WA/257/1999 of SEC APSEB HYD AND 2 Vs M.D.JAYAPRAKSH GUPTA CHITTOOR on 31 December 2009

THE HON’BLE SMT. JUSTICE T.MEENA KUMARIANDTHE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR

WRIT APPEAL NO.257 OF 1999

DATED DECEMBER 31, 2009

Between:

The A.P. State Electricity Board,Rep. by its Secretary,Vidyut Soudha, Somajiguda,Hyderabad, and others.

a n d

… Appellants

M/s.Sanjay Alloys (P) Ltd.,Rep. by its Managing Director,Jayaprakash Gupta, Moram, Kuppam Road,Palamaneru Post, Chittoor District,And another.

… Respondents

THE HON’BLE SMT. JUSTICET.MEENA KUMARIANDTHE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICESANJAY KUMAR

WRIT APPEAL NO.257 OF 1999

J U D G M E N T(Per Sri Justice Sanjay Kumar)

The entitlement of the first respondent SSI Unit to claim 25%rebate on power tariff for three years falls for consideration in thisappeal. By his judgment dated 29.01.1999 in W.P.No.9412 of 1992,the learned single Judge held in favour of the first respondent. Hence,this appeal by the State Electricity Board, presently the TransmissionCorporation of Andhra Pradesh Limited (A.P. Transco).

The first respondent is a Small Scale Industrial Unit engaged inthe manufacture of corrosion resistant steel blocks, heat resistant steelblocks, special alloy blocks and alloy iron blocks (Mini Steel Plant). Itwas granted provisional registration as a SSI Unit under Certificatedated 25.07.1986 of the District Industries Centre, Chittoor, which wasvalidated upto 23.07.1988. Further validation was however denied,constraining the first respondent to approach this Court by way ofW.P.No.5574 of 1989. Pursuant to the interim orders of this Court inthe said writ petition, the provisional SSI registration of the firstrespondent was continued. The said writ petition was allowedsubsequently and the first respondent was granted permanent SSIregistration by proceedings dated 25.05.1992.

As per the policy of the Government of Andhra Pradeshembodied in G.O.Ms.No.654, Industries and Commerce Department,dated 13.07.1976, new Industrial Units which went into commercialproduction on or after 01.01.1976 (thereafter modified as 20.10.1975),were extended 25% concession in power tariff for the first three yearsfrom the date of going into production. This concession was howeverdenied to the 65 excluded industries notified in G.O.Ms.No.224,Industries and Commerce Department, dated 09.03.1976. Pursuant toG.O.Ms.No.654 dated 13.07.1976, the State Electricity Board issuedB.P.Ms.No.691 (Commercial) dated 10.08.1976 allowing a rebate of25% on the power tariff to specified new industries for a period of threeyears from the date of their going into regular production.

It is the case of the first respondent that it was eligible for theconcession extended by G.O.Ms.No.654 dated 13.07.1976 andB.P.Ms.No.691 dated 10.08.1976. However, it is to be noted that thefirst respondent commenced commercial production only on08.12.1989. In the meanwhile, the Government of Andhra Pradeshissued G.O.Ms.No.379, Industries and Commerce (I.A) Department,dated 27.07.1989, excluding eight more categories of industries fromeligibility for availing the concession under G.O.Ms.No.654 dated13.07.1976. One of the categories so excluded is Mini Steel Plants. While so, the first respondent obtained an eligibility certificate forclaiming 25% rebate on energy charges, under proceedings dated27.06.1992 issued by the District Industries Centre, Chittoor. Thoughthe certificate was issued long after the promulgation ofG.O.Ms.No.379 dated 27.07.1989, the General Manager of the DistrictIndustries Centre, Chittoor, surprisingly stated that the first respondentdid not fall in the list of 65 industries ineligible for 25% rebate on powertariff. No mention was made in the said certificate about the eightcategories added to the existing list of 65 ineligible categories, by wayof G.O.Ms.No.379 dated 27.07.1989.

The grievance of the first respondent before the learned singleJudge was that in spite of the issuance of an eligibility certificate by theIndustries Department, the Electricity Board failed to give effect to therebate to which it was entitled. The first respondent stated that it wasready to commence commercial production in March, 1989 itself butowing to the delay on the part of the Electricity Board in energising theunit, the commencement of production was also delayed. The firstrespondent claimed entitlement for the rebate for three years from08.12.1989, being the date it went into commercial production.

