MACMA/3668/2011 of The AP State Road Transport Corporation Vs Katta Kusuma on 31 December 2013

JUDGMENT

The Managing Director of APSRTC-4[th] respondent to theclaim petition in O.P.No.686 of 2008 filed this appeal; having beenaggrieved by the Order/Award of the learned Chairman of theMotor Accidents Claims Tribunal–cum-Principal District Judge,Karimnagar (for short, ’Tribunal’) dated 06.09.2011, awardingcompensation of Rs.8,25,000/-(Rupees eight lakhs twenty fivethousand only) with interest at 7.5% per annum only againstrespondents 2 and 4 of the claim petition i.e., the owner of thecrime bus bearing No.AP-15-W-6082 hired with the 4[th]respondent-APSRTC covered by Ex.B1-hire agreement dated13.06.2007, by exonerating the claim petition third respondent-insurer of the bus even Ex.B2 is equivalent to Ex.B3-insurancepolicy issued covering the risk and in force with effect from themid night of 18.05.2007 as on the date of the accident on17.04.2008, by impugning mainly for exonerating the insurer andfastening of liability on the APSRTC with the contentions in thegrounds of appeal that the award of the Tribunal referred to suprais contrary to law, weight of evidence and probabilities of the case,against the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and inignorance of the factum that the bus was only hired with APSRTCowned by the claim petition second respondent insured with the claim petition third respondent-United India Insurance CompanyLimited and as per Ex.B1-agreement, the terms and conditionsincluding from Clause 5 sub-Clause iv, it is the owner that isresponsible to indemnify and not the APSRTC and there is no anyobservation of any of the policy terms and conditions violated bythe said owner for exonerating the insurer to escape from liabilityto indemnify the owner. The other contentions in the grounds ofappeal are on the quantum by disputing as excessive so also inconsidering the age of the deceased as 23 and income atRs.12,000/-per month by applying the multiplier ‘15’; and as to thefixing of contributory negligence on the part of the deceased alsowhile riding the Hero Honda motorcycle bearing No.AP 15-S-7405while proceeding in opposite direction and hence to fix contributorynegligence of 50% on the deceased rider of the bike instead of25%.

2. Heard Smt D. Radhika, the learned standing counsel for theappellant (APSRTC), Sri M. Sudhir Kumar, learned counsel forrespondents 1 to 3 (claimants). Perused the material on record. The parties hereinafter are referred to as arrayed before theTribunal for the sake of convenience in the appeal.

3. In the course of hearing, the learned Standing Counsel forAPSRTC brought to the notice of this Court the Full Benchjudgment of this Court reported in APSRTC, Hyderabad V.

B. Kanakaratnabai[[1]]and the decisions referred therein. The owner of the vehicle-5[th] respondent to the appeal though appearedbefore the trial Court along with the driver by engaging acommon Advocate and contested the notice issued in the appeal

was returned unserved and he did not intimate any change ofaddress and a perusal of the registered cover shows that it waseven in deposit for 7 days with dates noted by the Postman of theaddressee was not there, once it is the duty to intimate anychange of address and not communicated and for the sameaddress, the appellant taken the process that can be taken assufficient notice. Even otherwise, as per the judgment of this Courtin M. CHAKRADHARA RAO v. Y. BABU RAO[[2]], the appeal ismaintainable without impleading the owner of the vehicle. Theinsurer failed to appear despite served. The claimants contestedthe appeal saying that there is nothing to interfere with thequantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal so also on thecontributory negligence on the part of the deceased bike rider of25% fixed by the Tribunal and that it is for the Tribunal to considerwhether the insurer is liable to fix joint liability and the APSRTC isalso for the purpose of the claim owner since there is a hireagreement between the real owner and the APSRTC with thecontrol of the bus under APSRTC as per Ex.B1-agreement.

4. Now the points that arise for consideration in the appeal are:

1. Whether the finding of the Tribunal in fixing the liability onlyagainst the claim petition second respondent-K. Ramesh, ownerof the bus and the A.P.S.R.T.C-4[th] respondent to the claimpetition by exonerating the insurer-United Indian InsuranceCompany Limited-third respondent to the claim petition fromliability is unsustainable and requires interference by this Courtwhile sitting in the appeal?against the claim petition second respondent-K. Ramesh, ownerof the bus and the A.P.S.R.T.C-4[th] respondent to the claimpetition by exonerating the insurer-United Indian InsuranceCompany Limited-third respondent to the claim petition fromliability is unsustainable and requires interference by this Courtwhile sitting in the appeal?

