WP/3191/2008 of K.Srinivas, Vs The Commissioner of Fisheries, on 30 December 2008

ORDER:

The relief sought for in this writ petition is for a mandamusto declare the show cause notice issued by the Deputy Director ofFisheries, Nalgonda, dated 04-02-2008, as contrary to theprovisions of the A.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1964, arbitraryand in violation of principles of natural justice.

Facts, in brief, are that the petitioner is the President of theFishermen Co-operative Society, Miryalaguda, Nalgonda District. He was elected as such, along with the directors of the managingcommittee, by the general body of the society, at the instance ofthe Person-Incharge Committee, on 25-02-2005. On the basis of acomplaint levelled against the petitioner by respondents 4 and 5,the Deputy Director of Fisheries, Nalgonda, issued notice dated30-04-2007 asking him to appear, along with the records of theSociety, on 09-05-2007. In the said notice, the petitioner was alleged not tohave distributed the income derived from fishing to all themembers, to have been running the business for his own benefitwith the income of the society and to have threatened themembers of the society that he was the President upto 2010, thatnobody could do anything and that, if necessary, he would removethe members from their membership. The Deputy Director of Fisheries issued another notice dated 11.05.2007, which thepetitioner alleged to be based on different grounds. The petitionerwas asked therein to show cause why another President shouldnot be elected indirectly within one week.

These notices were the subject matter of challenge inW.P.No.10784 of 2007 and this Court, by order dated 09-07-2007, noted that the grounds mentioned in the notice dated11-05-2007 were totally different from the grounds mentioned inthe earlier notice dated 30-04-2007, that the Deputy Director ofFisheries had not mentioned the provision under which heproposed to take further action, that the records disclosed that theauthority, who conducted the election to the petitioner-Society inFebruary, 2005, was not aware of the amendment, that he hadproceeded to conduct the election through direct process and itwas only two years subsequent to the election that the secondrespondent had raised this ground. This Court further held that,even assuming that the election of the President of the Societytook place through direct means, it was not revealed whatprejudice any individual, or the government, had suffered, thatresolution of the disputes, relating to the election, was entrusted toa totally different agency under the Act and that the secondrespondent was not conferred with any power in this regard. ThisCourt held that the impugned proceedings could not be sustainedand, accordingly, set aside the said proceedings.

Thereafter, the second respondent issued notice dated 04-02-2008 calling upon the petitioner to show cause why he shouldnot be declared to have ceased to be the President of the Societyunder Section 32(3) of the A.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1964

(for short ‘the Act’). In the said notice, the Deputy Director ofFisheries placed reliance on an enquiry report of the AssistantDirector of Fisheries, Suryapet, dated 14-12-2007 to the effect thatthe petitioner had failed to conduct a general body meetingbetween 02-04-2006 and 02.10.2006, and the managing committeemeetings between 05.12.2006 and 05.03.2006, as required underSection 32(3) of the Act.

Petitioner would contend that the show cause notice issuedby the Deputy Director of Fisheries ought to have been underSection 32(1)(A) of the Act, and not Section 32(3) of the Act, that ageneral body meeting had to be convened by the Committee andnot by the President alone, that the President had to hold themeeting on behalf of the Committee but not in his individualcapacity and that the show cause notice dated 04-02-2008 wasbad, contrary to the provisions of the Act and the orders of thisCourt. Petitioner would allege that the Deputy Director of Fisherieshad started to issue a series of notices with false allegations, andwith a malafide intention, just to dethrone him from the post ofPresident, though he was elected in a democratic manner. Hewould allege that he, and the committee members, had convenedthe general body meetings, and the managing committeemeetings, regularly as per the Act and that the alleged enquiryreport annexed to the show cause notice was not correct as nosuch enquiry was held. He would further allege that the AssistantDirector of Fisheries had simply visited the place and had takenover the society records, that the alleged enquiry report was falseas no enquiry was conducted and that, even otherwise, the enquiryconducted was in violation of principles of natural justice sinceneither the petitioner nor the other members were given an opportunity to project their views. Petitioner would further contendthat the Deputy Director of Fisheries, Nalgonda, had no power toconduct such a comprehensive enquiry without referring to theprovisions of law and that the show cause notice of the DeputyDirector of Fisheries was arbitrary and contrary to the provisionsof the Act.

