WP/25600/2005 of Malyavantam Venkata Satyanarayana Charyulu, Vs Sri Anjaneya Swamyvari Temple, Gannavaram, on 31 December 2014

ORDER:

It is a writ of prohibition, seeking to prohibit the Revenue DivisionalOfficer, Nuzvid, Krishna district – the 2[nd] respondent, from proceedingwith the hearing of the appeal filed by the 1[st] respondent-institution and toset aside the order dated 29.10.2005 passed by the 2[nd] respondent inI.A.No.1 of 2000 in Inam Appeal No.1 of 2000.

2. Heard Sri Sudesh Anand, learned counsel for the petitioners,learned Government Pleader for Revenue and learned Standing Counselfor the 1[st] respondent-institution; apart from perusing the materialavailable before the Court.

3. Filtering the inapposite and unnecessary details, the pleaded caseof the petitioners is as under:

On an application made by one Malyavantam Srinivasa Charyulu,for grant of patta under the provisions of A.P. (Andhra Area) Inams(Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1956 (for short, ‘the InamsAct’), in respect of the land admeasuring Ac.13-21 cents in SurveyNos.809, 926 and 927 of Gannavaram village and mandal, Krishnadistrict, the authorities, after holding enquiry under the provisions of thesaid Inams Act, issued proceedings saying that the said person wasentitled for a claim under the Inams Act. Pursuant thereto, the revenueauthorities also prepared adangal and also issued pattadar passbook andtitle deeds under the provisions of the A.P. Rights in Land and PattadarPassbooks Act, 1971.

Petitioners 1 and 2 are the son and brother’s wife of the saidSrinivasa Charyulu. Earlier Srinivasa Charyulu and, after his death, thepetitioners have been in possession and enjoyment of the subjectproperty for more than 45 years. Previously, in the year 1969, the 1[st]

respondent herein filed O.A.No.141 of 1969 against the 1[st] petitioner’sfather under the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu ReligiousInstitutions and Endowments Act, 1966 (Act 18 of 1966) (for short, ‘theEndowments Act, 1966’), before the Deputy Commissioner ofEndowments, Vijayawada, for production of records and for possession,and the same was dismissed on 16.12.1970. After a lapse of 35 years,the 1[st] respondent filed Inam Appeal No.1 of 2000 under Section 7(2) ofthe Inams Act, with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act,for condonation of delay in filing appeal before the 2[nd] respondent. The2[nd] respondent, by order dated 29.10.2005, condoned the delay. In theabove background, the present writ petition came to be filed, seeking writof prohibition for restraining the 2[nd] respondent from adjudicating the InamAppeal No.1 of 2000, and to set aside the order in I.A.No.1 of 2000.

4. This Court, while issuing Rule Nisi on 02.12.2005, granted interimstay of all further proceedings including hearing of the said appeal. Inresponse to the Rule Nisi, a counter affidavit has been filed, denying theaverments made in the writ affidavit and in the direction of justifying theimpugned action.

5. Contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners.

(i) The action of entertaining the appeal by the 2[nd]respondent after a lapse of 35 years from the date of theorder of the Deputy Tahsildar, is untenable andunsustainable; and the vested rights cannot be light-heartedly divested.respondent after a lapse of 35 years from the date of theorder of the Deputy Tahsildar, is untenable andunsustainable; and the vested rights cannot be light-heartedly divested.

(ii) The 1[st] respondent herein did not assign any valid, cogentand sufficient reasons for condoning abnormal andexorbitant delay in filing the appeal under Section 7 of theInams Act.and sufficient reasons for condoning abnormal andexorbitant delay in filing the appeal under Section 7 of theInams Act.

The Inam Appeal filed against the father of the 1[st]petitioner, who is no more, is not maintainable.

(iii)

To bolster his submissions and contentions, the learned counselplaced reliance on the judgments in DAVAULRI PEDAVENKATESWARLU AND OTHERS v. GOVERNMENT OF A.P. ANDOTHERS[[1]], VEERAPPA v. R.D.O. CHITTOOR & ANR[[2]],a n d R.BALASUBRAMANYAM REDDY v. DISTRICT COLLECTOR[[3]].

