CPC does not contemplate to furnish the caste or community of plaintiff. Bymerely mentioning the community in the plaint, the name of the grand fatherof the 1[st] respondent was shown as Kshatriya, which was incorporated inthe decree is not by itself proof regarding the community of a person. Inmy considered opinion, the caste or community as mentioned in the plaintcannot be read as conclusive evidence so as to identify the caste orcommunity of a person.

53. The document Ex.P9 is the admission register whereunder thecommunity of the 1[st] respondent was shown as Kshatriya. To prove thisdocument, P.W.3, the present Head Master and Correspondent of MadrasChristian College and Higher Education was summoned. According to him,Ex.P9 is the copy of extract from the admission register pertaining to theyear 1957, which was issued in respect of V.Kishore Chandra SuryaNarayana Dev son of V.Durga Prasad Veerabhandra Dev. The serialnumber 183 in the admission register is noted in the name of 1[st]respondent. He brought the original admission register where in the caste ofthe 1[st] respondent is noted as Kshatriya. He admitted that each of theentries of the admission register has not been attested by any one. There isa statutory requirement for maintenance of the school records and thisadmission register of the years 1947 to 1963 does not contain theattestation of either Head Master or any officials of Education Departmentand the admission register is being maintained for the purpose of schoolrecords. He was not aware of the authenticity of the community of the 1[st]respondent as mentioned in the original of Ex.P9.

54. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on a decision reported in UMESH CHANDRA V STATE OF RAJASTHAN[[38]], wherein it was held thus:“A perusal of the provisions of Sec. 35 would clearly reveal that there is nolegal requirement, that the public or other official book should be kept onlyby a public officer but all that is required is that it should be regularly kept indischarge of her official duty. This fact has been clearly proved by twoindependent witnesses, viz. , DW 1, Ratilal Mehta and DW 3. Sister Stella.The question does not present any difficulty or complexity as in our opinionthe section which would assist in this behalf is S. 35 of the Evidence Actwhich provides for relevancy of entry in the public record”“A perusal of the provisions of Sec. 35 would clearly reveal that there is nolegal requirement, that the public or other official book should be kept onlyby a public officer but all that is required is that it should be regularly kept indischarge of her official duty. This fact has been clearly proved by twoindependent witnesses, viz. , DW 1, Ratilal Mehta and DW 3. Sister Stella.The question does not present any difficulty or complexity as in our opinionthe section which would assist in this behalf is S. 35 of the Evidence Actwhich provides for relevancy of entry in the public record”

The above decision is cited for the purpose of relying upon thecontents of Ex.P9, but in this case Ex.P9 is maintained not by publicauthority or public official in the course of regular official duty. Therefore,the above decision has no application to the present facts of the case.

55. He also relied on a decision reported in KUMARI MADHURI PATILAND ANOTHER V ADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER, TRIBAL DEVELOPMENT ANDANOTHER[[39]], wherein it was held thus:

