CRLRC/1771/2009 of Smt. Gousia Begum Vs Md. Fareed on 30 December 2009

ORDER:

This Revision case has been directed against the Judgment,dated 24-09-2009 in Crl.A.No.99 of 2009, on the file of the IVAdditional District and Sessions Judge (FTC) at Mahaboobnagar,whereby and whereunder the order passed by the Judicial Magistrateof First Class, Wanaparthy in D.V.S.No.1 of 2009, dated 15-07-2009has been confirmed, under Section 29 of the Domestic Violence Act,2005 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Act’).

2. The parties herein will be referred to as they are arrayedbefore the learned Magistrate for the sake of convenience.

3. The brief facts of the case are as follows:

The aggrieved person Gousia Begum is the wife of therespondent M.D. Fareed. They were married in 1980 and are blessedwith two sons and one daughter. The respondent was working asDriver in APSRTC and he retired from service on 31.03.2008 andreceived Rs.6 lakhs towards retirement benefits. The aggrievedperson, respondent and their children have been residing inHousehold No.41-14, Bander Nagar, Wanaparthy, MahabubnagarDistrict (hereinafter referred to as “shared household”).

4. The allegation against the respondent is that since lastfive years he has been ill-treating the aggrieved person and herchildren and attempted to drive them from the shared household. It isalso alleged that he did not show any love and affection towards themand that he beat the aggrieved person many a times indiscriminatelyand threatened to marry another woman. It is also alleged that sincethe last two years he has been residing separately in one portion of theshared household and not providing maintenance to the aggrievedperson and her children. It is also alleged that the respondent did not pay single paise to the aggrieved person and her children from hisretirement benefits and that he has been threatening to sell the sharedhousehold and trying to evict the aggrieved person and her childrenfrom the shared household. The specific case of the aggrieved personis that the shared household is the ancestral property of the parties. The aggrieved person sought protection order from ill-treatment andrestraining the respondent from alienating the shared household andfrom evicting her and her children from the said shared household.

5. The respondent in his counter denied the allegations ofill-treatment and all other material allegations made against him,however, the relationship between the parties has been admitted. Hisspecific case is that the aggrieved person is adamant and havingdominating nature and that she incurred huge debts without hisconsent and knowledge. His further case is that the aggrieved personhas misappropriated the amounts given to her by him and that she hadgiven the amounts to her brothers and father for their luxuriousexpenses. The specific case of the respondent is that the aggrievedperson has to pay Rs.26,000/- to one Mallaipalli Sriramulu S/oBaghavanthu resident of Mallaiapally, Rs.20,000/- to one Baliah S/oGalaiah, of Wanaparthy, Rs.20,000/- to G. Sathayanarayana S/o G. Ramulu and Rs.50,000/- to one Srinivasulu S/o Pullaiah ofWanaparthy. It is also his contention that he has been providingprovisions to the aggrieved person and his children fromRamalingeshwara Kirana and General Stores, Wanaparthy, whichbelongs to one Ramesh. It is also his case that he has brought-up histwo sons and performed the marriage of his daughter by incurringdebts and cleared debts with his retirement benefits. It is also his casethat the residential household is his self-acquired property and that heintended to dispose of the same and settle at his native place atGaggalapally of Nagarkurnool after his retirement, but the aggrieved

person is not agreeable for the same. It is also his case that he hasalso made arrangements for the employment of his sons atNagarkurnool by taking some shops at Wanaparthy. It is also his casethat since the aggrieved person is not inclined to obey him and settleat Gaggalapally, she filed the present complaint with all falseallegations.

6. In order to prove their case, the aggrieved person herselfhas been examined as PW-1 and PWs.2 and 3 have been examinedon her behalf. On behalf of the respondents, the respondent himselfhas been examined as RW-1 and RWs.2 and 3 have been examined.No documentary evidence has been adduced on either side.

