WA/317/2003 of G.CHENCHAIAH Vs DIST COLLECTOR CHITTOOR AND 2 ORS on 22 December 2006

::JUDGMENT::

December 22, 2006

Per G.S. Singhvi, CJ

Whether Award No.1 of 1998 dated 12-3-1998 passed by SpecialTahsildar and Land Acquisition Officer, Tirupathi Urban DevelopmentAuthority (respondent No.2) in respect of Ac.11-96 cts. of land comprised inSurvey Nos.203/3N to 3R, 196/2A to 2E, 202/1A and 3C and 204/6, 7, 9 and10 situated in Vedantapuram Village, Tirupathi Rural Mandal, Chittoor Districtwas beyond the period specified in Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, the Act’) and, on that account, the acquisition proceedingsinitiated vide notification dated 9-11-1992 issued by District Collector, Chittoor (respondent No.1) are liable tobe quashed, is the question which arises for determination in these appealsfiled against order dated 21-1-2003 passed by the learned Single Judge whereby he dismissed WritPetition Nos.17076, 17077, 17078, 17108, 17109 and 17110 of 2000 filed bythe appellants.

The facts necessary for deciding the above noted question are detailed below:

1) On receipt of the request made by the Tirupathi Urban DevelopmentAuthority (hereinafter described as ‘the Development Authority’) foracquisition of land for sites and services programme, respondent No.1issued notification dated 9-11-1992 under Section 4 (1) of the Act foracquisition of Ac.25.22 cts. of land comprised in Survey Nos.196, 202,203 and 204 of Vedantapuram Village. The same was published inAndhra Pradesh Gazette dated Authority (hereinafter described as ‘the Development Authority’) foracquisition of land for sites and services programme, respondent No.1issued notification dated 9-11-1992 under Section 4 (1) of the Act foracquisition of Ac.25.22 cts. of land comprised in Survey Nos.196, 202,203 and 204 of Vedantapuram Village. The same was published inAndhra Pradesh Gazette dated 10-11-1992 and two Telugu Newspapers i.e. Eenadu and AndhraJyothi dated 18-11-1992. The gist of the notification was alsopublished in the locality on Jyothi dated 18-11-1992. The gist of the notification was alsopublished in the locality on 14-12-1992. Thereafter, an enquiry was held under Section 5-A of theAct by giving notice to the interested persons. This was followed bydraft declaration issued under Section 6 of the Act, which waspublished in Andhra Pradesh Gazette No.270 dated 20-4-1993 andnewspapers Praja Sakti dated 26-4-1993 and Udayam dated Act by giving notice to the interested persons. This was followed bydraft declaration issued under Section 6 of the Act, which waspublished in Andhra Pradesh Gazette No.270 dated 20-4-1993 andnewspapers Praja Sakti dated 26-4-1993 and Udayam dated 22-4-1993. The gist of the draft declaration was also published in thelocality on 22-4-1993.locality on 22-4-1993.

2) The appellants, who had land in Survey Nos.203/3N to 3R, 196/2A to2E, 202/1A and 3C and 204/6, 7, 9 and 10 filed Writ Petition Nos.5282,5327, 5539, 5540, 5569 and 6653 of 1993 to challenge the acquisitionproceedings. They also filed WPMP Nos.6738, 6790, 7092, 7093,7134 and 8430 of 1993 for stay of all further proceedings in respect ofthe land owned by them. By an order dated 2E, 202/1A and 3C and 204/6, 7, 9 and 10 filed Writ Petition Nos.5282,5327, 5539, 5540, 5569 and 6653 of 1993 to challenge the acquisitionproceedings. They also filed WPMP Nos.6738, 6790, 7092, 7093,7134 and 8430 of 1993 for stay of all further proceedings in respect ofthe land owned by them. By an order dated

23-4-1993 passed in WPMP No.6738 of 1993 in Writ Petition No.5282of 1993, the learned Single Judge ordered status quo. Similar ordersof status quo were passed on 26-4-1993, 28-4-1993, 28-4-1993 and28-4-1993 respectively in WPMP Nos.6790 of 1993 in Writ PetitionNo.5327 of 1993, WPMP No.7092 of 1993 in Writ Petition No.5540 of1993, WPMP No.7093 of 1993 in Writ Petition No.5540 of 1993,WPMP No.7134 of 1993 in Writ Petition No.5569 of 1993 respectivelyand 19-5-1993 in WPMP No.8430 of 1993 in Writ Petition No.6653 of

1993.