6. Contentions of the learned counsel for the respondents:(i)The impugned action is legal and valid and is inconformity with the object and intention behind the InamsAct.(i)The impugned action is legal and valid and is inconformity with the object and intention behind the InamsAct.

(ii) The order of the Deputy Commissioner of Endowmenntsdated 16.12.1970 is not conclusive and final and no furtherenquiry was held by the Assistant Commissioner and theExecutive Officer, based on further directions, filed appealbefore the 2[nd] respondent.dated 16.12.1970 is not conclusive and final and no furtherenquiry was held by the Assistant Commissioner and theExecutive Officer, based on further directions, filed appealbefore the 2[nd] respondent.

(iii) The Law of Limitation is not applicable.

7. In the light of the pleadings, submissions and contentions availablebefore this Court, the issues which emerge for consideration are: –before this Court, the issues which emerge for consideration are: –

(i) Whether the 2[nd] respondent is justified incondoning the delay in filing the appeal andproceeding further with the process of adjudicatingthe Inam Appeal filed by the 1[st] respondent under theprovisions of Section 7(2) of the Inams Act?

(ii) Whether the 2[nd] respondent has jurisdiction toentertain and adjudicate the said appeal?entertain and adjudicate the said appeal?

8. The material made available before this Court manifestly disclosesthat the 1[st] respondent herein filed a petition under Section 93 of theEndowments Act, 1966, vide O.A.No.141 of 1969 against Mr. M. SrinivasaCharyulu, seeking direction to handover the records and to deliverpossession of the properties. The Deputy Commissioner of Endowments, Vijayawada, passed order dated 16.12.1970, saying that the properremedy to recover the lands is the Civil Court or the Revenue Court, andthe lands cannot be recovered under Section 93 of the Endowments Act. In the above order, the Deputy Commissioner of Endowments observedthat it is for the Assistant Commissioner to enquire carefully and takeappropriate action.

9. Admittedly, after a lapse of nearly three decades, i.e., on14.06.2000, the 1[st] respondent filed an appeal under Section 7(2) of theInams Act against Sri M. Srinivasa Charyulu (deceased father of the 1[st]petitioner) and petitioner No.2. Along with the said appeal, the 1[st]respondent filed I.A.No.1 of 2000 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act,seeking condonation of delay in filing appeal, without even indicating thelength of delay.

10. The 1[st] respondent herein, in the affidavit filed in support of theapplication filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, assigned thefollowing reasons at paragraph 3 for not filing appeal within time and thesaid paragraph reads as follows:

“There is no bad intention in not filing the above appealearlier as I was not told by my predecessor in title and onlyafter perusal of the records I found it. There is neitherwilful nor wanton fault on my part in not preferring theappeal in past and the delay is bonafide and is to becondoned as per law.”

A perusal of the said affidavit evidently shows that except the above,no other reasons were assigned by the 1[st] respondent herein. Opposingthe said application, a counter affidavit was also filed, stating that thesupporting affidavit is very vague and does not contain date of grant ofpatta by the Deputy Tahsildar.

11. It is also stated in the said counter affidavit that the 1[st] respondent-temple had the knowledge as early as 1970. A reading of the said counter affidavit clearly shows that the application filed under Section 5 ofthe Limitation Act was strongly resisted and opposed. The 2[nd]respondent-Revenue Divisional Officer by relying upon the judgment ofthis Court in THE MAHARAJAH ALAK NARAYANA SOCIETY OFARTS AND SCIENCE, REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY v.SPECIAL DEPUTY TAHSILDAR (INAMS), PARVATHIPURAM, ANDOTHERS[[4]], allowed the application filed by the 1[st] respondent.

12. As per the provisions of Section 7(2) of the Inams Act, it isincumbent and obligatory on the part of the person aggrieved to fileappeal to the Revenue Court within a period of 60 days from the date ofsuch grant. I n THE MAHARAJAH ALAK NARAYANA SOCIETY (4supra), on which the 2[nd] respondent herein placed reliance to condonethe delay, the institution had no notice nor knowledge of the earlierproceedings. But, in the instant case, by any stretch of imagination, itcannot be concluded that the 1[st] respondent had no knowledge, since the1[st] respondent earlier filed O.A.No.141 of 1969 before the DeputyCommissioner of Endowments, Vijayawada, and suffered an order dated16.12.1970, and no reasons are forthcoming for the absolute silence formore than three decades.