The Electricity Board contested the matter by stating that thefirst respondent had failed to comply with the necessary conditions forrelease of supply of power by the Board and therefore, the firstrespondent was itself responsible for the delay in this regard. Whileadmitting the receipt of the eligibility certificate dated 27.06.1992issued by the Industries Department, the Board pointed out that owingto the revision of the policy of the Government as reflected inG.O.Ms.No.379 dated 27.07.1989, the rebate was withdrawn so far asthe newly declared ineligible industries were concerned and the firstrespondent was one such industry. The Board also stated thatG.O.Ms.No.379 dated 27.07.1989 being prospective, the cut-off datewould be the date of the said G.O. and as the first respondent failed tocommence commercial production by that date, it was not eligible toclaim such rebate thereafter.

The delay on the part of the first respondent in availing the powersupply was demonstrated by setting out the details of the failure on thepart of the first respondent in complying with the conditions precedentfor release of the power supply. It was pointed out that the firstrespondent had to pay (1) service line charges of Rs.14,67,000/-,which was reduced to Rs.10,47,800/- as the first respondent undertookto supply two numbers of 33 K.V. Vaccum Circuit Brackets costing Rs.2,09,600/- each, (2) security deposit of Rs.14,56,000/-, and (3)service connection line charges of Rs.1,15,000/-. While so, the firstrespondent appears to have requested permission from the Board tomake the payment by way of instalments. This request was acceded toby the Board which permitted the said payment in six instalments, videits proceedings dated 11.01.1988. The first respondent paid the firstinstalment of service line charges of Rs.1,75,000/- on 11.03.1988 andpaid the first instalment of Rs.4,14,000/- towards security on27.03.1989 and Rs.15,000/- towards service connection charges onthe same date.

But, without paying the balance instalments, it appears that thefirst respondent approached this Court by filing W.P.No.10512 of 1989seeking release of the power supply unconditionally. Pursuant to theinterim order granted in the said writ petition, the power supply wasreleased on 29.11.1989. However, the writ petition was eventuallydismissed on 27.02.1998 directing the first respondent to pay thecharges as demanded.

The first respondent also filed W.P.No.18359 of 1989 beforethis Court challenging the action of the Electricity Board in demandingpayment of service line charges on the ground that the same wasopposed to the policy of the Government in G.O.Ms.No.41, Energy,Environments and Science and Technology (PR.II) Department, dated15.05.1986.

These facts were set out by the Board in its counter to supportits contention that there was no laxity on its part in the release of thepower supply and that it was the first respondent itself that was toblame for the delay.

The sheet anchor of the first respondent’s case before thelearned single Judge was that the Board could not decline 25% rebate on power tariff for three years by operation of the principle of‘promissory estoppel’. This argument found favour with the learnedsingle Judge, who accordingly allowed the writ petition holding that thefirst respondent was eligible to be given the rebate under the incentivescheme.

Conclusion

Sri O.Manohar Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant-Transco, stressed upon the facts to demonstrate that the firstrespondent was involved in litigation at every turn, be it for registrationas a Small Scale Industry or for availing power supply and owing tothe same, it could not commence commercial production before theissuance of G.O.Ms.No.379 dated 27.07.1989. Once the said G.O.was issued, the first respondent lost its eligibility to claim theconcession given under G.O.Ms.No.654 dated 13.07.1976. Thelearned counsel contended that the principle of promissory estoppeland the judgments cited in this regard had no role to play, as the firstrespondent did not commence commercial production before therelevant date, i.e., 27.07.1989. On the said date, the first respondentwas declared ineligible to claim such benefit vide G.O.Ms.No.379dated 27.07.1989 and could not thereafter be permitted to turn back theclock.

Per contra, Sri D.V.Nagarjuna Babu, learned counsel for the firstrespondent, argued that the Unit was ready to commence operationsas early as in March, 1989 and that it was only due to the delay on thepart of the Board in releasing the power supply that it could notcommence commercial production. The learned counsel thereforeasserted that the first respondent could invoke the doctrine ofpromissory estoppel against the Board and the Government, and insiston the concession promised to it under the scheme embodied inG.O.Ms.No.654 dated 13.07.1976. The learned counsel pressed intoservice a catena of decisions in support of his contention.

