WP/1700/1998 of M.YELLAIAH Vs MD. APSRTC HYD AND 2 OTHERS. on 5 November 1999

ORDER:

Heard Mr. V. Narasimha Goud, learned counsel for the petitioner andMr. H. Venugopal, learned standing counsel for the respondents.

2. The issue arising in this writ petition lies in a very narrow compass.Petitioner was working as driver in the respondent – corporation when hewas arrested in Cr.No.92/95-96 on the allegation that on 24.12.1995 whenthe Excise officials checked the bus, they found bottles of Indian made Foreign Liquor (IMFL) from the custody of the petitioner and he wasaccordingly charged under Section 8(b) of the A.P. Prohibition and ExciseAct. However, the fact of his arrest and involvement in the aforesaid crimewas not disclosed by the petitioner to the respondent – corporation, whichgave rise to suspension of the petitioner from service on 30.12.1995. Petitioner was also charged with another offence of remaining absent fromduty from 26.12.1995 till 30.12.1995 without any intimation or prior sanction. The enquiry was conducted into both the charges and after consideration ofthe detailed enquiry, the Depot Manager under his order dated 22.08.1996imposed punishment of removal from service against the petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner preferred an appeal against the said order before theDeputy Chief Traffic Manager and under the impugned order dated24.01.1997, the appellate authority has taken note of subsequent event ofacquittal of the petitioner in the criminal case and has also taken a lenientview and modified the punishment of removal from service to that ofdeferment of annual increments for two years with effect of postponing futureincrements. The said order is questioned in this writ petition.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner states that the fact that the petitionerwas no way involved in the crime is established by his acquittal in thecriminal case, which was noticed by the appellate authority and as such,charge No.1, therefore, was wholly unsubstantiated. With regard to chargeNo.2, learned counsel states that the petitioner was released on bail on27.12.1995 and his absence up to 30.12.1995 i.e. only for three days, oughtnot to have been viewed with such serious penalty of stoppage of twoincrements with effect on future increments.Learned counsel also statesthat the said punishment amounts to stoppage of increments with cumulativeeffect and till date the petitioner’s increments have not been released.

4. Learned standing counsel for the respondents points out that theacquittal in the criminal case subsequently has no relevance to charge No.1and even otherwise, the petitioner remained absent for at least three days without any prior intimation and sanction and as such,charge No.2 was also proved. Learned standing counsel, therefore, justifiesthe impugned order.

-5.Charge No.1 is merely relating to nonreporting the fact of arrest in thecriminal case in which the petitioner got involved himself.The saidmisconduct under Regulation 26 of the APSRTC Employees (Conduct)Regulations, 1963 is, therefore, different from conviction or acquittal of thepetitioner in the criminal case. The fact remains undisputed that petitioner didnot report his arrest dated 24.12.1995 to the employer and thereby, thecharge No.1 remained proved.

So far as charge No.2 is concerned, though petitioner was arrested on24.12.1995, he was released on bail on 27.12.1995 and he attended the dutybut went home without taking any permission or without applying for leave,as is noticed by the appellate authority in its order.In view of that, therefore,though the absence is of only three days, petitioner was conscious that hewas leaving duty without intimation.

6. I am not inclined to interfere with the findings of the primary andappellate authority with regard to charges 1 and 2. The appellate authorityhas already taken a lenient view and has modified the order of punishment ofremoval by that of deferment of two annual increments. However, the orderof the appellate authority, though does not state about the said defermentbeing cumulative or otherwise, the wording of that part of the order of theappellate authority, perhaps, amounts to postponing the increments witheffect on future increments. In other words, as stated by the learned counselfor the petitioner, the said punishment is working out to be a punishment ofwithholding of increments with cumulative effect.

On the facts and circumstances of the case also, when the appellateauthority intended to take a lenient view and imposed punishment ofwithholding of two annual increments, it did not use the words ‘cumulativeeffect’ while imposing the punishment and as such, interpreting the said order as amounting to permanently affecting two increments with cumulative effect would be highly unjust.

In that view of the matter, the writ petition is disposed of whileupholding the impugned order except to the extent of clarifying that the punishment imposed shall be construed as follows:

“Punishment of removal shall stand set aside and theincrements of the petitioner shall stand deferred for a period of””two (2) years without cumulative effect.There shall be no order as to costs.There shall be no order as to costs.

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VILAS V. AFZULPURKAR, J

February 21, 2012

DSK