WP/27546/2005 of Smt. U. Kalyani W/o K. Sambasiva Rao Vs Vice-Chairman AND Managing Director Sports Authority on 27 December 2005

ORDER:

The petitioner is employed as a Senior Assistant in the Sports Authority of AndhraPradesh, the first respondent herein. Through an order, dated 01.05.2003, the firstrespondent sanctioned an incentive increment to the petitioner in recognition of herservice in the National Games. Thereafter, the first respondent has withdrawn theincrement through proceedings, dated 15.12.2005. The petitioner challenges thesame, mainly contending that she was not put on notice and that the first respondenttook the decision on the basis of the directions issued by the second respondent.

The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that it is the fundamental requirementof law that the petitioner must have been put on notice, before passing the impugnedorder, detrimental to her interest. He contends that if the respondents were of theview that the petitioner was not entitled to be extended the benefit of any increment,they were under obligation to point out the reasons, before it was withdrawn.

The learned standing counsel for the first respondent, who took notice at the stage ofadmission, had obtained instructions and placed the relevant record before thisCourt. He contends that the grant of increment in favour of the petitioner wascontrary to Rule 29(4) of the Sports Authority of Andhra Pradesh Rules (for short ‘theRules’) and on noticing the same, the second respondent issued directions to thefirst respondent to correct the anomaly and through the impugned order, the increment which was granted to the petitioner contrary to the Rules, was withdrawn.He has also pointed out that an order of cancellation of increment was served on thepetitioner on 20.06.2005 and thereafter, the impugned order came to be passed,after taking into account the representation submitted by the petitioner.

The short question that falls for consideration in this writ petition is, as to whether thefirst respondent followed the prescribed procedure, before passing the impugnedorder.

It is true that Rule 29(4) of the Rules mandates that an increment shall be granted toan employee only on the basis of recommendation of a Selection Committee andthat the increment in favour of the petitioner was sanctioned on a recommendationmade by the Financial Advisor. Even assuming that there was any infirmity in theorder, dated 15.12.2005, through which, the petitioner was extended the benefit ofan incentive increment, the first respondent was under obligation to issue notice tothe petitioner, pointing out the reasons, on account of which, he proposes towithdraw the increment. The record discloses that much correspondence ensuedbetween respondents 1 and 2. However, the petitioner, who is the immediatelyaffected person, was never put on notice. It is rather curious that the first respondentpassed two orders, which have the same effect. Initially, he passed an order, dated20.06.2005, cancelling the increment issued to the petitioner reducing her scale ofpay. By referring to the same old proceedings, he passed another order, dated15.12.2005, which has the same effect. The whole episode discloses that the matterwas dealt with in an imperfect and superfluous manner. The respondents ought tohave exhibited little more care at every stage. The impugned order cannot besustained on the sole ground that it was not preceded by any show cause notice tothe petitioner.

Hence, the writ petition is allowed and the order impugned is set aside. It is,however, made clear that it shall be open to the respondents to take appropriateaction in the matter of withdrawal or retention of the increment in favour of thepetitioner, duly following the procedure prescribed by law.

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Note: Issue C.C. in three days

(B/o)

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