2. If so, whether there is any joint and several liability of all therespondents or only of the second and the third respondents byexonerating 4[th]respondent-APSRTC either based on anygeneral principles of law or factual matrix of the case for thisCourt while sitting in appeal against the award?respondents or only of the second and the third respondents byexonerating 4[th]respondent-APSRTC either based on anygeneral principles of law or factual matrix of the case for thisCourt while sitting in appeal against the award?

3. Whether the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunalincluding rate of interest are high and requires interference and ifso, to what extent and with what observations?including rate of interest are high and requires interference and ifso, to what extent and with what observations?

4. To what result?

-POINTS1 to 3:

5. As points 1 to 3 are interrelated and to avoid repetition offacts and discussion, these are taken up together for convenientdisposal.

6. The fact that the deceased Katta Vinod Kumar, Student of4[th] year B-Tech of Peddapalli, aged about 23 years, whileproceeding on his Hero Honda Bike bearing No.AP-15-S-7405 on17.04.2008, the accident occurred at the outskirts of SulthanabadVillage, involving the crime bus bearing No.AP 15-W-6082 andcovered by Ex.A1-FIR in Cr.No.53 of 2008 against the bus driver-first respondent to the claim petition and also the charge sheetfiled against him under Ex.A2 is not disputed. Though it is one ofthe contentions of the appellant-APSRTC regarding thecontributory negligence of 25% fixed by the Tribunal isunsustainable and it requires fixing of 50% contributorynegligence, the perusal of the material on record including Ex.A5-Motor Vehicle Inspector Report and Ex.A2-charge sheet coupledwith the evidence of P.W.2-eye witness speaks the mainnegligence was on the part of the bus driver. The contributorynegligence since depends upon several factors including size ofthe vehicle, width of the road and condition of the road and fromthe crime vehicle is a bus and the deceased was proceeding onbike while coming in opposite direction of both the vehicles, the accident occurred, there is nothing to show that the deceased wason extremely wrong side including from the evidence of R.Ws.1and 2. So far as 25% contributory negligence fixed on thedeceased in fastening liability for 75% on the owner and theinsurer, if any, of the crime bus concerned, for this Court whilesitting in appeal, there is nothing to interfere with the reasonedjudgment of the trial Court supported by the appreciation ofevidence on record with right conclusion.

7. Before coming to the dispute on fixation of liability on the 4[th]respondent-APSRTC and not fixing the liability jointly on the ownerand insurer of the hired bus and the quantum of compensationwhether excessive and what is just compensation in the factualmatrix of the case concerned, it is apt to state that perfectcompensation is hardly possible and money cannot renew aphysique or frame that has been battered and shattered, norrelieve from a pain suffered as stated by Lord Morris. In Ward v.James[[3]], it was observed by Lord Denning that award ofdamages in personal injury cases is basically a conventionalfigure derived from experience and from awards in comparablecases. Thus, in a case involving loss of limb or its permanentinability or impairment, it is difficult to say with precise certaintyas to what composition would be adequate to sufferer. The reasonis that the loss of a human limb or its permanent impairmentcannot be measured or converted in terms of money. The objectis to mitigate hardship that has been caused to the victim or his orher legal representatives due to sudden demise. Compensationawarded should not be inadequate and neither be unreasonable,

excessive nor deficient. There can be no exact uniform rule inmeasuring the value of human life or limb or sufferance and themeasure of damage cannot be arrived at, by precise mathematicalcalculation, but amount recoverable depends on facts andcircumstances of each case. Upjohn LJ in Charle red HouseCredit v. Tolly[[4]]remarked that the assessment of damages hasnever been an exact science and it is essentially practical. LordMorris in Parry v. Cleaver[[5]]observed that to compensate inmoney for pain and for physical consequences is invariablydifficult without some guess work but noother process can bedevised than that of making a monitory assessment though it isimpossible to equate the money with the human sufferings orpersonal deprivations. The Apex Court in R.D.Hattangadi v. PestControl (India) Private Limited[[6]]at paragraph No.12 held that inits very nature whatever a Tribunal or a Court is to fix the amountof compensation in cases of accident, it involves some guesswork, some hypothetical consideration, some amount of sympathylinked with the nature of the disability caused. But all theaforesaid elements have to be viewed with objective standard.Thus, in most of the cases involving Motor Accidents, by lookingat the totality of the circumstances, an inference may have to bedrawn and a guess work has to be made even regardingcompensation in case of death, for loss of dependent and estate toall claimants; care, guidance, love and affection especially of theminor children, consortium to the spouse, expenditure incurred intransport and funerals etc., and in case of injured from the natureof injuries, pain and sufferance, loss of earnings particularly for any disability and also probable expenditure that has to beincurred from nature of injuries sustained and nature of treatmentrequired.

