WP/12683/2009 of Charles Property Developers (P) Ltd., having its Vs The State of Andhra Pradesh,rep.by the Principal on 30 December 2009

COMMON ORDER:

In all these writ petitions, common questions of law andfact arise for consideration. Therefore, they are being disposed of bythis common order.

The facts as narrated in W.P. No. 18093 of 2008 arenecessarily to be noticed even for the purpose of deciding other twowrit petitions.

W.P. No. 18093 of 2008:

Petitioner No.1 is a public limited company, engaged inproduction of cement and cement products, having its factory anddistribution offices all over the country. It had purchased landadmeasuring an extent of Ac.9-44 cents or 45,719 Sq. yards or38,226.50 Sq. meters in S.Nos. 756, 752/1, 755, 753, 754, 751/2,752/2, 755/1, 748 and 750 of Kukatpally and S.Nos. 287, 286B, 286Part and 279 of Moosapet village, Rangareddy District, under twelveregistered sale deeds, before the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation)Act 1976 (for short, ‘the Act’) came into force. After the advent of theAct, a declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act was filed by 1[st]petitioner in C.C. No.F1/155/93, before 3[rd] respondent and 3[rd]respondent, after due enquiry, prepared a draft statement underSection 8(1) of the Act and issued the same along with notice underSection 8(3) of the Act, dated 23.6.1995, to 1[st] petitioner. Thus,petitioner No.1 filed its objections on 26.7.1995. Subsequently,proceedings No.F1/155/1993 dated 12.9.1995 were issued by 3[rd]respondent under Section 8(4) of the Act and final statement underSection 9 of the Act, confirming the draft statement under Section 8(1)

of the Act, was also issued without any alteration. The total extent ofvacant land was shown as 32,836.50 Sq. meters and after deduction ofthe retainable area of 1,000 Sq. meters, the extent of vacant land to besurrendered was shown as 31,836.50 Sq. meters. Aggrieved thereby,petitioner No.1 filed an appeal under Section 33 of the Act before 2ndrespondent – appellate authority. However, the said appeal wasdismissed on 20.9.2005. Aggrieved further, 1[st] petitioner filed revision,under Section 34 of the Act on 6.3.2007, before the Government ofAndhra Pradesh, which was pending at the time of repeal of thePrincipal Act, that is to say, as on 27.3.2008. The fact of filing ofrevision before the Government was also intimated to 3[rd] respondenton 8.3.2007 by filing a memo.

However, the 1[st] petitioner submitted a petition dated15.4.2007 under Section 20(1) of the Act, which was forwarded by theGovernment of Andhra Pradesh to 3[rd] respondent, for report and takingfurther action in the matter. 3[rd] respondent submitted a report, alongwith sketch, to the Government. In para 2 of the said report, 3[rd]respondent has informed the Government that the file was processedup to Section 10(3) stage of the Act and the applicant is in possessionof 23,055.47 Sq. meters of land, as shown in the sketch. In the sketch,the land acquired from 1[st] petitioner for Indian Oil Corporation, SouthCentral Railway, road widening by M.C.H. and A.P.S.E.B. wasdetailed, which was neither excluded by 3[rd] respondent in the earlierorder passed under Section 8(4) nor in the final statement underSection 9 of the Act and also not considered by 2[nd] respondent –appellate authority.

Further, Government of Andhra Pradesh videG.O.Ms.No.603 Revenue (UC-1) dated 22.4.2008, published in theA.P. Gazette, Part I Extraordinary No.207 dated 22.4.2008 adopted the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (Central Act 15of 1999), with effect from 27.3.2008 and consequential circularinstructions were issued by the Government of A.P. vide CircularMemo No.17377/UC.I (1)/2008 dated 24.4.2008, which read as under:

(a) only cases in which possession of surplus landstaken by the Government.taken by the Government.

