WA/1317/2006 of Visakhapatnam Port Trust, Visakhapatnam, Vs G.Govinda Rao, on 22 December 2006

:: J U D G M E N T::

Counsel for the appellants : Ms. V. Uma Devi Counsel for the respondent : Shri G. Vidya Sagar 22[nd] December, 2006

Per G.S.SINGHVI, CJ

This appeal is directed against order dated 08.08.2006passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No.1041 of1995, whereby he set aside the punishment of reduction in rankimposed on the petitioner (respondent herein) and directed that heshall be entitled to arrears of pay from 07.03.1994 till date.

The respondent joined the service of Visakhapatnam PortTrust (hereinafter described as ‘VPT’) as Greaser on 19.04.1979. He was promoted as Motor Vehicle Driver with effect from01.08.1981. Vide Memo dated 26.05.1992, Chief MechanicalEngineer, VPT and Disciplinary Authority (hereinafter described as‘the Disciplinary Authority’) instituted an enquiry against therespondent under Regulation 10 of the Visakhapatnam PortEmployees (Classification, Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1968(for short ‘the Regulations’). The following were the articles ofcharges framed against the respondent:

“Article of Charge – I

That the said Sri G.Govinda Rao, while functioningas Driver (MV) in M.V. Section has attended to duty inGeneral shift on 20.05.1992 and was posted to work onADH 6628 jeep.

At the commencement of the shift on the aforesaidday, Sri Govinda Rao has obtained a requisition and drew10 liters of HSD oil for the said vehicle and shown the totalHSD oil available in the vehicle as 11 liters in the vehiclelog book. He made only two trips to general stores fromMV Section in the forenoon, but not obtained the signaturesof those used the vehicle in the log book. When checkedthe vehicle at about 13.00 hrs. on the day in question there was no HSD oil available in the tank of the vehicle.

From the above, it is evident that Sri Govinda Raopilfered 10 liters of HSD oil drawn by him for the saidvehicle at the commencement of the shift.

By the above act, he exhibited gross misconductunbecoming of a public servant and inasmuch as he failedto maintain absolute integrity.

Thus, he violated Regulation 3(1) of VPE’s (C)Regulations, 1964.

Article of Charge - II

That the said Sri Govinda Rao who attended to dutyin general shift on 20.05.1992, left the work spotunauthorisedly at about 13.00 hrs. leaving the vehicle (ADH 6628) on which he was posted in M.V. Section aftermaking two trips with the vehicle to general stores in theforenoon of the aforesaid day. He applied for half dayleave for 20.05.1992 A.N. on 21.05.1992 to cover the lapsecommitted by him.

From the above, it is evident that Sri Govinda Raoabsconded from duty from 13.00 hrs. on the aforesaid day.

By the above act, he exhibited gross negligence,utter carelessness and lack of interest in performing hislegitimate duties and inasmuch as he failed to maintainabsolute devotion to duty.

Thus, he violated Regulation 3(1) of VPE’s (C)Regulations, 1964.

Article of Charge - III

That Sri Govinda Rao, Driver (MV) was in the habitof tampering the speedometer and record in the log bookas “MNW” (meter not working). Though the speedometerof the vehicle ADH 6628 on which he was posted wasrectified twice on 21.12.1991 and 22.04.1992 prior to theabove incident, he tampered the meter again and again andrecorded as MNW in the log book.

From the above, it is evident that Sri Govinda Raowas habituated to tamper with the speedometer to avoid toenter the exact distance travelled in the log book and thereby pilfer HSD oil to gain pecuniary advantage forhimself.

By the above act, he exhibited gross misconductunbecoming of a public servant and inasmuch as he failedto maintain absolute integrity.

Thus, he violated Regulation 3(1) of VPE’sRegulations, 1964.”