“THE entries in the school register preceding the Constitution do furnishgreat probative value to the declaration of the status of a caste. Hierarchicalcaste stratification of Hindu social order has its reflection in all entries in thepublic records. What would therefore, depict the caste status of the peopleinclusive of the school or college records, as they then census rules insistedupon. Undoubtedly, Hindu social order is based on hierarchy and caste isone of the predominant factors during pre-constitution period. Unfortunatelyinstead of dissipating its incursion it is being needlessly accentuated,perpetrated and stratification is given legitimacy for selfish ends instead ofbeing discouraged and put an end by all measures, including administrativeand legislative. Be it as it may, people are identified by their castes for oneor the other is a reality. Therefore, it is no wonder that caste is reflected inrelevant entries in the public records or school or college admission registerat the relevant time and the certificates are issued on its basis. The father ofthe appellants admittedly described himself in 1943 and thereafter as a HinduKoli. In other words his status was declared a Koli by caste and Hindu byreligion. Kolis are admittedly OBCs. His feigned ignorance of the ancestry istoo hard to believe. The averment in the affidavit that the entries weremistakenly made as Hindu Koli is an obvious afterthought. Theanthropological moorings and ethnological kinship affirmity gets geneticallyingrained in the blood and no one would shake off from past, in particular,when one is conscious of the need of preserving its relevance to seek thestatus of Scheduled Tribe or Scheduled Caste recognized by theConstitution for their upliftment in the Society. The ingrained Tribal traitspeculiar to each Tribe and anthropological features all the more becomerelevant when the social status is in acute controversy and needs a decision.The correct projectives furnished in pro forma and the material would lendcredence and give an assurance to properly consider the claims of the socialstatus and the concerned officer or authority would get an opportunity to testthe claim for social status of particular cast or tribe or tribal community orgroup or part of such caste, tribe or tribal community. It or he would reach asatisfactory conclusion on the claimed social status. The father of theappellant has failed to satisfy the crucial affinity test which is relevant andgermane one. On the other hand the entries in his school and collegeregisters as Hindu Koli positively belies the claim of his social status asScheduled Tribe.”

56. He also relied on a decision reported in DESH RAJ V BODH RAJ

[40], wherein it was held thus:

“In so far as the caste certificate Ex. RW-5/a issued by the executiveMagistrate, Indora, relied on by respondent, it has to be observed that suchcaste certificates are not given after a thorough investigation. When the casteof respondent is in issue and when primary evidence regarding caste is ledby appellant, and the attempt of respondent to claim to be a 'lohar' from 1990is evident, the caste certificate issued by the executive Magistrate on 1. 12.1991 cannot be taken as evidence to prove the caste of the respondent. Thedecision of this Court in R. Palanimuthu vs. Returning Officer [1984 (Supp.)SCC 77], supports this position. In Madhuri patil (supra), this court observedthat when the school records show a particular caste, the caste certificatesissued to the candidates and his relatives by the Executive Magistrateshowing a different caste should be ignored. Reference was also made to thecaste certificate of two relatives. But they are also of the period subsequent to 1990 when respondent started showing that he belonged to Lohar caste.They have to be ignored as observed by this Court in Madhuri Patil (supra ).”

57. Section 35 of the Evidence Act deals with relevancy of entry inpublic records made in performance of duty. It consists of two parts. Firstpart is not relevant because entry is not made by the public servant indischarge of his official duty. Second part deals with any other person inperformance of duty specially enjoined by the law of the country in whichsuch book, register or record is kept, is itself a relevant fact. If theEducation rules provides that Government or private school is obligated tomaintain register of maintenance with the prescribed particulars, suchentries can be relevant. Since original of Ex.P9 does not contain theattestation of the Head Master of the institution or any other officials of theEducation department vouchsafing the correctness of the entry at the end ofeach academic year, it cannot be taken as a admission of proof of contentstherein. Furthermore, no provision under Education Act was brought to thenotice of this Court, which is prevailing in the year 1957 that the HeadMaster and Correspondent of Madras Christian college has to makenecessary entries in the book or registers maintained by them. This aspectof the case can be seen from Ex.R5, which is the Secondary SchoolCertificate of 1[st] respondent issued by the same school and it does notshow about the community of 1[st] respondent. In view of the abovediscussion, it can safely be concluded that the community of the 1[st]respondent noted as Kshatriya in Ex.P9 cannot be taken as a conclusiveproof that he belongs to Kshatriya community. In the considered opinion ofthis Court, at best, the recitals in those documents with reference to the community of the 1[st] respondent can be taken to lend assurance to otherevidence, if any, on record. The entries in the documents with regard to thecommunity do not by themselves prove the community of the 1[st]respondent. The probative value of those entries is very weak piece ofevidence.