The established facts of the case clearly demonstrate that thefirst respondent did not commence commercial production till08.12.1989. The same was crucial to avail the 25% rebate underG.O.Ms.No.654 dated 13.07.1976, as the said concession was timebound, being relatable to a period of three years from the date the Unitwent into regular production. In the meanwhile, the Governmentrevised its policy by excluding certain industries from availing the saidconcession by issuing G.O.Ms.No.379 dated 27.07.1989. Admittedly,the first respondent fell in the newly excluded categories of industries. Had the first respondent Unit commenced its commercial productionprior to 27.07.1989, the matter would have been otherwise. In such acase the first respondent could have asserted its entitlement to receivethe concession, notwithstanding its subsequent inclusion in the list ofexcluded industries. However, the first respondent failed to commenceits commercial production before the issuance of G.O.Ms.No.379 dated27.07.1989. The details put forth by the Electricity Board clearlydemonstrate that the first respondent had failed to make the paymentsrequired by the Board for release of the power supply and was, on theother hand, involved in litigation before this Court. In suchcircumstances, the first respondent cannot seek to lay the blame uponthe Board for the delay in release of its power supply andconsequently, in the commencement of its production.

It is to be noted that this Court directed release of power supplyby way of its interim order in W.P.No.10512 of 1989, but eventually thesaid writ petition was dismissed directing the first respondent to paythe required charges. It is also to be noticed that the registration of thefirst respondent as a Small Scale Industrial Unit for establishing anindustry in the backward areas of Andhra Pradesh was for enabling itto seek the 10% outright subsidy in terms of the policy of theGovernment of India. The first respondent failed to prove that it hadestablished the industry, acting only upon the promised concession of 25% rebate on the power tariff held out by the Government of AndhraPradesh under G.O.Ms.No.654 dated 13.07.1976. Further, as it had notgone into commercial production prior to the withdrawal of theconcession in so far as mini steel plants are concerned, the questionarises as to whether the first respondent could seek the protection ofthe doctrine of promissory estoppel.

Where one party by his words or conduct made to the other aclear and unequivocal promise which is intended to create legalrelations or effect a legal relationship to arise in the future, knowing orintending that it would be acted upon by the other party to whom thepromise is made and it is in fact so acted upon by the other party, thepromise would be binding on the party making it and he would not beentitled to go back upon it, if it would be inequitable to allow him to doso having regard to the dealings which have taken place and thiswould be so irrespective of whether there is a pre-existing relationshipbetween the parties or not. This is the principle of promissory estoppel.It is an equitable principle evolved by the Courts for doing justice.However, what is crucial is that the party to whom the promise hasbeen made should have acted upon the same.

In the present case, the first respondent Unit did not commencecommercial production before the withdrawal of its eligibility. Further,as pointed out supra, there is no evidence that the establishment of thefirst respondent Unit was on the basis of the concession held out inG.O.Ms.No.654 dated 13.07.1976. Therefore, the very basis forinvocation of ‘promissory estoppel’ is not made out, as the firstrespondent did not ‘act’ in pursuance of the promised concession, be itby establishing the unit or by commencing production before therelevant date.

Now, the case law cited by Sri D.V.Nagarjuna Babu, learnedcounsel for the first respondent.

In HITECH ELECTROTHERMICS & HYDROPOWER LTD. V/s.

STATE OF KERALA[[1]], the Supreme Court was dealing with thequestion whether an industrial unit could claim the benefit ofconcessional tariff under the policy of the Government notwithstandingthe fact that there was delay in production, such delay beingattributable to the inaction on the part of the Board in providing thenecessary electricity connection. The Supreme Court came to thefinding that the industrial unit was denied power supply in appropriatetime which prevented it from starting commercial production by the cut-off date to claim the eligibility for the concessional power tariff andaccordingly held that the unit was entitled to grant of concessionaltariff.

In MARUTHI STEELS (P) LTD., ANANTHAPUR V/s. GOVT.OF A.P.[[2]], the industrial unit claimed benefit under G.O.Ms.No.375dated 23.08.1985, whereby it was eligible to claim 25% power rebatefor a period of five years. The industrial unit was given the benefit ofthe concession for the initial three years but was thereafter denied onthe ground that it was included in the list of ineligible industries underG.O.Ms.No.379 dated 27.07.1989. The learned Judge, having referredto the judgment of the Supreme Court in A.P.S.E.B. V/s. M/s.

