WP/23945/2000 of K.Pratap Reddy, Vs The Joint Collector, on 26 December 2008

O R D E R

The extent and scope of jurisdiction of Revenue Authorities inexercise of powers conferred by Sections 5 and 9 of the AndhraPradesh Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971 (for short,‘the Act of 1971’) fall for consideration in this writ petition.

The order passed by the Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District,Hyderabad, the 1[st]respondent herein, in ProceedingsNo.D5/9418/1997 dated 24.07.2000 in exercise of revisionaljurisdiction under Section 9 of the Act of 1971 and the consequentialorder passed by the Mandal Revenue Officer, Ghatkesar Mandal,Ghatkesar, Ranga Reddy District, the 2[nd] respondent herein, inproceedings No.B/2186/2000 dated 10.11.2000 in exercise of powers The petitioners claim that they and respondents 3 and 4 hereinshare a common lineage. According to them, Kommidi Kanna Reddyand his brothers Kommidi Venkat Reddy, Kommidi Laxma Reddy,Kommidi Tirumal Reddy and Kommidi Ramachandra Reddy hadseveral ancestral properties. Kommidi Ramachandra Reddy had threesons, Narsimha Reddy, Jagga Reddy and Narayan Reddy. JaipalReddy, respondent 3 herein, is the grandson of Sri Jagga Reddythrough his son Ramachandra Reddy. The petitioners on the otherhand are the descendents of the other brother Laxma Reddy. LaxmaReddy had one son Ram Reddy. Ram Reddy had two wives and thesons of one wife were Siddha Reddy and Gopal Reddy. Petitioners 1to 4 herein are the sons of Gopal Reddy, while petitioners 5 and 6 andrespondent 4 are the sons of Siddha Reddy.

According to the petitioners there was a partition in the familywhereby the subject ancestral lands admeasuring Ac.23.07 guntas atKondapur Village were retained by two sections of the family, namelyJagga Reddy who had 50% share and Siddha Reddy and GopalReddy, who jointly had 50% share. After the death of theirpredecessors-in-title, the petitioners lay a claim to 50% share withrespondent 4 in these lands and state that the remaining 50% fell tothe share of respondent 3, claiming through his grandfather JaggaReddy.

The petitioners state that the names of Gopal Reddy, SiddhaReddy and Jagga Reddy were entered in the khasra pahani of 1954-55 under the ownership column and that the entries found under thecolumn ‘pattadar’ in the revenue records continued to show the namesof Gopal Reddy and Siddha Reddy also.

While so, it is stated that respondent 3 approached the Revenue

Authorities in 1988 as he intended to sell away Ac.7-22 guntas out ofhis half share in the land admeasuring Ac.15-04 guntas in Sy.No.244in Kondapur Village which formed part of the larger extent of Ac.23-07guntas. When the other half sharers, Gopal Reddy and Siddha Reddy,questioned the same, respondent 3 challenged the correctness of theentries in the khasra pahani of 1954-55 by filing an appeal underSection 15(2) of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Record ofRights in Land Regulation of 1358 Fasli (for short, ‘Regulation of 1358-F’) before the District Revenue Officer, Ranga Reddy District.Thereupon, Gopal Reddy filed a partition suit, O.S.No.348 of 1989 onthe file of the Principal Subordinate Judge, Ranga Reddy, againstrespondent 3 and others seeking partition of the land at Kondapuradmeasuring Ac.23-07 guntas. Gopal Reddy filed a counter bringingthis aspect to the notice of the District Revenue Officer who dismissedthe appeal filed by respondent 3 by his order dated 26.10.1989,recording that the parties had approached the civil Court forestablishing their rights. It is the petitioners’ case that after thedismissal of the appeal before the District Revenue Officer there was acompromise between the parties and the G.P.A. Holder of respondent3 submitted a ‘no objection form’ stating to the effect that half of land inSy.No.244 of Kondapur Village was owned by Gopal Reddy andSiddha Reddy. In view of this admission, it is stated that Gopal Reddygot his suit, O.S.No.348 of 1989 dismissed for default on 07.08.1996.

As matters stood thus, respondent 3 filed an application beforethe Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District, to re-open his appeal whichhad been dismissed on 26.10.1989. It is further stated that withoutnotice to the petitioners herein, the said case was re-opened andnumbered as Case No.D5/9418/97 converting the appeal into arevision under Section 9 of the Act of 1971. It is alleged that the saidrevision was not maintainable as it was not filed against an order of theMandal Revenue Officer or of the appellate authority, the Revenue Divisional Officer. The Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy, passed orders inthe revision on 24.07.2000 advising respondent 3 to move the MandalRevenue Officer, Ghatkesar Mandal, the second respondent, fordeciding the succession in respect of the subject property. Thereupon,the second respondent came to the erroneous conclusion that only thename of the grandfather of respondent 3 was recorded as the pattadarof the lands in question. This was in contradiction with the khasrapahani of 1954-55 which showed the names of Gopal Reddy andSiddha Reddy, the predecessors-in-title of the petitioners andrespondent 4, as the joint pattadars and the entries in the revenuerecords in the same vein. It is stated that merely because thepossession of the land was shown to be with respondent 3 the samedid not have the legal implication that the joint pattadars had no rightsin the lands. The possession of one joint owner should be presumed tobe and treated as joint possession of all the owners. The petitionersparticipated in the proceedings before respondent 2 but were unable toconvince him of their rights over the subject lands. The orders passedby the Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District, under Section 9 and theMandal Revenue Officer, Ghatkesar Mandal under Section 5 of the Actof 1971 are challenged before this Court.

Respondent 3 filed a counter affidavit stating to the followingeffect:

Respondent 3 filed a counter affidavit stating to the followingeffect:

He denied the sharing and enjoyment of the family’s ancestralproperties under the alleged partition put forth by the petitioners andmore specifically, the claim put forth by them that the grandfather ofrespondent 3, Jagga Reddy, and their predecessors-in-title, GopalReddy and Siddha Reddy, jointly owned the lands at Kondapur. Thepetitioners, without making a distinction between a great grandfatherand a grandfather, were trying to lay a claim spanning five generationswhen law posited that a coparcenary can extend only upto threegenerations from the holder. Even in O.S.No.348 of 1989, respondent 3 had denied the relationship alleged to exist between him and thepredecessors-in-title of the petitioners herein. The said suit wasdismissed for non-prosecution after being dragged on for seven years. Petitioners 4 and 5 had come on record in the said suit after the deathof Gopal Reddy. The dismissal of the suit had become final as noappeal was preferred and no steps were taken to restore the case tothe file.

According to respondent 3, Gopal Reddy and Siddha Reddy, thepredecessors-in-title of the petitioners herein, with a view to grab thesubject lands got their names interpolated in the khasra pahani of1954-55 in collusion with the Village Patwari, who was their firstcousin. It is asserted that they did not have any right in respect of thesubject lands and the mere fabricated entry in the revenue record didnot vest them with any entitlement over the subject lands. In theSethwar of 1953 only the name of respondent 3’s grandfather, JaggaReddy, found mention both as the pattadar as well as the possessor. Similar is the case with the Wasool Baqi of the year 1354-F. TheVillage Patwari, Sri K.Surender Reddy, was in the habit of makingillegal entries and was ultimately removed from service. Respondent3’s grandfather, Jagga Reddy, had filed an appeal under Section 15(2)of the Regulation of 1358-F and the Tahsildar submitted a report on21.06.1967, which was in favour of Jagga Reddy. However, owing tothe expiry of Jagga Reddy and the ignorance of his heirs about thefiling of the said appeal, the same was dismissed for default. Havingcome to know of the wrong entries in the revenue records, respondent3 filed an appeal afresh under Section 15(2) of the Regulation of 1358-F. The said proceedings were closed owing to the fact that GopalReddy had filed O.S.No.348 of 1989 before the Principal SubordinateJudge, Ranga Reddy District, and brought it to the notice of the DistrictRevenue Officer. While closing the proceedings by his order dated26.10.1989, the Revenue Authority stated that he had no jurisdiction to interfere with the civil dispute until final orders were passed by theCivil Court and stating so, dismissed the appeal.

As the only ground for the dismissal of his appeal was thependency of the suit and as the suit had been dismissed on07.08.1996, it was lawful and appropriate for the Revenue Authority tore-open the proceedings upon an application. Reliance is placed uponRule 32 of the A.P. Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Rules,1989 (for short, ‘the Rules of 1989) which states that after the disposalof the civil suit the party is required to communicate the result to theRevenue Authority which shall take necessary steps in the matterthereafter.