7. The learned Judicial Magistrate of First Class,Wanaparthy (hereinafter referred to as ‘Magistrate”) held that theaggrieved person failed to prove that the respondent is guilty ofdomestic violence and that the respondent cannot be restrained fromselling the shared household and that in the circumstances, it isreasonable if the respondent is directed to provide alternativeaccommodation to the petitioner before selling the shared household. Aggrieved by the said order, the aggrieved person preferred an Appealbefore the IV Additional District and Sessions Judge (FTC),Hyderabad (hereinafter referred to as “Sessions Judge”) and thelearned Sessions Judge also opined that the aggrieved person failedto prove that there was domestic violence and in the circumstancesconfirmed the orders passed by the learned Magistrate. Aggrieved bythe same, this Revision Case has been filed.

8. The learned counsel for the petitioner/aggrieved personsubmitted that the domestic violence has been defined in Section 3 ofthe Act and as per clause (i) of the Explanation-I ‘physical abuse’ andas per clause (iii) ‘verbal and emotional abuse’ and as per clause (iv)‘economic abuse’ include domestic violence. It is also submitted that Section 17 of the Act gives right to residence to an aggrieved person ina shared household and that Section 19 of the Act empowers theMagistrate to pass residence orders restraining the respondent fromdispossessing the aggrieved person from the shared household. It isalso his submission that the evidence on record clinchinglyestablishes that the respondent committed domestic violence and thatboth the Courts below failed to appreciate the evidence in properperspective which resulted in miscarriage of justice.

9. The learned counsel for aggrieved person has alsosubmitted that the respondent, only in order to harass the aggrievedperson, has been trying to sell the shared household and if thehousehold is sold, the aggrieved person would become shelterless. Itis also submitted that where the circumstances show that there is noother alternate except to sell the household, then only an order foralternate accommodation should be passed. In support of hiscontention, he has relied on the decision in the case S.R. BATRA v.TARUNA BATRA[[1]],wherein it was held that if the property is a jointfamily property, in which the husband of an aggrieved person is amember, she can claim protection order not to disposes her.

10. The learned counsel for the first respondent submittedthat the aggrieved person earlier filed quash petition andsimultaneously she filed the Appeal and that she has not referredabout the quash proceedings in this Revision. It is also submitted thatthe respondent had incurred debts while constructing sharedhousehold and also in performing the marriage of his daughter andtherefore, he has to sell his household to clear off the debts. It is alsosubmitted that both the courts below categorically held that theaggrieved person failed to prove the domestic violence and thereforeshe is not entitled for the protection order. It is also argued that therespondent has been maintaining the aggrieved person by paying the bills in kirana shop and the orders passed by the Courts below arejustified and there are no grounds to interfere with the same.

11. The learned counsel for the aggrieved person, in reply,submitted that the aggrieved person has mentioned that she hadwithdrawn the quash proceedings in the grounds of Revision and thateven ‘economic abuse’ amounts to domestic violence.

12. In the light of the rival contentions, the points that arise for consideration are:

1. Whether the aggrieved person is the victim of domesticviolence?

2. Whether the aggrieved person is entitled for an order ofprotection restraining the respondent from alienating theshared household?protection restraining the respondent from alienating theshared household?

POINT NO.1:

13. Before discussing whether the aggrieved person is thevictim of domestic violence, it may be useful to refer to the definition of‘domestic violence’ as provided under Section 3 of the Act, whichreads as follows:

“3. Definition of domestic violence:-- For the purpose of this Act, any act,omission or commission or conduct of the respondent shall constitute domesticviolence in case it—

(a) harms or injures or endangers the health, safety, life, limb or well-being,whether mental or physical, of the aggrieved person or tends to do soand includes causing physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal andemotional abuse and economic abuse; orwhether mental or physical, of the aggrieved person or tends to do soand includes causing physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal andemotional abuse and economic abuse; or (b)harasses, harms, injures or endangers the aggrieved person with a viewto coerce her or any other person related to her to meet any unlawfuldemand for any dowry or other property or valuable security; orto coerce her or any other person related to her to meet any unlawfuldemand for any dowry or other property or valuable security; or

(c) has the effect of threatening the aggrieved person or any person relatedto her by any conduct mentioned in clause (a) or clause (b); orto her by any conduct mentioned in clause (a) or clause (b); or (d)otherwise injures or causes harm, whether physical or mental, to theaggrieved person.”aggrieved person.”