SARADA FERRO ALLOYS LIMITED[[3]],observed thatG.O.Ms.No.379 dated 27.07.1989 was not retrospective and that anyunit which went into production prior to 27.07.1989 was entitled to thebenefit of G.O.Ms.No.375 dated 23.08.1985 as against theGovernment. The unit, however, had gone into production on13.11.1989 i.e. after the promulgation of G.O.Ms.No.379 dated27.07.1989 and the learned Judge was of the opinion that if the saidG.O. was taken as the basis to determine the rights of the parties, theunit had no justiciable right under the policy. But, the learned Judgewas of the opinion that the doctrine of promissory estoppel would operate against the authorities as the unit had completed all theformalities and complied with all the conditions of both the ElectricityBoard and the Government by 25.03.1989, but it was only owing to thereticent attitude on the part of the Electricity Board that the unit couldnot go into production. The learned Judge took note of the fact thatthere were no laches on the part of the unit after 25.03.1989 and beforethe promulgation of G.O.Ms.No.379 dated 27.07.1989, with regard tocommencement of production. The learned Judge observed that theunit was able to demonstrate that it was ready to commenceproduction in the month of March, 1989 but was prevented from doingso due to the conduct of the Electricity Board in not energising the unit.The learned Judge also took note of the fact that it was on the basis ofthe promise/assurance by the Government under the scheme that thefirst respondent had obtained loans from financial institutions. It was inthese circumstances that the learned Judge held that the ingredients ofpromissory estoppel were fulfilled and accordingly extended thebenefit of the concessional tariff to the industrial unit.

Both the above cases are distinguishable from the present case,wherein the established facts demonstrate that the first respondentwas itself at fault for the delay in the release of the power supply and aclean chit cannot be given to it as was given to the industrial units inthe two aforestated decisions.

In SHRIJEE SALES CORPORATION V/s. UNION OF INDIA[[4]],the Supreme Court spelt out the scope and ambit of the principle ofpromissory estoppel. The Court observed that in public interest, anexemption could be granted and in public interest, the exemption couldbe rescinded. Therefore, the rights of individuals were subordinated tothe paramount interest of the public good. The Supreme Court furtherobserved that though the principle of promissory estoppel would beapplicable against the Government, if there was a supervening publicequity the Government would be allowed to change its stand and The Court also dealt with the question whether an exemptionnotified without specifying the period within which it would remain inforce could be withdrawn in public interest but not one in which aperiod has been so specified. The Court observed that when oncepublic interest was accepted as the superior equity to overrideindividual equity, the principle would be applicable even in caseswhere a period has been indicated. In such a case, the Governmentwould be competent to resile from a promise even if there is nomanifest public interest involved, provided, of course, no one is put inany adverse situation which cannot be rectified.

In the present case, the exemption claimed by the firstrespondent hinged upon its commencement of commercial production.The first respondent, owing to its own delays and actions, wasresponsible for the fact that the electricity service connection was notprovided to it enabling commencement of its commercial production,before the promulgation of G.O.Ms.No.379 dated 27.07.1989. Oncethe said G.O. came into effect, the eligibility of the first respondentstood extinguished as it was included in the list of ineligible industries. As there was a change in the policy and prior to such change, the firstrespondent’s eligibility had not crystallized, the principle of promissoryestoppel has no application.

In M/s. V.K. FERRO ALLOYS INDUSTRIES PVT. LTD., V/s.THE A.P. STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD[[5]], a Division Bench of thisCourt was concerned with the exclusion of an industrial unit from thelist of eligible industries to receive 25% concession in power tariff. Thisexclusion was effected by G.O.Ms.No.379 dated 27.07.1989. Theindustrial unit in the said case claimed the rebate in the power tariffbasing on G.O.Ms.No.654 dated 13.07.1976. The Division Bench tooknote of the fact that the industrial unit in that case had commenced regular production from 16.09.1988 i.e. before the issuance ofG.O.Ms.No.379 dated 27.07.1989 declaring it to be an ineligibleindustry, and therefore held that the said G.O. being prospective innature, could not be applied to the said industrial unit. The above caseis distinguishable from the case on hand as the first respondent did notcommence commercial production prior to the issuance ofG.O.Ms.No.379 dated 27.07.1989.

