WP/23713/2005 of Y. Chandraiah , Y. Chandra Reddy, Vs The Commissioner of Police, on 28 December 2006

ORDER :

The petitioner seeks a direction to the respondents 1 to 3 toprovide him protection for his agricultural operations in an extent ofAc.4.29 gts, in Sy.No.281; Ac.1.16 gts in Sy.No.282 and Ac.1.26 gts,in Sy.No.285 of Kuntloor village, RR District (‘the schedule land’).

The petitioner is about 61 years old and he is pursuingrelentless efforts and to obtain the fruits of his lawful entitlements to unhindered possession and enjoyment of agricultural land and apeaceful environment for his lawful occupation of agriculture in hisland for nearly 40 years.The chronology of facts:- A – The litigation:-

i)The petitioner’s father Yelamati Ramana @ Ramaiahwas a protected tenant in respect of the schedule land, whowas in possession of the land till his death on 10.1.1960. On 2.8.1967 the petitioner filed a petition before theTahsildar, Hayatnagar Taluk, Rangareddy District (theTahsildar) for a succession certificate.

ii)

The Tahsildar, by the order bearing reference No.B1/4317/67, dated 21.5.1969 declared the petitioner to bethe successor to the deceased protected tenant, his father,Yelamati Ramana. Aggrieved (by the order of the Tahsildardated 21.5.1969), the respondent No.5 herein, preferred anappeal to the Joint Collector, Hyderabad. The appellateauthority set aside the order of the Tahsildar dt 21.5.1969and remanded the matter for fresh enquiry by the Tahsildarto consider the issue whether the deceased protected tenant(Y.Ramana) was in lawful possession of the schedule landat the time of his death. On remand, the Tahsildarconsidered the application of the petitioner de novo, heardthe petitioner as well as the 5[th] respondent, recorded theirtestimony, considered the oral and documentary evidenceon record and by the order dated 8.12.80 certifiedsuccession of the protected tenancy to the petitioner as validand declared the petitioner to be the lawful successor to theprotected tenancy, in respect of the schedule land. TheTahsildar declared the possession of the 5[th] respondent tohave been unlawfully obtained.

iii)

The petitioner thereafter filed an application No.

iii)

The petitioner thereafter filed an application No.

B1/9785/1 dated 26.12.1980 before the Tahsildar forrestoration of his possession to schedule land, u/Sec. 32(1)of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy andAgricultural Lands Act, 1950 (‘the Act’). Notices were issuedto the respondents 5 to 8 who also filed a counter dated10.9.1981. The petitioner claimed in his application that hewas forcibly dispossessed after the death of his father in1960 and could not agitate for restoration of his possessionas he was a minor. On attainment of majority, he sought asuccession certificate which was granted to him by theTahsildar on 8.12.1980. The respondents claimed to havecontinued in possession of the schedule land since 1957and to have purchased the same in 1961 from the pattadarDevender Raju Naidu. By the order dated 31.3.1982, theTahsildar held, on the basis of the perusal of the relevantrecords that the protected tenant Y.Ramana expired andsoon thereafter the petitioner, his son, was forciblydispossessed as he was a minor and in view of thepetitioners status as the successor to the protected tenancyhaving been established by the order of the Tahsildar dated8.12.1980, the petitioner was entitled for possessionu/Sec.32. The Tahsildar directed the petitioner to be put inpossession of the schedule lands.

iv)

Aggrieved, the respondents 5 to 8 preferred an appealu/Sec.90 of the Act to the Joint Collector, RangareddyDistrict. By the order bearing reference No. B4/813682,dated 15.11.1982, the appeal was dismissed. The appellateauthority held that the order (of the Tahsildar) dated8.12.1980 granting succession to the petitioner (of the rightto protected tenancy) had become final, as no appeal waspreferred therefrom; the appellants failed to establish thatthe protected tenant had surrendered his rights voluntarily; that any sale or lease granted in favour of the respondents 5

to 8 without the consent of the protected tenant Y.Ramana orthe petitioner, as the case may be, is a nullity; andconsequently the possession by the respondents 5 to 8herein of the schedule land is contrary to law. Consequenton this finding the appellate authority confirmed thepetitioner’s right to possession of the schedule land, upheldthe order of the Tahsildar dated 31.3.1982 and dismissedthe appeal.

v)Aggrieved, the respondents 5 to 8 preferred a revision to this court u/Sec.91 of the Act. CRP No.1452 of 1983 wasdismissed by the order dated 24.4.1985. Dismissing therevision this court held :