8 . Now, coming to the quantum of compensation, theclaimants are the dependants of the deceased and the age of themother, first claimant, was 44 years. From that as per the ApexCourt’s expression in Sarla Verma v. Delhi TransportCorporation[[7]]from the age of mother within 41 to 45, themultiplier that is applicable is ‘14’ and the income of the deceasedestimated by the Tribunal was at Rs.12,000/-per month, as he is afinal year student, it may be more. Apart from it, the Tribunalought to have taken the prospective earning capacity also since heis in the verge of completion of his academics B-Tech being 4[th]year student and by considering the prospective earning capacityalso, it requires to take at least Rs.15,000/-per month and if half ofthe amount is deducted for personal expenses since bachelor, itcomes to Rs.7,500/-per month. Rs.7,500/-X12= 90,000/-X14=12,60,000/- and 75% contributory negligence thereon comesto Rs.9,45,000/-. In addition to that, for funeral expenses, theclaimants are entitled to Rs.25,000/- vide Rajesh v. Ranabir8]Singh[[] and for loss of estate at Rs.10,000/- vide SarlaVer ma’s casea n d Rajesh’s case supra, it comes toRs.9,80,0000/- and what the Tribunal awarded of Rs.8,25,000/- isthereby no way on high side but for to say a low amount andthough it is the just compensation, the claimants are to beawarded; this Court while sitting in appeal has no power with nocross-objections filed by the claimants much less any independent appeal, since there is a bar on the power of the Court even toexercise any power under Order XLI, Rule 33 C.P.C to enhancethe quantum from what is laid down in Ranjan Prakash V.Divisional Manager[[9]]that in the appeal filed by the driver orowner or insurer, in the absence of cross-objections by theclaimants they have no right and Court also has no power toenhance the compensation, but for to support the quantum on oneground or the other.

9. Regarding the rate of interest awarded by the Tribunal at7.5% per annum, the same is also reasonable as per the settledexpression in TN Transport Corporation v. Raja Priya[[10]];Sarala Verma’s case (supra) and Rajesh’s case (Supra). Thus,regarding the quantum of compensation and the rate of interestand also on the contributory negligence on the part of the crimebus, there is nothing to interfere.

10. Now, the only point left to answer, which is crucial iswhether the APSRTC is to be fastened with the liability or jointlyalong with the real owner of the bus and if so, whether the insureris liable to indemnify them or not concerned, the fact that prior tothe vehicle hired with APSRTC on 13.06.2007 under Ex.B1-agreement, the vehicle was insured by claim petition secondrespondent owner with the claim petition third respondent insurerunder Exs.B2 and B3 policy with effect from the mid night of18.05.2007 . No doubt, there and from, no reference of anypermission even subsequently for hire much less intimated evensubsequently of the hire of the bus by the owner with APSRTC

under ExB1 to the insurer. However, that itself is not a breachmuch less substantial to exonerate the insurer. The appellant,claim petition 4[th] respondent-APSRTC, no doubt, exercisingcontrol over the bus including on the driver of the bus by engagingits own conductor under Ex.B1 contract of hire. The question iswhether that by itself exonerates the real owner and the insurer,though APSRTC is a limited owner for the purpose so long as thecontract for hire under Ex.B1 in force and given full control of thebus with or without knowledge of the insurer of the vehicle insuredby the owner and not by the APSRTC.