14. Under Clause (i) of Explanation-I of Section 3 of the Act, “physical abuse” is defined as follows:

““physical abuse” means any act or conduct which is of such a nature as to cause bodily pain, harm, or danger to life, limb or health or impair thehealth or development of the aggrieved person and includes assault,criminal intimidation and criminal force.”

Clause (iii) of Explanation-I of Section 3 of the Act reads as follows:

“(iii) verbal and emotional abuse” includes- (a)insults, ridicule, humiliation, name calling and insults or ridicule speciallywith regard to not having a child or a male child; andwith regard to not having a child or a male child; and (b)repeated threats to cause physical pain to any person in whom theaggrieved person is interested.”aggrieved person is interested.”

Clause (iv) of Explanation-I of Section 3 of the Act reads as follows:

(iv) “economic abuse” includes—

(a) deprivation of all or any economic or financial resources to which theaggrieved person is entitled under any law or custom whetherpayable under an order of a court or otherwise or which the aggrievedperson requires out of necessity including, but not limited to,household necessities for the aggrieved person and her children, ifany, stridhan, property, jointly or separately owned by the aggrievedperson, payment of rental related to the shared household andmaintenance.aggrieved person is entitled under any law or custom whetherpayable under an order of a court or otherwise or which the aggrievedperson requires out of necessity including, but not limited to,household necessities for the aggrieved person and her children, ifany, stridhan, property, jointly or separately owned by the aggrievedperson, payment of rental related to the shared household andmaintenance.

(b) disposal of household effects, any alienation of assets whether movable orimmovable, valuables, shares, securities, bonds and the like or otherproperty in which the aggrieved person has an interest or is entitled touse by virtue of the domestic relationship or which may be reasonablyrequired by the aggrieved person or her children or her stridhan orany other property jointly or separately held by the aggrieved person;and

(c) Prohibition or restriction to continued access to resources or facilitieswhich the aggrieved person is entitled to use or enjoy by virtue of thedomestic relationship including access to the shared household.”which the aggrieved person is entitled to use or enjoy by virtue of thedomestic relationship including access to the shared household.”

15. Therefore, it has to be seen whether an aggrieved person isentitled to all or any economic or financial resources under any law,custom or under an order of Court or otherwise and whether theaggrieved person require such economic or financial resources out of necessity for example share in crops being provided for hermaintenance etc. Even the deprivation of household necessitiesamounts to economic abuse. Deprivation of stridhan or property heldjointly or separately by the aggrieved person, deprivation of payment ofrental related to the shared household and maintenance also amountto economic abuse. Under Clause iv(b) all the properties such ashousehold effects, assets whether movable or immovable, valuables,shares, securities, bonds and the like or other property in which theaggrieved person (a) has an interest (b) is entitled to use by virtue ofdomestic relationship (c) which may be reasonably required by herand her children (d) stridhan or any property jointly or separatelypossessed by her cannot be disposed of by the husband under clauseiv(c). The acts of the respondent husband in prohibiting or restrictingto continued access to resources or facilities which the aggrievedperson is entitled to use or enjoy or restriction to access to the sharedhousehold amounts to economic abuse thereby domestic violence. Thus a wide definition covering several omissions and commissionshave been brought within the ambit of domestic violence. The intentionof the Legislature appears to be to provide all sorts of protection to theaggrieved person and her children.

16. ‘Aggrieved person’ has been defined under clause (a) of Section 2 of the Act, which reads as follows:

“(a) “aggrieved person” means any woman who is, or has been, in adomestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have beensubjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent.”

