WP/38582/2013 of The District Malaria Officer, Nalgqnda District. Vs B. Venkanna on 30 December 2013

ORDER :

Heard the learned Government Pleader for Medical andHealth appearing for the petitioner as well as Sri P.Raghavender Reddy, learned counsel appearing for respondentNos.1 to 26.

2. This writ petition is filed by the District Malaria Officer,Nalgonda District, against the common Award passed by theLabour Court-III, Hyderabad in I.D.No.13 of 2004 and batch, dated09.06.2006.

3. Respondent Nos.1 to 26 herein were working at therelevant time as NMR field workers in the office of the petitioneron a salary of Rs.960/- per month. Their services were orally terminated on 25.12.1991. After their request for reinstatementwas refused, they raised disputes in I.D.Nos.13, 16, 23, 24, 26,27, 28, 31, 32, 39, 40, 42, 69, 70, 71, 72, 82, 83 and 84 of 2004;I.D.Nos.1, 2, 3, 4, 15 and 16 of 2005 and I.D.No.25 of 2004,respectively, by filing petitions under Section 2A (2) of theIndustrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, “the Act”) to set aside theoral termination and for reinstatement. Their case was that theyworked continuously for 240 days from the date of theirappointment till 25.12.1991 prior to the date of termination and theywere not given notices contemplated under Section 25-F of theAct.

4. Their applications were resisted by the petitioner. Hedenied that the respondents-workmen have worked for 240 days.

5. Respondents-workmen were examined themselves asW.W.1 and marked Ex.W.1 service certificates in the respectiveI.Ds. in support of their contention that they worked for 240 days.They also filed Ex.W.2 notices issued to the petitioner for claimingreinstatement. The petitioner herein got himself examined asM.W.1, but did not adduce any documentary evidence.

6. The Labour Court formulated two points for considerationin the respective I.Ds.:

i) Whether the petitioners worked for 240 days continuouslyas NMR workers prior to the date of oral termination?; and

ii) Whether the termination of petitioners is illegal since inviolation of Section 25-F of I.D.Act and if so, to what relief thepetitioners are entitled to?

7. On the basis of the Service Certificates Ex.W.1 issuedby the then incumbent Malaria Officer, as admitted by M.W.1,coupled with the oral evidence of respondents-workmen, and asthe petitioner did not adduce any documentary evidence contraryto the same, the Labour Court recorded a finding that the respondents-workmen worked for 240 days.

8. Considering the oral evidence of the respondents-workmen and the failure on the part of the petitioner in giving replyto Ex.W.2 notices, a finding was recorded that Section 25-F ofthe Act was not followed, and accordingly it was held that thetermination of the petitioners therein from service is illegal. TheLabour Court accordingly set aside the termination and directedreinstatement of the petitioners therein as NMR workers on dailywage with continuity of service but without any other benefits.

9. Learned Government Pleader for Medical and Healthappearing for the petitioner would submit that the impugnedcommon Award is not sustainable. According to him, therespondents-workmen did not adduce acceptable evidence tosupport their contention that they worked for 240 days and that theprocedure contemplated under Section 25-F of the Act was notfollowed. He would further argue that the office of the petitioner isnot an industry and as such, the dispute raised against him is notmaintainable.

10. I am unable to agree with the contentions.

11. The crucial documents filed by the respondents-workmen are Ex.W.1, Service Certificates. The said certificateswere issued by the then incumbent officer. When he wasconfronted with Ex.W.1, M.W.1 even admitted that they wereissued by his predecessor. The certificates which were emanatedfrom the office of the petitioner himself and which were issued asadmitted by him from a competent Officer, cannot be said to beunreliable documents. Therefore, the contention that there was noacceptable evidence is not sustainable. The petitioner did not takethe defence before the Court below that its office was not anindustry as to the applicability of the Act. No such plea can be permitted to be raised for the first time in the writ petition.

12. On the analysis as above, it cannot be said that theimpugned common Award passed by the Labour Court is illegal orotherwise invalid.

13. There is yet another reason which should disentitlethe petitioner for the relief. When the impugned common awardwas passed nearly eight years back, the petitioner has not givenany valid reason to explain as to why the writ petition was filedwith such an inordinate delay. It is sought to be stated that therespondents-workmen did not approach the petitioner and there isno requirement of employees like the respondents-workmen,hence there was delay in the matter. It is beyond comprehensionas to how it is a sufficient cause to justify the laches. A FullBench of this Court considered this issue in P.V.Narayana v. A.P.

[[1]]State Road Transport Corporationand held that though noperiod of limitation is prescribed for the Writ Court to exercisetheir powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or to filea writ petition, a person aggrieved should approach the Courtwithout loss of time and the Courts in their discretion may refuseto exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 of theConstitution of India in the case of persons who do not approachexpeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things tohappen and then approach the court to put forward stale claimsand try to unsettle settled matters.State Road Transport Corporationand held that though noperiod of limitation is prescribed for the Writ Court to exercisetheir powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or to filea writ petition, a person aggrieved should approach the Courtwithout loss of time and the Courts in their discretion may refuseto exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 of theConstitution of India in the case of persons who do not approachexpeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things tohappen and then approach the court to put forward stale claimsand try to unsettle settled matters.

14. The Full Bench further observed that where there isremiss or negligence on the part of a party approaching the Courtfor relief after an inordinate and unexplained delay, in such cases,it would not be proper to enforce even the fundamental rights. Asa general rule, if there has been unreasonable delay, the Courtought not ordinarily to lend its aid to a party in exercise of the extraordinary power of Mandamus. In the instant case, no reasonhas been assigned for the delay.

15. From the aforesaid facts, the writ petition is devoid ofmerits and the same is accordingly dismissed. There shall be noorder as to costs.

16. In view of the disposal of the writ petition,W.P.M.P.No.47954 of 2013 is dismissed as unnecessary.

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JUSTICE NOUSHAD ALI30.12.2013.Msr

1 2013 (3) ALT 711 (F.B)

30.12.2013Msr