11. In this regard the Apex Court in Uttar Pradesh State RoadTransport CorporationVs. Kulsam[[11]]by referring to Section146 to 149, 157 read with Section 2(3) and Section 103 of theM.V.Act, 1988 regarding the third party risk from the statutoryinsurance on the scope and meaning of who is owner of a hiredvehicle when the policy taken out by lesser and transferred thevehicle to the lessee covered by terms of lease held that “The liability to pay compensation is based on a statutoryprovision. Compulsory insurance of the vehicle is meant forthe benefit of third parties. The liability of the owner to havecompulsory insurance is only in regard to the third party andnot to the property. Once the vehicle is insured, the owner aswell as any other person can use the vehicle with the consentof the owner. Section 146 of the Act does not provide that anyperson who uses the vehicle independently, a separateinsurance policy should be taken. The purpose of compulsoryinsurance in the Act has been enacted with an object toadvance social justice.

Third party rights have been considered by this Court andseveral expressions and the law on the said point is now fairlywell settled.”

11(a). The Apex Court in Guru Govekar V. Filomena F.Lobo[[12]](1988 SC 1332) held that

“Thus if a policy is taken in respect of a motor vehicle from aninsurer in compliance with the requirements of chapter VII ofthe Act, the insurer is under an obligation to pay thecompensation payable to a third party on account of any injuryto his/her person or property or payable to the legalrepresentatives of the third party in case of death of the thirdparty caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle at apublic place. The liability to pay compensation in respect ofdeath of or injury caused to the person or property of a thirdparty undoubtedly arises when such injury is caused when theinsured is using the vehicle in a public place. It is also ariseswhen the insured has caused or allowed any other person(including an independent contractor) to use his vehicle in apublic place and the death of or injury to the person or propertyof a third party is caused on account of the use of the saidvehicle during such period, unless such other person hashimself taken out a policy of insurance to cover the liabilityarising out of such an accident.

This meant that once the insurer had issued a certificate ofinsurance in accordance with sub-section (4) of Section 95 ofthe Act the insurer had to satisfy any decree which a personreceiving injuries from the use of the vehicle insured hadobtained against any person insured by the policy. He wasliable to satisfy the decree when he had been served with anotice under sub-section (2) of Section 96 of the Act about theproceedings in which the judgment was delivered.

Any other view will expose innocent third parties to go withoutcompensation when they suffer injury on account of suchmotor accidents and will defeat the very object of introducingthe necessity for taking out insurance policy under the Act.

In a recent judgment of this Court, in United India Insurance Co.Ltd., V. Santro Devi ((2009)1SCC 558) it has been held asunder:

The provisions of compulsory insurance have been framed toadvance a social object. It is in a way part of the social justicedoctrine. When a certificate of insurance is issued, in law, theinsurance company is bound to reimburse the owner. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that a contract of insurancemust fulfil the statutory requirements of formation of a validcontract but in case of a third-party risk, the question has to beconsidered from a different angle.

Section 146 provides for statutory insurance. An insurance ismandatorily required to be obtained by the person in charge ofor in possession of the vehicle. There is no provision in theMotor Vehicles Act that unless the name(s) of the heirs of theowner of a vehicle is/are substituted on the certificate ofinsurance or in the certificate of registration in place of theoriginal owner (since deceased), the motor vehicle cannot beallowed to be used in apublic place. Thus, in a case where theowner of a motor vehicle has expired, although there does notexist any statutory interdict for the person in possession of thevehicle to ply the same on road; but there being a statutoryinjunction that the same cannot be plied unless a policy ofinsurance is obtained, we are of the opinion that the contract ofinsurance would be inforceable. It would be so in a case of thisnature as for the purpose of renewal of insurance policy onlythe premium is to be paid. It is not in dispute that quantum ofpremium paid for renewal of the policy is in terms of theprovisions of the Insurance Act, 1938.

Ratio decidendi

Perusal of the ratio of aforesaid judgments of this Court showsthat Section 146 of the Act gives complete protection to thethird party in respect of death or bodily injury or damage to theproperty while using the vehicle in public place. For thatpurpose, insurance of the vehicle has been made compulsoryto the vehicles or to the owners. This would further reflect thatcompulsory insurance is obviously for the benefit of thirdparties.

Certificate of insurance between the owner and the insurancecompany contemplates under what circumstances theinsurance company would be liable to pay the amount ofcompensation. The relevant conditions are reproducedhereinbelow:

“Rules with respect to use of the vehicle Use only for carriage of passengers in accordance with permit(contract carriage or stage carriage) issued within the meaningof the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. This policy does not cover:

1. Use for organized racing, pace making,

reliability trial, speed testing.

2. Use whilst drawing a trailer except the towing(other than to reward) of any one disabled mechanicallypropeller (sic propelled) vehicle.