58. The oral evidence adduced by the petitioner is that the 1[st]respondent belong to Kshatriya community and he is having relationshipwith other Zamindari families of Vyricherla and Poosapati in Vizianagaramdistrict and he was having close marital relationship with those Zamindarifamilies. Merely because, the 1[st] respondent or his family members werehaving relationship with family of Vyricherla and Poosapati, it does not meanhe belong to Kshatriya community. To the knowledge of P.W.1, there is no

relationship of any member of the family of the 1[st] respondent with anyfamily belong to Scheduled Tribes in Vizianagaram District. Inter castemarriages are prevailing in these days and on the ground that some of thefamily members of the 1[st] respondent did not marry the members of theScheduled Tribes, that cannot be a ground to arrive at a conclusion that hedoes not belong to Scheduled Tribe. Vizianagaram is predominantly having tribal population. According to P.W.1, the family of 1[st] respondent is onlysolitary and single family in Kurupam Mandal not belonging to any one of theScheduled Tribes. It is not in dispute that the 1[st] respondent contestederstwhile Parvathipuram Parliamentary constituency two or three times,which is reserved for Scheduled Tribe. He also admitted that the brother of1[st] respondent by name Pradeep Chandra Dev contested from the sameconstituency. He does not know who was the founder of KurupamZamindar. He stated that Kurupam Zamindar is not located in tribal area. According to P.W.1, Kshatriya or Raju is a caste. Only Kshatriyas arecalled as Rajus. He admitted that Bobbili Zamindars are not Kshatriyas. They are being called as Velama Doras. He admitted that when he made anapplication questioning the social status of the 1[st] respondent and requestedto cancel the caste certificate given to the 1[st] respondent before the DistrictCollector, the District Collector conducted enquiry and confirmed that 1[st]respondent belong to Scheduled Tribe community. According to him, theappeal is pending before the Government of Andhra Pradesh.

59. It is the case of the 1[st] respondent that right from the beginning,Kurupam is a tribal Zamindari. Though P.W.1 was a practicing Advocate, hedid not raise any dispute when 1[st] respondent contested the elections forabout five or six times. On earlier occasion, he has not filed any electionpetitions questioning the election of the 1[st] respondent. He admitted thatKonda Doras live in both tribal and plain areas. His objection petition Ex.P1in respect of present election was rejected by the returning officer.

60. To support his evidence, P.W.2 was examined, who is a residentof Adduru Valasa, Parvathipuram Mandal. According to him, 1[st] respondentbelong to Raju community. He does not know which Zamindar belong towhich community. According to him, he does not know the caste of the 1[st]respondent. He does not know whether 1[st] respondent belongs to KondaDora community. Therefore, his evidence is not much helpful to the case ofthe petitioner because he has not firmly stated that he does not know thecommunity of Zamindars of Kurupam. There is no pleading and evidence inthis case to show that the practices of worshipping goddesses, rituals in the

Konda Dora community followed the 1[st] respondent different and distinctfrom that of Konda Doras. There is no evidence that tribal customs ofKonda Doras are different from the practices of the family of 1[st] respondent.P.W.1 did not say that the customs and practices prevailing in Kshatriyaswere being followed by 1[st] respondent or his family members. At one timeP.W.1 says that he personally knows the tribal customs and traditions. Another time he speaks that there are no conventions and customs inKonda Dora community. He did not speak about the customs and traditionsor Konda Dora people. The tribal elders of Konda Dora community have not been examined to show that the customs prevailing in Konda Doracommunity. Similarly elders of Kshatriya community are not examined toshow about the customs in the Kshatriya community. No doubt R.W.1admitted that he does not have any relationship with any tribes in any one ofthe Districts in Andhra Pradesh, but at the same time, he does not have anyrelationship with Kshatriyas in the District. The fact that 1[st] respondentdoes not have any relationship with Konda Doras of Kurupam is a neutralfactor. Hence, this circumstance cannot be used to lend assurance to theother evidence adduced by the election petitioner.

