WP/15146/2000 of Dr. A.Gopal Menon, Vs University of Hyderabad, on 30 December 2009

Conclusion

ORDER:

This writ petition was filed on 20[th] November 2002,initially, by seeking directions by way of Mandamus,directing respondents 1 and 2 to treat the candidature ofthe petitioner equally on par with the candidates, byallowing him to face the Selection Committee for thepurpose of selections to the posts of Reader and Lecturerin the University of Hyderabad.

2. During the pendency of the writ petition, in view ofthe selections and appointment orders issued in favour ofrespondents 3 to 5, the petitioner sought permission foramendment of the prayer by filing WPMP.No.3673 of2003, which is allowed on 27[th] of August 2003. In termsof the amended prayer, the petitioner seeks a declarationby way of Mandamus, declaring the selection of respondents 3, 4 and 5 to the posts of Reader andLecturers pursuant to the Notification No.RECTT/P-I/2/99,dated 08.11.1999 in the 1[st] respondent University, asillegal and arbitrary.

3. The University of Hyderabad is a Central University,established in 1974, by an Act of Parliament. It hasissued Notification No.RECTT/P-I/2/99, dated 08.11.1999,inviting applications in prescribed format, to fill up variousfaculty posts. In the said notification, respondents havenotified the vacancies of 11 posts of Professors, 26 postsof Readers and 56 posts of Lecturers. In this petition, thedispute relates to the appointments made to the posts ofReader and Lecturer in the department of History. In theaforesaid notification, at Serial No.39, respondents havenotified two posts of Readers i.e. one post in AncientIndian History and the 2[nd] post in any area of historicalresearch, and two posts of Lecturers i.e. first post inMedieval Indian History (Desirable with research interestin Medieval Deccan) and the 2[nd] post in any area ofHistorical Research. The 1[st] respondent-University alsoissued written instructions to candidates and instructionNo.12 reads as follows :

“University will make a preliminary selection ofcandidates on the basis of informationfurnished by the candidates in theirapplications. Possession of minimumqualifications prescribed will not automaticallyentitle a candidate to be called for the test orinterview, if better qualified candidates areavailable. Summoning of a candidate to a testor interview merely indicates that the Universitythinks it possible that he will be selected or recommended along with other candidates.”

4. In response to the notification, number ofcandidates have applied for various posts in the facultypositions. All the applications were placed before theScreening Committee to restrict the candidates to becalled for interview on the basis of qualification,experience in accordance with the norms laid down by theUniversity. Among the applicants, keeping in view theratio of 1:5, the Screening Committee shortlisted thecandidates. The petitioner herein, claiming specializationin modern history, has applied to the post of Reader andalso to the 2[nd] post of Lecturer in History, but he was notcalled for interview on the ground that he was not fulfillingthe criteria adopted by the Screening Committee to becalled for interview. At that stage, he filed the writ petition,seeking directions to the respondents 1 and 2, to interviewhim and to consider his candidature along with the othercandidates, and this Court, by an order dated 17[th] ofAugust 2000, passed in WPMP.No.19211 of 2000, issueddirections to the 1[st] respondent-University to permit thepetitioner to appear before the Selection Committee forinterview to the post of Lecturer. Pursuant to suchdirections, the petitioner was interviewed and hiscandidature was considered to the vacancy of Lecturer,but he did not come up for selection. The SelectionCommittee, after interviewing the candidates, who fulfilledthe eligibility criteria in the screening test, recommendedrespondent No.3 herein to the post of Reader andrespondents 4 and 5 to the post of Lecturer. Based onthe recommendations made by the Selection Committee,the Executive Council of the University has appointed respondent No.3 as a Reader and respondents 4 and 5as Lecturers, and issued appointment orders, andconsequently, they joined the service of the University.