(b) All cases in which orders passed under Section20(1) shall be saved and furtheraction could be continued in future inthose cases only as if the PrincipalAct had not been repealed.20(1) shall be saved and furtheraction could be continued in future inthose cases only as if the PrincipalAct had not been repealed.

(c) All pending cases in different stages i.e. underSection 8 (1), 8(4) and notifications10(1), 10(3) and notice 10(5) shallabate.Section 8 (1), 8(4) and notifications10(1), 10(3) and notice 10(5) shallabate.(d)All cases pending before any Court or authorityshall abate.shall abate.

(e) All cases which were remanded back by Courtsor any authority on appeal shall alsoabate if they have not completed10(6) stage.or any authority on appeal shall alsoabate if they have not completed10(6) stage.

(f) All pending proceedings in respect of othermatters shall abate.matters shall abate.

(g) Under Repeal Act, 1999, Section 33 of thePrincipal Act is not protected alongwith other sections like Sec. 10(3)with land possession, Section 20(1)etc. That means the Commissioner ofAppeals has no jurisdiction to passany order on pending appealsincluding 10(6) stage cases. He isinstructed to close all pending caseswith proper endorsement on files.Principal Act is not protected alongwith other sections like Sec. 10(3)with land possession, Section 20(1)etc. That means the Commissioner ofAppeals has no jurisdiction to passany order on pending appealsincluding 10(6) stage cases. He isinstructed to close all pending caseswith proper endorsement on files.

(h) The concerned Special Officer and CompetentAuthorities, are instructed to fileMemo in the shape of counter for allcases which are pending before theHon’ble High Court and the SupremeCourt duly bringing the fact ofpassing of resolution by the StateLegislature on 27.3.2008 to thenotice of Hon’ble High Court andSupreme Court through concernedGovernment Pleaders.Authorities, are instructed to fileMemo in the shape of counter for allcases which are pending before theHon’ble High Court and the SupremeCourt duly bringing the fact ofpassing of resolution by the StateLegislature on 27.3.2008 to thenotice of Hon’ble High Court andSupreme Court through concernedGovernment Pleaders.

(i) Notifications have to be issued with detailsunder Section 22(1) of theRegistration Act, 1908 prohibiting thetransfer of ULC lands declared underSection 10(6) of the Principal Act.under Section 22(1) of theRegistration Act, 1908 prohibiting thetransfer of ULC lands declared underSection 10(6) of the Principal Act.(j)Municipal Authorities, Revenue Authorities,Registration Authorities, UrbanDevelopment Authorities etc. have tofollow the above Notification strictlyfor the ULC lands which were takenpossession by the Government underULC Act while granting NOCseffecting mutations, grantingregistrations etc. without referring tothe original authority.Registration Authorities, UrbanDevelopment Authorities etc. have tofollow the above Notification strictlyfor the ULC lands which were takenpossession by the Government underULC Act while granting NOCseffecting mutations, grantingregistrations etc. without referring tothe original authority.(k)All lands not covered by the above notificationunder Section 22(a) of theRegistration Act, 1908 and hithertofallen under respective UrbanAgglomerations are now excludedfrom the purview of ULC Regulationswithout any constraints.under Section 22(a) of theRegistration Act, 1908 and hithertofallen under respective UrbanAgglomerations are now excludedfrom the purview of ULC Regulationswithout any constraints.

From the above, it is clear that all the pending mattersstood abated except the cases in which possession of surplus landwas taken by the Government under Section 10(6) of the Act.

In the meanwhile, 3[rd] respondent issued notices underSection 10(5) and passed orders under Section 10(6) of the Act, on14.3.2008 and 25.3.2008 respectively. According to the petitioners, therespondents have never issued notice of any kind to them nor was itserved on them. The principal office of petitioner No.1 is located at R.P. Road, Secunderabad, but no notice was served either onpetitioner No.1 or petitioner No.2, who purchased the land frompetitioner No.1 on 30.6.2008 i.e. after the Repeal Act came into forceon 27.3.2008. According to the petitioners, no possession was takenby 3[rd] respondent at any point of time; therefore, the purported noticesissued under Section 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act are contrary to theprovisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder. Hence, this writ petition.