In the counter affidavit filed by respondents 4 and 5, it isstated that they were members, and managing committeemembers, of the Fishermen cooperative society, Miryalaguda andthat it was on their complaint that show cause notices were issuedto the petitioner and an enquiry was conducted into the affairs ofthe society. They would contend that, since the proceedingsimpugned in the writ petition was a show cause notice, the writpetition, as filed, was not maintainable. They would allege that thepetitioner had committed several financial and administrativeirregularities, that he had misappropriated huge amounts whichlegally belonged to the poor members of the society, that he wasrunning the society according to his whims and fancies, that hewas not conducting managing committee meetings within the timestipulated or the procedure prescribed under Section 32(3) of theAct and that it was in such circumstances that respondents 4 and5 had given a complaint to the Registrar who, in turn, hadappointed the Assistant Director of Fisheries to conduct an enquiryinto the affairs of the society. They would state that the AssistantDirector of Fisheries had conducted an open enquiry on 11-11-2007, 16-11-2007 and 10-12-2007 and that he had submitted hisreport on 14.12.2007. They would further state that basing on theenquiry report, submitted by the Assistant Director of Fisheries,the Deputy Director of Fisheries, Nalgonda, had issued show

cause notice dated 04-02-2008. With regards the petitioner’sfailure to conduct general body meetings, and managingcommittee meetings, they would state that since it was not eventhe petitioner’s case that the show cause notice was issuedwithout any authority, and as the second respondent had thepower to initiate action under Section 32(3) of the Act and thedelegation of powers in G.O.Ms.No.1982 dated 05-06-1966, hisaction cannot be said to be arbitrary or illegal.

Ms. M.Vidyavathi, learned counsel for the petitioner, wouldsubmit that the petitioner was elected as the President on 25-02-2005 along with the other members of the Managing Committee,that respondents 4 and 5 were also members of the ManagingCommittee and that the impugned notice dated 04-02-2008, asissued by the Deputy Director of Fisheries, was withoutjurisdiction. Learned counsel would state that, while the petitionerhad denied the allegations in the show cause notices with regardshis failure to hold general body meetings and the managingcommittee meetings, since the proceedings impugned in the writpetition was a show cause notice, she was not seekingadjudication on these factual aspects and that her contention waslimited only to the question of jurisdiction. Learned counsel wouldstate that, for failure to hold a meeting, the consequences, underSection 32(1A) and (3) of the Act, were cessation as members ofthe managing committee and the President of the Society, that thelegislature had not provided for the manner in which suchcessation should take effect and that, in the absence of any powerbeing specifically conferred on the Registrar to declare that eitherthe members of the managing committee, or the President of theSociety, had ceased to hold office, the impugned notice, calling upon the petitioner to show cause why he should not be declaredto have ceased to hold office, was without jurisdiction. Accordingto the learned counsel, in the absence of any power beingconferred under the Act either on the Registrar of CooperativeSocieties, or on the second respondent to make such adeclaration, the second respondent could not confer on himselfany such power and the impugned show cause notice was,therefore, ultra vires Section 32(1)(A) and (3) of the Act. Learnedcounsel would state that the society was governed by its bye-lawsand, in case of failure to hold a meeting either of the managingcommittee or of the general body, it was only the members of thesociety, in a meeting of the general body, who could take actionagainst the President or the members of the managing committeeand that neither the Registrar nor the second respondent had anysuch power. Learned counsel would submit that conferring powereither on the Registrar, or on the second respondent, in theabsence of any specific provision in the statute would disable thecooperative societies from functioning independently. She wouldrely on P.Chandra Reddy and others v. Government of Andhra Pradesh[[1]]in this regard. According to the learned counsel, even ifthe powers of the Registrar had been delegated to the secondrespondent, it is only such of those powers conferred on theRegistrar which could be exercised by the second respondent and,since Section 32 did not confer any power on the Registrar todeclare that either the President or the members of the managingcommittee had ceased to hold office, such a power could not beexercised by the second respondent. She would further contendthat a non-existent power cannot be delegated and, since theRegistrar himself had no power under Section 32, such a powercannot be said to have been delegated to the second respondent.