5. In the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition,initially, it is the case of the petitioner that no reasons wereassigned by the Registrar of the University for not issuingcall letter to him by the Selection Committee to interviewhim to consider his candidature for selection. Generalallegations are made stating that he was beingdiscriminated only on the ground that he is a Kerlite, andfurther alleging that some vested interests in theUniversity are trying to prevent him from appearing beforethe Selection Committee by not issuing the call letter. After respondents 3 to 5 were appointed, though animplead petition was filed to implead them, but noadditional grounds are raised in the writ petition,challenging their appointment. Merely in the affidavit filedin support of the interlocutory application inWPMP.No.22623 of 2001 for impleadment of respondents3 to 5, it is alleged by the petitioner that the procedureadopted by the Selection Committee is illegal. It is thecase of the petitioner that the seven point grading systemadopted in selection proceedings was not notified to thecandidates at any point of time, and keeping in dark thecandidates who have applied for the posts, assessment ofmerit was made. It is the case of the petitioner thatgrading the candidates as ‘outstanding’, ‘very good’,‘good’ etc., is not the correct method of evaluation,because the members of the Selection Committee mayconstrue two different things by the said expressions. With regard to the appointment of respondent No.3 as a

Reader, it is alleged that one Professor by name AjayMitra Sastry, is a Research Supervisor of the 3[rd]respondent, as such, he should not have been themember of Selection Committee for selecting the 3[rd]respondent. By giving the particulars of variousqualifications and experience possessed by the petitioner,he claims that he is more meritorious than respondentNo.3. So far as respondent No.4 is concerned, it isalleged that he has been selected and Appointed asLecturer against the post notified for Medieval IndianHistory by submitting his Doctoral theses on the BuddhistStudies. It is alleged that the topic of Doctoral theses hasno connection with the Medieval Indian History, much lessDeccan history. So far as the 5[th] respondent isconcerned, it is alleged that she is a fresh Ph.D fromLondon, as such, she is not having necessaryexperience, but inspite of the same, she was selected,ignoring the case of the petitioner. By stating theaforesaid grounds, he sought impleadment ofrespondents 3 to 5, but at no point of time, he has filedany petition to raise additional grounds in the writ petition.

6. The University of Hyderabad has filed counteraffidavit on behalf of respondents 1 and 2, through itsRegistrar. In the counter affidavit, it is stated that pursuantto the notification issued by the 1[st] respondent videNotification No. RECTT/P-I/2/99, dated 08.11.1999, it hascalled for applications to the posts of Professors, Readersand Lecturers in various disciplines and for the post ofLecturer in History, it is stated that two vacancies eachwere advertised in the category of Reader and Lecturer. It is stated that respondent No.1 has received 145applications to the post of Lecturer, and all theapplications were placed before the ScreeningCommittee, so as to call the candidates for interview in theratio of 1:5. As such, the Screening Committee hasshortlisted the candidates to 34 for two posts of Lecturer. The petitioner, whose specialization is Modern History,has applied for the 2[nd] post of History, but not satisfied thecriteria adopted by the Screening Committee with regardto age, as the petitioner was above 50 years according tohis application, though in the affidavit mentioned it as 46years. It is stated that apart from the petitioner, 27 otherswere called for interview to the 2[nd] post of History in anyarea of historical research, and out of 27, petitioner and 15others attended the interview. While denying the variousallegations made by the petitioner, it is stated that theScreening Committee, after assessing the performanceand basing on the information furnished to them throughthe applications and other material, made assessment ofthe relative merit of each candidate. The respondentshave denied the allegation of the petitioner that he has gotsuperior merit and his non-selection is illegal. It is statedthat in the absence of any illegality committed by themembers of the Selection Committee, the petitionercannot make any request to this Court to examine theselection as appellate authority with regard to comparativemerit. It is stated that the Selection Committee made theobjective assessment and evaluation of the merits andperformance of each candidate by interviewing them andhas graded the performance of each candidate byfollowing the scale of assessment as ‘outstanding’, ‘verygood’, ‘good’, ‘average’, ‘below average’, ‘poor’ and

‘unsatisfactory’. Counter further states that as perCondition No.10 of the employment notification, it isspecifically notified to the candidates that the selectionswill be made based on the candidates’ previous recordand their performance in the interview. It is further statedthat though the petitioner claims to be a pool officer ofCSIR, he did not get his application endorsed ascontemplated in Rule 11 of the employment notification,and by keeping blanks of such column, submitted hisapplication. Further, on the allegation of the petitioner thatthe Head of the Department of History i.e. ProfessorMrs.Aloka Parasar Sen has obstructed his induction intothe 1[st] respondent-University, it is stated that theapprehension of the petitioner is only a figment ofpetitioner’s imagination, as much as the SelectionCommittee comprises of eminent academicians drawn bythe panel of experts prepared by the academic council,experts nominated by the President of India, apart fromthe Vice-Chancellor, Head of the Department and Dean. While pleading that the University has followed theprocedure scrupulously, it is stated that the writ petition isdevoid of merit, and therefore, prayed for its dismissal.