The petitioners failed to participate in the proceedings beforethe Joint Collector in spite of notices being served upon them. Substituted service of notice was permitted on 08.04.2000 which wascarried out by publication of the notice in Eenadu Newspaper. In spiteof these steps, as the petitioners failed to put in an appearance, theywere set ex parte and the matter was heard on merits. Thereupon, theJoint Collector directed respondent 3 to approach the MandalRevenue Officer by his order dated 24.07.2000. Before the MandalRevenue Officer, Ghatkesar, the petitioners responded to the noticesissued and filed their objection petition. It is specifically pointed outthat the petitioners did not choose to challenge the order of the JointCollector dated 24.07.2000 at that stage and merely acted inpursuance thereof, by agitating their claim before the Mandal RevenueOfficer who was seized of the matter, solely because of the order dated24.07.2000 passed by the Joint Collector. The Mandal RevenueOfficer passed orders in favour of respondent 3 after due and properenquiry. The said order is appealable under Section 5(5) of the Act of1971 and circumventing the said statutory remedy, the petitioners hadapproached this Court by way of the present writ petition.

Respondent 3 also placed reliance upon the fact that he and hisfather had filed a declaration under the provisions of the A.P. LandReforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 (for brevity, ‘theAct of 1973) and proceedings were issued in their favour showing thesubject lands in their land holding. Respondent 3 claimed to havesold part of the land to the knowledge of one and all and stated that thepetitioners had not taken any steps at that point of time. Respondent 3also relied upon the fact that the sale deed executed by him did notallude to any admission on his part that Gopal Reddy and SiddhaReddy, the predecessors-in-title of the petitioners herein were the jointowners of 50% share of the subject lands. In summation, it iscontended that if the petitioners are aggrieved by the entries made inthe revenue records in respect of the land which was in their allegedpossession, their remedy is to institute a suit under the provisions ofSection 8(2) of the Act of 1971 or in the alternative, file an appealunder Section 5(5) of the Act of 1971 and that the present writ petitionis not maintainable.

No counter affidavit is filed by respondents 1 and 2.

Heard Sri V.Ramakrishna Reddy, learned counsel for thepetitioners, learned Government Pleader for Revenue for respondents1 and 2, Sri M.V.Durga Prasad, learned counsel for respondent 3 andperused the original record pertaining to the Revision. Respondent 4remained ex parte.

The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the findingof title recorded by the revenue authorities in favour of respondent 3 isdevoid of jurisdiction. The authorities, according to him, failed to notethat the petitioners and respondent 3 along with respondent 4 weremembers of a joint family and were co-owners of the subject property under a family partition. The counselcontended that the title of the co-owners was not ousted merely

because of the fact that one amongst them alone was in possession. He submitted that it was not open to the revenue authorities to go intocomplex questions or disputes of title over immovable property. Hecontended that the objections raised by the petitioners, with regard tothe entitlement of respondent 3 being limited to only a half share in thesubject lands, were not considered in the proper perspective by therevenue authorities.

He placed reliance upon the judgment of a Division Bench of thisCourt in COMMISSIONER OF SURVEY, SETTLEMENTS AND

LAND RECORDS, GOVERNMENT OF A.P. V/s. G.PADMAVATHI[[1]]to support his contention that a person whose name finds place in therecords will have a right to assert that he is entitled to make a claim asan owner unless the same is negatived by rebuttal evidence. It ishowever to be noticed that in the very same judgment, the DivisionBench held that a person who asserts ownership over a property shallestablish the same by resorting to a civil suit. The learned counselalso relied upon observations made in this judgment to the effect thatthe authority exercising revisional power, be it on an application or suomotu, should do so within reasonable time. In that case, the revisionalpower involved was that under Section 166-B of the Andhra Pradesh(Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act, 1317 F. The learned counsel forthe petitioners submitted that on an analogy of the provisions underSection 9 of the Act of 1971, the same proposition of law would standextended and the exercise of revisional power by the Joint Collector,Ranga Reddy District, in the present case was ‘well beyondreasonable time’.

He also placed reliance in this regard upon the judgment of theSupreme Court in STATE OF GUJARAT V/s. PATEL RAGHAV

NATHA[[2]]. The Supreme Court, in the said case, held that revisionalpower must be exercised in reasonable time even if no period of limitation is prescribed and that the length of reasonable time must bedetermined on the facts of the case and the nature of the orderrevised. The Supreme Court also observed that when the title of anoccupant is disputed and the dispute is serious, the appropriate coursefor the Collector or the Commissioner would be to refer the parties to acompetent court and not to decide the question of title himself againstthe occupant.

The judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court in K.SIDDIAH NAIDU V/s. DISTRICT COLLECTOR, CHITTOOR[[3]]isrelied upon to support the contention that the Mandal Revenue Officerin exercise of powers under Section 5 of the Act of 1971 cannot effectchanges of entries in the revenue records under the Act of 1971, ifthere was a dispute with regard to the title over a property. Therein, theCourt upheld the action of the Mandal Revenue Officer refusing toexercise powers under Section 5 of the Act of 1971 until the title overthe disputed property was decided one way or the other.

The learned counsel also drew the attention of this Court to thejudgment of the Rajasthan High Court in SHANTI LAL V/s. BOARDOF REVENUE[[4]], wherein a learned Judge of the Rajasthan HighCourt held that once there was a dispute about the right to succession,it was not open to the revenue authorities to adjudicate upon such rightand the matter should be referred to the civil Court or the partiesshould be directed to get their rights adjudicated through appropriateproceedings before the civil Court.

Another judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for thepetitioners is that of a learned Judge of this Court in V.GOUTHAMRAO V/s. REVENUE DIVISIONAL OFFICER, JAGTIAL,KARIMNAGAR DISTRICT[[5]]. In that case, the learned Judge relyingupon the Division Bench judgment of this Court in SANNEPALLI

NAGESWAR RAO V/s. DISTRICT COLLECTOR, KHAMMAM[[6]], reaffirmed that where a special statute prescribed remedies before ahierarchy of authorities, a person aggrieved has to take recourse onlyto such forum by the method and manner in which it is prescribedunder the said law. The learned Judge also held that wherever thereis a serious dispute of title or claims of rival title, it would not only beproper for the authorities to refrain from proceeding with the enquiriesunder the provisions of the Act of 1971 but also pragmatic for theparties to approach the civil Court for establishing their right, title andinterest.

It is pointed out that the Supreme Court in MAHILA BAJRANGI

(DEAD) THROUGH LRS. V/s. BADRIBAI, W/o. JAGANNATH[[7]]held that the Tahsildar or authorities exercising powers of mutation(original, appellate or revisional) have not been accorded the status ofcivil Courts or Courts of exclusive jurisdiction and such orders cannotbe used as a basis or source for asserting a claim of res judicatabefore a competent civil Court in a subsequent suit involvingadjudication of title to the immovable property. The Supreme Courtalso observed that mutation proceedings before the revenueauthorities were not judicial proceedings in a Court of law and do notdecide questions of title to immovable properties.

The learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of theSupreme Court in IBRAHIMPATNAM TALUK VYAVASAYA

COOLIE SANGHAM V/s. K.SURESH REDDY[[8]], wherein it was heldthat orders attaining finality, the certainty of rights of the partiesaccrued in the light of such orders must have sanctity. Stating so, theSupreme Court also observed that exercise of suo motu power ‘at anytime’ only means that no specific period such as days, months or yearsare prescribed from a particular date. But that does not mean that ‘atany time’ should be unguided and arbitrary, and must be understood as being within a reasonable time depending on the facts andcircumstances of the case.

The judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court inB.PUSHPAMMA V/s. JOINT COLLECTOR, RANGA REDDY

DISTRICT[[9]]is relied upon to support the contention that any personaggrieved by an entry made in the record of rights under the provisionsof the Act of 1971 must institute a suit against such person who isdenying or who is interested to deny his title for a declaration. This isas per Section 8(2) of the Act of 1971. In that case, the revenueauthorities had held that issues relating to disputes over title could notbe decided in the summary enquiry which would be held under theprovisions of the Act of 1971 and the same found favour with thisCourt.