(a) There is no evidence whatsoever that the originalprotected tenant (Y.Ramana) had surrendered the landto the original pattadar. Therefore the possession of thepurchasers (R-5 to R-8) is unlawful; they should bedispossessed and the current protected tenant whosucceeded to the right of protected tenancy of his father(the petitioner herein) is entitled to restoration ofpossession;protected tenant (Y.Ramana) had surrendered the landto the original pattadar. Therefore the possession of thepurchasers (R-5 to R-8) is unlawful; they should bedispossessed and the current protected tenant whosucceeded to the right of protected tenancy of his father(the petitioner herein) is entitled to restoration ofpossession; (b)In view of the law declared in G.Narasaiah v Tahsildar, [1][2]Mahaboobabad ()and G.Chennaiah v State of A.P ()once a certificate u/Sec.38-E(2) of the Act is issued afterholding an inquiry in accordance with the Rules, it isconclusive between the certificate holder and the landholder or other persons who were in possession, or areotherwise interested in the land in respect of whichownership is transferred to the protected tenant or anownership certificate is issued u/Sec.38E. The certificatecannot be challenged either in collateral proceedings oreven by way of a civil suit, as the jurisdiction of the CivilCourt is excluded under Sec.99 of the Act;

(c) The plea of the purchasers (R5 to R8 herein) that theyperfected their title by adverse possession isunsustainable. Y.Ramana was the protected tenant andcontinued to be so till his death (on 10.1.1960). Y.Ramana did not surrender his tenancy rights to theland holder during his lifetime. After his death, the landholder and the purchasers took advantage of theminority of Y.Chandraiah (the petitioner) and forcibly andunlawfully occupied the land. Soon after attainingmajority Chandraiah (the petitioner) filed the petition on2.8.1967 for succession. The Tahsildar enquired intothe mater and after issuing notices, affording opportunityand considering the objections of the purchasers, by theorder dated 8.12.1980 declared Chandraiah as thesuccessor to the protected tenancy after declaringY.Ramana to be the protected tenant till his death in1960. The Tahsildar also declared the occupation of theland by the purchasers as unlawful. The purchasers didnot claim that they had perfected their title by adversepossession or that the claim of Chandraiah was barredby limitation. Even if they had raised such an objectionthat would be unsustainable as the facts do not establishthe title of the purchasers by adverse possession; andperfected their title by adverse possession isunsustainable. Y.Ramana was the protected tenant andcontinued to be so till his death (on 10.1.1960). Y.Ramana did not surrender his tenancy rights to theland holder during his lifetime. After his death, the landholder and the purchasers took advantage of theminority of Y.Chandraiah (the petitioner) and forcibly andunlawfully occupied the land. Soon after attainingmajority Chandraiah (the petitioner) filed the petition on2.8.1967 for succession. The Tahsildar enquired intothe mater and after issuing notices, affording opportunityand considering the objections of the purchasers, by theorder dated 8.12.1980 declared Chandraiah as thesuccessor to the protected tenancy after declaringY.Ramana to be the protected tenant till his death in1960. The Tahsildar also declared the occupation of theland by the purchasers as unlawful. The purchasers didnot claim that they had perfected their title by adversepossession or that the claim of Chandraiah was barredby limitation. Even if they had raised such an objectionthat would be unsustainable as the facts do not establishthe title of the purchasers by adverse possession; and (d)In view of the several conclusions recorded on factsand analysis of the relevant legal principles, the revisionfails and the concurrent findings of the Tahsildar and theJoint Collector are confirmed.and analysis of the relevant legal principles, the revisionfails and the concurrent findings of the Tahsildar and theJoint Collector are confirmed.

vi)Respondents 5 to 8 aggrieved by the judgment in CRPNo. 452/83 preferred a Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.10352/85. The Supreme Court by the order dated 23.8.1985dismissed the SLP.No. 452/83 preferred a Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.10352/85. The Supreme Court by the order dated 23.8.1985dismissed the SLP.

vii)Under a Panchanama held on 21.1.1986 and recorded infile No. C/3504/82 in Cc/408/85, the MRO, Hayatnagar (R4

herein) took possession of the schedule land of Ac.4.29 gts,from the respondents 5 to 8 and handed it over to thepetitioner. The Panchanama recorded that the respondents5 to 8 were present but declined to sign it and thatpossession was restored to the petitioner in the presence ofthe said respondents.

viii)Respondents 5 to 8 thereafter filed OS No.35 of 1986 (on the file of the Addl. Subordinate Judge, Rangareddy atSaroornagar), for a declaration that they acquired title to thesuit lands by possession adverse to Y.Ramana nowrepresented by Chandraiah (the petitioner herein). By thejudgment and decree dated 31.1.1994, the suit wasdismissed with costs. In dismissing the suit the Civil Courtrecorded the following findings on facts :

(a) That the Panchanama dated 21.1.1986 (Ex.B6 in thesuit) is a public document, genuine and bona fide andestablishes the delivery of possession of the scheduleland to the defendant (petitioner herein) from theplaintiffs (R5 to R8 herein).suit) is a public document, genuine and bona fide andestablishes the delivery of possession of the scheduleland to the defendant (petitioner herein) from theplaintiffs (R5 to R8 herein).

(b) The plaintiffs failed to establish how the protectedtenant lost possession and how they acquiredpossession of the suit land.tenant lost possession and how they acquiredpossession of the suit land.

