CC/1879/2013 of Beeram Venkata Lakshmi Sreedhar, Vs Sri Siddhardha Jain, IAS, on 31 December 2015

ORDER:

The order, violation of which is alleged in this Contempt Case, isthe order passed by this Court in W.P.No.9425 of 2013 dated09.04.2013 permitting the petitioner to submit an application in theprescribed form within two weeks from the date of the order; and indirecting respondents 2 to 4 to consider such application and passorders thereupon, in accordance with law, within three monthsthereafter, and communicate their decision to the petitioner.

It is not in dispute that the petitioner submitted an application on20.04.2013.The three month period, stipulated by this Court, expiredon 20.07.2013.As the respondents did not comply with the order, thepetitioner filed the present Contempt Case on 27.10.2013.Noticebefore admission was ordered in the Contempt Case on 21.03.2014,and it is only on 27.09.2014 that the petitioner’s application wasconsidered and rejected.

The delay of more than 14 months, in complying with the orderof this Court, is sought to be explained by respondents 2 and 3 in thecounter affidavits filed by them.In his counter affidavit, the thirdrespondent (Tahsildar) stated that, pursuant to the representation-made by the petitioner, the second respondentJoint Collector hadcalled for remarks /reports from the field staff including himself; hisdetailed report was submitted on 14.05.2013; and the secondrespondent, after considering the representation, had passed adetailed order on 27.09.2014 rejecting the petitioner’s claim as thesaid land was found to be Wakf property.Along with the counteraffidavit is enclosed a report submitted by the third respondent to the-second respondentJoint Collector on 04.05.2013.The thirdrespondent could only have submitted a report on being so directed bythe second respondent and, as his report was submitted well within thethree months period stipulated by this Court, the third respondent cannot be faulted much less held to have wilfully and deliberatelyviolated the order of this Court.

What is disconcerting, however, is the lethargy and indifferenceof the second respondent in complying with the order of this Courtwithin the time stipulated therein.Though he received a report fromthe Tahsildar on 04.05.2013, and the order of this Court required himto dispose of the application on or before 20.07.2013, the secondrespondent passed an order only on 27.09.2014, more than 14 monthsafter expiry of the time stipulated by this Court.The justification for theinordinate delay in compliance, is attributed by the second respondentto the Panchayat elections which were notified on 19.03.2013 andwere held on 23.08.2013; elections to Local Bodies which werenotified on 17.03.2014 and were held on 06.04.2014; the Generalelections which were notified on 12.04.2014 and were held on07.05.2014; the Helen and Neelam Cyclones and the consequentrehabilitation schemes; and the Samaikhya Andhra agitation in twospells, the first for 66 days from 13.08.2013 to 17.10.2013 and,thereafter, for 14 days from 06.02.2014 to 19.02.2014.

The averments in the counter affidavit seem to suggest that, inthe opinion of the second respondent, all his administrative dutiesshould take precedence over his obligation to comply with the ordersof Court.Even after the first phase of the Samaikhya Andhra agitationended on 17.10.2013, the second respondent chose not to comply withthe order of this Court.During the intervening period of 3½ months,between the first spell of agitation which ended on 17.10.2013 and thesecond spell of agitation which began on 06.02.2014, the secondrespondent slept over the matter despite the specific directions of thisCourt to comply with the order within three months.The Panchayatelections, Local Body elections or even the General elections heldthereafter, do not justify the second respondent’s failure to comply withthe order of this Court.If, as is now contended before this Court, thesecond respondent had a genuine difficulty in complying with the order

Conclusion

of this Court, he ought to have filed an application, in the Writ Petition,seeking extension of time.No such application has, admittedly, beenfiled.The counter affidavit filed by the second respondent does noteven state when the cyclones took place, or how the secondrespondent was disabled thereby from complying with the order of this-Court.It is evident that the averments in the counteraffidavit are anafterthought to somehow justify his failure to pass orders within thestipulated time, and thereby avoid being punished for contempt.