The judgment of the Supreme Court in FAQRUDDIN (DEAD)

THROUGH LRS. V/s. TAJUDDIN (DEAD) THROUGH LRS.[[10]]is cited for the proposition that mutation takes place only for certainpurposes and that it is well settled that an entry in the revenue recordsis not a document of title. The Supreme Court held that revenueauthorities cannot decide a question of title. A title does not remain invacuum and must be determined keeping in view the law operating inthe field viz. religious law or statutory law or customary law. Referencewas made therein to its earlier judgment in SURAJ BHAN V/s.

FINANCIAL COMMISSIONER[[11]], wherein it was held that entries inthe revenue records do not confer title and are only intended forachieving the fiscal purpose and no ownership is conferred on thebasis of such entries. It was also held therein that so far as the title tothe property is concerned, it could only be decided by a competent civilCourt. The Supreme Court also held in FAQRUDDIN’s case (10supra) that once the revenue authorities had no jurisdiction to decide the question of title, their decision being without jurisdiction would be anullity.

The learned counsel relied upon the above decision to supporthis other contention that the orders challenged in this writ petitionpassed by the revenue authorities in exercise of the powers conferredby the Act of 1971 being without jurisdiction were nullities in the eye oflaw. He drew the attention of this Court to the observation made inFAQRUDDIN’s case (10 supra) that a jurisdictional fact would notattract the principles of estoppel as there can be no estoppel against astatute and the decision of the Board of Revenue in that case, being adecision on the question of title, was held to be without jurisdiction andconsequently, a nullity.

The learned counsel also supported this contention with thejudgment of the Supreme Court in KIRAN SINGH V/s. CHAMANPASWAN[[12]], wherein it was stated that “… It is a fundamentalprinciple well-established that a decree passed by a Court withoutjurisdiction is a nullity and that its invalidity could be set up wheneverand wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at thestage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect ofjurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial or whether, it is inrespect of the subject-matter of the action, strikes at the very authorityof the Court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be curedeven by consent of parties …”.

Another judgment of the Supreme Court in this regard is that inCHIEF JUSTICE OF A.P. V/s. L.V.A.DIKSHITULU[[13]], wherein aConstitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that where the decisionof a Tribunal is challenged on a pure question of law which if upheld,would make such a decision as having been given by an authoritysuffering from inherent lack of jurisdiction, such decision cannot be sustained by invoking either the doctrine of res judicata or estoppel.

Lastly, the learned counsel placed before this Court a judgmentof the Supreme Court in BIHAR STATE MINERAL DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION V/s. ENCON BUILDERS (I) (P) LTD.[[14]], wherein itwas held that an order which lacks inherent jurisdiction would be anullity and thus, the procedural law of waiver or estoppel would haveno application in such a situation.

Basing upon the above precedential law, the learned counsel forthe petitioners submitted that the entries in the revenue records whichhave been in existence since 1954-55 ought not to have beendisturbed by the revenue authorities. He contended that the ordersunder challenge had the effect of adjudicating serious disputes of titleover the subject lands, which were beyond the authority of the revenueauthorities while exercising jurisdiction under the provisions of the Actof 1971. Such orders, he urged, were therefore in the nature ofnullities and the mere participation of the petitioners in theconsequential proceedings before the Mandal Revenue Officer,Ghatkesar Mandal, did not have the effect of validating the revisionalorder of the Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District dated 24.07.2000. Relying on the judgments of the Supreme Court aforestated, heasserted that there could be no estoppel or waiver against thejurisdictional error underlying the order of the Joint Collector dated24.07.2000. It is his contention that if respondent 3 was aggrieved bythe entries in the revenue records showing the names of thepredecessors-in-title of the petitioners as Pattadars basing upon theKhasra pahani of 1954, he ought to have taken resort to Section 8(2) ofthe Act of 1971 and approached the civil Court. The learned counselsubmitted that the orders under challenge were unsustainable, be it onfacts or in law, and accordingly prayed for the same to be set aside.

Sri M.V.Durga Prasad, learned counsel appearing for respondent 3 urged various contentions, factual and legal, to counter thearguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners. Hestated that as per the tenets of Hindu Law there could be no jointnessbeyond three degrees from the holder. He pointed out that acoparcenary would only extend over four generations and as per thegenealogy put forth by the petitioners in the present case, respondent3 and the petitioners herein along with respondent 4 cannot, by anystretch of imagination, be said to be coparceners. He also pointed outthat the revenue authorities had passed the orders under challenge inexercise of the powers conferred by the Act of 1971 and therefore itcould not be said that there was an inherent lack of jurisdiction. According to him, the exercise of powers conferred by the Act of 1971was entrusted only to the revenue authorities and the orders underchallenge manifested the exercise of such powers within the scopeprovided.

The learned counsel contended that the issue of delay had notbeen urged earlier by the petitioners and in fact they had participatedin the proceedings before the Mandal Revenue Officer, GhatkesarMandal, consequent to the revisional order passed by the JointCollector, Ranga Reddy District. No steps had been taken by them atthat stage to raise the issue of the so-called delay, be it before theAuthorities or by way of independent legal proceedings. Further, hecontended that there was no delay, so to speak of, on facts. Hepointed out that respondent 3’s grandfather, Jagga Reddy, hadinitiated proceedings seeking correction of the entries in the revenuerecords as long back as in the year 1963, but owing to his death, theproceedings lapsed. However, the Revenue Inspector submitted areport dated 01.02.1967 in those proceedings recording the fact that inthe Wasool Baqi and Sethwar the name of Jagga Reddy alone hadbeen shown as the Pattedar of the lands admeasuring Ac.22-00guntas situated at Kondapur. He pointed out that as per the executive instructions, the Act of 1971 came into force in totality in the State ofAndhra Pradesh only in the year 1989 and respondent 3 filed theproceedings before the District Revenue Officer during that time. Healso pointed out that the proceedings before the District RevenueOfficer had not been disposed of but were only closed to await thedecision of the Civil Court in the suit, O.S.No.348 of 1989. As the saidsuit was dismissed for default, there was no illegality in respondent 3seeking reopening of the said proceedings.

Owing to the lack of representation on behalf of Gopal Reddyand Siddha Reddy in the reopened proceedings, the Joint Collectordecided the matter on the basis of the material on record and passedorders dated 24.07.2000 advising respondent 3 to approach theMandal Revenue Officer for sanction of succession over the subjectlands.

Strong reliance is placed by the learned counsel for respondent3 upon the fact that the petitioners thereafter participated in theproceedings before the Mandal Revenue Officer, Ghatkesar Mandal,having received the notices issued in those proceedings and theynever sought to question the order of the Joint Collector, Ranga ReddyDistrict at that stage. Their participation, according to the learnedcounsel, resulted in their waiving any objection that they may haveraised as against the said order and accordingly, it was not open tothem to challenge that order in the present writ petition.

The learned counsel also relied upon the Written Statementfiled by his client in O.S.No.348 of 1989 to show that his client hadbeen consistent in denying the claim of the petitioners herein. Hepointed out that the said suit had been dismissed for default on07.08.1996 as the plaintiffs, had been called absent and contendedthat legal consequences are bound to follow from the said dismissaland would attach to the petitioners herein who were laying a claim through late Gopal Reddy, the original plaintiff in that suit. The learnedcounsel pointed out that no application had been filed to set aside thedismissal order and as per the provisions of Order-9, Rule-9 of theCode of Civil Procedure, 1908, such dismissal bars the institution of afresh suit.

In support of his contention that the entries in the Khasra pahaniof 1954-55 had been fabricated by the predecessors-in-title of thepetitioners herein with the active connivance of their cousin SurenderReddy, the Patwari, the learned counsel drew the attention of thisCourt to the order passed by the Joint Collector, Hyderabad District ina separate proceeding on 30.04.1963 wherein the Patwari, SurenderReddy, was indicted. The Wasool Baqi and the Sethwar referred to inthe 1967 report of the Mandal Revenue Inspector were also placedbefore this Court to show that the name of respondent 3’s grandfatheralone was recorded as the Pattadar over the subject lands. Thelearned counsel also relied upon the fact that in the proceedings of theLand Reforms Tribunal under the provisions of the A.P. Land Reforms(Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973, respondent 3 and hisfather alone were parties to the computation of holdings in respect ofthe subject lands. This order, as pointed out by the learned counselwas relied upon by the Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District.