I n M/s. SREE RAYALASEEMA ALKALIES & ALLIEDCHEMICALS LTD., V/s. GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRAPRADESH[[6]], the issue before a Full Bench of this Court was whetherthe doctrine of promissory estoppel could be invoked against theGovernment compelling it to act contrary to the obligation or dutyimposed by statute. Reference was made therein to the Judgment ofthe Supreme Court in VASANTKUMAR RADHAKISAN VORA V/s.BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE PORT OF BOMBAY[[7]], where theSupreme Court stated as under:

"it is equally settled law that promissory estoppel cannot beused compelling the Government or a public authority tocarry out a representation or promise which is prohibited bylaw or which was devoid of the authority or power of theofficer of the Government or the public authority to make. Wemay also point out that the doctrine of promissory estoppelbeing an equitable doctrine, it must yield place to the equity,if larger public interest so requires, and if it can be shown bythe Government or public authority, for having regard to thefacts as they have transpired that it would be inequitable tohold the Government or public, authority to the promise orrepresentation made by it. The Court on satisfaction wouldnot, in those circumstances raise the equity in favour of thepersons to whom a promise or representation is made andenforce the promise or representation against Government orthe public authority. "

The Full Bench held that the doctrine of promissory estoppel could notbe invoked in the face of statutory provisions governing the situationand that the Government could not be compelled by the invocation ofthe said doctrine to act contrary to the provisions of the statute. Whatwas stated by the Full Bench with regard to the doctrine of promissory

estoppel not being enforceable against statutory provisions holds goodfor policy decisions also. Once the Government took a bona fidepolicy decision to include certain industries in the list of ineligibleindustries, the first respondent, being one such industry, can no longerclaim entitlement to the concession.

It is relevant to note that the learned single Judge, whileallowing the writ petition, drew support from the judgment of this Courtin M/s. SHARADA FERRO ALLOYS LTD.(W.P.No.8932 of 1991 andW.A.No.1271 of 1991). It is however to be noticed that the judgment inthe said case was reversed by the Supreme Court in A.P.S.E.B. V/s.

M/s. SHARADA FERRO ALLOYS LTD.[3]. Therein, the industrial unitclaimed concession of 25% power tariff which was subsequentlywithdrawn. This Court allowed the writ petition filed by the industrialunit claiming continuance of the concession after such withdrawal, onthe ground that the industrial unit had acted upon the representationmade by the Electricity Board and the State Government and therefore,the doctrine of promissory estoppel was attracted. However, theSupreme Court was of the view that the doctrine of promissoryestoppel was not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the caseas the promise or representation held out by the Board/StateGovernment was directly linked with the date of commencement ofproduction by the Company and as it was an admitted fact that theindustrial unit commenced production after the withdrawal of theincentive, it could not claim eligibility. The Court observed that even ifa promise or representation was made, the doctrine of promissoryestoppel would not be attracted if the company failed to act upon suchpromise or representation. The Court further observed that only thoseindustries were entitled to the benefit of the incentive, who fulfilled therequirements during the period the incentive was operative. Thisdecision is squarely applicable on all fours to the present case as thefirst respondent failed to commence production before the operative date and therefore, its eligibility to claim the concessional tariff did notcrystallize by the time the said rebate was withdrawn from it underG.O.Ms.No.379 dated 27.07.1989.

The judgment of the Supreme Court in POURNAMI OIL MILLSETC. V/s. STATE OF KERALA[[8]]has no application to the presentcase. In that case, the concessions given to the industries inpursuance of the prior order were sought to be withdrawn under thesecond order. The Supreme Court, having found that the industrieshad been set up prior to the issuance of the second order, held thatthey would be entitled to the exemption extended and/or promisesmade under the earlier order for the full period. In the present case, thefirst respondent failed to secure its entitlement for the 25% rebate bythe time its eligibility was withdrawn under G.O.Ms.No.379 dated27.07.1989. It cannot therefore draw parity with the industries beforethe Supreme Court in POURNAMI OIL MILLS.