Effective administration of justice would require some penalty tobe imposed for disobedience of orders of the Court if disobedience ismore than casual, accidental or unintentional. (Heatons TransportLtd. v. Transport and General Workers Union[[1]];Court on its own motion v. N.S. Kanwar[[2]]). In exercise of its contempt jurisdiction, theCourt is primarily concerned with an enquiry whether the contemnor isguilty of intentional and wilful violation of the orders of the court. (Maninderjit Singh Bitta v. Union of India[[3]]). The wilful element isan indispensable requirement to bring home the charge within themeaning of the Act. (Anil Ratan Sarkar v. Hirak Ghosh[[4]]). “Wilfulmeans an act or omission which is done voluntarily and with thespecific intent to do something the law forbids or with the specific intentto fail to do something the law requires to be done, that is to say, withthe purpose of either disobeying or disregarding the law. (Patel Rajnikant Dhulabhai v. Patel Chandrakant Dhulabhai[[5]];Ashok Paper Kamgar Union v. Dharam Godha[[6]]). Wilful would excludecasual, accidental, bona fide or unintentional acts or genuine inabilityto comply with the terms of the order. Whether or not disobedience iswillful depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Evennegligence and carelessness can amount to disobedience. (KapildeoPrasad Sah v. State of Bihar[[7]]).

If a party who is fully in the know of the order of the Court, or isconscious and aware of the consequences and implications of theCourt's order, ignores it or acts in violation thereof, it must be held thatthe disobedience is wilful. It may not be possible to prove the actualintention behind the act or omission. A Court can approach thequestion only objectively, and it may presume the intention from the actdone as every man is presumed to intend the probable consequenceof his act. (N.S. Kanwar[2]). To establish contempt of court, it issufficient to prove that the conduct was willful and that the contemnorknew of all the facts which made it a breach of the order. It is notnecessary to prove that he appreciated that it did breach the order. (St.Helen’s Ltd. v. Transport & General Workers’ Union[[8]];Adam Phones Ltd v. Goldschmidt[[9]]). While the jurisdiction exercised incases of contempt is quasi-criminal in nature and the court must besatisfied, on the material before it, that contempt of court was in factcommitted, such satisfaction may be derived from the circumstances ofthe case. (Ram Autar Shukla v. Arvind Shukla[[10]];Bank of India v.

Vijay Transport[[11]]). For the purposes of judging 'civil contempt',intention or mens rea is not relevant. The question is only whether thebreach was on account of willful disobedience i.e, whether it was notcasual or accidental and unintentional. (V.C. Govindaswami Mudaliv. B.Subba Reddy[[12]]).

Of late, Courts are coming across several instances wheresenior government officers display scant regard for orders of the court,and offer lame excuses for its violation. (Gurminder Singh Kang v.

Shiv Prasad Singh[[13]]). It has become a tendency with governmentofficers to somehow or the other circumvent the orders of the courttaking recourse to one justification or the other even if, ex facie, theyare unsustainable. This tendency of undermining the court order should not be countenanced. (Maninderjit Singh Bitta[3]; E.T. Sunupv. C.A.N.S.S. Employees Assn.[[14]]).

The very fact that, even after notice was served on him in theContempt Case on 04.04.2014, the second respondent chose not topass an order for nearly 5 ½ months thereafter till 27.09.2014, issufficient proof of his indifference to the need to comply with Courtorders within time.I am satisfied that the second respondent has notonly violated the order of this Court, but that such violation is wilful anddeliberate.

It is no doubt true that the 2[nd] respondent in this contempt casehas tendered his unconditional apology. Section 12(1) of theContempt of Courts Act, and the Explanation thereto, enable the Courtto remit the punishment awarded for committing contempt of court onan apology being made to the satisfaction of the court. An apologyshould not be rejected merely on the ground that it is qualified ortendered at a belated stage if the accused makes it bona fide.However a conduct which abuses, and makes a mockery of, thejudicial process of the court must be dealt with an iron hand. (Bal Kishan Giri v. State of U.P.,[[15]]). An apology can neither be adefence nor a justification for an act which tantamounts to contempt ofcourt. An apology can be accepted in cases where the conduct, forwhich the apology is given, is such that it can be “ignored withoutcompromising the dignity of the court”, or it is intended to be evidenceof real contrition. It should be sincere. Apology cannot be accepted incase it is hollow, there is no remorse, no regret, no repentance, or if itis only a device to escape the rigour of the law. Such an apology ismerely a “paper apology”. (Bal Kishan Giri[15]).