The learned counsel also pointed out that under Rule-9 of theRules of 1989 and more specifically Rule-9(1)(a)(iv), the RecordingAuthority is required to pass orders for change of registry after verifyingthat such change is not in contravention of any of the provisions of,among other statutes, the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling onAgricultural Holdings) Act, 1973. Under Rule-9(1)(c)(ii), the MandalRevenue Officer is required to hold a summary enquiry as to who hasthe right to succeed to the property of the deceased registered holder. It would be apposite to extract hereunder the provision in its entirety.

“9(1)(c)(ii). In respect of cases falling under Rule 9(1)(a)(i), the Mandal Revenue Officer shall hold asummary enquiry as to who has the right to succeedto the property of the deceased registered holder,according to the principles of the Law of Successionwhich govern the case and give notice to all personsknown or believed to be interested to the effect that theregistry will be made in the name of the person foundto be entitled, unless a declaration if filed, within threemonths from the date of the notice, by any personobjecting to the registry, stating that he has instituted asuit in a Civil Court to establish his superior title and anauthenticated copy of the plaint in the suit is produced. If no declaration is filed, the registry should be madeas stated in the notice, at the expiration of threemonths. If a declaration is filed, the result of the suitshould be awaited before taking further action.”

The learned counsel therefore submits that it is not open to thepetitioners to allege that the orders under challenge are inherentlywithout jurisdiction. The provision aforestated, according to him,vested the authorities with the power to undertake an enquiry into theissue of title.

The learned counsel relied upon various judgments in support ofthe contentions urged by him as set out herein above.

The judgment of the Supreme Court in SURJIT LAL CHHABDA

V/s. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BOMBAY[[15]]is relied uponto support the proposition that a Hindu coparcenary is a muchnarrower body than the joint family and it includes the threegenerations next to the holder in unbroken male descent.

The learned counsel relied upon the judgment of the SupremeCourt in M/s. PARASRAM HARNAND RAO V/s. M/s. SHANTIPARSAD NARINDER KUMAR JAIN[[16]], wherein the Court relyingupon its earlier judgment in SURAJ RATAN THIRANI V/s.AZAMABAD TEA CO.,[[17]]observed that once there was a dismissal of the suit for default there could be no escape from the position that afurther application for the same relief would be clearly barred by theprinciple contained in Order-9, Rule-9 of the CPC. In SURAJ RATANTHIRANI’s case (17 supra) the Supreme Court held that the bar underOrder-9, Rule-9 would not only attach to the person of that particularplaintiff, but would also apply to those claiming under him.

The learned counsel relied upon the judgment of a DivisionBench of this Court in SINGAMANENI PULLAMMA V/s. JOINTCOLLECTOR, ONGOLE, PRAKASAM DISTRICT[[18]]in support ofhis contention that the Revenue Authorities could undertake asummary enquiry into the issue of title under the provisions of the Actof 1971. In the said case, the Court was seized of a situation wherethe revisional authority had not passed orders in the matter awaitingthe resolution of the disputes by the Civil Court. The Court observedthat ‘ … It is true that the entry made in the revenue records can bechallenged in a civil suit, but that does not mean that the revenueauthorities will not exercise any discretion which they are required todo under the Act. Pattadar pass books are governed by the Act and incase of grievance about the entries in pattadar pass books or aboutissuance or non-issuance of pattadar pass books the revenueauthorities are supposed to do their job under the Act. Whether arevision had to be allowed or dismissed was a matter which had to bedecided by the revisional authority. In case anybody or any partybefore it was aggrieved of that order, they could workout theirremedies. …’

The learned counsel stated that in the present case the orderspassed by the revenue authorities were within jurisdiction and inproper exercise of the powers conferred by the Act. According to him,there were no serious questions or disputes pertaining to the title overthe subject lands in the light of the material placed on record by respondent 3. Except for the entry in the khasra pahani of 1954-55which was fraught with suspicion and which formed the basis for thesubsequent entries in the revenue records, the petitioners had nobasis for their claim before the revenue authorities. The powers of therevenue authorities while exercising jurisdiction under the Act of 1971are circumscribed by Sections 4, 5, 10 of the Act of 1971 and Rule-9 ofthe Rules of 1989.

The learned counsel pointed out that under Section 5(2) of theAct of 1971, the Mandal Revenue Officer is under an obligation to takenote of the acquisition of any right over land and ‘shall’ carry out theamendment in the record of rights. The learned counsel stressed uponthe use of the word ‘shall’ to support his contention that it was not somuch a discretion as it was a duty and a legal obligation on the part ofthe Mandal Revenue Officer to effect changes in the revenue recordstaking note of the subsequent developments in the matter ofacquisition/change of title. It is pointed out that under Rule-28 of theRules of 1989, the Recording Authority, the Appellate Authority or anyother Authority holding an enquiry under the Act of 1971 has suchpowers as are vested in a civil Court for the purpose of entering uponand inspecting any land. He pointed out that in the present case alsothe Mandal Revenue Officer, Ghatkesar, had made an inspection as isevident from his order dated 10.11.2000 and on the basis of suchinspection, he came to the conclusion that respondent 3 and hispredecessor-in-title alone were the owners and possessors of thesubject lands. He also found that the petitioners herein had neverbeen in possession of the subject lands.

The learned counsel also pointed out that the scheme of the Actof 1971 is such that the revenue authorities, while recognizing theacquisition of any right, be it as an owner, a pattadar, a mortgagee, anoccupant or a tenant over a land, is also required to take intoconsideration the right determined by the civil Court as per Explanation I to Section-4 of the Act of 1971. This fact, stressed thecounsel, is further exemplified by Section 8(2) of the Act of 1971, whichrecognizes the right of a party to seek a declaration from the competentcivil Court that the entry made under the Act of 1971 was incorrect.

He pointed out that Section 43 of the Andhra Pradesh Court-Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1956 refers to suits for alteration orcancellation of any entry in a register of the names of proprietors ofrevenue paying estates. This is the ‘suit for declaration’ which isreferred to in Section 8(2) of the Act of 1971. Rule-32 of the Rules of1989 is referred to by the learned counsel in this regard to show thatthe result of the proceeding under Section 8(2) of the Act of 1971 is tobe intimated to the Mandal Revenue Officer and the details of the suitin this regard during its pendency and after its disposal are to beentered into the relevant register by the Mandal Revenue Officer.

The learned counsel also pointed out that under Rule-9(1)(c)(ii) of the Rules of 1989, reference is made to the institutionof a suit for declaration of title and a person instituting such a suit isrequired to make a declaration before the Mandal Revenue Officer tothat effect.

Except for these bars upon the jurisdiction and exercise ofpower by the revenue authorities under the Act of 1971, the learnedcounsel contended that there could be no fetters upon such Authoritiesin so far as the subject matter of the Act of 1971 and the Rules of 1989were concerned.

Arguments

The learned counsel pointed out that under Rule-9(1)(c)(ii) ofthe Rules of 1989, the Mandal Revenue Officer is required to await theresult of the suit before taking further action, and in the present case,after the dismissal of the suit O.S.No.348 of 1989, necessary actionwas initiated, which is in accordance with the statutory provisions.

Learned counsel submitted that the orders under challenge weretherefore within jurisdiction and in any event, could not be categorizedas being inherently lacking in jurisdiction. The judgments cited by thelearned counsel for the petitioners on the aspects of nullity, estoppeland jurisdiction are therefore said to be inapplicable to the facts of thiscase.

The learned counsel also pointed out that the order of theMandal Revenue Officer, Ghatkesar Mandal, which is under challengebefore this Court is an appealable one under Section 5(5) of the Act of1971 and in the light of the judgment cited by the learned counsel forthe petitioners himself, once the statute provided a methodology ofremedies thereunder, duly providing a hierarchy of authorities, it wasnot open to the petitioners to circumvent the appellate remedy andapproach this Court by way of the present writ petition.

In reply, Sri V.Ramakrishna Reddy, the learned counsel for thepetitioners reiterated that the issues dealt with by the revenueauthorities involved disputed questions of fact and complicatedquestions of law relating to the definition and scope of a joint familyand partition of its properties. The learned counsel submitted that suchissues could only be decided by a civil Court of competent jurisdictionon the basis of evidence. He relied upon the judgment of the SupremeCourt in MAHILA BAJRANGI’s case (7 supra) to support hiscontention that the Tahsildar was not a Court. According to him, theKhasra pahani entry of 1954-55 which had been incorporated underthe Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act, 1317 Fcould not be disturbed under the Act of 1971. He submitted thatRevisional Jurisdiction under Section 166-B of the Act of 1317 F alonecould be invoked and not the Revisional power under Section 9 of theAct of 1971. He alleged that the procedure prescribed under the Act of1317 F had not been followed and the orders under challenge weretherefore unsustainable.