13. Coming to the judgment cited by the learned counsel for thepetitioners – in the case of VEERAPPA (2 supra),a Division Bench ofthis Court, by relying upon the earlier judgment reported inBALASUBRAMANYAM (3 supra) held as under:

“The learned Government Pleader for Revenue, on the other hand,contended that no prejudice would be caused by the order of thelearned single Judge inasmuch as the learned single Judge hasleft open all the issues raised by the parties to be agitated beforethe Revenue Court and, therefore, it is not a fit case where theDivision Bench should interfere with the discretionary order madeby the learned single Judge.

We would have perhaps fallen in line as suggested by thelearned Government Pleader if we did not find the jurisdictionalflaw in the impugned order. As already pointed out supra, under

sub-section (2) of Section 7 of the Act, an appeal could bepreferred by an aggrieved party within 60 days from the date of theorder. It is not brought to our notice by the learned GovernmentPleader for Revenue that the Act empowers the RevenueDivisional Officer who constitutes the Revenue Court to entertainan appeal by condoning the delay after expiry of 60 days. TheRevenue Divisional Officer is a creature of statute and whateverpower he exercises under the statute should be strictly within theparameters of power granted to him. Since the statute does notconfer any power on him to condone the delay, the RevenueDivisional Officer condoning delay of 2555 days would not arise. On this aspect, we are in complete agreement with the view takenby the learned Judge in Balasubramanyam Reddy’s case (supra). Secondly, it is quite startling to notice that the Revenue DivisionalOfficer straightaway, without notice to the writ petitioner andcompletely ignoring natural justice and fair-play in action, expartecondoned the enormous delay of 2555 days. This particular actionof the Revenue Divisional Officer speaks volumes, particularly, inthe context of Republican Constitution and Rule of Law and after52 years of Republic coming into existence. It is for the appropriateauthority in the Government to view this matter seriously and to seethat such a thing does not happen in future at least. In that view ofthe matter, we are of the considered opinion that the very appealpreferred by the District Collector is not maintainable. Therefore,directing the Revenue Court to dispose of the appeal on merit asdirected by the learned single Judge would not arise. Nomandamus will go to an authority, statutory or otherwise, toexercise a power which is not granted by the statute and the law. Since the Act does not grant the power to the District Collector toentertain an appeal beyond 60 days of the date of the order,directing him to decide the appeal on merit is not justified. WritAppeal, is therefore, allowed and the orders of the learned singleJudge in W.P.No.11598 of 2001, dated 14-12-2000 and ReviewWPMP No.5573/2000 dated 26-4-270707177 are set aside. Thewrit petition is allowed and the impugned order of the firstrespondent – Revenue Divisional Officer – is quashed with costsquantified at Rs.2,000/- payable within two weeks from today.”

14. Learned counsel for the petitioners also relied on a decisionreported in POPAT BAHIRU GOVARDHANE AND OTHERS v.SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER AND ANOTHER[[5]], andcontended that the provisions of the Limitation Act are not applicable for quasi-judicial authorities. I n POPAT BAHIRU (5 supra), the Hon’bleApex Court referred to earlier judgments reported in UNION OF INDIA V.

MANGATU RAM[[6]], and TOTA RAM v. STATE OF U.P.[[7]], held at paragraph 13 as under:

“This Court in UNION OF INDIA V. MANGATU RAM, andTOTA RAM v. STATE OF U.P. dealt with the issue involvedherein and held that as the Land Acquisition Collector is nota court and acts as a quasi-judicial authority while makingthe award, the provisions of the 1963 Act would not applyand, therefore, the application under Section 28-A of the Act,has to be filed within the period of limitation as prescribedunder Section 28-A of the Act. The said provisions requirethat an application for redetermination is to be filed within 3months from the date of the award of the court. The provisofurther provides that the period of limitation is to becalculated excluding the date on which the award is madeand the time requisite for obtaining the copy of the award.”