(c) The civil court had no jurisdiction to go into the merits ofthe order of the Tahsildar, Hayatnagar, a Tribunal underthe Act, particularly as the order was confirmed inappeal by the Joint Collector, in revision by the HighCourt and by the Supreme Court too by way of dismissalof the SLP.the order of the Tahsildar, Hayatnagar, a Tribunal underthe Act, particularly as the order was confirmed inappeal by the Joint Collector, in revision by the HighCourt and by the Supreme Court too by way of dismissalof the SLP.

(d) The plaintiffs’ claim that only paper possession wasdelivered to Chandraiah is unsustainable. The oraltestimony of PWs 4 to 6 that the plaintiffs are inpossession of the land is not worthy of credence. Indelivered to Chandraiah is unsustainable. The oraltestimony of PWs 4 to 6 that the plaintiffs are inpossession of the land is not worthy of credence. In view of the Panchanama (Ex.B6) the plaintiffs are notand the defendant is, in possession of the scheduledland.

(e) The plaintiffs are estopped from filing the suit in view ofthe successive upholding of the defendant’s case fromthe stage of the preliminary Tribunal (Tahsildar) up tothe Supreme Court;the successive upholding of the defendant’s case fromthe stage of the preliminary Tribunal (Tahsildar) up tothe Supreme Court; (f)Since the suit is filed for declaration of title, the civilcourt has jurisdiction;court has jurisdiction;

B. The petitioner’s futile efforts to seek State aid for enforcement of hisestablished right:-

ix)Ever since the delivery/restoration of possession (on21.01.1986) under the Panchanama, the petitioner has beenpetitioning to the official respondents, in particular the 4[th]respondent (MRO) complaining that despite induction intopossession his name was not entered in the Pahani of 1986-87 as a protected tenant and was seeking recording ofappropriate entries in the Revenue records. There was noresponse. The petitioner preferred an application to the JointCollector, RR District for an injunction against therespondents 5 to 8 from interfering with his possession of theproperty; for a direction to the police to provide protection toenable him to cultivate the land; a direction to the 4[th]respondent to incorporate the relevant entries in theRevenue records in the possessory column and for grant ofa patta pass book and title deeds. The application wasmade in 1997 by way of appeal No. B4/8836 of 1997. Hesubmitted another representation on 9.6.2004 to the 4[th]respondent for affecting necessary entries in the Revenuerecords and for issuance of pass books in respect of the21.01.1986) under the Panchanama, the petitioner has beenpetitioning to the official respondents, in particular the 4[th]respondent (MRO) complaining that despite induction intopossession his name was not entered in the Pahani of 1986-87 as a protected tenant and was seeking recording ofappropriate entries in the Revenue records. There was noresponse. The petitioner preferred an application to the JointCollector, RR District for an injunction against therespondents 5 to 8 from interfering with his possession of theproperty; for a direction to the police to provide protection toenable him to cultivate the land; a direction to the 4[th]respondent to incorporate the relevant entries in theRevenue records in the possessory column and for grant ofa patta pass book and title deeds. The application wasmade in 1997 by way of appeal No. B4/8836 of 1997. Hesubmitted another representation on 9.6.2004 to the 4[th]respondent for affecting necessary entries in the Revenuerecords and for issuance of pass books in respect of the schedule lands. By a representation dated 16.2.2005 thepetitioner petitioned the District Collector, Rangareddypleading that he was a poor and enfeebled farmer facingconstant threats from trespassers, was having no means “forpleasing the bureaucrats in various levels for effecting fastmovements to my file though there is a verdict of Hon’bleApex Court of India in my favour”; seeking police aid toprotect his possession; and for issuance of pass books withincorporation of the necessary entries in the Revenuerecords. He submitted another representation on22.11.2005 to the 4[th] respondent by way of a reminderseeking issuance of pass books and entries in the revenueregisters.

x)On 30.11.2005 the 4[th] respondent addressed the DistrictCollector, RR District, informing that he had written to the 3[rd]respondent (Hayatnagar PS) by a letter dated 21.2.2005, toprovide police aid to the petitioner to carry out agriculturaloperations; and that meanwhile the (present) writ petitionwas filed On 21.1.2006 the 4[th] respondent addressed the 3[rd]respondent to inform that on local inquiry and as per thestatement of the neighbouring pattadars, the possession ofthe schedule lands was now with the respondents 5 to 8.

xi)

xii)The petitioner had addressed several complaints (earlier)to the respondents 1 to 4 herein dated 14.8.1990(to R3),27.2.2003 (to R1), 8.4.2003 (to the DSP, RR District),16.11.2001 (to R4), 16.3.2003 (to the Joint Collector, RRDistrict), 6.5.2003 (to R4), 27.5.2003 (to R1) and 24.6.2005(to R1). There are also on record letters addressed by the4[th] respondent to the 3[rd] respondent dt 21.2.2005 to providepolice aid to the petitioner for his agricultural operations andanother dated 13.5.2003.