He also pointed out that the revenue authorities had not placedany reliance upon the report of the Mandal Revenue Inspector of theyear 1967 and stressed upon the fact that the names of the petitioners’predecessors-in-title found place under the column pertaining topattadar in the revenue records. He attacked the order of the MandalRevenue Officer, Ghatkesar, on the ground that the said Officer haddirected expunction of the entries of these names in the records,though there was no direction to that effect by the Joint Collector,Ranga Reddy or a civil Court of competent jurisdiction.

He also asserted that the proceedings under the A.P. LandReforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 were not bindingupon his clients and that the entries in the revenue records in favour ofhis clients dated long prior to the said proceedings. According to thelearned counsel, the revenue authorities, upon the reopening of thematter built up a new case altogether for respondent 3. The revenueauthorities failed to take note of the fact that a co-owner’s possessionis not to the exclusion of the other owners and cannot be said to beadverse to them. According to the learned counsel, there was apartition in the year 1953, which was not taken note of by theauthorities at all.

The learned counsel also asserted that revisional power underSection-9 could be exercised only on the grounds of fraud, illegality orirregularity in procedure. No such grounds were made out forintervention by the Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy in this case. Hereiterated that the revenue authorities had adjudicated seriousdisputes of title and that it was for respondent 3 to have invoked theremedy available under Section 8(2) of the Act of 1971. He alsosubmitted that the dismissal of the suit for default did not preclude hisclients from seeking relief as there was no decision on merits.

The learned Government Pleader supported the orders underchallenge. He submitted that the authorities had exercised power andjurisdiction correctly and that no grounds were made out forinterference by this Court.

It is noticed that in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition,the petitioners contended that no notice was given to Gopal Reddy orSiddha Reddy or the petitioners about the reopening of the casebefore the Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District. In view of thissubmission, the records pertaining to the Revision were called for. It isfound that the Mandal Revenue Officer, Ghatkesar Mandal addressedletter dated 08.02.1999 to the Collector, Ranga Reddy District statingto the effect that the served copy of the notice was enclosed therewith. It was further stated that K.Indrasena Reddy, K.Ram Reddy andK.Pratap Reddy were not residing in the village and that their addressparticulars were not known. Along with the said letter, a signed copy of the notice dated 29.01.1999 is found. Therein, it is stated:

‘Please take notice that the above case is posted forhearing on 13-2-99 at 11.00 A.M. before the JointCollector, Ranga Reddy district. Therefore you arerequired to be present before this Court either inperson or through an advocate on the said date andtime, failing which order will be passed on the materialavailable on record.’

The above notice was issued in the case between K.JaipalReddy and K.Gopal Reddy (died) per L.Rs and K.Sidda Reddy (died)per L.Rs. The notice was addressed to K.Pratap Reddy, K.SudhakarReddy, K.Ravinder Reddy and K.Upender Reddy as the L.Rs. ofK.Gopal Reddy and to K.Indrasena Reddy, K.Ram Reddy andK.Laxma Reddy as the L.Rs. of K.Sidda Reddy. On the rear of thisnotice, four signatures are found in proof of receipt of the notice on02.02.1999 and it is endorsed thereunder that the remaining personswere not residing in Ghatkesar Village. This endorsement is made bythe Mandal Revenue Inspector under his signature dated 05.02.1999.

The above notice is said to have been served upon K.Sidda Reddy,K.Ravinder Reddy, K.Upender Reddy and K.Laxma Reddy, four out ofthe six petitioners herein.

In so far as the failure of the service of notice upon the other twopetitioners is concerned, it appears that respondent 3 moved anapplication before the Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District seeking tocause substituted service of notice and the same was permitted byorder dated 08.04.2000. In pursuance thereof, publication of the noticewas caused in Eenadu Telugu Newspaper, Ranga Reddy Editiondated 08.04.2000. The original newspaper, evidencing thispublication, is also available in the record and shows that K.PratapReddy, K.Sudhakar Reddy, K.Ravinder Reddy and K.Upender Reddy,being sons of late Gopal Reddy, and K.Indrasena Reddy, K.RamReddy, K.Laxma Reddy, being the sons of late Siddha Reddy, wereput on notice that a petition had been filed by respondent 3 herein forrectification of the record of rights against K.Gopal Reddy andK.Siddha Reddy and that they were required to be present in person orthrough advocate on the next date of hearing of the case fixed on17.04.2000. In view of the above facts which emerge from the originalrecords, it is quite clear that it is not open to the petitioners to allegeany procedural lapse or irregularity in the service of notice in so far asthe proceedings before the Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy, areconcerned.

There is no evidence on record to show that the petitioners everraised any contention with regard to the alleged delay in the exerciseof revisional power by the Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy, earlier. Nosuch ground was raised before the Mandal Revenue Officer,Ghatkesar Mandal. Without a foundation it is not open to thepetitioners to raise this issue for the very first time in this writ petition. This aspect is therefore eschewed in the present adjudication.

On an analysis of the material on record the following factualmatrix emerges.

Initially, the grandfather of respondent 3, Jagga Reddy, filed anappeal under Section 15(2) of the Regulation of 1358-F, beingaggrieved by the entries in the khasra pahani of 1954-55 recording thenames of the predecessors-in-title of the petitioners. The said appealwas dismissed for default. Jagga Reddy is said to have expired in theyear 1969 and thereafter, Ramachandra Reddy, the father ofrespondent 3, is said to have died in the year 1979. Pertinent to note,no steps were taken after the dismissal of the appeal filed by JaggaReddy during the lifetime of Ramachandra Reddy. During this period,it appears that the names of the predecessors-in-title of the petitionerscontinued to be reflected in the revenue records intermittently.

Thereafter, respondent 3 himself filed an appeal under Section15(2) of the Regulation of 1358-F. This appeal was filed in the year1988, contending that respondent 3’s grandfather, Jagga Reddy, alonehad ownership and possessory rights over the subject landsadmeasuring Ac.23-07 guntas at Kondapur Village, GhatkesarMandal, Ranga Reddy District and that the names of thepredecessors-in-title of the petitioners had been interpolated with amala fide intention, though they had no right or interest in the subjectlands.

It appears that the predecessors-in-title of the petitionerscontested the maintainability of the above appeal on the ground thatthe Regulation of 1358-F stood repealed by the Act of 1971 and alsoon merits. It was further contended that a suit, O.S.No.348 of 1989 hadbeen instituted on the file of the Principal Subordinate Judge, RangaReddy District, for partition and division of the respective shares of theparties. Taking note of the pendency of the case before the civil Court,the District Revenue Officer, Ranga Reddy District, stating to the effect that he had no jurisdiction to interfere in a civil dispute until final orderswere issued by the civil Court, dismissed the appeal by his order dated26.10.1989.

The suit, O.S.No.348 of 1989 was dismissed for default on07.08.1996. Thereupon, respondent 3 filed a petition dated28.11.1997 seeking the reopening of the case filed under Section15(2) of the Regulation of 1358-F and to rectify the wrong entries in therecord of rights. As per the array of the respondents shown in the saidapplication, Gopal Reddy and Sidda Reddy, the predecessors-in-titleof the petitioners, were shown to have died and were represented bytheir legal representatives, the petitioners and respondent 4 herein. Itappears that this application was taken on file under Section 9 of theAct of 1971 by the Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy. Whether the saidaction of the Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy, in treating an applicationseeking reopening of a proceeding filed under Section 15(2) of therepealed Regulation of 1358-F as one under Section 9 of the Act of1971 is proper and correct would have to be ascertained from thescheme and the provisions of the Act of 1971.

An examination of the Act of 1971 and the Rules framedthereunder would show that this Act, as compared to other RevenueLaws such as the A.P. (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act, 1317-F,stands on a different footing altogether. Section 3-A of the Act of 1971gives it overriding effect over the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh(Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act, 1317 F. The argument of thelearned counsel for the petitioners to the contrary therefore does nothold water and is liable to be rejected.