The Enquiry Officer submitted report dated 15.12.1993 withthe finding that Charges No.1 and 2 have been proved against thedelinquent and Charge No.3 has not been proved. TheDisciplinary Authority accepted the enquiry report and issuednotice dated 18.01.1994 to the respondent and calledupon him to submit representation against the proposed penalty ofreduction to the post of Greaser in the time scale of pay ofRs.1075-1580 with cumulative effect. The respondent filed replydated 16.02.1994, wherein he challenged the findings recorded bythe Enquiry Officer in respect of Charges No.1 and 2. Hecontroverted the allegation of pilferage by stating that on22.05.1992 i.e. two days after he left the vehicle, nine liters ofHSD oil was found in the tank and this, by itself, was sufficient todisprove the charge. He also claimed that he had to leave duty on20.05.1992 on account of sudden illness, and there was nojustification to accuse him of having absconded from duty. Thereafter, the Disciplinary Authority passed order dated07.03.1994 and confirmed the proposed penalty. The appealpreferred by the respondent was dismissed by the Chairman, VPT-cum-Appellate Authority (hereinafter described as ‘the AppellateAuthority’). For the sake of convenient reference, paragraphs 1

and 2 of order dated 07.03.1994 passed by the DisciplinaryAuthority and the last two paragraphs of order dated 23.06.1994passed by the Appellate Authority are reproduced below:

“Order dated 07.03.1994

The undersigned has carefully considered therepresentation submitted by Sri G.Govinda Rao, Driver(MV)/MV Sec. vide reference 6[th] cited, in response to theshow cause notice issued to him vide reference 5[th] citedproposing to impose on him the penalty of reduction to thepost of Greaser (MV) on pay of Rs.1475/- in the time scaleof pay of Rs.1075-1580/- with cumulative effect, and foundthe same not satisfactory.

The reasons offered by him in the representation arenot convincing and hence not acceptable. He did not bringout any new points in the representation. The undersigned,therefore, comes to the conclusion to confirm the penaltyproposed in the said show cause notice.”

“Order dated 23.06.1994

The undersigned, having carefully considered thefacts of the case and after perusal of the relevant records,finds that there are no convincing grounds to interfere withthe orders passed by the Disc. Authority and rejected theappeal.

In the result, the appeal dt.9.4.1994 of Sri G.GovindaRao is hereby rejected and the punishment awarded by theCME (Disc. Authority) is confirmed.”

The respondent challenged the aforementioned orders inWrit Petition No.1041 of 1995 by contending that the enquiry heldagainst him is vitiated due to violation of the provisions containedin the Regulations and the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officerare perverse, inasmuch as, the same are based on no evidence. He claimed that there was no pilferage of oil because after taking

Conclusion

10 litres of HSD oil, he had twice driven the vehicle to the stores. On the issue of leaving the vehicle in the afternoon of 20.05.1992,he pleaded that this happened because he was not well. Insupport of this contention, he relied on the certificate issued by thedoctor. He also pleaded that the Disciplinary and AppellateAuthorities did not apply their mind to the points raised in the replyto the show cause notice and the memorandum of appeal and noreason has been assigned by them for confirming the proposedpunishment.

The learned Single Judge did not go into the legality of theenquiry proceedings and the findings recorded by the EnquiryOfficer, but straightaway adverted to the merits of the findingsrecorded by the Enquiry Officer and opined that charge of pilferageof HSD oil cannot be treated as proved against the petitioner(respondent herein). Accordingly, the learned Single Judgequashed the order of penalty and ordered payment of salary to therespondent for the intervening period.

We have heard Ms. V. Uma Devi, learned counsel for theappellants and Shri G. Vidya Sagar, learned counsel for therespondent and perused the record. The prayer made by thepetitioner in the writ petition was essentially for issuance of a writof certiorari. The parameters for exercise of the High Court’spower to issue a writ of certiorari are well defined. Such writ,order or direction can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdictioncommitted by inferior courts or tribunals or quasi-judicialauthorities. A writ can also be issued where in exercise ofjurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or the Tribunal or quasi-

judicial authority acts illegally or improperly, i.e., it decides aquestion without giving an opportunity of hearing to the partyaffected by the order or where the procedure adopted by it isopposed to the principles of natural justice. However, it must beremembered that the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writof certiorari is supervisory in nature and not appellate one. Thisnecessarily means that the finding of fact reached by the inferiorCourt, Tribunal, etc., as a result of the appreciation of evidence,cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings except whenthe judgment, order or award suffers from an error of law apparenton the face of the record. An error of law is one which can bediscovered on a bare reading of the judgment, order or awardunder challenge along with the documents which have been reliedupon by the inferior Court, Tribunal or quasi-judicial authority. Anerror, the discovery of which is possible only after a detailedscrutiny of the evidence produced by the parties and lengthydebate at the bar cannot be regarded as an error of law for thepurpose of a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact recorded by aninferior Court or Tribunal or quasi-judicial authority can becorrected only if it is shown that in recording the said finding, theCourt etc., had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence andthe same has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, a findingof fact based on no evidence would be regarded as error of lawwhich can be corrected by issuing a writ of certiorari. However,sufficiency or adequacy of the evidence relied upon by the inferiorCourt or Tribunal or quasi-judicial authority cannot be gone into bythe High Court while considering the prayer for issue of a writ of certiorari. Likewise, mere possibility of forming a different opinionon re-appreciation of evidence produced by the parties is notsufficient for issue of a writ of certiorari.