Respondent No.1 filed detailed counter affidavitdenying the allegations made by the petitioner. It is further stated thatnotice under Section 10(5) of the Act was issued on 14.3.2008 andsince the declarant was not residing in the address mentioned and nooffice was existing at the given address, notice was affixed in thelocality, in the presence of the staff. Therefore, the complaint that nonotice of any kind was issued to the petitioners is baseless. Since theOffice itself was not existing and nobody was available, the procedureknown to law i.e. affixing the notice in the locality was followed and,therefore, it must be deemed that all the notices were properly served,as per law, on the petitioners. Further, there is no lacuna or irregularityin serving the notices; therefore, the writ petition is liable to bedismissed.

Heard both sides.

Heard both sides.

Sri E. Manohar, learned senior counsel appearing forthe petitioners, strenuously contended that under Section 10(5) of theAct there is a procedure contemplated for service of notice andaccepting the explanation within 30 days, whereas, in the presentcase, notice under Section 10(5) of the Act was issued on 14.3.2008,which was never served on the petitioners, and immediately noticeunder Section 10(6) of the Act was issued on 25.3.2008, which wasagain never served on the petitioners. Therefore, on this ground alone,W.P. No. 18093 of 2008 is required to be allowed and once this writpetition is allowed, the other two writ petitions are also required to beallowed and the impugned orders therein are liable to be set aside.

Whereas, learned Special Government Pleader Mr. S.Sriram, appearing on behalf of learned Advocate General, strenuouslycontended, that every infraction of law cannot be challenged by thepetitioners under Article 226 of the Constitution of India unless there issubstantial miscarriage of justice. Petitioner No.2 is admittedly a purchaser after the issuance of notices under Sections 10(5) and 10(6)of the Act and it has no locus standi to join petitioner No.1 in this writpetition. Petitioner No.1 filed declaration on 26.11.1993 and when anorder was passed on 27.7.1995 declaring the entire land shown by itas excess, petitioner No.1 filed W.P.No. 16666 of 1995 before thisCourt and this Court remanded the matter for re-consideration. Onsuch remand, personal hearing was given on 23.8.1995 and, afterhearing both the parties, on 12.9.1995 final orders were passed underSection 8(4) of the Act. Aggrieved thereby, petitioner No.1 filed appealon 9.11.1995 and on 20.6.2005, proceedings under Section 10(1) ofthe Act were gazetted and no objection as required under Section10(3) of the Act was filed. Further, there is no lapse in the procedurefollowed in issuing 10(5) notices or order under Section 10(6) of theAct. Therefore, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.

I have given my earnest consideration to the respectivesubmissions made by the learned counsel on either side and perusedthe impugned order and other material made available on record.

From the arguments advanced by the learned counselon either side, the only question that falls for consideration in this writpetition is:

“Whether respondent No.3 has followedthe procedure as required under Sections10(5) and 10(6) of the Act while issuingimpugned notices and whether they are hitby the Repeal Act, 1999, as applicable to theState of Andhra Pradesh”?

It may be necessary to notice Sections 10(5) and 10(6)of the Act, which read as under:

“Section 10(5): Where any vacant land isvested in the State Government under sub-section (3), the competent authority may, bynotice in writing, order any person who maybe in possession of it to surrender or deliver possession thereof to the State Government orto any person duly authorized by the StateGovernment in this behalf within thirty daysof the service of the notice.

Section 10(6): If any person refuses orfails to comply with an order made under sub-section (5), the competent authority may takepossession of the vacant land or cause it to begiven to the concerned State Government orto any person duly authorized by such StateGovernment in this behalf and may for thatpurpose use such force as may benecessary”.