17. Under clause (s) of Section 2 of the Act, “Shared household” has been defined, which reads as follows:

(s) “shared household” means a household where the person aggrievedlives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship either singly oralong with the respondent and includes such a household whether ownedor tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent, orowned or tenanted by either of them in respect of which either the aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right,title, interest or equity and includes such a household which may belong tothe joint family of which the respondent is a member, irrespective ofwhether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title orinterest in the shared household.”

18. In the case between S.R. Batra and another v. TarunaBatra[[2]], when the aggrieved person claimed right in the house whichstands in the name of her mother-in-law it has been held as follows.

“Learned counsel for the respondent Smt. Taruna Batrastated that the definition of shared household includes a householdwhere the person aggrieved lives or at any stage had lived in adomestic relationship. He contended that since admittedly therespondent had lived in the property in question in the past, hencethe said property is her shared household.

We cannot agree with this submission.

If the aforesaid submission is accepted, then it will meanthat wherever the husband and wife lived together in the past thatproperty becomes a shared household. It is quite possible that thehusband and wife may have lived together in dozens of places e.g.with the husband’s father, husband’s paternal grandparents, hismaternal parents, uncles, aunts, brothers, sisters, nephews, nieces,etc. If the interpretation canvassed by the learned counsel for therespondent is accepted, all these houses of the husband’s relativeswill be shared households and the wife can well insist in living in allthese houses of her husband’s relatives merely because she hadstayed with her husband for some time in those houses in the past. Such a view would lead to chaos and would be absurd.”

19. In this case since the shared household stands in thename of the respondent, the above decision is not applicable.

20. The domestic violence includes not only ‘physicalabuse’, but also ‘verbal and emotional abuse’ and it also includes‘economic abuse’. The very object of the Act appears to be to provideeffective protection to the rights of the woman who are the victims ofviolence of any kind occurring within the family. The harassment byway of unlawful dowry, demand of dowry from the woman or her relative will also be covered under these definitions.

21. It is not in dispute that the aggrieved person is the wifeof the respondent. It is also an admitted fact that they are residing inthe same household. Since the relationship is not in dispute andadmittedly they lived together in a shared household, there is domesticrelationship between the aggrieved person and the respondent. It isalso not in dispute that the shared household in dispute is the sharedhousehold within the definition of clause (s) of Section 2 of the Act.

22. It has to be kept in mind that the domestic violence mayoccur within the four corners of the household and in some cases itmay occur in the bedroom of the parties. Therefore, it may not bepossible for a wife to secure the witnesses to corroborate her version. Where the parties have children, they may come forward and deposecorroborating the version of aggrieved person. In most of the cases,children may not interfere and may become silent spectators. Therefore, it is the duty of the Court to analyze the evidence of the wifeand to consider all other surrounding circumstances and decidewhether her version is acceptable or not. Merely because there is nocorroborating evidence of any other witness, the evidence of a victim ofdomestic violence need not be discarded. It is settled law thatconviction can be placed upon the solitary testimony of a singlewitness provided evidence of such witness is believed by the Court. This principle will hold good when the fact to which she deposes is notwitnessed by anybody else. Thus, the Court must examine whetherthe evidence is reliable inspiring confidence and trustworthy. If itappears to be truthworthy even solitary evidence of an aggrievedperson can be accepted. However, Court must examine whether theevidence is in conformity with normal human conduct and probable inthe surrounding circumstances of the case.

23. Coming to the evidence in this case, the aggrieved

23. Coming to the evidence in this case, the aggrieved person herself has been examined as PW-1. She has deposed thatthe respondent had been asking herself and her children to vacate theshared household. Her further case is that the respondent did not giveany amount from his retirement benefits and that he is not providinganything for maintenance to her and her children and that they aredepending upon the earnings of her elder son. Her specific case isthat the shared household was constructed about 20 or 22 years backand that the respondent, after selling the ancestral property atGaggalapally, constructed the said shared household and it’s presentvalue is Rs.30 to 40 lakhs and that the respondent is planning to sellthe said household and trying to evict her and her children from sharedhousehold.