7. A separate counter affidavit is filed on behalf ofrespondents 3, 4 and 5. In the detailed affidavit filed bythe 3[rd] respondent, while denying the various adverseallegations made by the petitioner, it is stated that by thetime he submitted his application, he was Post Graduatein Ancient Indian History, Culture and Archaeology andPh.D. in the said subject from Nagpur University and alsowas having 11 years of Post Graduate teachingexperience. Further, it is stated that he has published one book and 15 research papers and journals and books,including some in international journals. It is stated that hehas also presented research papers in the conferencesheld in France, Netherlands and Malaysia. It is stated thatin view of the qualifications possessed by him, the dulyconstituted Selection Committee has selected him andappointed him as a Reader and he joined in duty on11.10.2000, pursuant to his appointment order, dated 8[th]September 2000. In the counter, it is stated that thepetitioner was permitted to appear for interview onlypursuant to the interim directions issued by this Court.

8. So far as respondent No.4 is concerned, it is statedthat he is having M.A., M.Phil and Ph.D. in History fromJawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He has alsocleared National Eligibility Test for Lecturers and alsoJunior Research Fellowship conducted by the UniversityGrants Commission and he was also awarded the aboveFellowship for pursuing M.Phil and Ph.D. programmes. He has published a book titled ‘The Buddhist Monastery’and also two articles, namely, ‘Life of the Buddha’ and‘Spread of Dharma’ in the book ‘Walking With TheBuddha’, and that he was also Research Associate forpreparation of the above book. It is further stated thatrespondent No.4 has done his Post Doctoral Researchduring 1999-2000, for which, he was awarded prestigiousJunior Fellowship in Indology by the Department ofCulture, Ministry of Human Resource Development,Government of India. It is stated that in view of thequalifications possessed by him, the duly constitutedSelection Committee has recommended for his selection,basing upon which, he was appointed by issuing the

appointing order, dated 31[st] of March 2001, issued by the1[st] respondent, and joined in service on 04.04.2001. It isstated that after completion of probation, his services wereregularized. It is further stated that the 1[st] post of Lectureras notified by the 1[st] respondent-University is meant onlyfor Medieval Indian History and that he was possessingthe requisite qualification of Medieval Indian History,whereas the petitioner was not having any qualification inMedieval Indian History. In the counter, he hasspecifically denied the contention of the petitioner thatrespondent No.4 has no connection with the MedievalIndian History and it is stated that the traditional Tibetanculture area includes vast areas of India like Ladakh, largeparts of Himachal Pradesh, Sikkim, Darjeeling andTawang in Arunachal Pradesh, all of which, are integralparts of the Indian Union. It is stated that the focus of thePh.D. theses of respondent No.4 is on the Spread ofBuddhism in the above mentioned regions in the Medievalperiod. Hence, the above study pertains to Buddhisthistory of Medieval India.

9. So far as respondent No.5 is concerned, in thecounter, it is stated that she is having M.A. and M.Phil inHistory from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi andPh.D. from the University of London. During her M.Philstudy, she was awarded the Junior Research Fellowshipby the Indian Council of Historical Research. For thePh.D. programme, she was awarded the prestigiousCommonwealth Fellowship. With regard to experience, itis stated that respondent No.5 has Post-DoctoralResearch experience as a Visiting Junior Associate Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies(CSDS), New Delhi, from December 1996 to February1998. Further, she was Research Co-ordinator at theCSDS from February 1998 to June 1999. It is stated thatin addition to the above said qualifications, she hasundertaken three research papers; one on ‘Studies onViolence and Partition Violence’, funded by the Committeefor the Cultural Choices, CSDS, the 2[nd] project is on‘Corruption’, CSDS, and the 3[rd] project is titled ‘Towards aMore People Friendly and Economic Court Procedure’,CSDS. It is also stated that she has published 8 researcharticles and presented 4 papers in conferences, whichwere in press at the time of application, in addition to abook, which was also in the press at the time ofapplication. It is stated that the Selection Committee,having regard to her performance in the interview and thequalifications possessed by her, selected her andrecommended for appointment, and accordingly, the 1[st]respondent-University has issued appointment order,dated 23[rd] April 2001, and she joined in service on 30[th] ofApril 2001, and her services were also regularizedsubsequently. Referring to the allegation of the petitionerthat she is a fresh Ph.D. Doctorate, it is stated that shehas 3 years 4 months Post-Doctoral research experienceby the time she applied. Further, she has also gotexperience as a Course Co-ordinator for the Under-graduate studies in the Centre for Historical Studies,Jawaharlal Nehru University, for six months from April1992 to September 1992. Pleading that there areabsolutely no merits in the writ petition, the 5[th] respondenthas prayed for its dismissal.