Learned Government Pleader for Fisheries would submitthat, in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 3 of the Act,the Government, vide G.O.Ms.No.1982 dated 05-06-1966, had conferred such of those powers, on theauthorities, as were available to the Registrar as specified in thecorresponding entry in Column 3 of the Schedule. She wouldsubmit that the Deputy Director of Fisheries, and the Director ofFisheries, were conferred all the powers of the Registrar under theAct except those specified in Sections 50, 84 to 115 and, sinceSection 32 did not fall under the excepted powers, the secondrespondent could exercise the powers of the Registrar underSection 32 of the Act. She would state that, under Section 4(2) ofthe Act, every society registered or deemed to be registered underthe Act could function subject to such directions as could beissued by the Registrar from time to time, in the interests of theCooperative movement or in public interest or in order to preventthe affairs of the society from being conducted in a mannerdetrimental to the interest of the members or of the depositors orthe creditors thereof, and that the society was required to complywith such directions. Learned Government Pleader would submitthat failure to hold general body meetings, or the meetings of themanaging committee, was detrimental, to the interest of themembers of the society and, on a conjoint reading of Sections 4(2)and 32 with the delegation of power under G.O.Ms.No.1982 dated 05-06-1966, the second respondent had the power to declare thateither the President or the members of the managing committeehad ceased to hold office.

Sri P.Venugopal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents 4 and 5, would submit that the impugned proceedingsis merely a show cause notice, that such a notice was issued notonly to the petitioner but to all the members of the managingcommittee, including respondents 4 and 5, calling upon them tosubmit their explanation and that nothing prevented the petitionerfrom submitting her explanation thereto. Learned counsel wouldtake this Court through the affidavit filed in support of the writpetition in support of his contention of lack of pleadings to theeffect that the second respondent had neither the power nor thejurisdiction to issue the said notice. He would submit that, in theabsence of a specific plea in the affidavit, the writ petition filedchallenging the show cause notice was not maintainable. Learnedcounsel would place reliance on Special Director v. Mohd.

Ghulam Ghouse[[2]]in this regard. Learned counsel would furthersubmit that under Section 32(1)(a), on the failure on the part of themanaging committee to convene a general body meeting, theRegistrar had the power, notwithstanding, anything in the bye-laws, to call such a meeting, that similarly, under sub-section 5(a)thereof, the Registrar had the power to call for the meeting of themanaging committee and, since such a power had been conferredon the Registrar, it is he who is empowered, under the Act, tomake the declaration that the President, or the members of themanaging committee, had ceased to hold office for their failure tohold managing committee meetings or a general body meeting. Learned counsel would further contend that, in the absence of anyprohibition, principles of natural justice had to be read into astatutory provision and, when so read, Section 32(1)(a) andSection 32(3) would require the President and the members of themanaging committee to be put on notice of their failure to hold meetings, and to be called upon to show cause why a declarationshould not be made that they had statutorily ceased to hold office.Learned counsel would submit that, as the power of generalsuperintendence is conferred on the Registrar under Section 4(2)of the Act, it is he alone who is competent to issue a notice in thisregard. According to the learned counsel, since the powers of theRegistrar, under Sections 4 and 32, have been delegated to thesecond respondent, the impugned proceedings cannot be said tobe without jurisdiction. Learned counsel would place reliance onAwari Devanna, President, Primary Agricultural CooperativeCredit Society, Kammarpalli v. The Divisional CooperativeOfficer, Nizamabad District[[3]].

Before examining the rival contentions, it is necessary tobriefly note the relevant statutory provisions. Under Section 2(b)of the A.P. Co-operative Societies Act, a ‘Committee’ has beendefined to mean the governing body of a society, by whatevername called, to which the management of the affairs of the societyis entrusted. Clause (c) defines ‘Co-operative year’ to mean theperiod commencing on the first day of April of any year and endingwith the 31[st] day of March of the succeeding year. Clause (g)defines ‘general body’, in relation to the society, to mean all themembers of the society. Clause (h) defines ‘general meeting’ asthe meeting of the general body of a society. Clause(j) defines‘member’ to mean a member of the society. Clause (l) defines‘prescribed’ to mean prescribed by rules made under the Act.Clause (n) defines ‘Registrar’ to mean the Registrar ofCooperative Societies appointed under Section 3(1) and to includeany other person on whom all, or any of the powers of, theRegistrar under the Cooperative Societies Act are conferred.