24. It is the case of the respondent that he performed themarriage of his daughter in the month of August, 2007 by spending anamount of Rs.5 lakhs and that his two sons were unmarried. It is alsohis case that as on the date of filing of this case, he was residing inone portion, and his wife and children are residing in another portion atBandarunagar, Wanaparthy and that he used to take meals in hotel. Itis also his contention that he raised loans and constructed thehousehold and that he performed the marriage of his daughter byraising loans and that the parents of his wife did not give any amountto him for the construction of the household and for the marriage of hisdaughter. It is his specific case that he had to pay the entire retirementbenefits to the creditors and that still he has to discharge loans to thetune of Rs.5 or 6 lakhs and therefore, he intended to sell sharedhousehold to discharge the debts and to settle the life of his sons byestablishing business for them. It is also his contention that theaggrieved person obtained loan of Rs.1 lakh and odd and he haddischarged the same to some extent.

25. Thus the main dispute appears to be with regard to the proposal of respondent to sell the shared household. The case of theaggrieved person is that she had met the expenses for the marriage ofher daughter and according to her, her parents gave the entireamount. When she was confronted with some Xerox copies ofpronotes, she admitted that she brought Rs.20,000/- on two occasionsunder two promotes and gave the same to the respondent and later therespondent discharged the loan amount of Rs.40,000/- along withinterest.

26. On behalf of the aggrieved person (PW-1), her brotherwas examined as PW-2. He deposes that the respondent is trying tosell away the shared household since five years.

27. The aggrieved person has also examined PW-3, one ofher neighbour, who also deposed that the respondent is trying to sellthe shared household.

28. On behalf of the respondent, RW-2 was examined, whodeposed that at the time of the marriage of the respondent’s daughter,he gave Rs.2 lakhs towards loan and that the respondent haddischarged the said loan. He also deposed that the respondentagainst took loan and he is due to pay an amount of Rs.2 lakhs to him. However, he admitted that there is no document to show that he paidthe amount to the respondent.

29. RW-3, one of the colleagues of the respondent, alsodeposed that he advanced an amount of Rs.3 lakhs to the respondentas loan for the marriage of his daughter and he did not discharge thesaid loan.

30. Now it has to be seen whether the respondent incurredthe debts and he has to sell his household. Admittedly the respondentconstructed the shared household in the year 1984 and graduallyrenovated the same. He retired from service in March, 2008. Thus,admittedly the respondent constructed the shared household more

than 24 years prior to his retirement. Admittedly he has not taken anyloan from any bank or from APSRTC, in which he was working. Thusthe contention of the respondent that he borrowed the amount for theconstruction of his household cannot be accepted. It is not his casethat he borrowed the amount in 1984 and could not discharge thesame till the date of his retirement.

31. As far as the debts to be discharged by the respondent areconcerned, though the respondent (RW-1) deposed that still he has todischarge the debts to a tune of Rs.5 to 6 lakhs, there is no suchaverment in the counter. Admittedly, the household was constructed in1984. The suggestions given to the aggrieved person go to show thatthe respondent incurred debts about Rs.6 to 7 lakhs for the marriageexpenses of her daughter and that he discharged those debts. Therespondent also deposed that the aggrieved person obtained loans,which he discharged. Admittedly, the respondent received about Rs.6lakhs towards his retirement benefits and he discharged the loan takenfor the marriage of his daughter and the above circumstances go toshow that there is no need to sell the household to discharge thedebts. A reading of the counter also reveals that the main intention ofthe respondent is to settle down at his native place after his retirement.