On 27.5.2003 the 3[rd] respondent informed the 4[th]respondent that the persons who are harassing andthreatening the petitioner are in physical possession of theland and that the land should be vacated and handed overto the petitioner. The 3[rd] respondent also stated that thepolice are ready to provide protection if the 4[th] respondentintimates the date and time for ensuring vacant possessionand is willing to be present to ensure handing over of thepossession to the petitioner (protected tenant) for hisagricultural operations.

xiii)

xiv)The 4[th] respondent thereupon issued a memo on 4.6.2003to the Assistant MRI, Hayatnagar, to accompany the policeto ensure police aid to enable the petitioner to cultivate hislands. On 7.5.2003 the 3[rd] respondent had addressed the4[th] respondent stating that the police aid would be provided(to the petitioner) if the 4[th] respondent is present. On31.5.2005 the 4[th] respondent addressed the 3[rd] respondentstating that the 4[th] respondent would be present at 5 pm on4.6.2005 and that police aid should therefore be provided atthat time for enabling the petitioner to pursue his agriculturaloperations.

xv)There was however no police protection provided to thepetitioner. on 12.12.2005 the petitioner petitioned therespondents 3 and 4 to take necessary steps for protectinghis rights in respect of the land in question. He specificallyalleged in this petition that respondents 5 to 8 and theirhenchmen and family members along with antisocialelements are threatening and preventing him from pursuinghis agricultural operations. He also stated that the 3[rd]respondent had promised to provide police protection but nosuch protection was provided and that he is submitting this petition in the light of the interim order of this court dated8.12.2005 in this writ petition.

xvi)On 15.1.2006 Cr. No. 30 of 2006 was registered on the fileof the 3[rd] respondent-PS against respondents 5 to 8 andeight other u/Secs. 447, 188, 504, 506 r/w 34 IPC. On22.1.2000 Cr. No. 46 of 2006 was registered u/Secs. 147,447, 437 and 506 r/w 34 IPC against the respondents 5 to 8and some others. Another FIR 131 of 2006 was registeredon 15.3.2006 by the 3[rd] respondent u/Secs. 447, 324 and 34IPC against some family members of the respondents 5 to 8.

The 4[th] respondent has filed a counter affidavit admitting to thefact relating to the status of the petitioner as the protected tenant,pursuant to the orders of the several authorities under the Act; that theorders were confirmed through the revision in this court and thedismissal of the SLP preferred by the respondents 5 to 8 in theSupreme Court; that possession was delivered to the petitioner on21.1.1996; that the suit OS No. 35/86 filed by the respondents 5 to 8for declaration of title and permanent injunction was dismissed; thesaid judgment has become final; and that if the petitioner is unable toprotect his possession and raise crop because of the illegal andunlawful conduct of the respondents 5 to 8, the petitioner should seekprotection either from the police or from the competent Civil Court byinstituting a civil suit against those persons. The 4[th] respondent furtherstated in his counter that on his part he had forwarded the petitioner’srequest for police protection to the concerned police officials. (The 4[th]respondent was unmindful of his statutory obligations under Sec. 32 ofthe Act).

On behalf of the respondents 5 to 8, the 8[th] respondent has filedan affidavit dated 22.1.2006. This affidavit admits that the respondents5 to 8 had lost the litigation under the Act all through to the SupremeCourt; that the suit filed by them was also dismissed. Theynevertheless claim to have been in continuous possession of the land all through and claim that the Pahanis verify such possession. Theyplead that possession of the schedule land was never delivered to thepetitioner on 21.1.1986. They contend that though they lost thelitigation comprehensively under the provisions of the Act, theirpossession and enjoyment is intact and has not so far been disturbed. These respondents urge that since they are in possession they cannotbe dispossessed without following the procedure of law. Theyreiterate that have they perfected their title by adverse possession. They claim continuous possession on the strength of Pahanis whichallegedly certify their continuous possession. These respondents alsocontend that this court does not have jurisdiction to execute the orderspassed u/Sec.32 of the Act; that the petitioner has no right over theschedule land; and that no relief could be granted to him.

The petitioner has filed a reply affidavit on 9.9.2006. Thepetitioner seriously disputes the reports of the respondents 3 and 4and alleges that the 4[th] respondent had sent up a false report to the 3[rd]respondent in collusion with the respondents 5 to 8 with a dishonestintention of helping the party respondents and to subvert the orders ofthe authorities under the Act, of this court in the CRP and of theSupreme Court (dismissing the SLP filed on behalf of the respondents5 to 8). The petitioner pleads that the respondents 5 to 6 trespassedinto the schedule land by breaking the stone pillar fencing and on thebasis of the complaint by the petitioner and after due investigation, the3[rd] respondent had registered Cr. No. 157/06 and 429/06 and anotheron 15.5.2006. The petitioner categorically asserts that the inaction ofthe respondents 1 to 3 in extending protection and aid to safeguard hispossession of the schedule land constitutes a failure of the State inimplementing the law declared between the parties i.e., the petitionerand the respondents 5 to 8.