Under the normal Revenue Laws mutation is effected for thepurpose of achieving a fiscal objective, i.e. collection of land revenuefrom the person in occupation. The entries made in the revenuerecords under such laws do not confer title and are merely indicative of possession. However, the Act of 1971, having undergone severalamendments, enjoys a unique status as compared to other RevenueLaws in as much as it attaches certain presumptions in respect of titleto the revenue records maintained thereunder. This aspect isdemonstrated by Section 6 and Section 6-A of the Act of 1971. UnderSection 6 of the Act of 1971, every entry in the record of rights shall bepresumed to be true until the contrary is proved or until it is otherwiseamended in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Under Section6-A of the Act of 1971, every owner/pattadar is required to apply for theissue of a title deed and pass book under the provisions of the Act of1971. Even if such an application is not made, the Mandal RevenueOfficer is authorized suo motu to issue a pass book after collecting thefee prescribed therefor.

The Section posits that the issuance of the title deed and passbook is to be on the basis of the record of rights, which has beenbrought upto date. Under Section 6-A (5), it is laid down that the titledeed issued under Section 6-A(1) shall be the title deed in respect ofan owner/pattadar and it shall have the same evidentiary value withregard to title for the purpose of creation of an equitable mortgageunder the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, as adocument registered in accordance with the provisions of theRegistration Act, 1908, has under the law.

In the light of the value and importance which attach to therecord of rights maintained under the Act of 1971 it would benecessary to insist on strict maintenance of such record in accordancewith the provisions of the Act and the Rules. It is only when suchrecord is kept in conformity with the requirements prescribed by the Actof 1971 and the Rules of 1989 that the presumptions enjoined bySections 6 and 6-A would arise and enure to the benefit of the holderof such rights.

The Rules of 1989 framed under the Act of 1971 detail theprocedure to be followed by the revenue authorities in the course ofpreparation of the record of rights as envisaged by the Act. Thescheme of the said Rules clearly indicates that the revenue authoritiesare required to hold a summary enquiry into issues of title also incertain circumstances while deciding disputes as to the entries to beincorporated in the record of rights. The decision of a learned DivisionBench of this Court in SINGAMANENI PULLAMMA’s case (18 supra)is also to this effect. However, this authorization to the revenueauthorities is subject to judicial determination of disputes over issuesof title and as demonstrated by Rule 9(1)(c)(ii), once a declaration isfiled by a party that he has instituted a suit in a civil Court to establishhis title, the revenue authority is required to await the result of such suitbefore taking further action. This Rule makes it clear that even incases involving disputes as to succession to the property of thedeceased registered holder, the Mandal Revenue Officer in exercise ofhis powers under this Rule is required to hold a summary enquiry anddecide as to who has the right to succeed to such property by applyingthe law of succession governing the case.

The decisions in MAHILA BAJRANGI’s (7 supra), SHANTILAL’s case (4 supra), FAQRUDDIN’s case (10 supra) and SURAJBHAN’s case (11 supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for thepetitioners stating to the effect that the revenue authorities cannotdecide questions of title were rendered in the environment of generalrevenue laws which stand on a different footing when compared to theAct of 1971. In the light of the scheme of the Act of 1971, it cannot besaid that the record of rights maintained thereunder are only for thepurpose of achieving a fiscal objective, as is the case with otherrevenue laws of this nature. The judgments relied upon therefore haveno application to the facts of the present case.

It is however to be noted that revenue authorities are not

Issues

substitutes for the Courts of competent civil jurisdiction and it is for theparty concerned to invoke such jurisdiction so as to bar the summaryenquiry by the revenue authorities into issues of title in particular givencircumstances. Needless to state revenue authorities, in such a‘summary enquiry’, would not be capable of deciding complicatedquestions of title. The scope and circumstances of such enquiry byrevenue authorities into issues of title is circumscribed by Section 5 ofthe Act of 1971 read with Rule 9(1)(a)(i), (ii) and (iii) of the Rules of1989. Under Rule 9(1)(a)(i), the Mandal Revenue Officer isempowered to deal with change of Registry owing to the death of theregistered holder. Under Rule 9(1)(a)(ii), the Mandal Revenue Officeris authorized to entertain a dispute where there is a break in the chainof registered documents, if the change of registry is based on a sale,gift etc. through registered documents. Under Rule 9(1)(a)(iii),disputes pertaining to grant of joint pattas of a joint Hindu family shallbe referred to the Mandal Revenue Officer. Under Rule 9(1)(c)(iii), theMandal Revenue Officer is entitled to resolve disputes involving abreak in the chain of registered documents by relying on certain otherevidence such as statements of other ryots and cist receipts. UnderRule 9(1)(c)(ii), the Mandal Revenue Officer is empowered to hold asummary enquiry as to who has the right to succeed to the property ofa registered holder. These, then, are the only disputes that can beresolved by the Mandal Revenue Officer under the scheme of the Actof 1971 and the Rules of 1989.

The aforesaid provisions demonstrate that the revenueauthorities, under the Act of 1971 and the Rules of 1989, areempowered to undertake a summary appraisal and enquiry ofparticular disputes in respect of title. Such enquiry is obviously not asubstitute for an adjudication by a Civil Court of competentjurisdiction. In the course of such enquiry, it would not be open to therevenue authority to set aside transactions or adjudicate complicated issues falling out side the scope of Rule 9(1)(a)(i), (ii) and (iii) of theRules of 1989.

Coming to the facts of the present case, it is noticed that underSection 3(1) of the Act of 1971, after the commencement of the Act of1971 in any area, the recording authority is required to prepare andbring up to date from time to time the record of rights of all the lands inevery village in that area. Under Section 3(2) of the Act of 1971 afterthe preparation of the record of rights under Section 3(1), the fact ofsuch completion is required to be notified in the Andhra PradeshGazette or the District Gazette. Under Section 3(3) of the Act of 1971,any person affected by an entry in such record of rights is permittedwithin a period of one year from the date of notification caused underSection 3(2) of the Act to apply for rectification of the entry. The Officerto whom such an application is made is required to give a decision onthe said application after enquiry and direct rectification of the record ofrights in accordance with such decision. The said decision, subject toRevision under Section 9 of the Act of 1971 attains finality.

There is no evidence on record as to whether and when anysteps were taken under Sections 3(1) and 3(2) of the Act of 1971 in thearea covering the subject lands. The fact of the matter is that thenames of the predecessors-in-title of the petitioners were incorporatedin the khasra pahani of the year 1954-55. The khasra pahani is arecord of land ownership. Basing on this khasra pahani it appears thatthe names of the predecessors-in-title of the petitioners continued to bereflected in the revenue records for the subsequent years, thoughintermittently. The Wasool Baqi and the Sethwar however present adifferent picture as only the name of Jagga Reddy, grandfather ofrespondent 3, is shown as the pattadar and possessor. Thus, there isa discrepancy in the revenue records, which by its very nature, was notamenable to resolution by way of a summary enquiry by the MandalRevenue Officer under Rule 9 of the Rules of 1989.

The executive instructions issued by the Government of AndhraPradesh for implementation of the Act of 1971 demonstrate that the Actcame into force with effect from 15.08.1978 and was enforced in theState in four phases from 15.08.1978 to 01.07.1980. It is yet to beimplemented in certain areas, which is of no concern in the presentcase. Thus, in the absence of material and foundation, it is difficult tostate as to whether the situation under Section 3(3) of the Act of 1971had arisen in the present case. In any event, once the entries in therevenue records reflecting the names of the predecessors-in-title of thepetitioners were existing at the time the Act of 1971 came into force inKondapur Village, Ghatkesar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District and therewas a discrepancy with the entries in the Wasool Baqi and theSethwar, it was for the party aggrieved to move the officer concernedfor an appropriate decision under Section 3(3) of the Act of 1971 withregard to the rectification sought by him. Such decision would havebeen subject to Revision under Section 9 of the Act of 1971.

Under Section 4 of the Act of 1971, a person who acquired anyright over land, be it by succession, survivorship, inheritance, partitionetc. is mandated to intimate in writing his acquisition of such right tothe Mandal Revenue Officer within ninety days from the date of suchacquisition. Under Section 5 of the Act of 1971, upon receipt of suchintimation under Section 4, the Mandal Revenue Officer shalldetermine as to whether, and if so in what manner, the right of recordsmay be amended in consequence thereof and shall carry out theamendment in accordance with such determination. Such order ismade appealable before the Revenue Divisional Officer under Section5(5) of the Act of 1971. In turn the order passed under Section 5(5) isrevisable under Section 9 of the Act of 1971.