32. According to respondent, he has spent an amount ofRs.5 lakhs towards the marriage expenses of his daughter. Accordingto the aggrieved person, her parents helped her in performing themarriage of her daughter and the respondent did not spend anyamount. A reading of the evidence of PWs.2 and 3 reveals that theyadvanced the amount to the respondent for the marriage expenses ofthe daughter of the aggrieved person. According to the respondent hehas spent about Rs.5 lakhs towards the marriage expenses of hisdaughter. Even if the version of the complainant (PW-1) that herparents have spent the amount towards marriage expenses of their daughter is disbelieved, the evidence of the respondent (DW-1) showsthat he had spent Rs.5 lakhs towards the marriage expenses of hisdaughter. Admittedly, the respondent has received Rs.6 lakhs towardsretirement benefits. Therefore, the reasonable inference that could bedrawn from the circumstances is that the respondent must havedischarged the debts incurred by him for the marriage expenses of hisdaughter with the amounts received by him towards his retirementbenefits.

33. According to the respondent himself, the aggrievedperson obtained a loan of Rs.1 lakh, which he had discharged to someextent. Another important point to be considered is that though therespondent deposed that in order to discharge his debts, he isintending to sell his household, but he has not taken such plea in hiscounter. The case of the respondent, as seen from the averments inthe counter, is that after retirement, he intended to settle at his nativeplace at Goggalapally of Nagarkurnool and that his wife is not inclinedto obey him and settle at Goggalapally and therefore, he is intending tosell the household. What he has alleged in the counter is that his wifehad taken loans of Rs.26,000/- to one Mallaipalli Sriramulu S/oBaghavanthu resident of Mallaiapally, Rs.20,000/- to one Baliah S/oGalaiah, of Wanaparthy, Rs.20,000/- to G. Sathayanarayana S/o G.Ramulu and Rs.50,000/- to one Srinivasulu S/o Pullaiah. Admittedlythe parties performed the marriage of their daughter in 2001 and theymust have incurred some debts, which the respondent appears to havecleared with his retirement benefits. Thus the reason shown by therespondent in his counter to sell the shared household is different fromthe reason shown by him before the Court. Thus, the respondentappears to have been completely changed his version by the time hedeposed before the Court.

34. A careful reading of the entire evidence gives an impression that the main dispute arose between the parties when therespondent proposed to sell the shard household and settle at hisnative place and whereas the aggrieved person and her childrenpreferred to retain the shared household. It is also clear that since therespondent is intending to sell the household, he is forcing theaggrieved person and her children to vacate the shared household.

35. It is the case of PW-1 that from the last two years, therespondent is not providing her maintenance. It is the case of therespondent that he is not providing any amount towards maintenanceto the aggrieved person from the date of filing of the DVC. It is also hisevidence that he is providing rice to his children and wife from hisvillage. It is mentioned in the counter that he is providing monthlyprovisions to his wife and children by opening an account with oneRamesh, who is running a kirana shop in the name ofRamalingeswara Kirana and General Stores, Wanaparthy. Thus theevidence of the respondent is contradictory to his version in thecounter. Therefore, it is clear that the respondent has neglected hiswife and not providing any maintenance and there is nothing todisbelieve the version of the aggrieved person on this issue.

36. As per clause (iv) (b) of Explanation-I of Section 3 of theAct, disposal of household effects, any alienation of assets whethermovable or immovable, valuables, shares, securities, bonds and thelike or other property, in which the aggrieved person has an interest oris entitled to use it by virtue of the domestic relationship or which maybe reasonably required by the aggrieved person or her children or herstridhan or any other property jointly or separately held by theaggrieved person also come within the ambit of economic abuse.

37. In the case on hand, the evidence on record proves thatthe aggrieved person, by virtue of the domestic relationship, is entitledto reside in shared household. It is also clear that she requires the

shared household in which herself and her children have been livingin one portion. Thus the act of the respondent in trying to dispossessthe aggrieved person and her children from the shared householdamounts to economic abuse. Admittedly, the economic abuse is alsoone sort of domestic violence under Section 3 of the Act.

38. As discussed above, the respondent appears to havedischarged all his debts with the amount received by him from hisretirement benefits and there are no compelling circumstances to sellthe shared household.