Persons who are qualified to use the vehicle:

Any person including the insured provided that theperson driving holds an effective driving licence at the time ofthe accident and is not disqualified from holding or obtainingsuch licence. Provided also that a person holding an effectivelearner’s licence may also drive the vehicle when not used fortransport of passengers at the time of the accident and such aperson satisfies the requirement of Rule 3 of the Central MotorVehicle Rules, 1989.

Perusal thereof would show that there has not been anyviolation of the aforesaid terms and conditions of the policy. The respondent Insurance Company has also failed to point outviolation of any Act, Rules or conditions of insurance. TheInsurance Company has no legal justification to deny thepayment of compensation to the claimants.

In the light of the foregoing discussions, the appeal filedby the Insurance Company fails, wherein it has been directedthat the amount would first be paid by the Company, with rightto it to recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. Thiswe hold so as the liability of the Insurance Company isexclusive and absolute.

Thus, looking to the matter from every angle, we are ofthe considered opinion that the Insurance Company cannotescape its liability of payment of compensation to third partiesor claimants. Admittedly, owner of the vehicle has not violatedany of the terms and conditions of the policy or provisions ofthe Act. The owner had taken the insurance so as to meetsuch type of liability which may arise on account of use of thevehicle.

Apart from the above, the learned counsel for theInsurance Company could not point out any legal embargowhich may give right to it to deny the payment ofcompensation. Thus, legally or otherwise, liability has to befastened on the Insurance Company only.”

11(b). From this expression it is also necessary to discuss the relevant portions “A critical examination thereof would show that the appellantand the owner had specifically agreed that the vehicle will beinsured and a driver would be provided by owner of the vehiclebut overall control, along with the driver would be that of theAPSRTC. Thus, the vehicle was given on hire by owner of thevehicle together with existing and running insurance policy inview of the aforesaid terms and conditions, the insurancecompany cannot escape its liability to pay the amount ofcompensation.

On account of the aforesaid discussions, it is crystal clear thatactual possession of the vehicle was with the Corporation. Thevehicle, driver and the conductor were under the direct controland supervision of the Corporation.

Black’s Law Dictionary defines “vicarious liability” as follows:

“Liability that a supervisory party (such as an employer) bearsfor the actionable conduct of a subordinate or associate (suchas an employee) because of the relationship between the twoparties.”

So, through the above definition, it can be inferred that theperson supervising the driver through the principle ofrespondent superior should pay for the damages of the victim.”

12. From the above, for all practical purposes, for the relevantperiod, the APSRTC had become the owner of the vehicle duringthe specific hire period. If the Corporation had become the ownereven for the specific period and for the limited purpose the vehiclehaving been insured at the instance of original owner, it will bedeemed that the vehicle was transferred along with the insurancepolicy in existence to the Corporation and thus the InsuranceCompany would not be able to escape its liability to pay theamount of compensation. So, through the definition of vicariousliability it can be inferred that the person supervising the vehiclethrough the principal-respondeat superior to pay the damages tothe victim-third party, when it is not the case of the insurer that driver was not holding a valid licence to drive the vehicle at thetime of accident. It has not also been contended that there is anyviolation of terms and conditions of the policy from saying driverwas not entitled to drive the vehicle. The insured admittedlyreceived the premium for the period at the time that bus had metwith accident and the bus being plied by APSRTC. When there isno statutory duty cast on the owner under the Act or the Rules toseek permission or to give intimation to insurer in case of vehiclehired with APSRTC for it is being plied to say any violation, theinsurer cannot escape the liability much less any legal justificationto deny the payment of compensation to the third party claimants. It is because the liability of the insurance company is exclusiveand absolute.

13. Apart from the above expression; in the Full Benchjudgment of this Court in LPA No.206 of 2000, dated 20.11.2012between A.P.S.R.T.C. V. B.Kanakaratnabai and others (1[st]supra) it was held that “The only question that arises for consideration is as towhether the compensation payable in respect of third partyclaims arising out of accident, involving insured vehicle hired bythe APSRTC, should be borne by the owner of the vehicle or bythe insurance company or by the APSRTC or by some or all ofthem?