Section 4 relates to Societies which may be registered and, underSub-section (2) thereof, every society registered or deemed to beregistered shall function subject to such directions as may beissued by the Registrar from time to time, in the interest of theCooperative movement or in public interest or in order to preventthe affairs of the society from being conducted in a mannerdetrimental to the interests of the members or of the depositors orcreditors thereof, and that the society shall comply with suchdirections. Section 9 provides that the Society shall be a bodycorporate.

Chapter IV deals with the Management of Societies. UnderSection 30, the ultimate authority of the society shall vest in thegeneral body. Section 30(2) provides that, subject to the otherprovisions of the Act, the matters enumerated therein are to bedealt with by the general body in the manner prescribed. Amongthose matters are elections and removal of members of thecommittee. Section 31 relates to constitution of committees and,under sub-section (1)(a), the general body of a society shallconstitute a committee in accordance with the bye-laws andentrust the management of the affairs of the society to such acommittee. Section 31-A provides that the committee of a societyshall, subject to the provisions of the Act, rules, bye-laws andresolutions of the general body, exercise the powers and functionsenumerated therein, which include the power to admit members ofthe general body, recommend removal of any of the committeemembers disqualified under Sections 21-A, 21-AA, 21-B, conductelections in the manner specified in the bye-laws to the office ofthe members of the committee before the expiry of the term, toconduct general meetings as prescribed under the Act and to expel a member who has acted adverse to the interests of thesociety.

Since the entire dispute, in the case on hand, revolvesaround Section 32, it is extracted, to the extent relevant,hereunder:- Section 32: General meetings and committee meetings:

1. The committee may, at any time, call not less thantwo general meetings of a society in a cooperative year:Provided that one meeting shall be held in each half year.two general meetings of a society in a cooperative year:Provided that one meeting shall be held in each half year.

1-A If the general meeting is not convened in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1), the members of the Committee shall cease to hold office on the day with the provisions of sub-section (1), the members of the Committee shall cease to hold office on the day next after the 1[st] day on which the general meeting should have been held, and it shall be competent for the Registrar, notwithstanding anything in the bye- laws, to call such general meeting in such manner as may be prescribed.

2. xxxxxxx

3. It shall be the duty of the President of the society tocall the meetings of the committee so that atleast onemeeting of the committee is held in every three months. Ifthe President fails to discharge that duty with the resultthat no meeting is held, within such period of three monthsor within one month following such period, he shall witheffect from the date of expiration of one month aforesaidcease to be the President:

Provided that it shall also be the duty of the President tocall such meetings within fifteen days of the date of receiptof requisition in writing in that behalf from any of therequisitionists specified in sub-section (2).

4. The requisition referred to in sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) shall specify the purpose for which the meetingis to be called, and shall be signed by the requisitionistsand delivered in person or by registered post at theregistered address of the society.

5. (a) If for any reason, a meeting is not called inaccordance with the requisition delivered under sub-section (4), or if, in the opinion of the Registrar there is nocommittee or officer competent under this Act, the rules orthe bye-laws to call a meeting, or if there be a disputeregarding the competence of the committee to function,then notwithstanding anything in the bye-laws of the society, the Registrar shall have the power to call suchmeeting in the manner prescribed, and to determine thetime for such meeting and the subjects to be consideredthereat. The Registrar or a person authorized by him inwriting in this behalf shall preside at such meeting, but heshall not be entitled to vote.

(b) (i) If, at any general meeting of the society called bythe Registrar himself under clause (a), otherwise than inpursuance of the requisition, there is no quorum, themeeting shall stand adjourned to such other date and timeas the Registrar may determine.

(ii) If at the adjourned meeting also there is no quorum forholding the meeting, the members present shall constitutethe quorum.

(c) If at any general meeting of the society called by theRegistrar himself under clause (a) in pursuance of therequisition, there is no quorum, the requisition shall lapse.