15. The learned Government Pleader and the learned StandingCounsel for the respondent-institution, while referring to the provisions ofSection 143 of the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu ReligiousInstitutions & Endowments Act, 1987 (for short, ‘Endowments Act, 1987’)contends that there is no limitation for the 1[st] respondent to file appealbefore the 2[nd] respondent.

16. In view of the contention of the learned counsel, it may beappropriate and necessary to refer to Section 143 of the Endowments Act, 1987 which reads as under:

“143. Property of Charitable or religious institution orendowment not to vest under the law of limitation aftercommencement of this Act:- Nothing in any law oflimitation for the time being in force shall be deemed tovest in any person the property or funds of any charitableor religious institution or endowment which have notvested in such person or his predecessor in title before the30[th] September, 1951, in the Andhra Area of the State andthe 26[th] January, 1967 in the remaining area of the State”

17. A plain reading of Section 143 of the Endowments Act, 1987 makesit abundantly clear that the said provision of law deals with a claim ofvesting of the Endowments property in the individual and the effect of lawof limitation, but not with the present contingency filing of an appeal underthe provisions of the Inams Act. This provision imposes a prohibition onindividuals to claim ownership in the Endowments property on the groundof expiry of period of limitation, i.e., plea of adverse possession is notavailable in respect of Endowment properties. In the considered opinionof this Court, the scope, ambit and parameters of the applicability of thesaid provision are different and cannot be extended to the contingenciesof the present nature.

18. Having filed an application in 1969 before the DeputyCommissioner of Endowments, Vijayawada, and having suffered an orderin 1970, and having failed to explain the delay of approximately threedecades in filing appeal against the order of grant of patta, and havingfailed to explain the reasons for such exorbitant delay of three decades, inthe delay condonation application filed under Section 5 of the LimitationAct, it is not open to the respondents to advance such contention for thefirst time before this Court.

19. Learned counsel for the 1[st] respondent places reliance on thejudgments of the Apex Court reported in MAHANTH MOTILALGOSWAMI v. STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS[[8]]and BHARTIYASEVA SAMAJ TRUST TR. PRES. & ANR v. YOGESHBHAI AMBALAL

PATEL & ANR[[9]], and contends that quashing of one illegal order by theCourt should not result in revival of another illegal order.

20. In the facts and circumstances of the case, and in view of thereasons set out supra, the principles laid down in MAHANTH MOTILAL(8 supra) and BHARTIYA SEVA SAMAJ (9 supra)would not render anyassistance to the case of 1[st] respondent herein.

21. In view of the above narration, this Court has neither any hesitationnor any traces of doubt to hold that the order impugned in the present writpetition is neither sustainable nor tenable in the eye of law.

22. For the aforesaid reasons, the writ petition is allowed, setting asidethe order dated 29.10.2005 passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer,Nuzvid, Krishna district, in I.A.No.1 of 2000 in Inam Appeal No.1 of 2000,and consequently it is declared that the 2[nd] respondent herein cannotproceed further with the adjudication of the Inam Appeal No.1 of 2000.

No order as to costs. Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending inthis writ petition shall stand closed.

______________________

JUSTICE A.V. SESHA SAI

31[st] December, 2014

KSM

[1]2002 Suppl. (1) ALD 7852002 Suppl. (1) ALD 785

[2]2002 (3) L.S. 47 (D.B.)2002 (3) L.S. 47 (D.B.)

[3]1990 (1) An. WR 951990 (1) An. WR 95

[4]W.P.No. 4188 of 1974 dated 28.12.1976W.P.No. 4188 of 1974 dated 28.12.1976

[5](2013) 10 Supreme Court Cases 765(2013) 10 Supreme Court Cases 765

[6](1997) 6 SCC 59(1997) 6 SCC 59

[7](1997) 6 SCC 280(1997) 6 SCC 280

[8]AIR 1993 PATNA 171AIR 1993 PATNA 171

[9]CIVIL APPEAL No. 6463 of 2012 dated 14.09.2012CIVIL APPEAL No. 6463 of 2012 dated 14.09.2012