An apology tendered is not to be accepted as a matter ofcourse, and the court is competent to reject the apology and imposethe punishment recording reasons therefor. (Bal Kishan Giri[15]). Evenif the apology is not belated, but is found to be without real contrition and remorse, and to have been tendered merely as a weapon ofdefence, the court may refuse to accept it. If the apology is offered atthe time when the contemnor finds that the court is going to imposepunishment, it ceases to be an apology and becomes an act of acringing coward. (Bal Kishan Giri[15]; Debabrata Bandhopadhyaya v.State of W.B.[[16]]; Mulk Raj v. State of Punjab[[17]], Hailakandi BarAssn. v. State of Assam[[18]], C. Elumalai v. A.G.L. Irudayaraj[[19]]

and Ranveer Yadav v. State of Bihar[[20]]) . A mere statement ofapology by the contemnor before the court would hardly amount to hispurging himself of contempt. The Court must be satisfied of thegenuineness of the apology. If the court is so satisfied, and on thisbasis accepts the apology as genuine, it should pass an order holdingthat the contemnor has purged himself of contempt. (Pravin C. Shah

v. K.A. Mohd. Ali[[21]]).

An apology is not intended to operate as a universal panacea.(M.Y. Shareef v. Judges of Nagpur High Court[[22]];Pravin C.

Shah[21]; T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad (102) v. Ashok Khot[[23]]). Itis not a weapon of defence forged to purge the guilty of the offence, butis intended to be evidence of real contrition, the consciousness of awrong done, of an injury inflicted, and the earnest desire to make suchreparation as lies in the wrongdoer’s power. (Delhi Development

Authority v. Skipper Construction[[24]]). Only then is it of any avail ina court of justice. Unless that is done, not only is the tendered apologyrobbed of all grace but it also ceases to be a full and frank admissionof a wrong done, which it is intended to be. (Hiren Bose, Re[[25]]; PatelRajnikant Dhulabhai[5]). The apology tendered by the contemnor, tobe accepted by the Court, should be a product of remorse. (M.C.Mehta v. Union of India[[26]]) . Public interest demands that when a person has interfered with the judicial process, the judicial decisionshould not be pre-empted or circumvented merely by a conditional oran unconditional apology. While it is open to the Court, in anappropriate case, to accept an unconditional apology based on thefactual position, dropping the proceeding of contumacious actsdeliberately done, after accepting the apology offered, would be apremium for the flagrant abuse of the judicial process. (Ram AutarShukla[10]).

I n L.D. Jaikwal v. State of U.P.[[27]], the Supreme Court observed:- “………We are sorry to say we cannot subscribe to the “slap—say sorry—andforget” school of thought in administration of contempt jurisprudence. Saying“sorry” does not make the person taking the slap smart less upon the saidhypocritical word being uttered. Apology shall not be paper apology andexpression of sorrow should come from the heart and not from the pen. For it isone thing to “say” sorry—it is another to “feel” sorry……”(emphasis supplied).

The apology tendered by the 2[nd] respondent is neither a productof remorse nor is there any evidence of real contrition on his part. It isbut a lofty expression used only to avoid being committed for contempt.Accepting such an apology, in the facts of the present case, wouldresult in the contemnors going scot free after committing grosscontempt of Court.

The next question which necessitates examination is the natureand extent of punishment to be imposed on the second respondent forhis wilful and deliberate violation of the order of this Court. There is anelement of public policy in punishing civil contempt, since theadministration of justice would be undermined if the order of a Court oflaw is disregarded with impunity. (Patel Rajnikant Dhulabhai[5]; Attorney General v. Times Newspaper Ltd[[28]]). The power topunish for contempt is intended to maintain an effective legal system,and is exercised to prevent perversion of the course of justice. (Kapildeo Prasad Sah[7] Patel Rajnikant Dhulabhai[5]) . There are certain well recognized principles which govern the exercise of powerand jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The power to commit forcontempt will not be used for the vindication of a Judge as a person,but only with a view to protect the interests of the public for whosebenefit, and for the protection of whose rights and liberties, the courtsexist and function. Another factor which a High Court will take intoconsideration, in exercising its contempt jurisdiction, is to ascertainwhether the contempt is merely technical, slight or trifling in character.If it is so the Court will be satisfied with an expression of genuineregret and will not proceed to inflict punishment on the contemnor. (Advocate General, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad v. V. RamanaRao[[29]]).