In the present case, the father of respondent 3, RamachandraReddy, admittedly died in the year 1979. No application seems to have been made by respondent 3 under Section 4 of the Act of 1971claiming a right of succession thereafter. Similarly, the petitioners andrespondent 4 who claim through their predecessors Gopal Reddy andSidda Reddy, also failed to take steps in this regard after the death oftheir predecessors-in-title. Thus, as the matter stood, some of therevenue records showed the names of respondent 3’s grandfather andthe predecessors-in-title of the petitioners as the pattadars of thesubject land.

An appeal was filed by respondent 3 under Section 15(2) of theRegulation of 1358-F. Section 15(2) of the Regulation of 1358-F readsas follows:

“15. Appeal:- (1) … … …

(2) The “Collector” may of his own motion or on theapplication of a party call for and examine any recordsmade under Section 4 or Section 6 and pass suchorders as he may think fit:

Provided that no order which would adversely affectany person shall be passed except after hearing thatperson.”

There is no provision in the Act of 1971 which is identical toSection 15(2) of the Regulation of 1358-F. Though Rule 13 of theRules of 1989 seems to grant general powers of supervision whichcould be exercised suo motu by a host of revenue authorities to testand revise the entries in the confirmed record of rights, there is noprovision in the parent statute, the Act of 1971 conferring such widepowers. In any event, the power conferred by Rule 13(2) is with regardto the revision of entries in the confirmed record of rights preparedunder Rule 13(1). As stated earlier, no material has been placedbefore this Court as to whether such steps were initiated by therevenue authorities for the preparation of the draft record of rights andthe confirmation thereof following the due procedure prescribed under the Act and the Rules in so far as the subject lands are concerned.

The power of revision provided under Section 9 of the Act of1971 is with reference to calling for and examining the record underSections 3, 5, 5-A or 5-B of the Act of 1971 in respect of any record ofrights prepared or maintained. In the present case, there is noevidence of any orders having been passed under any of the abovesections warranting invocation of the revisional power under Section 9by the Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy. The application filed byrespondent 3 seeking reopening of a proceeding under a repealedenactment which, in effect, was not even in existence as on that date,ought not to have been converted into a Revision under Section 9 ofthe Act of 1971. No such power of conversion is vested in the JointCollector, Ranga Reddy District under the provisions of the Act of1971. There was thus an inherent lack of jurisdiction in the JointCollector, Ranga Reddy, to do so as is evident from the provisions ofSection 9 itself.

It is no doubt true that notice of the proceedings initiated by theJoint Collector, Ranga Reddy, under Section 9 was served upon thepetitioners, be it personally or by way of substituted service throughpublication in a newspaper. However, they did not participate in thesaid proceedings. A perusal of the order dated 24.07.2000 passed bythe Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy, in exercise of such revisional powerreflects that the said authority took note of the fact that the khasrapahani for the year 1954-55 reflected the names of Jagga Reddy,Gopal Reddy and Sidda Reddy, grandfather of respondent 3 and thepredecessors-in-title of the petitioners in the column pertaining to thename of the pattadar and cultivator.

The order also reflects that the pahanis for the years 1968-69,1972-73, 1976-77, 1979-80 and 1982-83 to 1988-89 showed thenames of the same three persons in the column pertaining to the name of the pattadar, while the name of respondent 3 alone is shown in thecolumn pertaining to the name of the cultivator. Having extracted theabove, the Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy, referred to the proceedingsof the Land Reforms Tribunal, Hyderabad East Division, dated08.03.1976 showing that the subject lands in addition to others werecomputed to the holding of respondent 3 and his father jointly, dulydeclaring them to be non-surplus holders under the Act of 1973.

The Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy, also referred to the fact thatthe pahani for the year 1996-97 continued to show the names of SiddaReddy and Gopal Reddy, predecessors-in-title of the petitioners alongwith the name of respondent 3 as pattadars while respondent 3 alonewas shown as the possessor/cultivator. Thereupon, the authority actedupon the aspect of possession alone, holding that respondent 3 was inexclusive possession and enjoyment of the lands and that thepredecessors-in-title of the petitioners did not have possession. Healso took note of the fact that the petitioners, having been brought onrecord, failed to contest the matter and that their names had not beenentered in the pahanies. The conclusion of the Joint Collector is in thefollowing terms:

“However since the other recorded joint pattadars,Sidda Reddy and Gopal Reddy have already died, thepetitioner may approach, the Mandal Revenue Officerfor sanction of succession over the lands.”

With the above observation, the Revision was disposed of. It ispertinent to note that the advice given by the Joint Collector was not inthe nature of any extraordinary relief as the same was alreadyprovided for under Section 4 of the Act of 1971, but as pointed outearlier, neither the petitioners herein nor respondent 3 took recourse tothe statutory provisions in this regard. It is no doubt true that underSection 4, a time limit is posited for making an intimation to the MandalRevenue Officer about the acquisition of a right by succession, but under the provisions of Section 10(2) of the Act of 1971, the LimitationAct, 1963 and more specifically Sections 5 and 12 to 24 thereof aremade applicable for the purposes of expiration and computation of theperiod prescribed in Section 4(1) of the Act of 1971. Therefore thepetitioners and respondent 3 could, in any event, have approached theMandal Revenue Officer under Section 4(1) of the Act of 1971 alongwith an application for condonation of delay under Section 10(2) in sofar as their alleged right of succession is concerned.

However, the matter is not that simple. While the petitionersclaim only half share in the subject lands in succession to the allegedrights of their predecessors-in-title, Gopal Reddy and Sidda Reddy,respondent 3 seeks to exclude them altogether and claims fullownership and title over the subject lands, as the successor of hisgrandfather, Jagga Reddy. He disputes the correctness of the entriesin so far as the incorporation of the names of Gopal Reddy and SiddaReddy is concerned. Under Rule 9(1)(c)(ii), the dispute which can beenquired into by the Mandal Revenue Officer is only with regard torival claims as to who would succeed to the property of a deceasedregistered holder. Such was not the factual scenario in the presentcase. There were three deceased registered holders in the revenuerecord and the heirs of one such registered holder wanted to excludethe heirs of the other two altogether. This dispute did not fall within theambit of Rule 9(1)(c)(ii) and could not have been enquired into by theMandal Revenue Officer by way of a summary enquiry.

By its very nature, this dispute raised complicated questions offact and law. Allegations are made that the original entry in the khasrapahani of 1954-55 was with the active connivance of one SurenderReddy, patwari, who was allegedly related to Gopal Reddy and SiddaReddy. Such allegations would require to be tried and tested by way ofadducing of evidence in a regular trial before a competent civil Court.On the other hand, the petitioners claim that there was a partition within the family in the year 1953 and also a compromise thereafter. Itis not clear as to whether such a partition and the subsequentcompromise were reduced into writing or were only oral. No documentappears to have been placed on record in proof of such partition orcompromise. In the event such partition or compromise was an oralone, the same would have to be proved before a civil Court ofcompetent jurisdiction by adducing acceptable and credible evidence.Such steps could not have been initiated before or entertained by therevenue authorities in the course of their summarily deciding limitedissues of title, as provided under Rule 9(1)(c)(ii) and (iii) of the Rules of1989.

The learned counsel for respondent 3 placed strong relianceupon the fact that the Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy, referred to theproceedings initiated under the Act of 1973 and as per Rule 9, noorder could be passed by the revenue authority, either for changing ofthe registry or for splitting of joint pattas, unless the authority wassatisfied that the said order was not in contravention of the provisionsof the Act of 1973. However it is to be noticed that the Rule requiresthat an order passed by the revenue authority in respect of the recordof rights should not be in contravention of ‘the Act of 1973’. Themeaning of this would necessarily be that by way of an entry in therecord of rights, the holder thereof is not permitted to have a holding inexcess of that permitted by the Act of 1973. The emphasis is oncontravention of the provisions of ‘the Act of 1973’ and not with theproceedings passed thereunder. No doubt, the proceedings initiatedunder the Act of 1973 which culminated in the order in favour ofrespondent 3 and his father would be a strong piece of evidence insupport of their case, but the same cannot be the sole foundation forexclusion of the petitioners’ rights, if any, claiming through theirpredecessors-in-title, whose names found mention in the revenuerecords earlier.