In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 130(1) of theAndhra Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act, 1964, the AndhraPradesh Cooperative Societies Rules, 1964, were made. Rule 23-A relates to meetings to be called by the Registrar and, under Sub-rule (1) thereof, the Registrar may convene a general meeting of asociety under sub-section (1-A) or under sub-section (5)(a) of Section 32, after giving duenotice to the members of the date, time and place of the meetingand the subjects to be considered in the said meeting. Under Sub-rule (2), the notice of meeting shall be given by affixture in theoffice of the society. Rule 24 relates to disqualification formembership of the managing committee including the President.Rule 24(4) provides that, before passing a resolution under sub-rule 3(c) or 3(d) thereof, the Committee of a society shall givesuch person an opportunity to state his objections, if any, to theproposed action and, if the person wishes to be heard, he shall begiven an opportunity to be heard. The rule further provides thatthe general body of such society shall, through a resolution, declare that a person shall cease to be a member of thecommittee of the society concerned from the date ofdisqualification. Failure to hold meetings of either the managingcommittee or the general body is not among the disqualificationsspecified in Rule 24.

It is no doubt true that Section 32 does not provide for themanner in which a person should be declared to have ceased tohold office either as a President or as a member of the managingcommittee. The cessation as a member of the committee has beenheld, under sub-section (1-A), to come into force on the day nextafter the 1[st] day on which the general meeting should have beenheld and, under sub-section (3), to come into force with effect fromthe date of expiry of one month. While the date from which suchcessation is required to come into force has been specified by thelegislature, the manner in which such cessation should be broughtabout has not been provided for.

I n P.Chandra Reddy[1], the action of the Government inissuing an order granting post facto permission for conducting anannual general meeting, exempting the society under Section 123of the Act, was in issue. Section 123 empowers the Government,by general or special order and for reasons to be recorded therein,to exempt any society or any class of societies from any of theprovisions of the Act. The Government had issued an order underSection 123 granting post facto exemption to conduct a generalbody meeting. It is in this context that this Court observed:

“………..A plain reading of Section 32(1-A) of the Act shows thatthe cessation of the Members of the Committee takes place next day, inthe event of the committee’s failure to convene meeting, six monthsbefore the end of the Co-operative Year. To arrest this legal effect,Section 123 of the Act cannot be pressed into service, inasmuch asSection 123 of the Act is not a provision for removal of disqualification but it only removes the obligation enjoined by law on the societies.Such a power cannot effectively be exercised for removal of adisqualification incurred by the societies by reason of their failure todischarge the obligation.

Having regard to the decided proposition of law, now let us examinethe case on hand. The respondents herein have admitted that as per Section32 of the Act, though they have to hold a meeting within six months of theend of the Cooperative Year, they did not hold the same for the reason thatthe Community Centre was not available to their society for conductingGeneral Body Meeting, as the area is covered by two different AssemblyConstituencies and one Parliamentary Constituency where GeneralElections were held on 11[th] and 19[th] September, 1999. As such they couldconduct Annual General Body Meeting only on 24-10-1999 and on theirrepresentation the Government issued the impugned GO granting post factopermission for having conducted the Annual General Body meeting for theyear 1998-99 exempting the Society under Section 123 of the Act. This veryaction of the Government in issuing the impugned GO with a view tocircumvent the cessation of the Managing Committee, does not fall within theambit of Section 123 of the Act, and the legislative intent, inasmuch as theGovernment has acted contrary to Section 123 of the Act and it amounts toremoving the disqualification acquired by the Members of the Society, asthey have failed to discharge the obligation attached to them. Therefore, theimpugned order issued by the Government has no effect exempting thesociety from holding the General Body Meeting, after they have acquired adisqualification under Section 32(1-A) of the Act. …………”

The questions as to how the cessation from office is to bebrought about, and who is the authority competent to issue adeclaration that a President or a member of the managingcommittee had ceased to hold office, did not arise forconsideration in P.Chandra Reddy[1]. Reliance placed thereupon,by Ms.M.Vidyavathi, learned counsel for the petitioner, is,therefore, misplaced.