61. According to R.W.1, the founder of Kurupam Zamindar isSanyasi Dora, who belongs to Konda Dora tribe. The said statement hasnot been specifically denied or disputed in the cross-examination. Ex.R1 isthe manual of the District of Visakhapatnam in the Presidency of Madras,which was compiled and edited by Collector, Magistrate and agent to theGovernor, wherein it is stated that the founder Garaya Dora who belonged toKonda Dora community was appointed to the charge of Andhra Taluk byVisvambhara Deo of Jeypore with the title of Pratapa Rao and these Dorasafterwards allied themselves to the Vizianagaram family. KurupamZamindar was granted to Sanyasi Dora. Ex.R4, which is the book writtenby Sri Padmasree S.S.Shashi with regard to the tribes of Andhra Pradesh,would go to show that the tribal estates of Kurupam, Chinamerangi andAndhra and Pachipenta in Srikakulam district patronized Telugu and Oriyascholars. He also filed Ex.R5, which is the Secondary School leavingcertificate issued by the Government of Madras. It does not contain anycommunity, but he was shown as Indian Hinduism. The evidence of R.W.1would go to show that he belong to Konda Dora tribe and he worship deities viz., Pydimaremma, Ammatalli and Malathamma etc., and he does not haveany relationship with any tribes in Vizianagaram district and his socialstatus certificate was not cancelled by any authority. The evidence ofR.W.1 that the social status certificates issued to the members of KurupamZamindar family in various occasions for many decades recognizing themas belonging to Scheduled Tribes has not been denied or disputedspecifically. Concerned authorities issued community certificates in hisfavour and in favour of his family members strictly in accordance with theprovisions of the A.P. (SC, ST and BC) Regulation of issue of CommunityCertificate Act, 1993 and that manual published by the then Collector andMagistrate shows that Andra and Kurupam Zamindars were handed over toGarayya Dora and Sanyasi Dora and they belonged to Konda Dora tribewhich are found in Visakhapatnam as hill cultivators. He also speaks aboutvarious religious worships to be performed by Konda Doras. Since a long time, the family of the 1[st] respondent are being recognized as Konda Doras,which is a tribe listed in the Constitution (S.T.) Order, 1950.

62. P.W.1 is not aware of founder of Kurupam Zamindari. It is not indispute that the 1[st] respondent is from Kurupam Zamindari family. He does

not know whether the genealogical tree filed by the 1[st] respondent in thisCourt is true or not. According to R.W.1, his ancestors were tribal chiefsand Zamindars of Kurupam and the Kurupam Zamindari is founded by oneSanyasi Dora, who belonged to Konda Dora tribe. Exs.R1 and R2 would goto show that Kurupam Zamindari was founded by Sanyasi Dora. Hisevidence further would go to show that originally the names of KurupamZamindari ended with ‘Dora’, but over a period of time, the same wasreplaced with suffix ‘Raju’, which means king. His grand father died at earlyage. On his death, Kurupam Zamindari was managed by grand mother whohails from Orissa. Therefore, their title Deo was added to name ofsuccessors. According to him, Ex.R3 would go to show that Andhra andKurupam Zamindari were handed over to Garayya Dora and Sanyasi Dorawho belong to Konda Dora tribe and that Ex.R4 shows that Konda Dora is acaste of hill cultivators found chiefly in Visakhapatnam. R.W.1 also statedabout the worship Isthadevi and they perform Sakthi Pooja and during tribalfestivals, they offer the blood of Goat and Catfish as ‘Nivedyam’. Everyyear Dasara Festival will be celebrated at Viswanadhapuram, which is theirancestral place and after thorough enquiry, social status certificate wasissued by the Revenue Officials. He admits that he does not have anyrelationship in Vizianagaram or in any other districts. He also admitted thatin Exs.P3 to P5, the community of Vyricherla is written as Kshatriya and inEx.P6 his paternal grand father’s junior brother and his late fathercommunity was shown as Kshatriya. It is possible that in Exs.P7 and P8 hiscommunity was described as Kshatriya. He also stated that in Ex.P9 incolumn of caste, it is mentioned as Kshatriya and he also admitted that Ex.P9, relevant entry at Sl.No.183 relates to him. He also admitted that inEx.P10, his community is mentioned as Kshatriya. The suggestions put tohim that by using his economic social status and by using political influence,he obtained false certificate to contest the election and he does not belongto Scheduled Tribe, were denied by R.W.1.