I n State of Orissa v. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra[[1]], the Supreme Court considered whether the High Court can interferewith the order of punishment simply because finding recorded bythe enquiry officer in respect of some charges is found to bevitiated by an error of law and whether it can go into thesufficiency and adequacy of punishment. While reversing theorder of Orissa High Court, which had allowed the writ petition filedby the respondent, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed:

“But the Court in a case in which an order of dismissalof a public servant is impugned is not concerned to decidewhether the sentence imposed, provided it is justified bythe rules, is appropriate having regard to the gravity of themisdemeanour established. The reasons which induce thepunishing authority, if there has been an inquiry consistentwith the prescribed rules, are not justiciable: nor is thepenalty open to review by the Court. If the High Court issatisfied that if some but not all of the findings of theTribunal were ‘unassailable’, the order of the Governor onwhose powers by the rules no restrictions in determiningthe appropriate punishment are placed, was final, and theHigh Court had no jurisdiction to direct the Governor toreview the penalty for as we have already observed theorder of dismissal passed by a competent authority on apublic servant, if the conditions of the constitutionalprotection have been complied with, is not justiciable.Therefore if the order may be supported on any finding asto substantial misdemeanour for which the punishment canlawfully be imposed, it is not for the Court to considerwhether that ground alone would have weighed with theauthority in dismissing the public servant. The Court has no jurisdiction if the findings of the inquiry officer or theTribunal prima facie make out a case of misdemeanour, todirect the authority to reconsider that order because inrespect of some of the findings but not all it appears thatthere had been violation of the rules of natural justice.”

In State of A.P. v. Sree Rama Rao[[2]], the Supreme Courtindirectly reiterated the proposition laid down in BidyabhushanMohapatra (supra) and held:

“The High Court is not constituted in a proceedingunder Article 226 of the Constitution a court of appeal overthe decision of the authorities holding a departmentalinquiry against a public servant; it is concerned todetermine whether the inquiry is held by an authoritycompetent in that behalf, and according to the procedureprescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of naturaljustice are not violated. Where there is some evidence,which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold theinquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonablysupport the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guiltyof the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in apetition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidenceand to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence.The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where thedepartmental authorities have held the proceedings againstthe delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules ofnatural justice or in violation of the statutory rulesprescribing the mode of inquiry or where the authoritieshave disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision bysome considerations extraneous to the evidence and themerits of the case or by allowing themselves to beinfluenced by irrelevant considerations or where theconclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary andcapricious that no reasonable person could ever havearrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the

departmental authorities are, if the inquiry is otherwiseproperly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be somelegal evidence on which the findings can be based, theadequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matterwhich can be permitted to be canvassed before the HighCourt in a proceeding under Article 226 of theConstitution.”

In Rly. Board v. Niranjan Singh[[3]], the principle laid downin Bidyabhushan Mohapatra (supra) was reiterated. In State of Madras v. G. Sundaram[[4]], the Constitution Bench of theSupreme Court laid down the following proposition:

“High Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction underArticle 226 of the Constitution, cannot sit in appeal over thefindings of fact recorded by a competent Tribunal in aproperly conducted departmental enquiry except when it beshown that the impugned findings were not supported byany evidence. It cannot consider adequacy of thatevidence to sustain the charge.”