In the present case, the notice under Section 10(5) ofthe Act was issued on 14.3.2008, in the prescribed form. However, thatpart of the notice, which says “within 30 days of the service of thenotice” was struck down and the petitioner No.1 was directed tosurrender/deliver possession of the said land to the Deputy Tahsildar,by 20.3.2008. Thus, the mandatory provision of allowing time of 30days from the date of service of notice was not followed. The noticeunder Section 10(5) of the Act was issued on 14.3.2008 and thepetitioner No.1 was asked to surrender the land by 20.3.2008. Thus,hardly seven days’ time was provided, which is contrary to themandatory provision of Section 10(5) itself. Immediately, on 25.3.2008the notice under Section 10(6) of the Act was issued. Thus, a formalitywas attempted to satisfy the provisions of Sections 10(5) and 10(6) ofthe Act, to take possession of the land in question, which is in clearviolation of the very Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act.

However, learned Special Government Pleaderstrenuously contended that the word “within” 30 days has to beconstrued as “up to” 30 days and not until or uptill 30 days – rather, amaximum time of 30 days was allowed under Section 10(5) of the Actto surrender the land and not as contended by the petitioners. It is theargument of the learned Special Government Pleader that unless substantial prejudice is shown to have been caused to the petitioners,the notice, even if it allowed seven days’ time to surrender the land,cannot be said to be either arbitrary or illegal, more particularly, when itsub-serves the public interest. Further, this is not a case of ownershipand title. This is a case where Section 8(4) proceedings wereconcluded, land vested in Government and rest of the things are mereformalities.

Here, it may be necessary to notice that aggrieved bythe orders passed under Section 8(4) of the Act, the petitioners havepreferred appeal before the competent authority and the same waspending as on the date the Repeal Act came into force i.e. 23.7.2008.May be, stay was not granted, but the proceedings were not concludedas on that date. It is also in the knowledge of everybody that theRepealing Act was in the offing and, in fact, in order to hurriedlyconclude the proceedings under Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act,the impugned notices were issued by the respondents, so that theycan complete the formalities before the Repeal Act comes into force.This argument of the learned senior counsel for the petitioners is notfar from truth in the background of the facts.

In fact, it was the contention of the learned seniorcounsel Sri E. Manohar that these proceedings were fabricated. Nopanchanama was conducted on the spot and no independent panchaswere signatories to the same. Further, he had also drawn the attentionof the Court to various provisions under the Act, to justify his argumentthat under Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act, the word “within” hasbeen used as a mandatory provision whereas under Sections 6(2),8(3), 14(1), 15(1), 22(1), 23(1), 26(2), 27(4), and 27(5)(b) of the Act, theword “within” was used as a discretionary power vested in the authorityfor issuing notices within a particular period. The said Sections read asunder:

“Section 6(2): If the competent authority is of opinion that—

(a) … … …

(b) in any State which adopts this Act under Cl.(1) ofArt.252 of the Constitution, any person holds at thecommencement of this Act,Art.252 of the Constitution, any person holds at thecommencement of this Act, vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit, then,notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), itmay serve a notice upon such person requiring him tofile, within such period as may be specified in thenotice, the statement referred to in sub-section (1)”.notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), itmay serve a notice upon such person requiring him tofile, within such period as may be specified in thenotice, the statement referred to in sub-section (1)”.

Section 8(3): The draft statement shall be served insuch manner as may be prescribed on the personconcerned together with a notice stating that anyobjection to the draft statement shall be preferred withinthirty days of the service thereof.

Section 14(1): The State Government shall, within aperiod of six months from the date of the order ofthe competent authority determining the amount to bepaid under Section 11, or, in a case where an appealhas been preferred against such order under Section 12or under Section 13, within a period of six monthsfrom the date of the final appellate order, pay theamount referred to in Section 11 to the person orpersons entitled thereto.

Section 15(1): If, on or after the commencement of thisAct, any person acquires by inheritance, settlement orbequest from any other person or by sale in execution ofa decree or order of a Civil Court or of an award or orderof any other authority or by purchase or otherwise, anyvacant land the extent of which together with the extentof the vacant land, if any, already held by him exceedsin the aggregate the ceiling limit, then he shall, withinthree months of the date of such acquisition, file astatement before the competent authority havingjurisdiction specifying the location, value and such otherparticulars as may be prescribed of all the vacant landsheld by him and also specifying the vacant lands withinthe ceiling limit which he desires to retain.