3) During the pendency of the writ petitions filed by the appellants,respondent No.2 passed Award No.1 of 1993 dated 16-6-1993 inrespect of Ac.13-26 cts. of land, which was not subject matter of any ofthe writ petitions.respondent No.2 passed Award No.1 of 1993 dated 16-6-1993 inrespect of Ac.13-26 cts. of land, which was not subject matter of any ofthe writ petitions.

4) All the writ petitions, except Writ Petition No.6653 of 1993, weredismissed by the learned Single Judge by a common order dated 3-6-1994. The appellants challenged that order by filing appeals underClause 15 of the Letters Patent. They also filed miscellaneouspetitions for stay of the further proceedings. By similar orders passedon dismissed by the learned Single Judge by a common order dated 3-6-1994. The appellants challenged that order by filing appeals underClause 15 of the Letters Patent. They also filed miscellaneouspetitions for stay of the further proceedings. By similar orders passedon 20-9-1994, the Division Bench stayed further proceedings. The writappeals were finally dismissed on 29-2-1996. appeals were finally dismissed on 29-2-1996.

5) Writ Petition No.6653 of 1993 jointly filed by E. Pulla Reddy and C.Sankar Reddy was dismissed by the Division Bench on 25-3-1996along with Writ Appeal No.1071 of 1994 and Writ Petition Nos.7375and 9254 of 1993.Sankar Reddy was dismissed by the Division Bench on 25-3-1996along with Writ Appeal No.1071 of 1994 and Writ Petition Nos.7375and 9254 of 1993.

6) Thereafter, respondent No.2 issued notices to the parties and passedAward No.1 of 1998 dated 12-3-1998.Award No.1 of 1998 dated 12-3-1998.

The appellants challenged the award in Writ Petition Nos. 17076, 17077,17078, 17108, 17109 and 17110 of 2000 by contending that the same isviolative of Section 11A of the Act. They pleaded that in terms of Section 11Aof the Act, the award can be passed within two years from the date ofpublication of declaration and, as the impugned award had been made after expiry of that period, the same is liable to be declared as illegal and quashed.

In the counter-affidavits filed on behalf of the Development Authority, itwas pleaded that while computing the period of two years specified in Section11A of the Act, the period during which the proceedings remain stayed is liableto be excluded and if that is done, then the award will be deemed to have beenmade within two years.

Conclusion

The learned Single Judge rejected the contention of the respondents thatthe time consumed between the decision of the writ petition and passing ofstay order by the Division Bench as also the time taken in supply of copy of theorder of the Division Bench to the Land Acquisition Officer is liable to beexcluded. He relied on the judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Padmasundara Rao v. State of T.N.[[1]]and held that in computingthe period specified in Section 11A, only the time during which theproceedings under Section 4 (1) remain stayed by the order of the Court isliable to be excluded and not the time taken in the service of the Court’s orderon the Land Acquisition Collector. The learned Single Judge further held thatthe time spent by the land owners in filing writ appeals against order dated 3-6-1994 passed in the writ petitions cannot be excluded from the periodspecified in Section 11A. He then took note of the fact that in respect of Ac.13-26 cts. of land, award was passed as early as on 16-6-1993 and that interimorder passed in Writ Petition No.6653 of 1993 remained operative till 25-3-1996 and held that the award dated 12-3-1998 cannot be declared illegal onthe ground that the same was made beyond the period specified in Section11A. This is evinced from the last two paragraphs of the order of the learnedSingle Judge, which are reproduced below:

“It is no doubt true that the lands belonging to all the petitioners herein were proposed for acquisition under the same notification andthe same declaration was given. The petitioners individuallychallenged the proceedings in various writ petitions as noticedhereinabove. E. Pulla Reddy and others, the petitioners inW.P.No.17110 of 2000 filed W.P.No.6653 of 1993 and obtained interimorder on 19-5-1993. The interim order was in force till 26-3-1996 and,therefore, no award should have been passed in respect of the lands ofthose persons. Similar is the case in respect of other writ petitioners. The award passed on 12-3-1998 insofar as the same extent is concerned, cannot be said tobe beyond two years. Further, as rightly contended, in relation toAcs.13.26 cts, an award being Award No.1 of 1993 was already passedon 16-6-1993 and the same, in my considered opinion, does not renderthe award dated 12-3-1998 passed in relation to other lands illegal. Areference may be made to State of Tamil Nadu v. MahalakshmiAmmal {AIR 1996 SC 866}, wherein it was held:

“It is well settled law that publication of the declarationunder Section 6 gives conclusiveness to public purpose. Awardwas made on September 26,1986 and for survey No. 2/11 awardwas made on August 31, 1990 . Possession having alreadybeen undertaken on November 24, 1986, it stands vested in theState under Section 16 of the Act free from all encumbrancesand thereby the Government acquired absolute title to the land.The initial award having been made within two years underSection 11 of the Act. the fact that subsequent award wasmade on 31st August, 1990 does not render the initial awardinvalid. It is also to be seen that there is stay of dispossession.Once there is stay of dispossession, all further proceedingsnecessarily could not be proceeded with as laid down by thisCourt. Therefore, the limitation also does not stand as animpediment as provided in the proviso to Section 11A of the Act.Equally, even if there is an irregularity in service of notice underSections 9 and 10, it would be a curable irregularity and onaccount thereof, award made under Section 11 does not becomeinvalid. …………

(emphasis mine)”

When the Government proposes to acquire the land and initiatesproceedings therefor, it is possible that some persons challenge theacquisition by way of a writ petition. If an award is passed in relation tothe land in respect of which no litigation is pending before the HighCourt and where there is no challenge in respect of those lands, even ifthe award is passed in respect of the lands subsequently, the samedoes not render the award invalid in terms of Section 11A of the Act. That is the ratio of the decision in State of Tamil Nadu v. MahalakshmiAmmal (supra). In my opinion, the said ratio squarely applies to thefacts of the case. The writ petitions, therefore, fail and are accordinglydismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.”

Shri E. Manohar, Senior Advocate appearing for the appellants arguedthat the view expressed by the learned Single Judge on the interpretation ofSection 11A of the Act is not only contrary to the plain language of the section,but is also against the law laid down by the Supreme Court. He submitted that Award No.1 of 1993 dated 16-6-1993 passed by respondent No.2 in respect ofAc.13-26 cts. of land does not have any nexus with the land belonging to theappellants and, therefore, the same could not be relied by the learned SingleJudge for holding that Award No.1 of 1998 dated 12-3-1998 was not beyondtwo years. Learned Senior Counsel further argued that the date of dismissal ofWrit Petition No.6653 of 1993 i.e. 25-3-1996 cannot be taken intoconsideration for computation of two years period specified in Section 11Abecause that petition was filed after one month of the publication of declarationunder Section 6 of the Act. He submitted that even if the total period duringwhich the proceedings in relation to the land measuring Ac.2-78 cts. coveredby Survey No.203/3N to 203/3R remained stayed in WPMP No.8430 of 1993in Writ Petition No.6653 of 1993 is excluded, the award would be deemed tohave been made after 10 days of the expiry of two years period. In support ofthis submission, Shri E. Manohar invited our attention to the statements filedby his assistant counsel Shri M.P. Chandramouli today in the Court. Learnedcounsel then argued that the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. Mahalakshmi Ammal[[2]]is distinguishable because in that case, theland, which was subject matter of acquisition, was indivisible whereas in thepresent cases different parcels of land belonging to different persons had beenacquired.

Shri C.V. Mohan Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for theDevelopment Authority argued that the total period during which theproceedings initiated vide notification dated 9-11-1992 remained stayed isliable to be excluded in terms of explanation appearing below Section 11Aand if that is done, Award No.1 of 1998 dated 12-3-1998 cannot be said tohave been passed beyond the period specified in that section. He pointed outthat the acquisition of the entire land was for urban development of the areaand in view of the first order of status quo passed on 23-4-1993, which was followed by similar orders dated 26-4-1993, 28-4-1993 and 19-5-1993, respondent No.2 was disabled frompassing award in respect of land measuring Ac.11-96 cts. and as Writ Petition No.6653 of 1993 was dismissed only on 25- 3-1996, the award passed on 12-3-1998 cannot be declared violative ofSection 11A of the Act. In support of this argument, Shri C.V.Mohan Reddyrelied on the judgments of the Supreme Court in L.N. Venkatesan v. State of T.N.[[3]]and Abhey Ram v. Union of India[[4]]. He also drew support from theratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mahalakshmi Ammal’s case(supra) and argued that in view of Award No.1 of 1993 dated 16-6-1993 passed in respect of Ac.13-26 cts. of land, and the fact that acommon declaration was made under Section 6 in respect of the entire extentof land, the subsequent award passed in respect of the remaining land i.e.Ac.11-96 cts. cannot be nullified on the ground that the same was passedbeyond the period of two years specified in Section 11A of the Act.