I n State of A.P. v. C. Venkata Rao[[5]], a three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court referred to the judgments of Syed Yakoob v. K.S.Radhakrishnan and others[[6]],BidyabhushanMohapatra (supra) and Niranjan Singh (supra) and observed:

“In considering whether a public officer is guilty ofmisconduct charged against him, the rule followed incriminal trials that an offence is not established unlessproved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt to thesatisfaction of the Court need not be applied. Even if thatrule is not applied by a domestic tribunal in any inquiry theHigh Court in a petition under Article 226 of theConstitution is not competent to declare the order of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry invalid. The HighCourt is not a court of appeal under Article 226 over thedecision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiryagainst a public servant. The Court is concerned todetermine whether the enquiry is held by an authoritycompetent in that behalf and according to the procedureprescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of naturaljustice are not violated. Where there is some evidencewhich the authority entrusted with the duty to hold theenquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonablysupport the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guiltyof the charge, it is not the function of the High Court toreview the evidence and to arrive at an independent findingon the evidence. An error of law which is apparent on theface of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not anerror of fact, however grave it may appear to be. A findingof fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged onthe ground that the relevant and material evidence adducedbefore the Tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain afinding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on apoint and the inference of fact to be drawn from the saidfinding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal.”

(Emphasis supplied)

I n B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India[[7]], the SupremeCourt, while considering the appellant’s challenge to the order ofpunishment passed as a sequel to the departmental enquiry heldagainst him, highlighted the limited scope of judicial review bymaking the following observations:

“Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but areview of the manner in which the decision is made. Powerof judicial review is meant to ensure that the individualreceives fair treatment and not to ensure that theconclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily

correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry isconducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant,the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether theinquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules ofnatural justice are complied with. Whether the findings orconclusions are based on some evidence, the authorityentrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction,power and authority to reach a finding of fact orconclusion. But that finding must be based on someevidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act norof proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply todisciplinary proceeding. Adequacy of evidence or reliabilityof evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed beforethe Court/Tribunal. When the authority accepts thatevidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, thedisciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquentofficer is guilty of the charge. The disciplinary authority isthe sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, theappellate authority has coextensive power to re-appreciatethe evidence or the nature of punishment. TheCourt/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act-as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and toarrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. TheCourt/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held theproceedings against the delinquent officer in a mannerinconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violationof statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or wherethe conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinaryauthority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion orfinding be such as no reasonable person would have everreached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with theconclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as tomake it appropriate to the facts of that case.”

In Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra[[8]], the Supreme Court again considered the High Court’s power to interfere with the disciplinary proceedings and held:

“It is a settled position that in departmentalproceedings, the disciplinary authority is the sole judge offacts and in case an appeal is presented to the appellateauthority, the appellate authority has also the power/andjurisdiction to reappreciate the evidence and come to itsown conclusion, on facts, being the sole fact-findingauthorities. Once findings of fact, based on appreciation ofevidence are recorded, the High Court in writ jurisdictionmay not normally interfere with those factual findingsunless it finds that the recorded findings were based eitheron no evidence or that the findings were wholly perverseand/or legally untenable. The adequacy or inadequacy ofthe evidence is not permitted to be canvassed before theHigh Court. Since the High Court does not sit as anappellate authority over the factual findings recordedduring departmental proceedings, while exercising thepower of judicial review, the High Court cannot, normallyspeaking, substitute its own conclusion, with regard to theguilt of the delinquent, for that of the departmentalauthorities. Even insofar as imposition of penalty orpunishment is concerned, unless the punishment orpenalty imposed by the disciplinary or the departmentalappellate authority, is either impermissible or such that itshocks the conscience of the High Court, it should notnormally substitute its own opinion and impose some otherpunishment or penalty.

Further, it is a well-settled principle that even thoughjudicial review of administrative action must remain flexibleand its dimension not closed, yet the court, in exercise ofthe power of judicial review, is not concerned with thecorrectness of the findings of fact on the basis of which theorders are made so long as those findings are reasonablysupported by evidence and have been arrived at throughproceedings which cannot be faulted with for proceduralillegalities or irregularities which vitiate the process bywhich the decision was arrived at. Judicial review, it must be remembered, is directed not against the decision, but isconfined to the examination of the decision-makingprocess.

Judicial review, not being an appeal from a decision,but a review of the manner in which the decision wasarrived at, the court, while exercising the power of judicialreview, must remain conscious of the fact that if thedecision has been arrived at by the administrative authorityafter following the principles established by law and therules of natural justice and the individual has received afair treatment to meet the case against him, the courtcannot substitute its judgment for that of the administrativeauthority on a matter which fell squarely within the sphereof jurisdiction of that authority.”