63. The evidence of R.W.1 that his ancestors were the tribal chiefsand Zamindars of Kurupam, that Kurupam Zamindari was founded bySanyasi Dora, who belongs to Konda Dora tribe and the name of KurupamZamindari ended with Dora and replaced with suffix Raju and that his familyworship Goddess Isthadevi by performing Pooja and offering Nivedyam andthey worship the tribal diety remained unchallenged. Once a fact is testifiedby a witness, and the same is not challenged in the cross-examination ofsuch witness, it can be safely be said that such a fact is admitted. Similarly,social status certificate issued in favour of the 1[st] respondent was nevercancelled by any authority. Therefore, the oral evidence of P.W.1 thatthere is no tribal Zamindari in Kurupam cannot be accepted in view ofExs.R1 and R2. He was not aware of traditions and customs being followedin the family of 1[st] respondent. It is not his case that he visited KurupamZamindari several times and that R.W.1 was not following the tribaltraditions and customs. Admittedly, P.W.1 is a resident of Salur and he has

not produced any material to show that Kurupam is not a tribal Zamindari. When P.W.1 does not belong to Kurupam and he is resident of Salur, hisevidence is not much helpful for the purpose of deciding whether the 1[st]respondent is Scheduled Tribe or not. The remaining witness examined onbehalf of the petitioner categorically stated that he does not know thecommunity of the 1[st] respondent. P.W.2 had no relations at Kurupam,which is at a distance of 30 K.Ms from his village. Therefore, when hedoes not know about the community of the 1[st] respondent, his evidence isnot relevant to the fact in issue.

64. If the oral evidence of petitioner is eschewed from consideration,then the entire case of the petitioner rests upon the recitals mentioned inExs.P3 to P9 whereunder the community of the 1[st] respondent or hisancestors has been mentioned as Kshatriya. Both the counsel admitted thatthe community of the person is to be noted in those documents for theidentification purpose. Though R.W.1 is not seriously disputing about these documents, but the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the 1[st]respondent is that those do not conclusively prove the social status of aperson. All these documents are certified copies, which are not denied, butthey were marked subject to objection. The contents therein even it can betaken as true and correct, but they do not by themselves prove beyondreasonable doubt that the 1[st] respondent belongs to Kshatriya community.

At best, it give rise to a suspicion that 1[st] respondent belongs to Kshatriya. But, suspicion however, strong cannot take the place of legal proof. Merelymentioning the caste or community of a person in all the documents though100 years old, it does not lead to an irresistible conclusion that particularperson belongs to a community as mentioned in the document especiallywhen there is a doubt with regard to the community of the person.Furthermore, proper explanation is given by R.W.1 that tribal Zamindari wasbeing managed by Diwan, who controlled the day-to-day activities, mighthave treated the Zamindar as ‘Kshatriya’. This can be accepted consideringthe fact that the original ancestor of 1[st] respondent was a tribal chief. Theancestors of the persons hail from tribal Zamindars and ancestors of 1[st]respondent were recognized as Konda Doras. It is not in dispute thatKonda Dora is included in the list of Constitution (S.T.) Order, 1950. Overthe course of period after Konda Doras are called as Kshatriya or Rajus who are living in the tribal areas, it cannot be said that 1[st] respondent does notbelongs to Konda Dora community. The evidence of R.W.1 is very clear thatthe founder of Kurupam Zamindari Sanyasi Dora belongs to Konda Doratribe. Such is the case, R.W.1 hails from Kurupam Zamindari can safely besaid that he belongs to Konda Dora tribe.