Section 22(1): Notwithstanding anything contained inany of the foregoing provisions of this Chapter, where any person demolishes any building on any land heldby him or any such building is destroyed or demolishedsolely due to natural causes and beyond the control ofhuman agency and as a consequence thereof, in eithercase, the land on which such building has beenconstructed becomes vacant land and the aggregate ofthe extent of such land and the extent of any othervacant land held by him exceeds the ceiling limit, then,he shall within three months from the date of suchdemolition or destruction file a statement before thecompetent authority having jurisdiction specifyingthe location, value and such other particulars asmay be prescribed, of all the vacant lands held byhim.

Section 26(2): Where a notice given under sub-section(1) is for the transfer of the land by way of sale, thecompetent authority shall have the first option topurchase such land on behalf of the State Governmentat a price calculated in accordance with the provisionsof the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), or of anyother corresponding law for the time being in force andif such option is not exercised within a period of sixtydays from the date of receipt of the notice, it shall bepresumed that the competent authority has no intentionto purchase such land on behalf of the StateGovernment and it shall be lawful for such person totransfer the land to whomsoever he may like.

Section 27(4):Where within a period of sixty days ofthe date of receipt of an application under this sectionthe competent authority does not refuse to grant thepermission applied for or does not communicate therefusal to the applicant, the competent authority shall bedeemed to have granted the permission applied for.

Section 27(5)(b): If the option referred to in Cl.(a) is notexercised within a period of sixty days from the dateof receipt of the application under this section, itshall be presumed that the competent authority has nointention to purchase such land with building or aportion only of such building on behalf of the StateGovernment and it shall be lawful for such person totransfer the land to whomsoever he may like.

Whereas, in Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act, absolutely there is nodiscretion vested in the authority to cut-short the period of notice. I amin full agreement with the submissions made by the learned seniorcounsel appearing for the petitioners. Further, Section 10(5)contemplates “the competent authority may, by notice in writing, orderany person who may be in possession of it to surrender or deliverpossession thereof to the State Government or to any person dulyauthorized by the State Government in this behalf within thirty days ofthe service of the notice”.

Further, Rule 5(2) of the Urban Land (Ceiling andRegulation) Rules, 1976 contemplates the procedure for service ofnotices, as follows:

“(a) The draft statement shall be served, together withthe notice referred to in sub-section (3) of Section 8, on—

(i) the holder of the vacant lands, and

(ii) all other persons, so far as may be known, whohave, or are likely to have, any claim to, orinterest in the ownership, or possession, or both,of the vacant lands, by sending the same byregistered post addressed to the personconcerned.have, or are likely to have, any claim to, orinterest in the ownership, or possession, or both,of the vacant lands, by sending the same byregistered post addressed to the personconcerned.

However, no such notice was sent by registered post-acknowledgement due to the petitioners , in spite of the fact that thepostal address was available with the authorities and the earliercorrespondence was received by the petitioners at that address. It isnot the case of the respondents that they have made efforts by sendingnotices by registered post and they were returned as the addresseewas not available. The case of the respondents is that the notices weresent through special messenger and none was available at theaddress furnished nor the office was existing as on that date, therefore,

the notices were affixed in the locality.