We may now advert to the order under challenge. In firsttwo paragraphs, the learned Single Judge briefly noticed thesubject matter of challenge and facts leading to the imposition ofpunishment by the Disciplinary Authority and dismissal of theappeal and review petition. The learned Single Judge then notedthe plea of the respondent that on 20-5-1992 he got filled 10 litresof HSD oil into the tank of the vehicle; that he made some tripsand in the afternoon he left the place and went to his housebecause he was suffering from fever; that at 13-00 hours, theother driver filled 5 litres of HSD oil; that on 21-5-1992, the vehicle was not operatedand that on the morning of 22-5-1992, 9 litres of HSD oil wasavailable. In the next three paragraphs, the learned Single Judgetook cognizance of the contentions of the respondents andconcluded that the charge of pilferage of HSD oil is not proved andthat even if the second charge is treated as proved, the punishment is arbitrary and excessive. It is, thus, clear that thelearned Single Judge not only reviewed the factual matrix of thecase, but also re-evaluated the evidence and concluded that thepunishment imposed on the respondent was unjustified. Themanner in which the learned Single Judge dealt with the issuesraised in the writ petition shows that he was seeking to exerciseappellate jurisdiction on the findings recorded by the EnquiryOfficer. By doing so, the learned Single Judge clearlytransgressed the parameters laid down by the Supreme Court forexercise of the power of judicial review in such matters. In ourconsidered view, it was not open to the learned Single Judge to re-evaluate the evidence produced during the inquiry and overturn thefindings recorded by the Enquiry Officer, which, as mentionedabove, were accepted by the Disciplinary Authority.

Notwithstanding the above conclusion, we are convincedthat the orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority as well as theAppellate Authority are vitiated due to violation of the Regulationsframed under Section 28 of the Act and the rules of naturaljustice.

Clause 8 of the Regulations specifies the minor as well asthe major penalties, which can be imposed on an employee ofVPT. Clause 10 contains the procedure for imposing majorpenalties. The various steps envisaged in this clause includepreparation of the statement of charges, appointment of EnquiryOfficer, recording of evidence by the Enquiry Officer andsubmission of enquiry report. Sub-clause (21) of Clause 10authorises the specified Disciplinary Authority to impose any of

the minor penalties. Sub-clause (23) postulates preparation ofenquiry report. Clause 11 enumerates the powers of theDisciplinary Authority and Clause 24 regulates consideration ofappeal. These clauses, which have bearing on the issue beingdecided by us, read as under:

“11. Action on the inquiry report:

(1) The Disciplinary Authority, if it is not itself theinquiring authority may, for reasons to be recorded by it inwriting, remit the case to inquiring authority for furtherinquiry and report and the inquiring authority shallthereupon proceed to hold further inquiry according to theprovisions of Regulation 10 as far as may be.

(1a) The Disciplinary Authority shall forward orcause to be forwarded a copy of the report of the inquiry, ifany held by the Disciplinary Authority or where theDisciplinary Authority is not the inquiring authority, a copyof the report of the inquiring authority to the employee, whoshall be required to submit, if he so desires, his writtenrepresentation or submission to the Disciplinary Authoritywithin 15 days, irrespective of whether the report isfavourable or not to the employee.

(1b) The Disciplinary Authority shall consider therepresentation, if any submitted by the employee beforeproceeding further in the manner specified in sub-regulations (2) to (4).

(2) The Disciplinary Authority shall, if it disagreeswith the findings of the inquiring authority on any article ofcharge, record its reasons for such disagreement andrecord its own findings on such charge, if the evidence onrecord is sufficient for the purpose.

(3) If the Disciplinary Authority, having regard to itsfindings on all or any of the articles of charge, is of theopinion that any of the penalties specified in clauses (i) to(v) of Regulation 8 should be imposed on the employee, itshall, notwithstanding anything contained in Regulation 12, make an order imposing such penalty.

Provided that in every case where it is necessary toconsult the Central Government, the record of the inquiryshall be forwarded by the Disciplinary Authority to theCentral Government for its advice and such advice shallbe taken into consideration before making any orderimposing any penalty on the employee.

(4) If the Disciplinary Authority, having regard to itsfindings on all or any of the articles of charge and on thebasis of the evidence addressed during the enquiry, is ofthe opinion that any of the penalties specified in clauses(vi) to (x) of Regulation 8 should be imposed on theemployee, it shall make an order imposing such penaltyand it shall not be necessary to give the employee anyopportunity of making representation on the penaltyproposed to be imposed.