65. It is one of the contentions raised by the learned counselappearing for the 1[st] respondent that in Ex.P12 which is the statement given by R.W.1 before the Enquiry Officer, he stated that Konda Raju tribe of thesame branch of Kurupam Zamindari. So as per the admission made byR.W.1 in Ex.P12, it can be said that he belongs to Konda Raju, which is notincluded as one of the tribes in the Constitution (S.T.) Order, 1950. But theentire statement has to be read together for the purpose of deciding whetherhe belongs to Konda Dora or Konda Raju, for which R.W.1 has given anexplanation that the name of tribal Zamindari ended with ‘Dora’, but later itwas replaced with suffix ‘Raju’ and later it was suffixed as ‘Deo’. Over aperiod of time, if the suffix is changed from one name to another, thecommunity of a person would not be changed. The suffix ‘Raju’ has beenreplaced as ‘Deo’ because his father died at early age and his mother whohails from Deo family took over Kurupam Zamindari. Therefore, Ex.P12

cannot be said to be conclusive proof that 1[st] respondent belongs to KondaRaju community. Therefore, the evidence adduced on behalf of thepetitioner does not establish beyond all reasonable doubt that the 1[st]respondent does not belong to Scheduled Tribe. Therefore, the petitionerfailed to establish the case beyond all reasonable doubt. Hence, this issueis answered against the petitioner.

66. ISSUE NO.2:In view of the foregoing discussion, the electionpetition is liable to be dismissed and accordingly, it isdismissed withquantified costs of Rs.5,000/-.

Date; 31.12.2010

DATED:31[st] DAY OF DECEMBER, 2010

HsdLR Copy to be marked. BO HSD

-----------------------

K.C.BHANU, J

For petitioner

Appendix of EvidenceWitnesses examined

P.W.1: R.Maheswara RaoP.W.2: A.Somanna DoraP.W.3: G.J.Manohar For 1strespondent R.W.1: Vyricherla Kishore Chandra Suryanarayan DeoR.W.2: Nandivada Krishna Babu For petitioner Exhibits marked Ex.P1: Objection petition.

Ex.P2: Order of this Court dated 28.1.2009 issuing certain directions to theDistrict Collector Ex.P3: Certified copy of regd. Document no.3 of 1901 on the file of the SubRegistrar, Parvathipuram (marked subject to objection with regard toadmissibility and proof).

Ex.P3(A): Relevant portion in Ex.P3 containing executant has describedhimself as belonging to Kshatriya caste Ex.P4: Regd. Document no.121 of 1902 on the file of the Sub Registrar,Parvathipuram executed by grand father of R.1.

Ex.P4 (A: Relevant portion in Ex.P4 executed as described himself asbelonging Kshatriya caste.

Ex.P5: Registered document no.127 of 1902 on the file of the Sub Registrar,Parvathipuram executed by the grand father of R.1(marked subject toobjection with regard to admissibility and proof).

Ex.P5(A): Relevant entry made in Ex.P5 as described himself as belongingto Kshatriya caste. (marked subject to objection with regard to admissibilityand proof).

Ex.P6:Certified copy of decree dt.31.3.1938 in O.S.No.3 of 1935 on the fileof the Subordinate Court, Srikakulam. (marked subject to objection withregard to admissibility and proof).

Ex.P6(A: Relevant portion in Ex.P6 as description of grand father of R1 asbelonging to Kshatriya caste. (marked subject to objection with regard toadmissibility and proof).

Ex.P7: Registered document no.1870 of 1949 on the file of Sub Registrar,Parvathipuram executed by father of R.1. (marked subject to objection withregard to admissibility and proof).

Ex.P7(A): Relevant portion in Ex.P7 showing the caste of the said executantas that of Kshatriya. (marked subject to objection with regard toadmissibility and proof).