Further, for the purpose of effectuating notices underSections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act, a panchanama was conducted. Inthe reply affidavit filed by the petitioners, they have also included theinformation received under the Right to Information Act, showing as tohow farce of an effort was made in taking possession of the land underthe said panchanama dated 25.3.2008 i.e. the date on which Section10(6) notice was issued. Under the same panchanama, lands in asmany as 10 places were taken over and in all the cases, the panchasare one and the same. The lands at Moosapet, Uppal, Uppal, UppalBhagath, Lalaguda, Uppal, Kukatpally, Guttala Begumpet, GuttalaBegumpet, Lalaguda and Malkajgiri were taken over on the same dayin the presence of same panchas. This itself would indicate that 3[rd]respondent has made a farce of attempt to issue notices contrary to thelaw, and a farce of a panchanama was conducted on 25.3.2008. Allthis would again fortify the argument advanced by the learned seniorcounsel appearing for the petitioners that these are all fabricateddocuments. It is not the case of the respondents that in any other caseearlier such procedure was followed curtailing the notice period toseven days instead of thirty days as required under the law. Thus, onone side the appeal filed by the petitioners was pending against theorder passed under Section 8(4) of the Act and on the other side theRepealing Act was in offing, and only to takeover possession illegally,respondent No.3 curtailed the notice period, which is contrary to law.

Such a question had already come up for considerationbefore this Court in a reported decision in Singireddy Narasimha Reddy v. Government of A.P.[[1]], wherein, after an elaborateconsideration of the matter, it was held that a notice issued stipulatingsurrender of land within 15 days is contrary to Section 10(5) andaccordingly, the consequential proceedings, including notice under Section 10(6) of the Act, and possession taken by conduct ofpanchanama, were held to be void ab initio and of no legalconsequence. In this regard, it is necessary to notice paras 25 to 31 ofthe said decision, which read as under:

“25. One Sri Seshadri assumed the charge of theoffice of the 2[nd] respondent, on 1.3.2008. He tookthe steps under Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act.A notice dated 5.3.2008 was issued to him. He tootried to compete with his immediate predecessor, inviolating the specific provisions of the act.

26. Section 10(5) of the Act mandates that thedeclarant must be given 30 days of notice, todeliver possession of the land. The provision readsas under:

“Section 10(5): Where any vacant land is vested inthe State Government under sub-section (3), thecompetent authority may, by notice in writing,order any person who may be in possession of itto surrender or deliver possession thereof to theState Government or to any person dulyauthorized by the State Government in this behalfwithin thirty days of the service of the notice”.

27. The Special Officer and Competent Authorityhas no option, except to stipulate the period of 30days in this regard. As a matter of fact, the proformanotice itself mentions that the possession must bedelivered to the named official within “30 days” fromthe date of service of the notice. Sri Seshadri,however, has chosen to issue a notice dated5.3.2008 by striking off the words “30 days”, printedin the notice, and wrote “15 days”, with pen. Thisitself is a serious illegality and blatant violation ofthe specific provisions of the Act. The justificationpleaded by the officer is contained in Para 7 of hiscounter-affidavit. It reads as under:

“Para-7: It is respectfully submitted that the contention ofthe petitioner in para 8 of the affidavit that the declarantis entitled to minimum of 30 days’ time to deliverpossession of the vacant land is not tenable. It issubmitted that with the publication of notification underSection 10(3) of the Act, the land stands absolutelyvested in the State Government and the words “within 30

days” in Section 10(5) of the Act, indicate the maximumtime (not the minimum time) within which the possessionof the surplus land is to be made over to the StateGovernment. The Act does not prescribe the minimumtime to be afforded to the declarant in this regard. It issubmitted that, therefore, in the instant proceedings, thepetitioner herein was afforded a period of fifteen daysfrom the date of service of notice to deliver possessionof the excess land”.

28. The word “within”, in its etymological sense,may connote something, which is inside aprescribed perimeter or periphery. However, whenit is used in the context of time, given to anindividual, to do, or undo a particular thing, itsignifies that the recipient of the notice must takenecessary steps before expiry of the stipulatedtime. It also means that, he is at liberty to do, orundo, even at the last point of time mentioned in thenotice. Conversely, the authority or the person, whoissues the notice, must desist from taking anyaction, until the stipulated period expires. It wouldbe naïve to assume that the recipient of a notice, inwhich any time is stipulated, must act instantly, andthe issuer of the notice can swing into action,before the expiry of the time limit, on the plea ofdefault. Anyone, who is conversant with theadministration, in any Government department,which involves issuance of notices, followed bycorresponding actions, would know this asfundamental. Hardly any judicial precedent isneeded in this regard. However, reference to oneold precedent may add strength to the discussion.In Dasrulal Bhagchand Lal v. Narayan Mahadeoand others, AIR 1937 Nag. 105, Pollock Justice,observed the words ‘within one month’, as under:

“[T]he words “within one month” would be morereasonably interpreted as meaning not beyond onemonth and therefore the respondent has a right to filecross-objections at any time up to one month after thedate of service”.

29. Any other view is prone to defeat the verypurpose of granting time to an individual, to do orundo a particular act. Therefore, the approach ofthe concerned officer, in this regard, is untenable,and contrary to the basis tenets of issuing notice,stipulating any particular time.

30. The notice under Section 10(5) was followed bythe one, dated 24.3.2008, under Section 10(6) ofthe Act. The petitioners obtained a copy of thesame by filing an application under the Right toInformation Act. According to that, the notice dated5.3.2008, under Section 10(5) of the Act wasserved on the petitioners on 7.3.2008. The lastparagraph of the notice reads as under:

“The (30) days time given in the notice under Section10(5) of the Act expired on 29.3.2008. But he/she failedto deliver possession before the expiry date. Hence, SriRameshwar Rao, Enquiry Officer of this office isauthorized to take over possession of land in questionunder Section 10(6) of the Act and hand over the sameto Mandal Revenue Officer concerned and reportcompliance”.

31. The callousness, in this regard is found fromthe fact that, 30 days was shown to have expiredon 29.3.2008. This would not be so, whether onecounts it from 5.3.2008 or 7.3.2008. The matter didnot stop at that. A panchanama was prepared on25.3.2008, stating that possession of land to anextent of 1,66,563.48 sq. meters was taken from thepetitioners. If, according to the calculation of therespondents, the time stipulated in notice, underSection 10(5) had expired on 29.3.2008, it is un-understandable as to how the possession couldhave been taken on 25.3.2008. The matterassumes significance, in view of the fact that theState Assembly passed a resolution to adopt therepealing Act, with effect from 27.3.2008. Obviouslybecause the date 29.3.2008, mentioned in thenotice dated 24.3.2008 is well outside the date onwhich the Act stood repealed in the State of AndhraPradesh, the panchanama was either antedated, orwas prepared before the expiry of stipulated time”.

Further, it is interesting to notice that the panchanamawhich was conducted against these proceedings as well as theproceedings challenged in the above case are one and the same. TheTahsildar concerned had furnished information under the Right toInformation Act, to say that possession of this land was never takenover by him.

For all the above reasons, it must be deemed that nonotice of any kind as required under the law was served on thepetitioners and the purported notices issued by the respondents u/s.,10(5) and 10(6) of the Act are non est in the eye of law. Therefore, theimpugned proceedings must be treated as having not initiated and theproceedings stand abated under the Act, in view of the repealing Actwhich came into force with effect from 23.7.2008.

Therefore, the impugned proceedings are liable to beset aside and they are accordingly set aside and the writ petitionstands allowed.. No order as to costs.

W.P. Nos. 12683 and 19759 of 2009

For the reasons stated in W.P. No. 18093 of 2008, as anatural corollary, the impugned proceedings dated 20.9.2005 inAppeal No.Hyd/226/1995 on the file of Chief Commissioner of LandAdministration, Hyderabad confirming the order of the Special Officerand Competent Authority, Urban Land Ceiling, Hyderabad in File C.C.No.F1/155/1993 dated 12.9.1995 and the G.O. Ms. No. 969 dated2.8.2008 herein are also liable to bet aside and they are accordinglyset aside and the writ petitions are allowed. No order as to costs.

JUSTICE C.V. RAMULU.

Date: 30-12-2009.

MVB.

[1](2009 (6) ALD 169