10. Heard Sri J.Sudheer, learned counsel appearing forthe petitioner and Sri Sumanth, learned Standing Counselappearing for respondents 1 and 2-Universities, and SriK.V.N.Bhupal, learned counsel appearing for respondents3 to 5.

11. With reference to the allegations made by thepetitioner, it has been submitted by Sri J.Sudheer, learnedcounsel for petitioner that in this case, selections aremade arbitrarily and illegally and in a biased manner. It issubmitted that though the petitioner has applied for theposts of Reader and Lecturer, he was not even called forinterview for any one of the said posts, though he ishaving better qualifications than the selected candidates. It is submitted that one of the members of the SelectionCommittee, by name, Professor Ajay Mitra Sastry ofNagpur, was a Research Supervisor of the 3[rd] respondentherein, and inspite of the same, he has participated in theselection process, in which, respondent No.3 wasselected for the post of Reader. Further, it is submittedthat there are no guidelines for the selection process, andalso no set procedure to be adopted by the members ofthe Selection Committee. It is submitted that though allthe unofficial respondents 3, 4 and 5 are not qualified tohold the post, they were selected and appointed, andtherefore, such appointments are fit to be set aside in viewof the arbitrary action on the part of respondents 1 and 2.

12. In support of his arguments, the learned counsel forpetitioner has relied on the following judgments :

1. Ranjit Thakur V. Union of India[[1]]

2. Baidyanath Mahapatra V. State of Orissa[[2]]

3. C.Muralikrishna V. Telugu University,Hyderabad[[3]]Hyderabad[[3]]

4. Gullappalli Nageswara Rao V. State ofA.P.[[4]]A.P.[[4]]

5. A.P.S.R.T.C. V. Sri Satyanarayana.[[5]].[[5]]Transports (P) Ltd

6. A.K.Kraipak V. Union of India[[6]]

7. S. Parthasarathi V. State of A.P.[[7]]

8. Dr. G.Sarana V. University of Lucknow[[8]]

9. Ashok Kumar Yadav V. State of Haryana[[9]]

10. G.N.Nayak V. Goa University[[10]]

11. Dr. Triloki Nath Singh V. Dr.Bhagwan DinMisra[[11]]Misra[[11]]

12. K.V.L. Kameswari V. Andhra University[[12]]

13. A.Periakaruppan V. State of Tamilnadu[[13]]14.Lila Dhar V. State of Rajasthan[[14]]14.Lila Dhar V. State of Rajasthan[[14]]

13. In the case of Ranjit Thakur (1 supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held; “The second limb of the contention is as to theeffect of the alleged bias on the part ofrespondent 4. The test of real likelihood ofbias is whether a reasonable person, inpossession of relevant information, would havethought that bias was likely and is whetherrespondent 4 was likely to be disposed todecide the matter only in a particular way. It isthe essence of a judgment that it is made afterdue observance of the judicial process; thatthe Court or Tribunal passing it observes, atleast the minimal requirements of naturaljustice is composed of impartial persons actingfairly and without bias and in good faith. Ajudgment which is the result of bias or want ofimpartiality is a nullity and the trial ‘coram nonjudice’.”

14. In the case of Baidyanath Mahapatra (2 supra),when an issue was taken up on administrative side andsame issue is dealt by a member of AdministrativeCommittee on judicial side, the Hon’ble Supreme Courthas held :