Provided that in every case where it is necessary toconsult the Central Government, the record of the inquiryshall be forwarded by the Disciplinary Authority to theCentral Government for its advice and such advice shallbe taken into consideration before making an orderimposing any such penalty on the employee.

24. Consideration of Appeal:

In the case of an appeal against an order ofsuspension, the Appellate Authority shall consider whetherin the light of the provisions of Regulation 7 and havingregard to the circumstances of the case, the order ofsuspension is justified or not and confirm or revoke theorder accordingly.

(2) In the case of an appeal against an orderimposing any of the penalties specified in Regulation 8 orenhancing any penalty imposed under the said Regulation,the Appellate Authority shall consider –

a) whether the procedure laid down in theseRegulations has been complied with, and if not, whethersuch non-compliance has resulted in the failure of justice;

b) whether the findings of the Disciplinary Authorityare warranted by the evidence on the record, and c) whether the penalty or enhanced penalty imposedis adequate, inadequate or severe, and pass orders –

i)confirming, enhancing, reducing or setting asidethe penalty, or

ii)remitting the case to the authority which imposedor enhanced the penalty or to any other authority with suchdirection as it may deem fit in the circumstances of thecase,Provided that –

i) The Government shall be consulted in all caseswhere such consultation is necessary;

ii) If such enhanced penalty which the AppellateAuthority proposes to impose is one of the penaltiesspecified in clauses (vi) to (x) of Regulation 8 and aninquiry under Regulation 10 has not already been held inthe case, the Appellate Authority shall, subject to theprovisions of Regulation 15, itself hold such inquiry ordirect that such inquiry be held in accordance with theprovisions of Regulation 10 and thereafter, on aconsideration of the proceedings of such inquiry and makesuch orders as it may deem fit;

iii) If the enhanced penalty, which the AppellateAuthority proposes to impose, is one of the penaltiesspecified in clauses (v) to (ix) of Regulation 8 and anenquiry under Regulation 10 has been held in the case, theAppellate Authority shall make such orders as it may deemfit after the appellant has been given a reasonableopportunity of making a representation against theproposed penalty.

iv) No order imposing an enhanced penalty shall bemade in any other case unless the appellant has beengiven a reasonable opportunity, as far as may be inaccordance with the provisions of Regulation 12, of makinga representation against such enhanced penalty.

3) In an appeal against any other order specified inRegulations 19 to 21, the Appellate Authority shall considerall the circumstances of the case and make such ordersas it may deem just and equitable.”

An analysis of Clause 11 shows that if the DisciplinaryAuthority intends to impose any of the minor penalties specified inRegulation 8, then on receipt of the enquiry report, it canstraightaway pass the order of punishment. If the DisciplinaryAuthority intends to impose any of the major penalties, then it isrequired to consider the enquiry report and record its findings onall or any of the articles of charges and consider therepresentation, if any made by the delinquent employee. Therequirement of such consideration has been introduced in the formof sub-clause (1b) of Clause 11. This sub-clause obligates theDisciplinary Authority to apply its mind to the record of enquiry andthe representation, if any submitted by the delinquent and thenpass the final order. Sub-clause (2) of Clause 24 casts a duty onthe Appellate Authority to consider whether the procedure laiddown in the Regulations has been complied with, and if not,whether such non-compliance has resulted in failure of justice;whether the findings of the Disciplinary Authority are warranted bythe evidence on the record, and whether the penalty or enhancedpenalty imposed is adequate, inadequate or severe, and then passorder confirming, enhancing, reducing or setting aside the penaltyor remitting the case to the Disciplinary Authority with such adirection as the Appellate Authority may deem fit in thecircumstances of the case.

In our opinion, the above mentioned two clauses represent statutory impediment of two facets of the rules of natural justicei.e. every quasi-judicial authority must apply objectively its mind tothe material produced before it and assign reasons in support ofits conclusions/decision. To put it differently, the DisciplinaryAuthority is required to deal with the points raised in therepresentation/explanation and assign reasons, howsoever briefly,for accepting or rejecting the same and the Appellate Authority isrequired to consider whether or not the enquiry has been held inaccordance with the Regulations and, if there is a violation of theRegulations, whether the cause of the delinquent has beenprejudiced. The Appellate Authority is also duty bound to examinethe findings recorded by the Disciplinary Authority and thequantum of punishment and then pass appropriate order.