In P.Narayana Rao v. Government of A.P.[[4]], this Court observed thus:

“…………The Management Committee of Sri VenkateswaraCooperative House Building Society for A.P. Legislators elected its presidenton 05-05-1986 during the cooperative year beginning from 01-07-19895 tothe end of June 30, 1986. The Managing Committee had not convenedeven one meeting of the General Body under Section 32(1)(A) of theA.P. Cooperative Societies Act. As the General Body meeting was not convened in accordance with the provisions of sub-section 1 of Section32 of the Act by the Management Committee, the members ceased tohold their office on and from the day next after the last day on whichthe general body meeting should have been held. In terms of Section32(1) (A) of the Act, the Committee ceased to hold office by January 1, 1987.When the third respondent, D.L.Ravindra Reddy, was acting as President ofthe Management Committee of the said Sri Venkateswara CooperativeHouse Building Society, it appears that the Government, purporting to actunder Section 123 of the Cooperative Societies Act, exempted the said SriVenkateswara Cooperative House Building Society, from the provisions ofthe Cooperative Societies Act. This order was passed in G.O.Ms.No.226dated 01-05-1987. By that time, the Managing Committee had ceased to bein office for full four months. I have no doubt that the reasons which havebeen given in G.O.Ms.No.226 for exempting this Society from the provisionsof the Societies Act, in the circumstances mentioned therein, are genuine,but the question that arises for consideration is whether the Government hascompetence to issue this order of exemption, four months after themanagement Committee members had ceased to hold the office. It must benoted that under Section 32(1)(A) of the Act, the cessation of themembers of the Committee is automatic. It takes place in the event ofthe Committee’s failure to convene a meeting. There is no provision inthe Act arresting the legal effects of disqualifications that willunceasingly flow from the happening of that event under Section 32(1)(A) of the Act. Section 123 of the A.P. Cooperative Societies Act, is nota provision for removal of disqualification but it only removes theobligation enjoined by law on the Societies. Such a power cannoteffectively be exercised for removal of disqualifications incurred by Societiesby reason of their failure to discharge the obligations attached to them in thiscase the Government has issued G.O.Ms.No.226 on 01-05-1987 but it willhave no effect because, after the G.O. the question of exempting the societyfrom holding a General body meeting cannot arise. For these reasons, I haveno other go except to quash G.O.Ms.No.226 dated 01-05-1987 and hold thatthe continuance of the former Management Committee of Sri VenkateswaraCooperative House Building Society is illegal…………”

While cessation from office for failure to hold a meeting isautomatic, as held by this Court in P.Narayana Rao[4], the questionwhich still necessitates examination is the manner in which suchcessation is to be brought about, and who is the authoritycompetent to declare that the President of the Society, ormembers of the managing committee, have ceased to hold office.

Even, if it is construed that cessation from the office ofPresident, or as a member of the managing committee, under

Section 32(1-A) and 32(3) of the Act, is automatic, and that nodeclaration is required to be made in this regard, the questionwhich remains to be examined is how this cessation should bebrought about in case either the President, or the members of thecommittee, continue to exercise powers as such. There mayvery well be a situation where there is a dispute whether or notsuch a meeting was held, in which event, how and by whom wouldthis cessation from office be brought about? Would not fair playrequire that, before a person is held to have ceased to hold officeeither as the President of the Society, or as a member of themanaging committee, he should be given the minimum requiredopportunity of being heard? It is well settled that principles ofnatural justice must be read into the unoccupied interstices of thestatute unless there is a clear mandate to the contrary. (Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. L.K. Ratna[[5]]; C.B.Gautam v. Union of India[[6]]). There is nothing in Sections 32(1-A)and 32(3) of the Act which mandates against principles of naturaljustice being read into them.

In Awari Devanna[3],an elected Managing Committee washeld to have ceased to be in office for violation of the statutoryprovisions in Section 32(1) and (1-A) of the Act by the DistrictCooperative Officer, Nizamabad. The order did not disclose anynotice having been issued either to the President or to anymember of the Managing Committee. This Court, while noting thecontention urged on behalf of the respondent that neither thestatutory provision nor the rules contemplate issuance of noticebefore the impugned order was passed, and that there was noobligation cast on the respondent to issue a notice, observed:

“…………I cannot countenance a contention that for an order tobe passed of the instant nature, no opportunity is necessary to thepetitioner. May be, the statutory provision is silent, but by that, itcannot be concluded that the principles of fair play need not befollowed. The committee is elected for a specific term and has got avested right under law to hold the office for the said tenure. But, thatcan be terminated prematurely for the grounds stated under thestatute. If that be so, the vested rights of the committee are beingdivested even before the expiry of the term on stated grounds andwhen such is the order passed by the State or its servants, to theprejudice of the petitioner in derogation of his said rights, it can only bemade in accordance with the basic rules of natural justice whichincludes fair play. Rules of natural justice are not rules embodiedalways expressly in a statute or in rules framed thereunder. They maybe implied from the nature of the duty to be performed under a statue. What particular rule of natural justice should be implied and what itscontext should be, depends upon the framework of the law underwhich the enquiry is held. If the stated provisions of the A.P.Cooperative Societies Act are silent as to the procedure to be adoptedfor ousting the elected committee prematurely as happened in theinstant case, the power should be exercised only after due enquiry inaccordance with the principles of natural justice. As the same is notfollowed in the instant case, I set aside the impugned order and direct therespondents to issue a notice to the President and all the members of themanaging committee by specifying a minimum period of 7 clear days fromthe date of service of notice for filing replies and then consider the same.Should the said office bearers require a personal hearing, the same shouldalso be given. The decision afresh shall be taken only after due observanceof procedure stated supra. …………”

It is evident, therefore, that cessation from the office ofPresident, or as a member of the managing committee, of asociety can only be after the person concerned is put on noticeand is given an opportunity of being heard. The question, whichwould then arise, is who is competent to issue such a notice or tomake such a declaration? Would it be the Registrar ofCooperative Societies/Deputy Director of Fisheries, as contendedby the learned Government Pleader for Fisheries and SriP.Venugopal, learned counsel appearing for respondents 4 and 5,or the general body of the society as contended by Ms.Vidyavathi?

As noted hereinabove, there are certain powers which thegeneral body and the managing committee have been specificallyempowered to exercise under Sections 30(2) and 31-A of the Actrespectively. The power to declare that the President of thesociety or the members of the managing committee have ceasedto hold office, on their failure to hold meetings of the managingcommittee or the general body, is not amongst those specificallyconferred either on the general body or on the managingcommittee. On the other hand, under Section 4(2), the Registrar ofCooperative Societies has been conferred the power of generalsuperintendence and to issue directions in the public interest andto prevent the affairs of the society from being conducted in amanner detrimental to the interest of the members of the society.Failure to hold a general body meeting, or a meeting of themanaging committee, would, undoubtedly, be against publicinterest and detrimental to the interest of the members of thesociety. It would follow, therefore, that it is the Registrar ofCooperative Societies who has the power to declare, underSection 32(1)(A) and (3) of the Act, that the President of theSociety, or a member of the managing committee, has ceased tohold office. As noted hereinabove, the powers conferred on theRegistrar, under Section 32 of the Act, has now been delegated tothe Deputy Director of Fisheries, vide G.O.Ms.No.1982 dated 05-06-1966, and, as such, the second respondent was entitled toissue a notice calling upon the President, and the members of theManaging Committee, to show cause why they should not bedeclared to have ceased to hold office.

A show cause notice can be the subject matter of challengein writ proceedings only if it is without jurisdiction. Unless theHigh Court is satisfied that the show cause notice is totally non est in the eye of law for absolute want of jurisdiction of the authority toeven investigate into facts, writ petitions should not be entertainedfor the mere asking and as a matter of routine, and the petitionershould invariably be directed to respond to the show cause noticeand take all the stands highlighted in the writ petition (The Special Director v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse[[7]]).

As noted hereinabove, the Deputy Director of Fisheries hasthe power to issue the impugned show cause notice. Once theplea of inherent lack of jurisdiction is rejected, the petitioner mustbe relegated to file his reply to the show cause notice, wherein heis entitled to raise all questions both on facts and law, including onthe question whether or not the general body meeting/managingcommittee meeting was held during the periods mentioned in thenotice. In case the petitioner submits a reply within two weeksfrom the date of receipt of a copy of this order, the same shall beconsidered by the Deputy Director of Fisheries, Nalgonda, whoshall, thereafter, be entitled to pass appropriate orders inaccordance with law.

Subject to the observations hereinabove mentioned, the writpetition must fail and is, accordingly, dismissed. However, in thecircumstances, without costs.

_______________________________

RAMESH RANGANATHAN, J.

Date: 30[th] December 2008

Note:LR copy to be marked(B/O)ASP/NSR

[1]2002(5) Ald 515[2]2004(1) ACE 310 (SC)[3]1994(1) ALT 363

[4]1988 (1) ALT 278[5]AIR 1987 SC 71[6](1993) 1 SCC 78[7] (2004) 1 ACE 310