We have thoughtfully considered the entire matter. Section 11A of the Act reads as under:

11A. Period within which an award shall be made:

The Collector shall make an award under Section 11 within aperiod of two years from the date of the publication of the declarationand if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings forthe acquisition of the land shall lapse:

PROVIDED that in a case where the said declaration has beenpublished before the commencement of the Land Acquisition(Amendment) Act, 1984, the award shall be made within a period of twoyears from such commencement.

Explanation: In computing the period of two years referred to in thissection, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken inpursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of a court shallbe excluded.

Though it may appear repetitive, we deem it necessary to brieflyrecapitulate the relevant facts. The total extent of land measuring Ac.25-22cts. comprised in Survey Nos.196, 202, 203 and 204 of Vedantapuram Village,including Ac.11-96 cts. belonging to the appellants was acquired videnotification dated 9-11-1992 issued under Section 4 (1) of the Act. Theacquisition was for sites and services programme undertaken by theDevelopment Authority. At the conclusion of enquiry held under Section 5A ofthe Act, the competent authority issued declaration under Section 6 in respectof the entire land. The same was published in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette dated 20-4-1993. The gist of the declaration was published in the locality on 22-4-1993 and also in two newspapers i.e. Praja Sakti dated 26-4-1993 andUdayam dated 22-4-1993. Out of the total extent of land acquired videnotification dated 9-11-1992, Award No.1 of 1993 dated 16-6-1993 waspassed in respect of Ac.13-26 cts. However, on account of the order of statusquo dated

23-4-1993 passed in WPMP No.6738 of 1993 in Writ Petition No.5282 of 1993and similar orders passed in other petitions on 26-4-1993, 28-4-1993 and 19-5-1993, further proceedings including the making of award could not be held inrespect of Ac.11-96 cts. of land. All the writ petitions, except Writ PetitionNo.6653 of 1993 were dismissed on 3-6-1994 and writ appeals preferred bythe petitioners of those cases were also dismissed on 29-2-1996. Writ PetitionNo.6653 of 1993 was dismissed on 25-3-1996. Thereafter, Award No.1 of 1998 was passed on 12-3-1998 in respect of Ac.11-96 cts. of land.

For better appreciation of the rival contentions, the dates on whichinterim and final orders were passed in the writ petitions and writ appealsinstituted in the earlier round of litigation are given below:

S.No.W.P.No.CorrespondingDate ofDate ofDate ofDate ofW.P. No. inorder inorder ininterimdismissalearlierWPMPWPorder inof W.A.litigationorderingWAMP instatusWritquoAppeal1)17076/20005282 of 199323-4-933-6-9420-9-9429-2-962)17077/20005539 of 199328-4-93-do--do--do-3)17078/20005327 of 199326-4-93-do--do--do-4)17108/20005569 of 199328-4-93-do--do--do-5)17109/20005540 of 199328-4-93-do--do--do-6)17110/20006653 of 199319-5-9325-3-96No writ---appeal The above recapitulation of facts and tabular statement of the orders passed in different cases makes it clear that on account of the interim orders ofstatus quo passed by this Court in the writ petitions filed by the appellants,respondent No.2 could not undertake the exercise for passing award inrespect of Ac.11-96 cts. of land was passed on 16-6-1993. The last order ofstatus quo was passed on 19-5-1993 in WPMP No.8430 of 1993 in WritPetition No.6653 of 1993. That petition was finally dismissed on 25-3-1996and the award was passed on 12-3-1998. Therefore, by virtue of the explanation appearing below Section11A, the period during which the proceedings in furtherance of declarationmade under Section 6 remained stayed is liable to be excluded in computingthe period of two years specified in Section 11A.