Ex.P8: Registered document executed on 28.4.1950 on the file of the SubRegistrar, Parvathipuram executed by father of R 1. (marked subject to objection with regard to admissibility and proof).

Ex.P8A: Relevant portion of Ex.P8 which shows the description of the casteof executant as Kshatriya. (marked subject to objection with regard toadmissibility and proof).

Ex.P9: Copy of the register of admissions and withdrawls relating to R1dated 7.7.2009 (marked subject to objection with regard to admissibility,relevancy and proof)

Ex.P10 is the admission of R1 in the School dated 27.6.1957.

Ex.P11: Proceedings dt.21.4.2010 issued by the Collector & DistrictMagistrate, Vizianagaram. (marked subject to objection with regard to admissibility, relevancy and proof)

Ex.P12: Statement submitted by R.1 before the Enquiry Officer. (markedsubject to objection with regard to admissibility, relevancy and proof)

For 1strespondent

Ex.R1: Original manual of the District of Vizagapatnam in the Presidency ofMadras compiled and edited by D.F.Carmichael, M.C.S. in 1869.

Ex.R1A: The relevant entries in Ex.R1 at page 323

Ex.R1B: Relevant entries in Ex.R1 at page 331

Ex.R1C: Relevant entries in Ex.R1 at page 332

Ex.R2: Vizagapatnam District Gazetteer in the Presidency of Madraspublished in the year 1907.

Ex.R2A: Relevant entry in Ex.R2 at page 81

Ex.R2B: Relevant entry in Ex.R2 at page 95.

Ex.R2C: Relevant entry in Ex.R2 at page 293

Ex.R2D: Relevant entry in Ex.R2 at page 295

Ex.R2E: Index pages 8 & 9 in Ex.R2

Ex.R2F: Index pages 10 and 11 in Ex.R2

Ex.R3: Original book ‘Castes and Tribes of Southern India’ by EdgarThurston.

Ex.R3A: Relevant entry in Ex.R3 at page 349

Ex.R3B: Relevant entry in Ex.R3 at page 351

Ex.R4: Original book written by Sri Padmasree S.S.Shashi with regard tothe Tribes of Andhra Pradesh.

Ex.R4A: Relevant entry in Ex.R4 at page nos. 4 and 5

Ex.R4B: Relevant entry in Ex.R4 at page 6 para 3.

----------------------K.C.BHANU, J

[1]1969 (3) SCC 238[2](2009) 10 SCC 541[3]1987 (SUPP) SCC 93[4]2006 (4) SCC 98[5]AIR 1969 SC 597[6]AIR 2001 SC 393[7]1996 (3) SCC 576[8]AIR 1965 SC 183[9]AIR 1954 SC 139[10]AIR 1957 SC 857[11]AIR 1973 SC 626[12]AIR 1964 SC 880[13]AIR 1963 SC 1633[14]AIR 1968 SC 1413[15]AIR 1971 SC 1865[16]AIR 1971 SC 2548[17]AIR 1983 AP 181[18]AIR 2000 SC 426[19]AIR 2000 SC 2857[20]AIR 2001 SC 2532[21]AIR 2006 KAR 231[22]2005 AIR SCW 6197[23](1980) 3 SCC 169[24](2003) 8 SCC 204[25]1984 (SUPP) SCC77[26](1995) 4 SCC 32[27](2003) 8 SCC 613[28]AIR 1972 SC 608[29](1981) 1 SCC 80[30]AIR 1954 BOMBAY 305[31]AIR 1956 MAD 226[32]AIR 1956 SC 593[33]AIR 1967 SC 256[34]AIR 1995 SC 167[35]1988 (1) ALT 915[36]AIR 1983 BOM.1[37](2010) 9 SCC 712[38](1982) 2 SCC 202

[39](1994) 6 SCC 241[40](2008) 2 SCC 186