WA/2571/2005 of G.MOHAN GOUD MAHABOOBNAGAR DISTRICT. Vs THE STATE DIVISIONAL OFFICER COMMISSION HYD AND 3 OTHERS on 28 December 2005

Conclusion

1. Whether the petitioner is entitled for declaration of the election of thefourth respondent is void on the ground of corrupt practice?

2. To what relief ?

Respondent No.4 examined himself as P.W.1 and also examined P.Ws.2 to 5and produced documentary evidence, marked Exs. A.1 to A.7. The appellantexamined himself as R.W.2 and examined two other witnesses as R.Ws.3 and 4.

The Election Tribunal, after considering the pleadings and evidence of the parties, concluded that the appellant was guilty of indulging in corrupt practices and,therefore, his election was liable to be set aside. The Election Tribunal held that bydepositing Rs.4.00 lakhs in the name of Sri Lakhsmi Venkateswara JeernodharanaCommittee, the appellant had tried to influence the voters by attracting their religioussentiments. The Tribunal further held that the appellant had supplied banians withhis election symbol to the voters with a view to influence their votes. Accordingly, itpassed an order dated 18.1.2005 and set aside the election of the appellant with thedirection that fresh election be held for the post of Sarpanch.

The appellant challenged the aforementioned order of the Election Tribunalin Writ Petition No.2635 of 2005. The learned Single Judge confirmed the findingrecorded by the Election Tribunal that the appellant’s act of depositing Rs.4.00 lakhsin the name of Sri Lakshmi Venkateswara Jeernodharana Committee, Gattu wasintended to influence the voters by attracting their religious sentiments and that thesame amounted to corrupt practice. The learned Single Judge also agreed with theElection Tribunal that the distribution of banians with the election symbol of theappellant is a corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 211 of the AndhraPradesh Panchayat Act, 1994.

Sri Vedula Srinivas, learned counsel for the appellant argued that the depositof Rs.4.00 lakhs by the appellant in the State Bank of India in the name of SriLakshmi Venkateswara Jeernodharana Committee did not amount to corruptpractice because the same did not in any manner influence the voters in castingtheir votes. He submitted that the amount was deposited because there was aproposal to unanimous election of the Sarpacnh. He then argued that the evidenceproduced before the Tribunal was wholly insufficient to prove that the appellant wasresponsible for distributing banians with his election symbol and the learned SingleJudge gravely erred by holding the appellant guilty of adopting corrupt practices.

Sri R.V. Subbarao, learned counsel for respondent No.4 supported the orderunder challenge and argued that the Division Bench may not interfere with theconcurrent findings recorded by the Election Tribunal and the learned Single Judgeon the issue of corrupt practices indulged by the appellant.

Before adverting to the contentions of the learned counsel, we deem it properto observe that the High Court’s power of judicial review in such matters is verylimited. In Syed Yakob vs. K.S. Radhakrishna and others, the Supreme Court held that a writ of certiorari can be issued only for correcting errors of jurisdiction oran order passed in violation of the rules of natural justice or when the quasi-judicialauthority commits an error of law apparent on the facts of the record. For the sake ofreference, the relevant extracts of that judgment are reproduced below:

“The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts inissuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently consideredby this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. Awrit of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committedby inferior Courts or tribunals; these are cases where orders are passed byinferior Courts or Tribunals without jurisdiction, or, is in excess of it, or as aresult of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued wherein exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally orimproperly, as for instance it decides a question without giving an opportunityto be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedureadopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice.There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari isa supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act asan appellate court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of factreached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciating ofevidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error oflaw, which is apparent on the face of the record, can be corrected by a writ,but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to afinding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if itis shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneouslyrefused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneouslyadmitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding.Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regardedas an error of law, which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealingwith this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that afinding of fact recorded by an Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedingsfor a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidenceadduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain theimpugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point andthe inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusivejurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before awrit Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the HighCourts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimatelyexercised.”

We shall now advert to the case on hand. A reading of order dated 18.1.2005passed by the Election Tribunal and the order of the learned Single Judge showsthat both of them have concurrently held the appellant guilty of adopting corrupt practices. The Election Tribunal held that the appellant’s act of depositing Rs.4.00lakhs in the name of Sri Lakshmi Venkateswara Jeernodharana Committee wasmeant to attract the religious sentiments of the voters and to influence them to castetheir votes in his favour. It further held that the distribution of banians with theelection symbol of the appellant was also intended to influence the voters. Thesefindings are based on appreciation of evidence. The learned Single Judgeindependently examined the evidence and concurred with the findings recorded bythe Election Tribunal.

We have carefully perused the two orders and are of the view that the findingsrecorded on both the aforementioned issues are based on a correct appreciation ofevidence and do not call for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. All thewitnesses examined by respondent No.4 categorically stated that the appellant haddeposited Rs.4.00 laksh in the name of Sri Lakshmi Venkateswara JeernodharanaCommittee and withdrew that amount only after declaration of the result. The depositmade by the appellant was subsisting during the process of election. He could notoffer any explanation for keeping the deposit in the name of Sri LakshmiVenkateswara Jeernodharan Committee for a period of 46 days. Therefore, thesuggestive argument made by the learned counsel for the appellant that amount wasdeposited in the back drop of the negotiations for unanimous election for the post ofSarpanch cannot be accepted.

In the case of M. Chenna Reddy Vs. V.Ramachandra Rao and anothertheSupreme Court has considered the scope of burden of proof, and, assessment ofevidence in election trials, and, held, in case of failure of a candidate to leadevidence, which was available to rebut the allegations, will also lead adverseinference against such candidate.

By applying the ratio of the aforesaid judgments to the facts of the case, we hold thatthe concurrent findings recorded by the Election Tribunal and the learned SingleJudge do not call for interference.

In the result, the appeal is dismissed.

R.SUBHASH REDDY,J.

G.S. SINGHVI, CJ.28[TH] DECEMBER, 2005.

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