“There is a disturbing feature of this casewhich vitiats Tribunal’s order. Shri GianChand, Chairman of the Tribunal, ex-ChiefSecretary of the State of Orissa, was memberof the Review Committee which maderecommendation against the appellant for hispremature retirement, and in pursuancethereof the State Government had issued theimpugned order. It appears that Shri GianChand had latter been appointed as Chairmanof the Administrative Tribunal. Shri GianChand participated in the proceedings of theTribunal, and he is party to the decision of theTribunal. These facts show that Mr.GianChand, who had administratively taken adecision against the appellant, considered thematter judicially as a Chairman of the Tribunal,thereby he acted as a Judge of his owncause. While it is true that there is noallegation of personal bias against Shri GianChand, he may have acted bona fide,nonetheless, the principles of natural justice,fair play, and judicial discipline required that heshould have abstained from hearing theappellant’s case. While considering theappellant’s case, the Tribunal exercisedjudicial powers and it was required to actjudicially, as the jurisdiction of the Civil Courtand High Court have been excluded andvested in the Administrative Tribunal. The Members of the Tribunal must follow rules ofnatural justice in administering justice likeJudges, they should not sit in judgment ontheir own decisions. Shri Gian Chand wasdisqualified to hear the appellant’s case. Theorder of the Tribunal is vitiated on this groundbut as the appellant had not raised anyobjection before the Tribunal against theparticipation of Shri Gian Chand, we do notconsider it necessary to grant relief to theappellant on this ground.”

15. In the case of C. Muralikrishna (3 supa), a DivisionBench of this Court has taken the view that the SelectionCommittee cannot select a person who is not possessingthe prescribed qualifications and experience on theground that he possesses other qualifications andexperience, which is equal or superior to that ofprescribed under the Rules. It is held in the said judgmentthat it is not for the Selection Committee to replace theprescribed qualifications and experience by other types ofqualifications and experience.

16. In the case of Gullapalli Nageswara Rao (4 supra),the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in paras 5 and 6 asunder :

5. The learned Advocate-General sought tomake out a distinction between "official bias" ofan authority which is inherent in a statutoryduty imposed on it and "personal bias" of thesaid authority in favour of, or against, one ofthe parties and contended that the mere factthat the Chief Minister of the Government hadsupported the policy of Nationalisation, or eventhe fact that the Government initiated the said scheme, did not disqualify him from decidingthe dispute unless it was established that hewas guilty of personal bias, and that there wasno legal proof establishing the said fact.

6. At this stage, it would be convenient tonotice briefly, the decisions cited at the Bardisclosing the relevant principles governing the"doctrine of bias". The principles governing the"doctrine of bias" vis-_is judicial tribunals arewell-settled and they are: (i) no man shall be ajudge in his own cause; (ii) justice should notonly be done but manifestly and undoubtedlyseem to be done. The two maxims yield theresult that if a member of a judicial body is"subject to a bias (whether financial or other) infavour of, or against, any party to a dispute, oris in such a position that a bias must beassumed to exist, he ought not to take part inthe decision or sit on the tribunal"; and that"any direct pecuniary interest, however small,in the subject-matter of inquiry will disqualify ajudge, and any interest, though not pecuniary,will have the same effect, if it be sufficientlysubstantial to create a reasonable suspicion ofbias". The said principles are equallyapplicable to authorities, though they are notcourts of justice or judicial tribunals, who haveto act judicially in deciding the rights of others,i.e., authorities who are empowered todischarge quasi-judicial functions.

17. In the case of APSRTC V. Sri SatyanarayanaTransports (P) Ltd. (5 supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Courthas held; “The position in law in regard to the plea ofbias raised against the Minister is not in doubt.It is clear that when the Minister heard theobjections to the proposed schemes under S.68D (2), he was dealing with the matter in a quasi-judicial manner and his inquiry had toconform to the principles of natural justice. It isan elementary rule of natural justice that aperson who tries a cause should be able todeal with the matter before him objectively,fairly, and impartially. As has been observed inthe Jewitt's Dictionary of English Law,"anything which tends or may be regarded astending to cause such a person to decide acase otherwise than on evidence must be heldto be biased". If a person has a pecuniaryinterest in the case brought before him, that isan obvious case of bias which disqualifies himto try the cause. If a person is hostile to a partywhose cause he is called upon to try, thatagain would introduce the infirmity of bias andcould disqualify him from trying the cause. Indealing with cases of bias, it is necessary toremember that "no one can act in a judicialcapacity if his previous conduct gives round forbelieving that he cannot act with an openmind". The broad principle which is universallyaccepted is that a person trying a cause evenin quasi-judicial proceedings, must not only actfairly, but must be able to act above suspicionof unfairness. As was observed in Franklin v.Minister of Town and Country Planning, 1948AC 87, "the use of the word 'bias should beconfined to its sphere. