WP/18881/2006 of R.Veera Raghava Prasad Vs The District Collector, on 28 December 2007

COMMON JUDGMENT:-

In this batch of cases, the petitioners, besides raising issuesspecific to their cases, also raised the common issue, viz., whetherthe proceedings initiated by respondents for acquiring their agriculturallands without their conversion for non-agricultural use, viz., housesites, are invalid as being contrary to the provisions of the AndhraPradesh Agricultural Land (Conversion for Non-Agricultural Purposes)Act, 2006 (for short “the 2006 Act”). Therefore, all these Writ Petitionswere heard together and are being disposed of by this commonjudgment.

Before going into the individual issues raised in these WritPetitions, I propose to decide the common issue first.

In all these cases, the lands proposed to be acquired areagricultural lands. They are proposed to be acquired for providinghouse sites to the poorer sections of the Society. In the affidavits filedin support of their respective Writ Petitions, the petitioners averred thatunder Section 3 of the 2006 Act, which came into force from 2-1-2006,no agricultural land shall be put to non-agricultural purposes, withoutthe prior permission of the competent authority, and that the person,who intends to use the agricultural land for non-agricultural purposes,has to make an application to the competent authority for suchconversion in the prescribed form by payment of a specified fees. It isfurther averred that under Section 3(6) the competent authority mayreject the request for conversion by giving reasons. On this premise,the petitioners averred that in the face of the prohibition contained inSection 3 on the use of agricultural land for non-agricultural purposes, the impugned notifications, under which the petitioners’ agriculturallands are proposed to be acquired, are liable to be declared as illegal.

In the separate counter-affidavits filed on behalf of therespondents, it is averred that the provisions of the 2006 Act have noapplication to the lands proposed to be acquired for providing housesites to the poorer sections of the Society.

Sri C.Raghu, Sri P.Sri Raghuram, SriT.Jagadeesh, Sri Ch.Dhananjaya and Smt.A.Chaya Deviadvanced their arguments on behalf of the petitioners on this issue andthe learned Government Pleader for Land Acquisition made hissubmissions on behalf of the respondents.

The sheet-anchor of their arguments is that the proposedacquisition of agricultural lands for non-agricultural purpose (providinghouse sites), without conversion, is in the teeth of the provisions ofSection 3 of the 2006 Act.

Sri C.Raghu, learned counsel for the petitioners, relied uponthe judgment of the Supreme Court in STATE OF PUNJAB V.SANJEET SINGH GREWAL[[1]].

Sri P.Sreeraghuram, learned counsel, submitted that though aDivision Bench of this Court in its judgment dated 1-10-2007 renderedin Writ Petition No.22809 of 2006 rejected a similar contention, thisissue requires fresh consideration in view of the judgment of theSupreme Court in SANJEET SINGH GREWAL (1 supra).

Sri T.Jagadish, learned counsel, submitted that while Rule 71of A.P. (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Rules envisaged prohibition ofconversion of any agricultural land for non-agricultural purposeswithout permission from the District Collector concerned, for the firsttime a comprehensive Statute was introduced by way of the 2006 Act.He submitted that the objective of this Act is to enable the neighboringagricultural land owners to raise objections to usage of land for non-agricultural purpose, and that Section 3 prohibits such usage of theland without prior permission from the competent authority.

I have carefully considered the submissions of the learnedcounsel. To appreciate the above mentioned contentions of the learnedcounsel, it is necessary to notice the relevant provisions of the 2006Act.

The long title of the Act reads as under:

“ An Act to Regulate the Conversion of Agricultural Land to Non-Agricultural Purposes and for matters connected therewith orincidental thereto and to repeal the Andhra Pradesh Non-Agricultural Lands Assessment Act, 1963”.

The Statement of Objects and Reasons are as follows:

“The Andhra Pradesh Non-Agricultural Land Assessment Act,1963 provides for the levy of assessment on lands used for Non-agricultural purposes.

The ‘Non-agricultural land’ as defined under Section 2(g) of the Act,means Land other than the land used exclusively for the purpose ofagriculture but does not include the land used exclusively for (i)Cattle sheds; (ii) hay ricks.

Section 3 of the Act, is the charging section according to the areasand rates indicated in the Schedule therein. The Schedule sets outthe rates of assessment per Sqr.Mtr. of land used per Fasli year(a) for industrial purpose; (b) for commercial purpose; and (c) forany other Non-agricultural purpose including residential purpose.

The High Court of A.P. in S.V. Cements Ltd., Vs. R.D.O. Nandyaland others – (1993 (2) ALT 32) interpreted the word ‘used’recurring in Section 3 and the Schedule of the said Act means notonly actually used but also means any land meant to be used orset apart for being used.

On appeal, the Apex Court in the Federation of A.P. Chamber ofCommerce and Industry and others Vs. State of A.P.(C.A.No.1039/2000) on 04-08-2000 held that it is only the landwhich is actually in use for an Industrial purpose as defined in theAct that can be assessed to non-agricultural assessment at therate specified for land used for Industrial purposes. If the SupremeCourt orders are implemented by charging NALA, the demand willgo down to 75% of the total demand.

The Government have evolved New Industrial policy and orderswere issued exempting all Industrial units from levy of NALA witheffect from 01-04-2000 to 31-03-2005.

Accordingly, Government have decided to abolish NALA byrepealing the Andhra Pradesh Non-Agricultural Land AssessmentAct, 1963 in its present form and to introduce levy in lump sum atthe rate of 10% (Ten percent) of the basic value of the land inarrears as may be fixed by the Government from time to time asone time measure at the time of conversion by undertaking aspecific legislation”.

Section 2(a) defined the word ‘agricultural’ as:

(i) the raising of any crop or garden produce; or(ii)the raising of orchards; or(iii)the raising of pasture; or(iv)Hay-ricks.

Section 2(b) defined ‘Agriculture lands’ as lands used foragriculture.

Conclusion

Section 2© defined ‘Conversion’ as change of land use fromagricultural to non-agricultural purposes and Section 2(d)defined ‘Non-agricultural land’ as land other than Agriculturalland.

Section 3(1) imposes prohibition on use of agricultural land fornon-agricultural purposes without prior permission of the competentauthority.

Sub-Sections (2) to (6) of Section 3 provide for the procedure forconversion of agricultural lands for non-agricultural purpose.

Under Section 4, with effect from the date of commencement ofthe Act every owner or occupier of agricultural land shall have to pay aconversion fee for non-agricultural purposes at the rate of 10% of thebasic value of the land in areas as may be notified by the Governmentfrom time to time.

Section 6 provides for imposition of penalty if any agriculturalland is put to non-agricultural purpose without obtaining the priorpermission of the competent authority under Section 3 of the 2006 Act.

Section 7 exempts application of the provisions of the 2006 Actto the following lands, viz., (a)Lands owned by the State Government; (b)Lands owned by a local authority and used for any communalpurposes so long as the land is not used for commercial purposes;purposes so long as the land is not used for commercial purposes;

(c) Lands used for religious or charitable purposes; (d)Lands used by owner for household industries involving traditionaloccupation, not exceeding one acre;occupation, not exceeding one acre; (e)Lands used for such other purposes as may be notified by theGovernment from time to time.Government from time to time.

Section 8, which repealed the provisions of the Andhra PradeshNon-Agricultural Lands Assessment Act, 1963 is as follows:

“Any person aggrieved by an order of the RevenueDivisional Officer may file an appeal before the Collectorwithin sixty days of receipt of such order by the applicant”.

From the long title of the 2006 Act and the Statement of Objectsand Reasons, it is clear that this Act is brought into existence in placeof the Andhra Pradesh Non-Agricultural Land Assessment Act, 1963 inthe wake of the decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court on theinterpretation of the word ‘used’. In Section 3 of the repealed Act andthe new Industrial policy, the State Government exempted IndustrialUnits from levy of Non-Agricultural Land Assessment (NALA) witheffect from 1-4-2000 to 31-3-2005.

A conjoint reading of the Long Tile, the Statement of Objectivesand Reasons and Section 8 leaves one in no doubt that this Act isintended to replace the earlier enactment on recovery of NALA byregulating the conversions and prescribe and recover fees forconverting agriculture land for non-agricultural purposes. Theprovisions of the said Act are, therefore, required to be consideredkeeping in view the purpose for and the objects with which the Act ismade.

While interpreting the provisions of a Statute, the Long Title andthe Statement of Objects and Reasons constitute internal aids to arriveat the true purport of a statutory provision. In ASWINIKUMAR GHOSEV. ARABINDA BOSE[[2]]the Supreme Court held:

“One cannot but be impressed at once with the wording ofthe full title of the Act. Although there are observations in earlierEnglish cases that the title is not a part of the statute and is,therefore, to be excluded from consideration in construing thestatutes, it is now settled law that the title of a statute is animportant part of the Act and may be referred to for the purpose ofascertaining its general scope and of throwing light on itsconstruction, although it cannot override the clear meaning of theenactment”.

I n WORKMEN OF DIMAKUCHI TEA ESTATE V.

MANAGEMENT OF DIMAKUCHI TEA ESTATE[[3]]the Supreme Court held:

“The words of a statute, when there is doubt about their meaning,are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonizewith the subject of the enactment and the object which theLegislature has in view. Their meaning is found not so much in astrict grammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor evenin its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on whichthey are used, and the object to be attained”.

In NEW INDIA SUGAR MILLS LTD. V. COMMISSIONER OF

SALES TAX, BIHAR[[4]]the Supreme Court observed:

“It is a recognized rule of interpretation of statutes that expressionsused therein should ordinarily be understood in a sense in whichthey best harmonize with the object of the statute, and whicheffectuate the object of the Legislature”.

I n BUSCHING SCHMITZ PRIVATE LTD. V.

P.T.MENGHANI[[5]]the Supreme Court held:

“The Court should adopt an object oriented approach keeping inmind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long asinterpretative possibility permits”.

However, in COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, ORISSA V.BUDHRAJA AND COMPANY[[6]], the Supreme Court held:

“The object oriented approach, however, cannot be carried to theextent of doing violence to the plain language used by rewriting thesection or substituting words in place of the actual words used bythe Legislature”.

In the light of the settled law, on the interpretation of theStatutory provisions from the above mentioned judgments, theprohibition contained in Section 3 of the 2006 Act is required to beinterpreted.

A careful reading of Section 3, as a whole, clearly indicates thata person shall not use agricultural land for non-agricultural purposeswithout paying the stipulated conversion fees and obtaining the

permission of the competent authority. The 2006 Act is, therefore,intended to achieve the purpose of user of the agricultural landfor non-agricultural purposes through a regulatory mechanism. Itis significant to notice that certain categories of lands are exemptedfrom the application of the provisions of this Act and one such categoryrelates to the lands owned by the State Government. The attempt onthe part of the learned counsel for the petitioners to relate theprovisions of this Act to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act,1894 (for short “the Act”) and contend that without conversion the Statecannot propose to acquire the agricultural land for putting it to non-agricultural use, has no legal basis at all. In my considered view, theprovisions of the two enactments operate in different areas. While theAct empowers the State to acquire private lands for public purposesand also for being used by Companies for the purposes mentioned inPart-VII of the said Act, the purposes and objects of the 2006 Act areconfined only to regulate the conversion of agricultural land for non-agricultural use and prescribe and recover NALA. Neither of the twoActs places any restriction on the State’s power of eminent domain toacquire agricultural land for being used for non-agricultural purposes.That, far from placing such a prohibition on the State, the State isexempted from the application of the provisions of the 2006 Act, isclear from the provisions of Section 7(a) of the said Act.

In the impugned notifications, the State, through itsfunctionaries, has proposed to acquire the agricultural lands for beingput to non-agricultural purposes. Section 3 of the 2006 Actonly prohibits use of agricultural land for non-agricultural purposeswithout permission from the competent authority and it dose notprohibit acquisition of agricultural land for future use for non-agricultural purposes. Thus, the conditional prohibition contained inSection 3 would only apply at the stage when a person, who acquiredagricultural land seeks to put the same to non-agricultural use. Thereis, thus, no prohibition, whatsoever, on an individual or the State toacquire agricultural land with a view to use it for non-agricultural purposes in future. Once the State acquires the land under theprovisions of the Act, it becomes the owner and it is exempted fromthe application of the provisions of the 2006 Act by virtue of Section7(a) of the said Act. In view of such an exemption, the restrictions, ifany, placed by the provisions of the 2006 Act on the use of agriculturalland for non-agricultural purpose will have no application to the landsso acquired by the State.

In BHAGAT SINGH V. STATE OF U.P.,[[7]]the Supreme Courtrejected the contention of the land owners that the proposed acquisitionfor establishment of a market yard in an area where the Master Planpermitted use of the land for ‘light industries’ held that the acquisitionwill not be invalid merely because the land proposed to be acquired isfor the purpose other than the one permitted by the Master Plan orZonal Plan applicable to that locality. It was further held that acquisitionwill be valid if it is for a public purpose even if it is not for the type ofthe user permitted by the Master Plan or Zonal Plan in force at the timethe acquisition is made and that it will be for the beneficiary of theacquisition to move the competent authority under the DevelopmentAct and obtain the sanction of the said authority for suitablemodification of the Master Plan so as to permit the use of the land forthe public purpose for which the land is acquired. In coming to thisconclusion, the Supreme Court referred to and relied upon its judgmenti n AFLATOON V. Lt. GOVERNOR OF DELHI {(1975) 4 SCC 285}wherein it negatived the contention of the land owners that theacquisition of the land was contrary to the concept of ‘planneddevelopment’ envisaged in the Delhi Development Act, 1957 and heldthat the fact that actual development is permissible in an area otherthan a development area with the approval or sanction of the localauthority did not preclude the Central Government from acquiring theland for planned development under the said Act and that while Section12 is only concerned with the planned development, it has nothing todo with the acquisition of the property, and acquisition generallyprecedes development.

The ratio laid down in the above mentioned judgments squarelyapplies to the present cases where the State, under the provisions ofthe Act is empowered to acquire any land provided it satisfies the test‘public purpose’ and when once it acquires the land and becomes it’sowner, it will be subject to the provisions of the 2006 Act. Therefore,the power of the eminent domine inhered in the State is in no waycurtailed, controlled or limited by the provisions of the 2006 Act.

A Division Bench of this Court, of which I am a party,negatived a similar contention raised in Writ Petition Nos.22809 of2006 and batch in judgment dated 1-10-2007. While answering questionNo.4 framed therein, the Division Bench held as under:

“The argument of Shri P.Sri Raghuram that the agricultural landscannot be used for non-agricultural purposes without obtaining priorpermission under the said Act and, therefore, the acquisition of thepetitioners’ land should be nullified merits summary rejectionbecause Section 3(1) of the 2006 Act contemplates the priorpermission of the competent authority only when agricultural land isactually put to non-agricultural purpose. In these cases, thateventuality will happen only when the government succeeds inacquiring the land. So far, the acquisition proceedings could not befinalized because of the interim orders passed by this Court.Therefore, the impugned acquisition cannot be annulled byassuming that after taking possession of the land, the governmentwill put the agricultural land to non-agricultural use without obtainingprior permission from the competent authority”.

The view taken by the Division Bench fortifies my opinion that thestage for application of the provisions of the 2006 Act would not set inuntil the acquisition is complete.

A learned single Judge of this Court in CHANDANAMEENAKSHI V. GOVERNMENT OF A.P. REPRESENTED BY ITSSECRETARY, REVENUE & LAND ACQUISITION DEPARTMENT[[8]]

also took a similar view by holding that the necessity of obtaining priorpermission under the provisions of the 2006 Act will not arise at thestage of notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act and that thepermission for conversion is required to be obtained only before usingthe agricultural land for non-agricultural purpose. The learned Judge onthat premise held that the notifications issued for acquisition couldn’t be invalidated on that ground.

In SANJEET SINGH GREWAL (1 supra), on which reliance isplaced by the learned counsel for the petitioners, the proposedacquisition by the State of Punjab of huge extent of about 9354 acresof land in 29 villages for setting up of a new town viz., Anandgarh, wasset aside by the Supreme Court mainly on the ground that themandatory procedure of selection of the site by the Board constitutedunder the Punjab Regional and Town Planning and Development Act,1995 (for short “the 1995 Act”) before initiating proceedings foracquisition was not followed. While referring to the provisions of the1995 Act, the Supreme Court in paras 28 and 38 held thus:

“28. Clause (i) of sub-Section (2) of Section 28 is significant. Itprovides that the State Government or the Board may require theauthority (PUDA) to take up the works in connection with thepreparation and implementation of regional plans, master plans andnew township plans, and town improvement schemes. It does notempower PUDA to declare the site for a new town as a planningarea though it is authorized to prepare and implement newtownship plans. It can, therefore, be safely concluded that after asite for a new town is selected by the Board and declared as aplanning area in exercise of its powers under Section 56 of the Act,the authority designated as the planning agency for that area, cantake up the works in connection with the preparation andimplementation of new township plans.

38. Reliance was also placed on the judgment of this Court in AjayKrishan Shinghal V. Union of India – (1996) 10 SCC 721 –submitting that the acquisition for planned development is a publicpurpose. Once a public purpose has been specified by theGovernment, the notification under Section 4(1) of the LandAcquisition Act is not vitiated on account of the fact that planneddevelopment was not specified with particularization of the land inquestion needed for the public purpose. In the instant case theissue is quite different. The land has been acquired on the requestof the New Town Planning Authority constituted under Section 31of the Act for development of the new town of Anandgarh. The HighCourt has quashed the notification not on the ground that thedetailed scheme had not been specified in the notification, but onthe ground that there did not exist any valid public purpose in theabsence of a validly declared planning area, namely, a site for anew town, by the competent authority by notification in the OfficialGazette under Section 56 of the Act of 1995”.

A careful reading of the said judgment discloses that Section 42 of the 1995 Act enabled the State Government, at the request of theauthority constituted under that Act, to acquire the land owned by the

Central Government under the provisions of the Act subject to theconditions laid down in the said provision. Therefore, there was aninterplay of the two statutory enactments, viz., 1995 Act and Act, andunless the provisions of the former Act are complied with, the StateGovernment could not validly invoke the provisions of the Act foracquiring the lands. From the above reproduced paragraphs of thejudgment of the Supreme Court, it is clear that the acquisition wasquashed on the ground that in the absence of a validly declaredplanning area under the 1995 Act, no valid public purpose could be saidto exist. I am, therefore, of the view that the said judgment of theSupreme Court, relating to a case involving two statutory enactmentsand where the acquisition was invalidated on the ground of violation ofmandatory statutory requirements of one of the two enactments,compliance of which was sine qua non for acquisition, has noapplication to the present case.

For all the aforementioned reasons, I hold that the acquisitionproceedings initiated by the respondents cannot be invalidated on theground of non-conversion of agricultural land for being used for non-agricultural purposes.

I shall now deal with individual cases.

Writ Petition Nos.18881 and 19286 of 2006 and 1900, 2697, 2703,2742, 3269, 3270, 3359, 3483, 9222, 10463, 10945, 22966 and 23937of 2007:

Since the contentions raised in these Writ Petitions are almostcommon, they are dealt with together.

In all these Writ Petitions, the notifications issued underSection 4(1) of the Act were published in accordance with the saidprovision. It is mentioned in the said notifications that the DistrictCollector, Krishna District appointed the Revenue Divisional Officer,Gudiwada, to conduct enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act.

One of the grounds of challenge of the impugned notifications isthat delegation of power of holding enquiry under Section 5-A in favour of the Revenue Divisional Officer, Gudiwada, is contrary to theprovisions of the Act.

This Court, while admitting the Writ Petitions, granted interimstay of all further proceedings, including dispossession of thepetitioners from the lands in their occupation. Therefore, enquiry underSection 5-A of the Act is not held so far.

Sri C.Raghu and Smt.A.Chaya Devi learned counsel for thepetitioners, pointed out that under Section 5-A (2) of the Act everyobjection shall be made to the Collector in writing, and the Collectorshall give the objector an opportunity of being heard in person or byany person authorized by him in this behalf or by Pleader. Theycontend that Section 3© of the Act defined the word ‘Collector’ as theCollector of a district, and includes a Deputy Commissioner and anyofficer specially appointed by the appropriate Government to performthe functions of a Collector under this Act and that it is only theappropriate Government, which is empowered to authorize any officer,other than the District Collector, to perform the functions of a Collector.According to them, since no such authorization was given by theappropriate Government in favour of the Revenue Divisional Officer,Gudiwada, and the Collector - who claimed to have authorized the saidofficer to hold enquiry under Section 5-A, as evident from the impugnednotifications - has no power to make any such authorization, thenotifications issued under Section 4(1) of the Act are vitiated.

The learned Government Pleader for Land Acquisition statedthat in exercise of the power contained in Section 3© of the Act theState Government issued a notification authorizing the RevenueDivisional Officers and the Mandal Revenue Officers in their respectivejurisdictions to perform the functions of a Collector for the purpose ofacquisition of lands for construction, extension or improvements andfor the provision of dwelling houses to the poor etc., and that,therefore, in view of the said notification, which is general in nature, theRevenue Divisional Officer has the authority to hold enquiry underSection 5-A of the Act.

I have carefully considered the submissions of the learnedcounsel. G.O.Ms.No.822 Revenue (K) Department, dated 16-7-1985 reads as under:

ORDER

“The Notification appended to this order will be published in the nextissue of the Andhra Pradesh Gazette. (By order and in the name ofthe Government of Andhra Pradesh).

APPENDIX

NOTIFICATION

Under Clause © of Section 3 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894(Central Act, 1 of 1894), the Governor of Andhra Pradesh herebyappoints Revenue Divisional Officers and the Mandal RevenueOfficers in their respective jurisdiction to perform the functions of aCollector, under the Act, for the purpose of acquisition of lands forthe construction, extension or improvements of any dwelling houseto the poor; for the provision of Pathways to Harijanawadas andprovision of burial grounds including pathways to burial grounds toScheduled Castes and other Weaker Sections of Society”.

It is evident from the above extracted notification that the RevenueDivisional Officers in the State are appointed as Collectors fordischarging the function of holding enquiry under Section 5-A of theAct. It is no doubt true that the impugned notifications mention that theDistrict Collector, Krishna District, authorized the Revenue DivisionalOfficer, Gudiwada, to hold enquiry under Section 5-A and that theDistrict Collector does not contain such a power. In my consideredview, this misstatement of fact by itself would not vitiate thenotifications under Section 4(1) of the Act since the Revenue DivisionalOfficer, Gudiwada, by virtue of the above mentioned notification issuedby the State Government falls within the definition of ‘Collector’ inSection 3© of the Act and, consequently, she is vested with the powerto hold the enquiry under Section 5-A. In my considered view, it is theexistence of power, which is relevant irrespective of the claim of theDistrict Collector that he appointed the Revenue Divisional Officer,Gudiwada, to discharge the functions of Collector. In view ofG.O.Ms.No.822, dated 16-7-1985, this contention of the learnedcounsel for the petitioners deserves to be and is, accordingly, rejected.

The learned counsel for the petitioners next contended that the impugned notifications do not contain the boundaries of theproperties, which are sought to be acquired from the petitioners.

The learned Government Pleader invited my attention tothe provisions of Section 4(2) of the Act and submitted that the stagefor fixing of the boundaries would come in only after publication of thenotification under Section 4(1), since the officers of the State cannotenter upon the land for the purpose of fixing the boundaries until thepublication as envisaged in Section 4(1) is complete.

Section 4(2) of the 1894 Act reads as under:

“Thereupon it shall be lawful for any officer, either generally orspecifically authorized by such Government in this behalf, and forhis servants and workmen –

to enter upon and survey and take levels of any land in suchlocality; to dig or bore into the sub-soil; to do all other acts necessary to ascertain whether the land isadaptable for such purpose; to set out the boundaries of the land proposed to be taken and theintended line of the work if any proposed to be made thereon; to make such levels, boundaries and line by placing marks andcutting trenches; and

Where otherwise the survey cannot be completed and the levelstaken and the boundaries and line marked, to cut down and clearaway any part of any standing crop, fence or jungle:

Provided that no person shall enter into any building or upon anyenclosed court or garden attached to a dwelling house unless withthe consent of the occupier thereof without previously giving suchoccupier at least seven days notice in writing of his intention to doso”.

It is, therefore, clear from the above reproduced provision that until the procedure prescribed for publication of preliminary notification underSection 4(1) is completed, the authorities cannot enter the land and fixup the boundaries. Therefore, I am in agreement with the contention ofthe learned Government pleader that non-mentioning of the boundariesin the impugned notifications does not violate the scheme of the Actand the notifications cannot, therefore, be invalidated on that ground.

Smt.A.Chaya Devi, learned counsel for the petitioners,further contended that the purpose of acquisition mentioned in the notification is vague. In support of her contention, she relied upon thedecisions of the Supreme Court in MADHYA PRADESH HOUSINGBOARD V. MOHD SAFI[[9]], DEVINDER SINGH AND OTHERS,APPELLANT V. STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS[[10]].

I have carefully perused the impugned notifications. It ismentioned therein that the purpose of acquisition is to provide housesites to poor people. In my considered opinion, there is absolutely noambiguity or vagueness in the purpose mentioned in the notification. Ialso considered the judgments relied upon by Smt. A.Chaya Devi, andon the facts of the cases on hand, they are of no relevance. Thiscontention is, therefore, rejected.

The contention of the learned counsel for the petitionersthat the petitioners are small farmers cannot be entertained at thisstage because the same does not raise jurisdictional issue to stallfurther acquisition proceedings. As enquiry contemplated underSection 5-A is yet to be held, the petitioners are free to raise theirobjections therein.

Therefore, all these Writ Petitions deserve to bedismissed and they are accordingly dismissed with liberty to thepetitioners to raise all legally sustainable objections before theRevenue Divisional Officer, Gudiwada, and participate in the enquiry tobe held under Section 5-A of the Act. The Revenue Divisional Officer,Gudiwada, is directed to give an opportunity of personal hearing to thepetitioners and consider their objections to the proposed acquisition.

In this Writ petition, the petitioners challenge notificationdated 25-8-2006 issued under Section 4(1) of the Act, wherein anextent of Ac.3.68 cents of land of the petitioners is proposed to beacquired.

A perusal of the notification shows that the RevenueDivisional Officer, Gudiwada, respondent No.3 herein, is authorized to hold enquiry under Section 5-A. In the affidavit filed in support of theWrit Petition, the petitioners contended that they are small farmers andthere are alternative lands available for acquisition.

Inasmuch as the respondents have made a provision forholding enquiry under Section 5-A, the petitioners are provided with thevaluable opportunity of raising all the legally sustainable objections tothe proposed acquisition, I am not inclined to go into and adjudicate thecontentions raised by the petitioners on merits.

The Writ Petition is accordingly dismissed with liberty tothe petitioners to participate in the enquiry to be held under Section 5-Aof the Act and respondent No.3 is directed to give an opportunity ofpersonal hearing to the petitioners and consider their objections to theproposed acquisition.

In this Writ Petition, the petitioner assailed notificationdated 10-8-2006 issued under Section 4(1) and declaration dated 19-10-2006 made under Section 6 of the Act on the following grounds: (1)The Revenue Divisional Officer, Gudiwada, respondent No.2 herein,has no jurisdiction to hold enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act; (2) theland proposed to be acquired is a fish tank and it is not suitable forhouse sites unless it is leveled up to a considerable height; (3) thereare many alternative lands belonging to the Government andDevasthanams; and (4) proper opportunity was not afforded in theenquiry held under Section 5-A of the Act.

In the counter-affidavit filed by respondent No.2, it isstated that all the lands in the village were converted into fish tanksand that there are neither agricultural lands nor government landsavailable for providing house sites to the poor people. It is furtherstated that the land proposed for acquisition is abutting the VillagePanchayat road and nearer to the present village site and that thepetitioner is not a small or marginal farmer. It is further stated that on6-9-2006 the petitioner attended the enquiry held under Section 5-A and submitted her objections and on the basis of the report submitted byher, the District Collector, Krishna, respondent No.1 herein, rejectedthe petitioner’s objections and approved the draft declaration underSection 6 of the Act on 19-10-2006.

The learned counsel for the petitioner reiterated thecontention that respondent No.2 has no jurisdiction to hold enquiryunder Section 5-A. In view of the findings already recorded in WritPetition No.18881 of 2006 and batch supra, this contention is rejected.

The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that evenbefore the expiry of 30 days from the date of publication of notificationunder Section 4(1), notice under Section 5-A was issued by respondentNo.2 to the petitioner and, therefore, the procedure followed byrespondent No.2 is contrary to the provisions of the Act. Thiscontention of the learned counsel is without merit for the reason thatstipulation of 30 days time in Section 5-A is the outer time limit for aperson intending to object to the proposed acquisition to file hisobjections and this provision does not prevent the Land AcquisitionOfficer from issuing a notice to file objections and fix a date for hearingbefore the expiry of the 30 days period, if objections are received. Inany case, it is not the case of the petitioner that she was not givensufficient time to file her objections nor that her objections were notconsidered. I do not, therefore, see any force in this contention of thelearned counsel for the petitioner and it is, accordingly, rejected.

With regard to the contention that the land proposed to beacquired is a fish tank, there is no statutory prohibition to acquire landused as fish tank for the purpose of being used as house sites. In viewof the categorical assertion of respondent No.2 that there are no otherlands, which are better suited for being acquired and the petitioner’sfailure to convince the respondents to accept her plea in this regard,the acquisition proceedings cannot be set aside merely on the groundthat the land proposed to be acquired is being used as fish tank. Onthe petitioner’s own showing if it is leveled up, the land can be used forhouse sites. At any rate, this contention does not posit of any legal principle on which the Court can invalidate the power of eminentdomain exercised by the respondents.

With regard to lack of proper opportunity, the petitionerdid not specifically plead in the affidavit filed in support of the WritPetition that she was denied the opportunity of personal hearing byrespondent No.2. Respondent No.2 in her counter-affidavit specificallystated that the petitioner attended the enquiry on 6-9-2006 andsubmitted her objections. It is only in her reply affidavit she stated thatshe attended the office of respondent No.2 on 6-9-2006 and waitedfrom 10-30 AM to 3 PM and that no personal hearing was given. Thefact that the petitioner did not come out with this plea at the earliestwhen she filed the affidavit coupled with the assertion in the counter-affidavit of respondent No.2 that the petitioner personally attended heroffice on 6-9-2006 and submitted objections, convince me to hold thatthe plea of alleged lack of opportunity of personal hearing is raised asa pure after thought by the petitioner. This plea is, therefore, withoutany basis. In view of the same, I do not find any relevance of thejudgments of the Supreme Court in MADHYA PRADESH HOUSINGBOARD (9 supra) and HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM CORPN LTD. V.DARIUS SHAPUR CHENAI[[11]],relied on by the learned counsel, tothe facts of this case.

As regards the alternative land, respondent No.2categorically stated in the counter-affidavit that while there is nosuitable Government land of an extent of Ac.3.00 cents inR.S.No.86/1,2,3P for providing house sites to 99 beneficiaries; thelands in R.S. No.58/2 admeasuring Ac.16.20 cents and R.S.No.62 and63 admeasuring Ac.23.11 cents belonging to Sri SyamalambaAmmavari Devasthanam and Kanaka Lingeswara SwamyvariDevasthanam respectively are not situated adjacent to the village site;and that this Court in another proceedings prohibitedacquisition/alienation of the lands belonging to the Religious Institutionsin the State.

After carefully considering the case in its entirety, I am not inclined to interfere with the proposed acquisition as I am of theview that the same does not suffer from any illegality, irrationality orprocedural impropriety warranting interference of this Court underArticle 226 of the Constitution of India.

The Writ Petition is accordingly dismissed.

WRIT PETITION Nos.7042 and 7046 of 2007:

In these two Writ Petitions common notificationdated 17-2-2007 issued under Section 4(1) of the Act - by whichthe lands of the petitioners, along with other’s lands, are proposed tobe acquired - is questioned.

Though the ground that the lands proposed to be acquiredare being used as fish tanks, in view of the fact that enquiry underSection 5-A, which is envisaged in the impugned notification, is yetto be held, I am not inclined to go into the contentions raised by thepetitioners on merits.

These Writ Petitions are, therefore, dismissed leaving thepetitioners free to file their objections under Section 5-A, and therespondents are directed to give the petitioners an opportunity ofpersonal hearing before deciding on the objections, if filed by thepetitioners.

In this Writ Petition, an extent of Ac.3.00 cents belongingto the petitioners in Survey No.133/1A of Pedaparapudi village andMandal, Krishna District is proposed to be acquired for providing housesites to weaker sections of the Society under notificationdated 13-8-2006 issued under Section 4(1). Afterconsidering the objections of the petitioners, declaration under Section6 was made on 3-10-2006 and these proceedings are assailed in thisWrit Petition.

Though several pleas have been raised in the WritPetition, the only contention advanced by the learned counsel for thepetitioners, apart from the contention based on the 2006 Act, is that availability of alternative lands in the village.

In the counter-affidavit filed by respondent No.2 it is averred as under:

“ In reply to the averments made in para 5 of the petitioners’affidavit it is submitted that there is no poramboke land fit for housesites in the vicinity and abutting to the habitation as contended bythe petitioners. There is an extent of Ac.2.42 of surplus landavailable in the following R.S.Nos. of Pedaparupudi village which isa part of Ac.5.22 cents reserved for community purpose i.e., for theconstruction of Mandal Office building in G.O.Rt.No.727, Revenue(G) Department, dated 11-3-1988.

R.S.No. ExtentAc. Cts.130/1B 0.73130/2B 0.52130/3B 1.17205/8B 2.37205/10 0.43 ----------Total: 5.22

---------

There is also an extent of Ac.4.08 cents in R.S.No.43 ofPedaparupudi village is vacant on ground since it is takenpossession on 26-3-1996 under Land Acquisition Act. As thebeneficiaries are not willing to take pattas stating that the land issituated in low lying area and northern side of the village, the saidland is proposed for construction of A.P.S.W. Residential SchoolBuilding Society. Thus, the Government land available was alreadyearmarked for a specific purpose. Except these two plots there areno Government Poramboke lands available in the village fit forproviding house sites to the weaker sections as contended by thepetitioners. The acquisition of the lands of the petitioners iswarranted for implementing Government Welfare Programme towit for providing of house sites to weaker sections and not with anymalafide intention and motivated with political inclinations asalleged by the petitioners. Hence, the contention of the writpetitioners is baseless”.

Having regard to the categorical assertion of respondentNo.2 that alternative lands available in the village cannot be utilized forproviding house sites to weaker sections and in the absence of anyother legal ground urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners, theWrit Petition is liable to be and accordingly dismissed.

In this Writ Petition, total extent of Ac.8.00 centscomprised in Survey Nos.38/1,38/2,38/3, 38/4 and 39/2 situated inKurada village, Gudlavalleru Mandal, Krishna District and belonging tothe petitioners, is proposed to be acquired under notification dated 13-8-2006 issued under Section 4(1) of the Act.

In response to notice dated 8-8-2006 issuedunder Section 5-A, the petitioners are stated to have sent theirobjections on 6-9-2006. The petitioners averred that withoutcommunicating any order, rejecting their objections, respondent No.2issued declaration under Section 6. On 6-12-2006 this Court grantedinterim stay of all further proceedings.

Respondent No.2 filed counter-affidavit, in which it isstated that the petitioners attended the enquiry held under Section 5-Aon 6-9-2006 and submitted their objections and that the saidobjections were rejected as untenable. It is further stated that draftdeclaration was issued under Section 6 on 9-10-2006 and wasaccordingly published in the District Gazette, two daily newspapersand in the locality on 9-10-2006, 2-11-2006, 6-11-2006 and 8-11-2006respectively. After notices under Sections 9(3) and 10 were issued tothe petitioners fixing 5-12-2006 as the date of award enquiry, thepetitioners filed the present Writ Petition.

The petitioners did not question the order, by which theirobjections were rejected. As Section 5-A enquiry was already held andthe objections filed by them were rejected, this Court cannot interdictthe further proceedings unless the petitioners challenge the decision ofrespondent No.1, rejecting their objections.

At the hearing, learned counsel for the petitioners statedthat the petitioners failed to question the said order as they were notsupplied with a copy of the same.

Having regard to this contention of the learned counselfor the petitioners, I feel that ends of justice would be met if respondentNo.1 is directed to furnish to the petitioners copies of the orders, by which their objections were rejected, within a period of two weeks fromthe date of receipt of a copy of this order and it shall then be open tothe petitioners to question the said orders, if they so choose. Therespondents shall maintain status quo obtaining as on today for aperiod of two weeks from the date of furnishing a copy of the order ofrespondent No.1 to the petitioners.

The Writ Petition is accordingly disposed of.

In this Writ Petition an extent of Ac.0.62 cents each inR.S.Nos.275/1A and 275/1B belonging to the petitioner is proposed tobe acquired under notification dated 17-2-2007 issued under Section4(1) of the Act.

In the affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition, thepetitioner stated that on receiving the notice under Section 5-A, shesubmitted her objections on 9-3-2007 to the Revenue DivisionalOfficer, Gudiwada, respondent No.3 herein. Within a few days later,she filed the present Writ Petition. On 30-3-2007 this Court whileadmitting the Writ Petition granted interim stay of dispossession. Thepetitioner has not pleaded that the objections filed by her wererejected. Therefore, in my opinion, this Writ Petition is premature,inasmuch as in the absence of any allegation of procedural illegalitiesin the publication of notification, she cannot invoke the jurisdiction ofthis Court even before her objections were disposed of.

The Writ Petition is, therefore, dismissed leaving thepetitioner free to avail appropriate remedy in the event her objections,filed under Section 5-A, are rejected.

In this Writ Petition, the petitioners questioned notificationdated 17-2-2007 issued under Section 4(1) of the Act.

In the affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition, thepetitioners stated that on receiving the notice under Section 5-A, theysubmitted their objections on 9-3-2007 to the Revenue DivisionalOfficer, Gudiwada, respondent No.3 herein. A few days later, they filedthe present Writ Petition. On 30-3-2007 this Court while admitting theWrit Petition granted interim stay of dispossession. In the affidavit, thepetitioners have not pleaded that the objections filed by them wererejected.

For the same reasons as given in Writ Petition No.6413of 2007, this Writ Petition is premature and is, therefore, dismissedleaving the petitioners free to avail appropriate remedy in the eventtheir objections filed under Section 5-A are rejected.

In this Writ Petition an extent of Ac.0.30 cents in SurveyNo.255/1-Part situated in Tadicherla village, Hamlet of Seri Daggumillivillage, Gudlavalleru Mandal, Krishna District, is proposed to beacquired under Notification dated 14-4-2007 issued under Section 4(1)of the Act and published on 25-4-2007. In pursuance of the noticeissued under Section 5-A, the petitioner filed his objections on 11-5-2007. The said objections were rejected by the Collector, KrishnaDistrict, respondent No.1 herein, by his order dated 21-5-2007.

A perusal of the said order shows that the petitionermainly objected to the acquisition on the ground that the proposed landis chosen from a compact block of Ac.50.00 cents and that there willbe difficulty in discharging the drain water, if the said land is acquired.The proposed acquisition was also objected on the ground that the landis not suitable for house sites and that the other members of his jointfamily are not agreeable to part with the land. These objections wereconsidered and rejected.

Having regard to the nature of the objections raised bythe petitioner, I am of the view that they do not pertain to any legal orjurisdictional aspects, the decision on which would be amenable to scrutiny by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Theorder rejecting the objections, in my opinion, does not suffer from anylegal infirmity for interference by this Court in exercise of its Writjurisdiction.

The Writ Petition is, therefore, dismissed.

In this Writ Petition, the grievance of the petitioner -whose land admeasuring Ac.1.66 cents in Survey No.34/1-Part ofJujjavaram village, Pamarru Mandal, Krishna District, is proposed tobe acquired - is that even before the time for filing objections againstthe proposed acquisition expired, the respondents are seeking to holdenquiry under Section 5-A. According to the petitioner, she receivednotice issued under Section 5-A on 25-10-2007, wherein she waspermitted to file her objections within 15 days from the date of serviceof notice, but the notice fixed 1-11-2007 as the date of enquiry.

A perusal of the record shows that on 1-11-2007 this WritPetition came up for admission. Since a batch of Writ Petitions, raisingthe common issue of validity of acquisition of agricultural land withoutconversion, was expected to come up on 2-11-2007, the same wasposted on the said date and on 2-11-2007 order of status quo withrespect to possession of the land was granted.

As the petitioner is provided with an opportunity of raisingher objections in the enquiry to be held under Section 5-A, I am notinclined to entertain this Writ Petition.

Accordingly, while dismissing the Writ Petition, thepetitioner is given liberty to file her objections within three weeks fromtoday and respondent No.2 is directed to give the petitioner anopportunity of personal hearing after receipt of objections, if any, fromthe petitioner before seeking to proceed further with the acquisition.

WRIT PETITION Nos.25099 and 25612 of 2006:

The petitioner in Writ Petition No.25099 is the wife of thepetitioner in Writ Petition No.25612 of 2006. These two Writ Petitions are filed questioning notification dated 13-8-2006 issued under Section4(1) of the Act, whereunder an extent of Ac.6.01 cents of land inSurvey No.412/B-Part, situated in Vadlamannadu village, GudlavalleruMandal, Krishna District and belonging to the petitioners is sought tobe acquired.

It is the common case of the petitioners that they filedobjections to the notices issued under Section 5-A and that withoutsupplying copies of their orders, whereby their objections are stated tohave been rejected, the respondents are seeking to proceed to issuedeclaration under Section 6.

In the counter-affidavit filed by the Revenue DivisionalOfficer, Gudiwada, respondent No.2, it is averred that after enquiringinto the objections filed by the petitioners, she submitted a report torespondent No.1 and the latter rejected the said objections. It is furtherstated that declaration under Section 6 was made on 9-10-2006 andpublished in the Gazette, newspapers and the locality. After receipt ofnotice of award enquiry, the petitioners filed the present Writ Petitions.

Since the petitioners neither filed the order rejecting theobjections, nor questioned the reasons contained therein, this Courtcannot invalidate the land acquisition proceedings. Therefore, whiledismissing these Writ Petitions, liberty is given to the petitioners toavail the appropriate remedy, if they so choose, by questioning theorder passed by respondent No.1 rejecting their objections. Tofacilitate the petitioners to avail such a remedy, respondent No.1 isdirected to supply to the petitioners copies of the order rejecting theirobjections within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of acopy of this order. Status quo obtaining as on today shall bemaintained for a period of two weeks from the date of furnishing of theorder to the petitioners.

This Writ Petition is filed questioning notification dated 18-3-2006 issued under Section 4(1) of the Act,whereby an extent of Ac.0.30 cents in Survey No.438/14-B2 situated inVenkayammapeta, Kadiyam Mandal, East Godavari District, isproposed to be acquired for laying approach road for Scheduled Casteand Backward Class house sites from National High Way inVenkayammapeta village.

A perusal of the notification shows that enquiry underSection 5-A was dispensed with. After hearing the learned counsel forthe petitioner and the learned Assistant Government Pleader for LandAcquisition, I am of the view that the purpose of acquisition, viz., layingof approach road, does not warrant invocation of urgency clause.Section 5-A affords a valuable opportunity to the owners of the land toraise their objections to the proposed acquisition and such a valuableright cannot be denied by invoking the urgency clause in a casualmanner.

Therefore, I deem it appropriate to set aside declarationdated 29-3-2006and direct the respondents to conduct enquiry underSection 5-A by giving an opportunity of personal hearing to thepetitioner before seeking to proceed further.

The Writ Petition is accordingly allowed in part.

In this Writ Petition, the petitioners questioned noticedated 2-7-2007 issued under Section 5-A of the Act, whereby an extentof Ac.1.81 cents of land, belonging to the petitioners, situated inTherani village, Nagari Mandal, Chittoor District is sought to beacquired and they were called upon to file their objections within 15days from the date of publication of the said notice while fixing 20-7-2007 as the date for enquiring into the objections, if any, filed.

At the hearing, Sri K.S.Gopala Krishnan, learned counselfor the petitioners, submitted that under Section 5-A, a period of 30days is given to the owners of the land for submitting objections andthat prescribing 15 days time for filing objections is contrary to the said provision.

This contention, in my considered opinion, is whollymisconceived. The period of 30 days stipulated in Section 5-A is theouter limit from the date of publication of notice under Section 4(1) forpersons who intend to object to the acquisition of the land. The saidprovision does not mandate that by giving notice for filing objectionsand holding enquiry, the owners of the land shall be given 30 days timefor submitting their objections. The notice received by the petitioners isstatutorily prescribed in ‘Form-3’ wherein 15 days time is stipulated forfiling objections. The intendment of giving notice is to provide areasonable opportunity of filing objections against the proposedacquisition and, in the absence of any mandatory statutory provision,providing for longer period, the period of 15 days provided in Form-3cannot be said to be unreasonable.

I am, therefore, of the opinion that the Writ Petition iswholly without any merit and is accordingly dismissed. The petitionersare given three weeks’ time to file their objections, if not already filed,and on receipt of the objections, Revenue Divisional Officer, Chittoor,respondent No.1 herein, shall dispose of the same after giving anopportunity of personal hearing to the petitioners.

In this Writ Petition, notification under Section 4(1) of theAct was issued on 1-11-2007 and ‘Form-3’ notice under Section 5-Awas issued by Revenue Divisional Officer, Machilipatnam, respondentNo.2 herein, to the petitioner. In response to the same, the petitionersubmitted her objections on 16-11-2007 to respondent No.2, andwithout waiting for disposal of the said objections; the petitioner filedthis Writ Petition.

I am of the considered opinion that this Writ Petition iswholly premature. As the petitioners failed to point out any legalinfirmity in issuance of notification under Section 4(1) or its publication,there is no warrant to entertain this Writ Petition so as to prevent therespondents from initiating further steps in pursuance of the notification under Section 4(1). In the event, a decision adverse to the petitioner’sinterest is taken, she is free to avail appropriate remedy at that stage.

The Writ Petition is, therefore, dismissed.

In this Writ Petition an extent of Ac.2.50 cents comprisedin Survey No.373-part of Dosapadu village, Pedaparupudi Mandal,Krishna District, is proposed to be acquired by notification dated 10-8-2006 issued under Section 4(1) of Act. The petitioner has assailed thesame in this Writ Petition.

At the hearing, apart from the issue relatingto non-conversion of agricultural land, the only otherground raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that an extentof Ac.2.50 cents is proposed to be acquired and the notificationmentioned the names of the petitioner and another person, by name,Bolem Yasaswini. The learned counsel contended that the petitionerhas no connection, whatsoever, with B.Yasaswini, and that therespondents failed to show the extent of the land belonging to thepetitioner separately for the proposed acquisition.

On 19-11-2007 the Revenue Divisional Officer,Gudiwada, 2[nd] respondent herein, was personally present andaccording to her since the land was not sub-divided by the date ofnotification under Section 4(1), separate extents were not shown andthat the extent of the land of the petitioner, which is proposed to beacquired, is subsequently ascertained as Ac.1.16 cents. She alsosubmitted that since the petitioner did not attend the enquiry, the samewas not closed and that, if so directed by this Court, she will holdfurther enquiry after giving opportunity to the petitioner.

As the respondents have come out with a plausiblereason for not notifying the actual extent of land of the petitioner in thenotification issued under Section 4(1), I am not inclined to set aside thesaid notification. The officer authorized by the Government can enterupon the land only after publication of notification under Section 4(1).

Failure of the respondents to indicate the actual extent of landbelonging to the petitioner does not suffer from any illegality. Since therespondents have demarcated the land of the petitioner separately,after publication of notification under Section 4(1), I am of the view thatthe impugned notification does not suffer from any legal infirmitywarranting its invalidation.

Since the enquiry under Section 5-A is not yet closed, asheld out by respondent No.2, this Writ Petition is disposed of bypermitting the petitioner to file his objections within a period of threeweeks and directing respondent No.2 to dispose of the same, aftergiving an opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner.

The Writ Petition is ordered accordingly.

In this Writ Petition, a total extent of Ac.13.40 cents inSurvey No.326/1 and 328-Part of Mallayapalem village, Gudivada Sivarand Mandal, Krishna District, belonging to the petitioners is notified on1-5-2007 issued under Section 4(1) of the Act.

The case of the petitioners is that petitioner No.1, whoowns Ac.5.50 cents of land executed a registered gift deed in favour ofher daughter, by name, A.Sailaja on 18-12-1999 and title deeds andpattadar pass books were issued in respect of the said extent.Petitioner No.2 executed registered gift deed dated 16-7-2002 for anextent of Ac.3.00 cents in Survey No.328-Part in favour of his daughterKolli Sri Rani and pattadar passbooks and title deeds were issued inher name. Petitioner No.2 also executed another registered gift deed inthe year 2004 in favour of his another daughter, by name, UppalapatiSridevi, for an extent of Ac.3.00 cents in Survey No.328-Part.

At the hearing, Smt.A.Jayanti, learned counsel for thepetitioners, strenuously contended that despite the fact that thepetitioners executed registered gift deeds in favour of their daughters,and the names of the donees under the gift deeds were mutated in therevenue records, the impugned notification does not reflect their names and that, therefore, the same is liable to be declared as illegal.

I have carefully considered the submission of the learnedcounsel for the petitioners and I am not persuaded to accept the same.The object of issuing notification under Section 4(1) is to make all thepersons interested in the land to be aware of the proposal to acquirethe lands. Even if the names of the registered owners are notmentioned in the notification, as persons interested they are notprecluded from filing their objections and on such objections beingfiled, it is the duty of the Land Acquisition Officer to consider theobjections so filed by all the persons, who are interested in the lands,irrespective of whether their names are shown in the notification issuedunder Section 4(1).

Therefore, merely on account of the reason that thenames of the registered owners are not mentioned in the notificationissued under Section 4(1), the notification cannot be, ipso facto,invalidated unless it is pleaded and proved that any prejudice, onaccount of the same, is caused to the owners of the land. I havecarefully gone through the averments contained in the affidavit filed insupport of the Writ Petition and the petitioners failed to plead havingsuffered any such prejudice. As the enquiry under Section 5-A is yet tobe held, I am of the view that it would be in the fitness of things that thepetitioners/their daughters file their objections within a period of threeweeks and on receipt of the objections, if any, respondent No.2 shallhear either the petitioners/registered owners or the persons authorizedby them before proceeding further.

The Writ Petition is accordingly disposed of.

In this Writ Petition, an extent of Ac.0.75 cents comprisedin Survey No.168/1M part, situated in Komaravole village, PamarruMandal, Krishna District, is proposed to be acquired by notificationdated 14-4-2007 issued under Section 4(1) of the Act.

The averments contained in the affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition disclose that in pursuance of the notice issuedunder Section 5-A, the petitioners filed their objections and appeared inperson on 11-5-2007 at 11 AM before respondent No.2.The petitionersfurther averred that a decision on the objections filed by them has notso far been taken. Inasmuch as the objections of the petitioners are notso far disposed of, I am of the view that the Writ Petition is premature.

Therefore, while dismissing the Writ Petition, liberty isgiven to the petitioners to avail appropriate remedy in the event anydecision is taken against their interest in the enquiry held underSection 5-A.

In the result:

(1) I hold that the acquisition proceedings initiated by therespondents cannot be invalidated on the ground of non-conversion of agricultural land for being usedrespondents cannot be invalidated on the ground of non-conversion of agricultural land for being usedfor non-agricultural purposes;

(2) Writ Petition Nos.18881 and 19286 of 2006 and 1900,2697, 2703, 2742, 3269, 3270, 3359, 3483, 9222, 10463,10945, 22966 and 23937 of 2007 are dismissed with libertyto the petitioners to raise all legally sustainable objectionsbefore the Revenue Divisional Officer, Gudiwada, withintwo weeks from today, if not already filed, and participate inthe enquiry to be held under Section 5-A of the Act. TheRevenue Divisional Officer, Gudiwada, is directed to givean opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioners andconsider their objections to the proposed acquisition; 2697, 2703, 2742, 3269, 3270, 3359, 3483, 9222, 10463,10945, 22966 and 23937 of 2007 are dismissed with libertyto the petitioners to raise all legally sustainable objectionsbefore the Revenue Divisional Officer, Gudiwada, withintwo weeks from today, if not already filed, and participate inthe enquiry to be held under Section 5-A of the Act. TheRevenue Divisional Officer, Gudiwada, is directed to givean opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioners andconsider their objections to the proposed acquisition;

(3) Writ Petition No.19751 of 2006 is dismissed. However,liberty is given to the petitioners to participate in the enquiryto be held under Section 5-A of the Act and respondentNo.3 is directed to give an opportunity of personal hearingto the petitioners and consider their objections to theproposed acquisition;liberty is given to the petitioners to participate in the enquiryto be held under Section 5-A of the Act and respondentNo.3 is directed to give an opportunity of personal hearingto the petitioners and consider their objections to theproposed acquisition;

(4) Writ Petition No.24564, 23770 of 2006 and 12957 and25131 of 2007 are dismissed;25131 of 2007 are dismissed;

(5) Writ Petition Nos.7042 and 7046 of 2007 are dismissed.The petitioners are free to file their objections under Section5-A, and the respondents are directed to give thepetitioners an opportunity of personal hearing beforedeciding on the objections, if filed by the petitioners;The petitioners are free to file their objections under Section5-A, and the respondents are directed to give thepetitioners an opportunity of personal hearing beforedeciding on the objections, if filed by the petitioners;

(6) Writ Petition No.25278 of 2006 is disposed of directingrespondent No.1 to furnish to the petitioners copies of theorders, by which their objections were rejected, within aperiod of two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy ofthis order. It shall then be open to the petitioners toquestion the said orders, if they so choose. Therespondents shall maintain status quo obtaining as on todaytill the expiry of two weeks from the date of furnishing of theorders of respondent No.1 to the petitioners;respondent No.1 to furnish to the petitioners copies of theorders, by which their objections were rejected, within aperiod of two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy ofthis order. It shall then be open to the petitioners toquestion the said orders, if they so choose. Therespondents shall maintain status quo obtaining as on todaytill the expiry of two weeks from the date of furnishing of theorders of respondent No.1 to the petitioners;

(7) Writ Petition No.6413 and 6424 of 2007 are dismissed aspremature. The petitioners are free to avail appropriateremedy in the event their objections, filed underSection 5-A, are rejected;premature. The petitioners are free to avail appropriateremedy in the event their objections, filed underSection 5-A, are rejected;

(8) Writ Petition No.22952 of 2007 is dismissed. However,petitioner is given liberty to file her objections within threeweeks from today and respondent No.2 is directed to givethe petitioner an opportunity of personal hearing afterreceipt of objections, if any, from the petitioner beforeseeking to proceed further with the acquisition;petitioner is given liberty to file her objections within threeweeks from today and respondent No.2 is directed to givethe petitioner an opportunity of personal hearing afterreceipt of objections, if any, from the petitioner beforeseeking to proceed further with the acquisition;

(9) Writ Petition Nos.25099 and 25612 of 2006 are dismissed.However, liberty is given to the petitioners to avail theappropriate remedy, if they so choose, by questioning theorder passed by respondent No.1 rejecting their objections.To facilitate the petitioners to avail such a remedy,respondent No.1 is directed to supply to the petitionersHowever, liberty is given to the petitioners to avail theappropriate remedy, if they so choose, by questioning theorder passed by respondent No.1 rejecting their objections.To facilitate the petitioners to avail such a remedy,respondent No.1 is directed to supply to the petitioners copies of the orders rejecting their objections within aperiod of two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy ofthis order. Status quo obtaining as on today shall bemaintained till expiry of two weeks from the date offurnishing of copies of the orders of respondent No.1;

(10) Writ Petition No.10159 of 2007 is allowed in part.Declaration dated 29-3-2006issued under Section 6is setaside.Respondents are directed to conduct enquiry underSection 5-A by giving an opportunity of personal hearing tothe petitioner before seeking to proceed further;Declaration dated 29-3-2006issued under Section 6is setaside.Respondents are directed to conduct enquiry underSection 5-A by giving an opportunity of personal hearing tothe petitioner before seeking to proceed further;

(11) Writ Petition No.15447 of 2007 is dismissed. However,petitioners are given three week’s time to file theirobjections, if not already filed, and on receipt of theobjections, the Revenue Divisional Officer, Chittoor,respondent No.1 herein, shall dispose of the same aftergiving an opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioners;petitioners are given three week’s time to file theirobjections, if not already filed, and on receipt of theobjections, the Revenue Divisional Officer, Chittoor,respondent No.1 herein, shall dispose of the same aftergiving an opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioners;

(12) Writ Petition No.19105 of 2006 is disposed of by permittingthe petitioner to file his objections within a period of threeweeks and directing respondent No.2 to dispose of thesame, after giving an opportunity of personal hearing to thepetitioner;the petitioner to file his objections within a period of threeweeks and directing respondent No.2 to dispose of thesame, after giving an opportunity of personal hearing to thepetitioner;

(13) Writ Petition No.10936 of 2007 is disposed of permitting thepetitioners/their daughters to file their objections within aperiod of three weeks, and on receipt of the objections, ifany, respondent No.2 shall hear either thepetitioners/registered owners or the persons authorized bythem;petitioners/their daughters to file their objections within aperiod of three weeks, and on receipt of the objections, ifany, respondent No.2 shall hear either thepetitioners/registered owners or the persons authorized bythem;(14)Writ Petition No.10680 of 2007 is dismissed. However,liberty is given to the petitioners to avail appropriateremedy in the event any decision is taken by therespondents, against their interest, in the enquiry heldunder Section 5-A of the Act; andliberty is given to the petitioners to avail appropriateremedy in the event any decision is taken by therespondents, against their interest, in the enquiry heldunder Section 5-A of the Act; and

(15) As a sequel to disposal of all these Writ Petitions, all theW.P.M.Ps., filed in the respective Writ Petitions standdisposed of as infructuous.

Date:28.12.2007

MNR

___________________________

C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY,J

[1]) (2007) 6 SCC 292[2]) AIR 1952 SC 369

[3]) AIR 1958 SC 353

[4]) AIR 1963 SC 1207

[5]) AIR 1977 SC 1569

[6]) AIR 1993 SC 2529[7]) (1999) 2 SCC 384[8]) Writ Petition No.26424 of 2006 and batch dt.14-8-2007

[9]) (1992) 2 SCC 168[10]) 2007 (1) DECISIONS TODAY (SC) 850

[11]) (2005) 7 SCC 627.