39. The definition of domestic violence under clause (a) ofExplanation-I of Section 3 of the Act makes it clear that the deprivationof economic resources or maintenance also amounts to economicabuse and thereby such acts come within the ambit of domesticviolence under Section 3 of the Act. In this case, it is the contention ofthe aggrieved person that the respondent has not been providinganything towards the maintenance of aggrieved person and that she isdepending upon the income of her elder son. The respondent himselfadmitted that he is not providing any amount towards maintenance tothe aggrieved person from the date of filing of the DVC. Thus it is clearthat the aggrieved person has been deprived of her maintenance andtherefore, the respondent is guilty of domestic violence.

POINT NO.2:

40. Section 17 of the Act reads as follows:

“17. Right to reside in a shared household:--

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time beingin fore, every woman in a domestic relationship shall have the right toreside in the shared household, whether or not she has any right, title orbeneficial interest in the same.(2) The aggrieved person shall not be evicted or excluded from the sharedhousehold or any part of it by the respondent save in accordance with theprocedure established by law.”

41. Thus Section 17 envisages that every woman in a domestic relation has the right to reside in the shared household. Section 18 of the Act envisages that the Magistrate is authorized topass orders restraining the respondent from alienating any assetsused or enjoyed jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent. Admittedly, in this case, the aggrieved person (PW-1) and therespondent (RW-1) have been jointly using the shared household andtherefore, the Magistrate ought to have passed an order restraining therespondent from alienating the shared household under Section 18 (e)of the Act and also an order restraining the respondent fromdispossessing the aggrieved person under Section 19 (1) (a) of theAct.

42. Section 19 of the Act reads as follows:

19. Residence orders:-- (1) While disposing of an application under sub-section (1) of Section 12, the Magistrate may, on being satisfied thatdomestic violence has taken place, pass a residence order—section (1) of Section 12, the Magistrate may, on being satisfied thatdomestic violence has taken place, pass a residence order—

(a) restraining the respondent from dispossessing or in any other mannerdisturbing the possession of the aggrieved person from the sharedhousehold, whether or not the respondent has a legal or equitableinterest in the shared household;disturbing the possession of the aggrieved person from the sharedhousehold, whether or not the respondent has a legal or equitableinterest in the shared household; (b)directing the respondent to remove himself from the shared household;(c)restraining the respondent or any of his relatives from entering any portionof the shared household in which the aggrieved person resides;(c)restraining the respondent or any of his relatives from entering any portionof the shared household in which the aggrieved person resides; (d)restraining the respondent from alienating or disposing of the sharedhousehold or encumbering the same;household or encumbering the same; (e)restraining the respondent from renouncing his rights in the sharedhousehold except with the leave of the Magistrate; orhousehold except with the leave of the Magistrate; or (f)directing the respondent to secure same level of alternate accommodationfor the aggrieved person as enjoyed by her in the shared householdor to pay rent for the same, if the circumstances so require.”for the aggrieved person as enjoyed by her in the shared householdor to pay rent for the same, if the circumstances so require.”

43. In the circumstances of the case, it appears that therespondent is not justified in trying to sell the shared household andthere is no need to pass any order to provide alternativeaccommodation to the aggrieved person and the aggrieved person isentitled to an order under Section 18 (e) of the Act i.e., prohibiting the respondent from alienating the shared household and dispossessingthe complainant and her children from the shared household underSection 19 (1) (a) of the Act.

44. In view of the above discussion, the orders passed bythe Courts below are set aside and the aggrieved person is entitled tothe necessary orders as stated above. Accordingly, the respondent isprohibited from alienating the shared household and also restrainedfrom dispossessing the aggrieved person and her children from theshared household.

45. In the result, the Criminal Revision Case is allowed.

Date: 30-12-2009YCR

____________________

B. CHANDRA KUMAR, J

[1](2007) 3 SCC 169(2007) 3 SCC 169

[2] (2007) 3 Supreme Court Cases 169 (2007) 3 Supreme Court Cases 169