A similar question as to whether the compensation payable inrespect of the claims arising out of accident involving insuredbut hired by the APSRTC should be borne by the owner of thevehicle or by the Insurance Company or by the APSRTC or bysome or all of them was referred to a Full Bench of this Courtand the Full Bench in L.P.A. No.206 of 2000 and batch videcommon judgment, dated 20.11.2012 held that mere hiring ofinsured buses by the owners to the APSRTC would not in any manner limit the liability and accountability of the insurancecompanies, be it under the Act of 1988 or the Act of 1939, tohonour passengers/third party risks covered by the Insurancepolicies issued by them in favour of the owners andnotwithstanding the hiring of insured buses by the owner to theAPSRTC, the Insurance Company shall be solely andexclusively liable for payment of the compensation arising outof such passengers/third party claims unless any of thegrounds in Section 149(2) of the Act of 1988/Section 96(2) ofthe Act of 1939 are made out.

Therefore, we are of the opinion that the issue raised in thisappeal by the APSRTC is squarely covered by the Full Benchjudgment of this Court.

Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, theappeal is allowed setting aside the order dated 22.03.2010passed in O.P.No.904 of 2008 by the Tribunal, in so far asdismissing the same as against the owner and insurancecompany. The 8[th] respondent-insurance company is directedto honour the claim of respondents 1 to 6 herein as ordered bythe Tribunal notwithstanding hiring of the said vehicle by theowner in favour of the APSRTC, as it is solely and exclusivelyliable to pay compensation arising out of the third party claims.”

14. The above propositions of law thus crystallizes the issue onhand to the conclusion that even the APSRTC, for the limitedpurpose during the agreement of hire in force, having control overthe bus as well as the driver that belongs to the owner by engagingits own conductor in plying the bus got control over it to a limitedextent as owner, the real owner is always the original person whohired the bus and owned the bus registered in his name and oncethe insurance company insured the vehicle by impugning for itshiring, insurer cannot escape the liability much less fastened theliability solely on the APSRTC. As the bus was taken on hire forplying by the APSRTC and from above expression of theHonourable Apex Court, no doubt there is something left open to say that if there is any violation of the policy terms and conditionssaying that the driver of the bus was not having valid drivinglicence at the time of accident; whether the insurance company isliable to be exonerated and if so, the real owner or the APSRTClimited owner can alone or both together subject to any direction tothe insurer to pay and recover from real owner to be given in thepresent case that aspect also does not arise to answer but for tosay among the respondents 1 to 3 i.e., real owner and the insurerof the bus which hired to APSRTC are jointly liable and not theAPSRTC. From the above it is though not necessary but for thepurpose to clear the cloud to observe that even if there is anyviolation from the driver engaged by the real owner from anyconscious knowledge of not having effective driving licence tomake him liable but for the real owner and not the APSRTC aslimited owner, to be made liable to pay and recover if at all theinsurer was made liable to pay to recover by execution of theaward only against the real owner and not against the APSRTCwho is not the real owner. Accordingly the above points forconsideration are answered.

15. In the result, the appeal is allowed in part while confirmingthe quantum of compensation of Rs.8,25,000/- with percentage ofcontributory negligence and the rate of interest awarded by theTribunal in favour of the claimants, however by modifying thefinding of the Tribunal in fixing liability only against the real ownerand the APSRTC i.e., respondents 2 and 4 to the joint liability bydirecting the 3[rd] respondent to the claim petition-insurer of thevehicle to satisfy the claim by payment or deposit of compensation

amount (indemnifying the real owner-insured) within one monthfrom today, failing which the claimants can execute and recover tothe credit of the O.P before the Tribunal. It is only after suchexecution of recovery, the APSRTC is to be permitted to withdrawthe amount in their deposit. On other aspects, the finding of theTribunal regarding apportionment and withdrawal holds good. There is no order as to costs. The application for vacating the stayis thereby closed for no orders are necessary as the appeal itselfis disposed of.

_________________________

Dr. B. SIVA SANKARA RAO, J

31[st] December, 2013sj

LR COPYs

[1]2013(1)ALD 644 (FB)

[2]2001(1) ALT 495(DB)

[3]1965(1) A11. E.R-563

[4]1963(2) All.E.R-432

[5]1969(1)A11.E.R –555

[6]1995 ACJ 366(SC)-CA Nos.1799 &1800 of 1989 with SLP(Civil) 4586 of 1989

[7](2009) 6 SCC 121

[8]2013(4)ALT 35(SC)

[9]2011(8) SCALE 240

[10](2005) 6 SCC 236

[11]2011(8) SCC 142

[12](1988)3 SCC 1