The necessity of recording reasons by a quasi-judicialauthority and even an administrative authority, which is entrustedwith the task of deciding the rights of the parties or passing anorder affecting any person, has been judicially recognized inHarinagar Sugar Mills v. Shyam Sundar[[9]], M.P.IndustriesLimited v. Union of India[[10]], Bhagat Raja v. Union ofIndia[[11]], Mahavir Prasad Santoshkumar v. State of U.P.[[12]],Travancore Rayons v. UOI[[13]], Messrs Ajanta Industries v.Central Board of Direct Taxes, New Delhi[[14]], Messrs SiemensEngineering & Manufacturing Company v. Union of India[[15]],S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India[[16]], Charan Singh v. Healing Touch Hospital[[17]]State of Punjab v. Bagh Singh[[18]], State ofOrissa v. Dhaniram Luhar[[19]], State of Rajasthan v. SohanLal[[20]], Cyril Lasrado v. Juliana Maria Lasrado[[21]], MangaloreGanesh Beedi Works v. CIT[[22]],Manorama Sachan v. LucknowDevelopment Authority[[23]]and Testeels Limited v. N.M. Desai,Conciliation Officer and another[[24]].

If, in the light of the above noted propositions, orders dated 7-3-1994 and 23-6-1994 are scrutinized, it becomes clear thatneither the Disciplinary Authority nor the Appellate Authoritydirected their attention to the relevant statutory provisions andtheir duty to pass speaking orders. Instead, both the authoritiespassed cryptic orders using stock phrases. Why the DisciplinaryAuthority did not accept the plea of the respondent that charge ofpilferage of HSD oil should be treated as not proved because hemade two trips to the stores and left the vehicle on 20-5-1992because of illness, is not discernible from order dated 7-3-1994.On its part, the Appellate Authority did not consider the appeal inthe light of sub-clause (2) of Clause 24 of the Regulations andarbitrarily dismissed the appeal by observing that there are noconvincing grounds to interfere with the order of punishment. Themanner in which the appeal of the respondent was dismissed isex-facie contrary to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Ram Chander v. Union of India[[25]].

We are further of the view that the failure of the DisciplinaryAuthority to objectively consider the representation made by the respondent has resulted in substantial failure of justice and theimpugned orders are liable to be quashed by applying the tests laiddown by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Managing Director, ECIL vs. B. Karunakar[[26]].

In the result, the appeal is disposed of in the following terms:

1) The order of the learned Single Judge is set aside.

2) Orders dated 07.03.1994 and 23.06.1994 passed by theDisciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority aredeclared illegal and quashed.Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority aredeclared illegal and quashed.

3) The Disciplinary Authority shall re-consider therepresentation made by the respondent along withadditional representation, which he may submit withinnext one month, and then pass appropriate orderassigning cogent reasons.representation made by the respondent along withadditional representation, which he may submit withinnext one month, and then pass appropriate orderassigning cogent reasons.

4) If the respondent feels aggrieved by the fresh order,then he shall be entitled to avail appropriate departmentalor legal remedy.then he shall be entitled to avail appropriate departmentalor legal remedy.

22[nd] December, 2006

G.S.SINGHVI, CJ

C.V. NAGARJUNA REDDY, J

ksld

[1]AIR 1963 SC 779AIR 1963 SC 779

[2]AIR 1963 SC 1723AIR 1963 SC 1723

[3]AIR 1969 SC 966AIR 1969 SC 966

[4]AIR 1965 SC 1103AIR 1965 SC 1103

[5]AIR 1975 SC 2151AIR 1975 SC 2151

[6]AIR 1964 SC 477AIR 1964 SC 477

[7](1995) 6 SCC 749(1995) 6 SCC 749

[8](1999) 1 SCC 759[9]AIR 1961 SC 1669[10]AIR 1966 SC 671[11]AIR 1967 SC 1606[12]AIR 1970 1302[13]AIR 1971 SC 862[14]AIR 1976 SC 437[15]AIR 1976 SC 1785[16]AIR 1990 SC 1984[17](2000) 7 SCC 668[18](2004) 1 SCC 547[19](2004) 5 SCC 568[20](2004) 5 SCC 573[21](2004) 7 SCC 431[22](2005) 5 SCC 75[23](2005) 9 SCC 425[24]AIR 1970 Gujarat 1[25]AIR 1986 SC 1173[26](1993) 4 SCC 727