In M/s. MOTILAL PADAMPAT SUGAR MILLS CO. LTD., V/s.THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH[[9]], the Supreme Courtconsidered the meaning of ‘promissory estoppel’. The observations ofthe Supreme Court in this regard are apposite:

“… But if the Government makes such a promise andthe promisee acts in reliance upon it and alters hisposition, there is no reason why the Governmentshould not be compelled to make good such promiselike any other private individual. The law cannotacquire legitimacy and gain social acceptance unlessit accords with the moral values of the society and theconstant endeavour of the Courts and the legislaturesmust, therefore, be to close the gap between law andmorality and bring about as near an approximationbetween the two as possible. The doctrine ofpromissory estoppel is a significant judicialcontribution in that direction. But it is necessary topoint out that since the doctrine of promissory estoppelis an equitable doctrine, it must yield when the equityso requires. If it can be shown by the Government thathaving regard to the facts as they have subsequently transpired, it would be inequitable to hold theGovernment to the promise made by it, the Courtwould not raise an equity in favour of the promiseeeand enforce the promise against the Government. Thedoctrine of promissory estoppel would be displaced insuch a case because, on the facts, equity would notrequired that the Government should be held bound bythe promise made by it. When the Government is ableto show that in view of the facts which have transpiredsince the making of the promise, public interest wouldbe prejudiced if the Government were required to carryout the promise, the Court would have to balance thepublic interest in the Government carrying out apromise made to a citizen which has induced thecitizen to act upon it and alter his position and thepublic interest likely to suffer if the promise wererequired to be carried out by the Government anddetermine which way the equity lies. …”

As pointed out in MARUTHI STEELS (P) LTD.[2], G.O.Ms.No.379 dated27.07.1989 was upheld as to its validity by the Supreme Court in M/s.SARADA FERRO ALLOYS LTD., and by this Court in M/s. V.K.FERRO ALLOYS INDUSTRIES PVT. LTD.[5]. Therefore, the doctrineof promissory estoppel cannot be invoked against the policy decisionof the State embodied in the above G.O. and the first respondent,having failed to establish within time its entitlement to the concessionunder the prior policy, cannot seek the said concession thereafter,relying on promissory estoppel.

In KASINKA TRADING V/s. UNION OF INDIA[[10]], the SupremeCourt held that the doctrine of promissory estoppel could not beinvoked where the exemption was withdrawn in public interest. TheCourt pointed out that in order to invoke the doctrine of promissoryestoppel it would be necessary that the promise which is sought to beenforced must be shown to be an unequivocal promise, intended tocreate a legal relationship and that it was acted upon as such by theparty to whom the same was made. In the present case, the eligibilityof the first respondent to claim 25% rebate under G.O.Ms.No.654 dated13.07.1976 hinged upon its compliance with the conditions mentioned therein. The first respondent failed to do so and in the meantimeG.O.Ms.No.379 dated 27.07.1989 was issued, extinguishing itseligibility to claim such concession.

In the aforestated facts and circumstances and viewed in thecontext of the above precedents, it is clear that the first respondentcannot rely upon the principle of promissory estoppel to assert a claimfor 25% rebate. Its entitlement for such concession stood extinguishedbefore its eligibility for the same could crystallize. The learned singleJudge, having taken note of the factual concatenation, failed to drawthe correct inference therefrom and erroneously extended to the firstrespondent the benefit of promissory estoppel merely because itclaimed that it had taken all necessary steps for commissioning itsUnit. We are unable to agree as the facts indicate otherwise.

Once the first respondent failed to commence its commercialproduction before the withdrawal of its eligibility under G.O.Ms.No.379dated 27.07.1989, it could not assert that the principle of promissoryestoppel was applicable to it. As pointed out supra, the eligibility of thefirst respondent to claim such entitlement stood extinguished evenbefore it had crystallized and accordingly, promissory estoppel had norole to play in the matter. The order of the learned single Judgeholding that the first respondent was eligible to be given the rebate of25% on the power tariff for a period of three years is therefore setaside.

The Writ Appeal is allowed, but in the circumstances of thecase, without costs.

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SMT.T.MEENA KUMARI,J

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_______DECEMBER, 2009

PGS

[1](2003) 2 SCC 716[2]1997 (5) ALD 124[3]AIR 1993 SC 1521[4](1997) 3 SCC 398[5]AIR 1996 AP 212[6] AIR 1993 A.P. 278[7] AIR 1991 SC 14[8]AIR 1987 SC 590[9]AIR 1979 SC 621[10]AIR 1995 SC 874

SANJAY KUMAR,J