A reading of the proceedings dated 10.11.2000 passed by theMandal Revenue Officer, Ghatkesar Mandal, clearly demonstrates thatthe matter was taken on file only in pursuance of the Joint Collector’sorder dated 24.07.2000. Before the Mandal Revenue Officer,Ghatkesar Mandal, the petitioners chose to participate. The learnedcounsel for respondent 3 placed strong reliance on this to support hiscontention that the petitioners, having participated in theseproceedings must be deemed to have waived their objections, if any,with regard to the revisional orders of the Joint Collector, RangaReddy, dated 24.07.2000 under Section 9 of the Act of 1971. However,as pointed out earlier, the said order, innocuous in itself, wasinherently lacking in jurisdiction. Once that is so, there is no questionof any estoppel or waiver against the statute. The decisions inFAQRUDDIN’s case (10 supra), KIRAN SINGH’s case (12 supra), DIKSHITULU’s case (13supra) and ENCON BUILDERS’s case (14 supra) support this view. Further as pointed out earlier the said order did not have any effectsubstantively inasmuch as the Joint Collector only directed respondent3 to make an application for succession, ostensibly under Section 4 ofthe Act of 1971.

The order dated 10.11.2000 passed by the Mandal RevenueOfficer, Ghatkesar Mandal, would also show that the Mandal RevenueOfficer personally conducted a panchanama regarding the possessionof the subject land at Kondapur Village as provided for under Rule20(1)(c). Having conducted this inspection, the Mandal RevenueOfficer, Ghatkesar, recorded his finding that respondent 3 and priorthereto his predecessor were the owners and possessors of thesubject lands and also that the petitioners had never been inpossession thereof. In this connection, it is relevant to note that it is notthe case of the petitioners that they were in possession of the subjectlands. According to them they are joint owners of the subject lands along with respondent 3 and they specifically assert that thepossession of one joint owner cannot be to the exclusion or adverse tothe other joint owners.

Therefore, the spot inspection by the Mandal Revenue Officer,Ghatkesar Mandal, could throw light only on the fact of possessionwhich was not even in dispute. So far as the ownership is concerned,the same could not have been decided on the basis of a spotinspection; all the more so, when there is a dispute with regard to thetitle. It is to be noted that all the parties are members of the same familyand though not falling within a coparcenary, it would have to beexamined as to whether there is any foundation in the case of thepetitioners that there was a partition, whereby the subject lands fell tothe joint shares of the grandfather of respondent 3 and thepredecessors-in-title of the petitioners. The Mandal Revenue Officerplaced reliance upon the Wasool Baqi which showed the name of thegrandfather of respondent 3 alone as khatadar and pattadar and cameto the finding that the respondent 3 alone was in exclusive possessionand enjoyment of the subject lands and that the petitioners herein hadnever been in possession and had no concern with the same.

It appears that the Mandal Revenue Officer, Ghatkesar Mandal,lost sight of the fact that in exercise of the powers conferred by the Actof 1971 and in preparing the record of rights thereunder, he was notonly dealing with the aspect of possession but was also required torecord a finding with regard to title. However the approach of theMandal Revenue Officer as demonstrated by the order shows that hewas swayed only by the exclusive possession and enjoyment ofrespondent 3 and did not toil over the issue of title though the disputepertaining thereto loomed large.

Even if the proceeding before the Mandal Revenue Officer,Ghatkesar, could be taken to be one under Section 4(1) of the Act of 1971, the enquiry under Section 5 of the Act of 1971 required theofficer to determine as to whether, and if so in what manner, the recordof rights was to be amended. Under Rule 9(1)(a)(i), (ii) and (iii), thescope of the enquiry into such determination is clearly circumscribed.The dispute raised in the present case with regard to the deletion ofthe existing names in the revenue records clearly did not fall within theenquiry permissible under Rule 9. Therefore, the Mandal RevenueOfficer, Ghatkesar Mandal, had he even chosen to do so, could nothave resolved the dispute.

Conclusion

The Mandal Revenue Officer, Ghatkesar Mandal, in fact, did notventure into this issue and merely basing on the possession aspectcame to the conclusion that respondent 3’s name should beincorporated in the pattadar column in respect of the subject lands andthat he would be entitled to obtain the title deed and the pass book asper the provisions of the Act of 1971. This order had the effect ofextinguishing the rights, if any, of the petitioners who were laying aclaim through Gopal Reddy and Sidda Reddy, whose names were inexistence under the ownership column in the revenue records evenupto the year 1996-97.

Therefore, the said order was devoid of jurisdiction and far inexcess of the powers conferred by the Act of 1971 and the Rules of1989. The Revenue Authorities, be it the Joint Collector or the MandalRevenue Officer, acting in exercise of the powers conferred by the Actof 1971 could not have resolved the disputed questions of title whichwere thrown up by the facts of the present case. The decisions inG.PADMAVATHI’s case (1 supra), PATEL RAGHAV NATHA’s case(2 supra), K.SIDDIAH NAIDU’s case (3 supra), V.GOUTHAM RAO’scase (5 supra), SANNEPALLI NAGESWAR RAO’s case (6 supra)and B.PUSHPAMMA’s case (9 supra) are of guidance and support inthis regard.

Complex and serious disputes of title falling beyond the ambit ofRule 9 of the Rules of 1989 are not within the ken of the adjudicativeauthority of revenue authorities even under the Act of 1971. It is for theparties to initiate appropriate proceedings before a civil Court ofcompetent jurisdiction to resolve their dispute and it is not open toeither party to turn to the Act of 1971 to steal a march over the other. Needless to state, in the event of either party approaching a civil Courtof competent jurisdiction, it is open to them to raise all the issues andcontentions raised in this writ petition, including the effect andconsequences of the dismissal of the suit O.S.No.348 of 1989 fordefault, and the same would be decided independently without beinginfluenced by any observations made herein.

In the result, the order dated 24.07.2000 passed by the JointCollector, Ranga Reddy District, in exercise of revisional jurisdictionunder Section 9 of the Act of 1971 is found to be without jurisdictionand hence, unsustainable. The consequential order dated 10.11.2000passed by the Mandal Revenue Officer, Ghatkesar Mandal, RangaReddy District, in exercise of powers conferred by Section 5 of the Actof 1971 had the effect of resolving serious and complex disputes of titlefar beyond the scope of the summary enquiry which could have beeninitiated by the said Officer under Rule 9 of the Rules of 1989. Thesaid order is in excess of jurisdiction and is accordingly held to be nulland void.

The writ petition is therefore allowed. There shall be no orderas to costs.

26[th] DECEMBER, 2008

--------------------------------

P.V.SANJAY KUMAR,J

Note: L.R.Copy to bemarked.

(B/O) PGS/VGSR

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICEP.V.SANJAY KUMAR

WRIT PETITION NO.23945 OF 2000

26[th] DECEMBER, 2008

[1]1999(4) ALT 209 (D.B.)1999(4) ALT 209 (D.B.)

[2]AIR 1969 SUPREME COURT 1297AIR 1969 SUPREME COURT 1297

[3]1999 (5) ALT 4801999 (5) ALT 480

[4]2001 AIHC 19902001 AIHC 1990

[5]2003 (1) ALT 6152003 (1) ALT 615

[6]2002(4) ALT 465 (DB)2002(4) ALT 465 (DB)

[7](2003) 2 SCC 464(2003) 2 SCC 464

[8](2003) 7 SCC 667(2003) 7 SCC 667

[9]2005(1) ALT 2402005(1) ALT 240

[10](2008) 8 SCC 12(2008) 8 SCC 12

[11](2007) 6 SCC 186(2007) 6 SCC 186

[12]AIR 1954 SUPREME COURT 340AIR 1954 SUPREME COURT 340

[13]AIR 1979 SUPREME COURT 193AIR 1979 SUPREME COURT 193

[14](2003) 7 SUPREME COURT CASES 418(2003) 7 SUPREME COURT CASES 418

[15]AIR 1976 SUPREME COURT 109AIR 1976 SUPREME COURT 109

[16]AIR 1980 SUPREME COURT 1655AIR 1980 SUPREME COURT 1655

[17]AIR 1965 SC 295AIR 1965 SC 295

[18]2004(7) ALT 9632004(7) ALT 963