In Abhey Ram’s case (supra), a three Judges Bench of the SupremeCourt considered the question somewhat similar to the one raised in theseappeals. The factual matrix of that case shows that notification under Section4 (1) of the Act was published on 5-11-1980 for acquiring large extent of landin several villages including Khirkee Village. The appellant was inpossession of 25 bighas of land in Khirkee Village. Declaration under Section6 was published on 7-6-1985. The same was challenged in the writ petitionsfiled before the Delhi High Court. A Full Bench of that Court upheld thevalidity of notification issued under Section 4 (1) and declaration issued underSection 6 of the Act on the ground that some of the land owners whose landwas covered under the common notification had already approached the HighCourt and obtained stay of further proceedings including the publication ofdeclaration under Section 6 and, as a consequence, the period of stay stoodexcluded by operation of explanation 2 appearing below Section 6 (1) of theAct. The Supreme Court considered the question whether the stay obtainedby some of the persons which resulted in prohibiting the respondents frompublishing declaration under Section 6 would equally be extendable to thecases of the appellants. After taking cognizance of various stay orders passedby the High Court, the Supreme Court observed:

“We proceed on the premise that the appellants had not obtainedany stay of the publication of the declaration but since the High Court insome of the cases has, in fact, prohibited them as extracted

hereinbefore, from publication of the declaration, necessarily, when theCourt has not restricted the declaration in the impugned orders insupport of the petitioners therein, the officers had to hold back theirhands till the matters were disposed of. In fact, this Court has givenextended meaning to the orders of stay or proceeding in various cases,namely, Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat {(1991)4 SCC 531}, Hansraj H. Jain v. State of Maharashtra {(1993) 3 SCC634}, Sangappa Gurulingappa Sajjan v. State of Karnataka {(1994) 4SCC 145}, Gandhi Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. v. State ofRajasthan{(1993) 2 SCC 662}, G. Narayanaswamy Reddy v. Govt. ofKarnataka {(1991) 3 SCC 261} and Roshnara Begum v. Union of India{(1986) 1 Apex Dec 6}. The words stay of the action or proceeding havebeen widely interpreted by this Court and mean that any type of theorders passed by this Court would be an inhibitive action on the part ofthe authorities to proceed further. When the action of conducting an-enquiry under Section 5A was put in issue and the declaration underSection 6 was questioned, necessarily unless the Court holds that-enquiry under Section 5A was properly conducted and the declarationpublished under Section 6 was valid, it would not be open to the officersto proceed further into the matter. As a consequence, the stay granted inrespect of some would be applicable to others also who had not”obtained stay in that behalf.

(underlining is ours)

I n L.N. Venkatesan v. State of T.N. (supra), the Supreme Courtconsidered the effect of stay order passed in respect of a portion of the land,which was subject matter of acquisition, referred to the earlier judgment in Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat[[5]]and held that aperson who is interested in the land and wants to take advantage of Section11A, is entitled to the benefit of the period of two years specified in Section11A, only if he has not obtained interim order against the land acquisitionproceedings of any nature whatsoever.

The aforementioned two judgments substantially support the view wehave taken that the orders of status quo passed in different writ petitions andwrit appeals filed by the appellants, which remained effective till 25-3-1996 i.e.the date on which Writ Petition No.6653 of 1993 was dismissed, effectivelyprevented respondent No.2 from passing award in respect of land measuringAc.11-96 cts. and, therefore, the award passed on 12-3-1998 was within the period of two years specified in Section 11A.

We also agree with the learned Single Judge that the ratio of thejudgment of the Supreme Court in Mahalakshmi Ammal’s case (supra) hasbearing on the issue raised by the writ petitioners (appellants herein). Thoughthe factual matrix of that case is slightly different, the ratio of the judgment,which has been extracted in the order of the learned Single Judge, is clearlyapplicable to these cases because award in respect of a part of the acquiredland measuring Ac.13-26 cts. was passed on 16-6-1993 i.e. in less than two months from the date of publication ofdeclaration under Section 6 of the Act and, therefore, the second awardpassed on 12-3-1998 cannot be nullified on the ground of violation of Section11A of the Act.

No other point has been argued.

In the result, the appeals are dismissed. However, the parties are left tobear their own costs.

As a sequel to dismissal of the appeals, all the interim orders shallstand vacated and WAMP Nos.555, 560, 561, 562, 564 and 574 of 2003 filedby the appellants shall stand dismissed.

G.S. SINGHVI, CJ

G. CHANDRAIAH, J

December 22, 2006

svs

[1]AIR 2002 SC 1334

[2]AIR 1996 SC 866AIR 1996 SC 866

[3](1997) 5 SCC 309(1997) 5 SCC 309

[4](1997) 5 SCC 421(1997) 5 SCC 421

[5](1991) 4 SCC 531(1991) 4 SCC 531