Mr. Vedula Venkata Ramana, the learned counsel (for therespondents 5 to 8) submits that the relief (as claimed) cannot begranted; the writ petition seeks grant of police protection to the petitioner for conducting his agricultural operations; no such reliefcould be granted is the defence. Reliance is placed on a decision ofthe Supreme Court in P.R.Murlidharan v Swami DharamanandaTheertha Padar ([[3]]). Particular reliance is placed by Mr.Venkataramana on the observations in para 17 of this judgment, whichreads as follows :

“ (17) A writ petition under the guise of seeking a writ of mandamusdirecting the police authorities to give protection to a writ petitioner,cannot be made a forum for adjudicating on civil rights. It is one thingto approach the High Court, for issuance of such a writ on a plea thata particular party has not obeyed a decree or an order of injunctionpassed in favour of the writ petitioner, was deliberately flouting thatdecree or order and in spite of the petitioner applying for it, the policeauthorities are not giving him the needed protection in terms of thedecree or order passed by a court with jurisdiction. But, it is quiteanother thing to seek a writ of mandamus directing protection inrespect of property, status or right which remains to be adjudicatedupon and when such an adjudication can only be got done in aproperly instituted civil suit. It would be an abuse of process for a writpetitioner to approach the High Court under Article 226 of theConstitution of India seeking a writ of mandamus directing the policeauthorities to protect his claimed possession of a property withoutfirst establishing his possession in an appropriate civil court. Thetemptation to grant relief in cases of this nature should be resisted bythe High Court. The wide jurisdiction under Article 226 of theConstitution of India would remain effective and meaningful only whenit is exercised prudently and in appropriate situations.”

I n Murlidharan (3 supra) the relevant facts were that therespondent (before the Supreme Court) filed a writ petition seekingpolice protection claiming to be the Mathadhipathi of “VadayampadiAshramam”. Earlier he filed OS No.71 of 2000 (court of Civil JudgeJunior Division), for a declaration that he was the Mathadhipathi;entitled to continue in the said capacity and alleging that he is notbeing permitted to discharge the duties of his office. The suit wasdismissed. It was the case of the appellant (before the Supreme Court)that the General Body of the Seva Sangham had resolved on 7.1.2001to amend the Deed of Trust and had provided for abolition of the postof Mathadhipathi and to vest the powers and duties of Mathadhipathi inthe President of the Seva Sangham. There was thus a dispute as to

whether the respondent was a Mathadhipathi. The Division Bench ofthe Kerala High Court (in the writ petition filed by the respondent) wentinto the question of the entitlement of the respondent; declared hisentitlement to being the Mathadhipathi; and allowed the writ petitiondirecting the police to grant adequate and effective protection. Theappellants (respondents in the writ petition) preferred the appeal to theSupreme Court. The observations in para-17 (extracted above), weremade by the Supreme Court in the above factual context. It must benoticed that the Apex Court clearly implied (in para-17) that a writ ismaintainable on a complaint that a party had not obeyed a decree oran order of injunction passed in favour of the writ petitioner or when aparty was deliberately flouting the decree or order and the policeauthorities were not providing him the required protection in terms ofthe decree or order, passed by a court having jurisdiction. TheSupreme Court’s ruling is that no Writ (of Mandamus) could be granteddirecting protection in respect of property, status or right which has notbeen adjudicated upon.(emphasis supplied). The Supreme Court’sobservations are also to the effect that the determination as to theexistence of a right or status in respect of property must be after aprocess of adjudication and in an appropriately instituted civil suit. What the Supreme Court ratio clearly prohibits (under the rubric ofMandamus) is a direction to the police to protect a mere claim forpossession of property without the right to property having beenestablished in an appropriate substantive adjudicatory process. Theobservations in para-18 in Muralidharan (3 supra) fortify this analysis. The Supreme Court pointed out that in the case before it, severaldisputed questions based on the Deed of Trust and arising out of thefacts pleaded by the writ petitioner and controverted by the other side,require to be resolved and therefore no relief should have beengranted in the writ petition.

In the case on hand, by the order dated 8.12.1980 (of theTahsildar) the petitioner was declared the successor to his father - thedeceased protected tenant Y.Ramana. The Tahsildar had also

declared the possession of the respondents 5 to 8 to be unlawful. Thisdecision had become final. The application of the petitioneru/Sec.32(1) of the Act (seeking restoration of possession) was allowedby the Tahsildar on 26.12.1980. the appeal of the respondents 5 to 8was rejected by the order of the Joint Collector dated 15.11.1982. Therevision CRP No. 1452/83 preferred by the respondents 5 to 8 (againstthe order of the Joint Collector) was dismissed by this court on24.4.1985. The SLP filed by the respondents 5 to 8 was dismissed bythe Supreme Court on 23.8.1985. OS No. 35/86 (instituted by therespondents 5 to 8 seeking declaration of title by adverse possession)was dismissed on 31.1.1994 by the Addl. Subordinate Judge, RRDistrict. That decision has also become final. In the judgment in OSNo.35/80 the civil court rejected the claim of respondents 5 to 8 thatpossession was factually restored to the petitioner on 21.1.1986 undera panchanama. The civil court clearly recorded a finding that physicalpossession was delivered to the petitioner from the respondents 5 to 8.

In substance it is the effectuation of such successivelyadjudicated and comprehensively declared right (by the statutoryTribunals and the Courts) and the deployment of the coercive processof the State to effectuate the declaration and restoration of possessionby Courts and Tribunals of competent jurisdiction, that is sought in thiswrit petition. The observations in para-17 of Muralidharan (3 supra) farfrom supporting the defense of respondents 5 to 8 comprehensivelysupports the petitioner’s case and the observations and underlyingprinciples compel this court to direct the police and the State to grantpolice aid to effectuate and enforce the order of the Tahsildar asconfirmed in the appeal by the Joint Collector, as further confirmed inthe revision by this court and as ultimately confirmed by the dismissalof SLP preferred by the respondents 1 to 8 and further judiciallyverified by the dismissal of OS NO. 35/86 (preferred by therespondents 5 to 8).

The conduct of the respondents 5 to 8 in interfering with the right, title, possession and enjoyment of the schedule land socomprehensively, conclusively and successively declared by theTribunals and Courts of competent jurisdiction, is a conduct that isinconsistent with the membership of a civilized society and subvert therule of law. Once a Tribunal or a Court of competent jurisdictiondeclares a right in a party, it is the duty of the State in every relevantfacet of its functioning to effectuate such declaration and ensure thepeaceful enjoyment of the declared right.

Such is the fundamental purpose of an organized State and of aconstitutional Government. This is also the normative justification forthe State to collect taxes from citizens to support the behemoth of theGovernmental structure. It is the fundamental incident of law and orderand good governance function of the Executive to deploy State force toenforce the decrees, directions and orders of courts or tribunals ofcompetent jurisdiction; to restrain persons like respondents 5 to 8 fromdefying judicial or quasi judicial declarations. Despite the Tahsildarhaving restored possession to the petitioner on 21.1.1986 (arestoration of possession verified under a panchanama drawn up onthe said date and declared to have been duly executed - by the civilcourt in OS No.35/86), the respondents 5 to 8, in utter defiance of thecommand of the Tribunal having exclusive jurisdiction (the Tahsildaru/Sec. 32 of the Act), are seen to exercise brute physical force,threatening the petitioner and interfering with his lawful possessionand enjoyment of the property. The dispossession of the petitioner (asis claimed by the respondents 5 to 8) even if true is thus onlysubsequent to 31.1.1994. Such defiance of the lawful authority of theState by the respondents 5 to 8 cannot be countenanced and if noteffectively restrained by exercise of lawful State power, woulddebilitate the exercise of the Sovereign power of the Republic of whichthe State is a constituent. The conduct of the respondents 5 to 8 issubversive of all fundamental assumptions of the Rule of Law.

No rights of the petitioner either to title, possession, enjoymentor otherwise remain to be adjudicated. They have already been adjudicated in successive of orders of Tribunals of exclusivejurisdiction and by Courts including the Apex Court. The furtherlitigative adventures of the respondents 5 to 8 have also met theirWaterloo in the dismissal of OS No.35/86.

Exercising statutory power, authority and jurisdiction u/Sec.32of the Act the Tahsildar by the order dated 31.3.1982 directedrestoration of possession to the petitioner from the respondents 5 to 8. This is an order of a duly constituted statutory Tribunal. It is the duty ofthe State to employ the fullness and plenitude of State power to aidand enforce the order of the Tahsildar, particularly as the order wasconfirmed right up to the Supreme Court.

The repeated and relentless representations by the petitioner tothe several authorities were not responded to with the seriousness ofpurpose and expedition as is obligated and expected by law. Thenegligence of the State and of its various officers had emboldened therespondents 5 to 8 to run amuck and persistently defy the lawfulauthority and the solemn declaration and injunctions of a statutoryTribunal. Not only has the petitioner suffered and continuously as aconsequence, the authority of the State has also been dented. But forsuch continuous abdication of executive responsibility by the Stateand its officers, neither would the petitioner have suffered incessantdeprivation nor the respondents 5 to 8 become so brazen.

This court as the sentinel on the qui vive cannot remainimpassive to the cooperative subversion of lawful authority – a productof cooperation between the lawless conduct of the respondents 5 to 8and the chronic apathetic conduct of the hierarchy of State officials. This court is obligated to administer the corrective and direct theexecutive to effectuate the rights of the petitioner as by law declaredand to restrain the respondents 5 to 8 from defying and subvertingsuch declared rights. This is the justification and purpose for whichjudicial authority vests in this court under Article 226 of ourConstitution. The will of the Republic must prevail over the lawlessness of the respondents 1 to 8. There is no other way. Thewrit must therefore issue.

It requires to be noticed that in P.Anil Kumar and others v The Joint Collector, Rangareddy District at Hyderabad and others ([[4]]) aDivision Bench of this court considering the scope of Sections 32 and40 of the Act held that the power of the Tahsildar u/Sec.32 is vast andinclusive, not merely preventive or prohibitive and extends to restoringhis lost possession including by granting interim injunction in favour ofthe protected tenant. The Division Bench further held that the civilcourt has no jurisdiction in this matter.

On behalf of the respondents 5 to 8 reliance is also placed onthe decision in Rame Gowda (dead) by LRs v M. Varadappa Naidu [5](dead) by LRs and another (). The ratio of this decision is that underIndian law a person in peaceful possession which amounts to “settledpossession” is entitled to retain his possession. The Apex Court heldthat settled or effective possession of a person even without title wouldentitle him to protect his possession even against the true ownerunless he is evicted in the due course of law. The possession which atrespasser is entitled to defend against the rightful owner must besettled possession, extending over sufficiently long period of time andacquiesced to by the true owner. In para-9 the Supreme Courtreiterated the test to be adopted as a working rule of determining theattributes of ‘settled possession’. The court affirmed these testsenunciated earlier in Puran Singh v State of Punjab ([[6]]).

The principle laid down in Rame Gowda denies entitlement tothe petitioner to recover his possession of the schedule land from therespondents 5 to 8, by employing force. Does the Rame Gowda ratioprohibit a direction as sought in this writ petition is an altogetherdifferent question.

In the case on hand the petitioner’s entitlement to possessionand enjoyment of land was declared by the certificate and order of theTahsildar dated 8.12.1980. By a subsequent order dated 31.3.1982

the Tahsildar exercising his consecrated statutory power andjurisdiction (u/Sec. 32 of the Act) directed restoration of possession tothe petitioner. This order of the statutory Tribunal was confirmed by allrelevant quasi judicial and judicial authorities. As a result thepetitioner is entitled and the respondents 5 to 8 disentitled, topossession of the schedule lands. These respondents may notinterfere with the possession and enjoyment of the schedule land bythe petitioner. Yet they have done so, relentlessly and with manifestimpunity. The Executive authority of the State is required to ensure thecontinued protection of the petitioner from transgression of thedeclared right, by the respondents 5 to 8. The State failed to do sodespite repeated representations of the petitioner (which have beenchronicled in this judgment). The physical force of the respondents 5to 8 cannot prevail over the lawful authority of the State to the extentthe petitioner’s right to possession and enjoyment of the schedule landhas been declared. To countenance such a proposition would be toobfuscate the seminal principles of constitutional Government. Thelaw of the jungle would overtake the Rule of Law. That ought not tobe.

The respondents 5 to 8 reiterate that they have acquired title tothe property by adverse possession. In view of the findings recordedin OS NO. 35/86 (judgment and decree dated 31.1.1994 of the Court ofAddl. Subordinate Judge, RR District) [a judgment inter partes] thepetitioner’s possession was restored on 21.1.1986. The petitionernever acquiesced in the unlawful use of force by the respondents 5 to8 in depriving him of his possession. The petitioner was consistentlyrepresenting to the Revenue and Police authorities and complainingas to the unlawful conduct of the respondents 5 to 8. The Executiveauthority of the State defaulted in its constitutional and legal duty, togive full faith and credit to the orders of the statutory and judicialauthorities; failed to enforce the quasi judicial and judicial declarationsby employing the coercive power of the State to effectively and expeditiously protect the lawfully restored possession of thepetitioners. Abdication of a constitutional function by the State, despitepersistent requisition by a citizen cannot feed a new head ofsubstantive right that constitutes title in favour of the respondents 5 to8. The claim of the respondents 5 to 8 to have acquired prescriptivetitle to the schedule land has been rejected clearly andcomprehensively in the judgment of this court dated 21.4.1985 in CRPNo. 1452/83 and in the judgment dated 31.1.1994 in OS NO. 35/86 (bythe Court of Addl. Subordinate Judge, RR District). In sub-paras (ix) to(xvi) above (The Chronology of Facts) the several representations andpetitions of the petitioner to the State – the Police and Revenueauthorities, has been set out. The petitioner has not at all beenindolent or remiss in pursuing his remedies. The respondents 5 to 8cannot legitimately and gainfully claim title by adverse possession andat any rate for a period which confers a title in these respondents. Therespondents have no lawful defence to this writ petition.

Respondents 5 to 8 have pleaded and Sri Venkataramana theirlearned counsel has urged at the hearing, that the petitioner cannotseek relief u/Art.226. According to these respondents, the only courseavailable to the petitioner is to again apply to the Tahsildar forpossession u/Sec. 32 or to seek injunctive relief before the civil court ofcompetent jurisdiction. This contention on behalf of the respondents 5to 8 does not commend acceptance by this court. Sec.99 of the Actexcludes the jurisdiction of the civil court - to settle, decide or deal withany question which is by or under the Act required to be settled,decided or dealt with by the Tahsildar and no order of the Tahsildarmade under the Act could be questioned in any Civil or Criminal court. Sec.98 of the Act consecrates power and authority in the Collector tosummarily evict any person unauthorisedly occupying or wrongfully inpossession of any land, to the use and occupation of which he is notentitled, under the provisions of the Act. Sec.32 confers power andauthority in the Tahsildar to restore lost possession (of the protectedtenant) including by way of grant of interim injunction. The jurisdiction of the civil court is therefore comprehensively excluded (insofar as thepetitioner’s substantive grievance is concerned), by specific legislativeouster of jurisdiction. In so far as the Tahsildar is concerned, he hadalready passed an order on 31.3.1982 directing restoration ofpossession to the petitioner from the party respondents herein. Possession was restored to the petitioner on 21.1.1986. Despite theseproceedings and executive action by duly constituted statutoryauthority, the respondents 5 to 8 have interfered with the petitioner’spossession and peaceful enjoyment of the property and now claim tohave been in continuous possession. These respondents again claimthat no factual possession was restored to the petitioner on 21.1.1986,despite the clear finding recorded by the civil court in OS No. 35/86.

The respondents 5 to 8 are thus seen to adopt a strategy ofemploying brazen and unlawful use of force to deprive the petitioner ofhis legal desserts, complacent in the belief that the functionally slowand tardy process of the statutory remedy available under theprovisions of the Act and administered by an apathetic executivebranch, would entrench and perpetuate their illegal and unlawfuloccupation of the petitioner’s property. On and since the death of thepetitioner’s father (in 1960), the respondents (5 to 8) had illegally andforcibly dispossessed the petitioner and occupied the property. Thiswas put an end to, formally by the order of the Tahsildar dated3.11.1982 and possession was factually restored to the petitioner on21.1.1986. Even thereafter and despite their suit OS No. 35/86 beingdismissed on 31.1.1994, the respondents 5 to 8 continue their lawlesspursuits. Now they claim that the petitioner can only go back to theTahsildar to reclaim his possession. The respondents 5 to 8 are seento mock at the Rule of Law; at social order as by law established andadministered; and at the integrity of the legal process. The majesty oflaw qua the beneficent provisions of the Act (legislatively crafted toensure a level playing field between the wealthy and powerfullandlords and the poor and enfeebled tenants) has been relentlessly under attack by the respondents 5 to 8 and their motley crowd oflawless companions.

It is the constitutional obligation of this court to issue amandamus to enforce the established legal right of the citizen. Thepetitioner has an adjudicated and duly declared legal right to continuein possession and to peacefully enjoy the schedule land. Therespondents 5 to 8 have conclusively suffered a declareddisentitlement to be in possession and enjoyment of these lands. These declared rights and the corollary obligations (of the petitionerand of the respondents 5 to 8) could and must be enforced by issuing amandamus to the State to deploy State power to enforce thedeclarations and orders of statutory and legal authorities. The abovecontention of the respondents 5 to 8 is accordingly rejected. No othercontention or defence is urged by or on behalf of the respondents 5 to8 except what have been recorded and dealt with in this judgment.-The Mandamus :

For the aforesaid reasons and on the aforesaid analysis therespondents 1 to 3, in particular the 1[st] respondent is directed toforthwith and in any event within three days from today, restorethe possession of the petitioner to an extent of Ac.4.29 gts, inSy.No.281; Ac.1.16 gts in Sy.No.282 and Ac.1.26 gts, inSy.No.285, Kuntloor village, RR District, by evicting, if warranted,respondents 5 to 8 from the lands. The 4[th] respondent shallwhenever directed by the 1[st] respondent be available to assistand coordinate with the 1[st] respondent or to his direction foreffectuating this order. The 1[st] respondent shall further deployand keep deployed adequate police force in requisite strength toprotect, defend and effectuate the possession of the petitioner inrespect of the schedule land, to enable peaceful pursuit ofagricultural operations by the petitioner in relation to the lands inquestion and to prevent unlawful interference by or on behalf ofthe respondents 5 to 8 herein. Such deployment shall continue at least for a period of 12 months from the date of restoration ofpossession to the petitioner under this order.

As the respondents 5 to 8 have brazenly, incessantly,without any justification in law and in flagrant defiance of the Ruleof Law and binding declaration and direction of duly constitutedstatutory Tribunals (the Tahsildar and the Joint Collector); of theCourts (this court and the Supreme Court) and the competentCivil Court (in OS No.35/86), interfered with the possession andenjoyment by the petitioner in relation to the schedule land andhave defied lawful authority, the writ petition is allowed with costsof Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only) payable by therespondents 5 to 8 jointly and severally. Of these costsRs.50,000/- shall be paid to the petitioner and Rs.50,000/- to theSecretary, AP State Legal Services Authority, High CourtBuildings, Hyderabad. The costs shall be paid by therespondents 5 to 8 within a period of four week from today. Acopy of this order be furnished to the Secretary, AP State LegalServices Authority, for information.

The writ petition is allowed as above with costs.

Dated: ---------------------------LR Copy to be marked: Yes/No JusticeG.Raghuram(B/O)Pvsn [1]1978(2) APLJ 361978(2) APLJ 36

[2]1982(2) APLJ 3761982(2) APLJ 376

[3]2006 JT (3) 5562006 JT (3) 556

[4]1988 (2) ALT 5831988 (2) ALT 583

[5](2004) 1 SCC 769(2004) 1 SCC 769

[6](1975) 4 SCC 518(1975) 4 SCC 518