It is not only the power but the duty of the court to uphold andmaintain the dignity of courts and the majesty of law which may call forthe extreme step of punishing the person for contempt of court. Forproper administration of justice, and to ensure due compliance with theorders passed by it, the Court would not hesitate in wielding the potentweapon of contempt. (Patel Rajnikant Dhulabhai[5]). The summaryjurisdiction, exercised by Superior Courts, in punishing contempt oftheir authority exists in order to prevent interference with the course ofjustice; to maintain the authority of law as is administered in the Court;and thereby protect the public interest in ensuring the purity of administration of justice (Hira Lal Dixit v. State of U.P.[[30]]).

While awarding sentence on a contemnor, the Court does so touphold the majesty of the law and to ensure that the unflinching faith ofpeople in Courts remains intact. If the guilty are let off, and theirsentence remitted on grounds of mercy, people would lose faith in theadministration of justice. The Court is duty-bound to award properpunishment to uphold the rule of law, however high the person may be.(J. Vasudevan v. T.R. Dhananjaya[[31]]). There cannot be any laxity,as otherwise law courts would render their orders to utter mockery.

Tolerance of law courts there is, but not without limits and only upto apoint and not beyond. (Anil Ratan Sarkar[4]). The law should not beseen to sit by limply, while those who defy it go free and those who[32]seek its protection lose hope.(Jennison v. Baker).

Notwithstanding the persuasive submissions of the learnedGovernment Pleader that this Court should take a lenient view and itwould suffice to admonish the second respondent with a warning, I amsatisfied that the indifference exhibited by the second respondent, tothe need to comply with the orders of Court within the stipulatedperiod, would necessitate at least imposition of a fine on him.For hiswilful and deliberate violation of the order of this Court, the second-respondent is sentenced to payment of fine of Rs.2,000/ (Rupees twothousand only) which he shall pay within four (4) weeks from todayfailing which he shall undergo Simple Imprisonment for a period ofthree (3) days.

The Contempt Case is, accordingly, disposed of.

31[st] December 2015RRB

_______________________

(RAMESH RANGANATHAN, J)

[1](1972) 3 All ER 101 (House of Lords)

[2]1995 Cri.L.J.1261 (Punjab & Haryana HC DB)[3](2012) 1 SCC 273[4](2002) 4 SCC 21[5](2008) 14 SCC 561[6](2003) 11 SCC 1[7](1999) 7 SCC 569[8](1972) 3 All ER 101[9](1999)4 All ER 486[10]1995 Supp (2) SCC 1301995 Cri.L.J.1261 (Punjab & Haryana HC DB)[3](2012) 1 SCC 273[4](2002) 4 SCC 21[5](2008) 14 SCC 561[6](2003) 11 SCC 1[7](1999) 7 SCC 569[8](1972) 3 All ER 101[9](1999)4 All ER 486[10]1995 Supp (2) SCC 130

[11](2000) 8 SCC 512

[12]1986 (2) A.L.T. 131[13](2013) 11 SCC 332[14](2004) 8 SCC 683[15](2014) 7 SCC 280[16]AIR 1969 SC 189[17]AIR 1972 SC 1197[18]AIR 1996 SC 1925[19]AIR 2009 SC 2214[20](2010) 11 SCC 493[21](2001) 8 SCC 650[22]AIR 1955 SC 19[23](2006) 5 SCC 1[24](1995) 3 SCC 507[25]AIR 1969 Cal 1[26](2003) 5 SCC 376[27](1984) 3 SCC 405[28]1974 AC 273[29]AIR 1967 AP 299[30]AIR 1954 SC 743[31](1995) 6 SCC 249[32](1972) 1 AllER 997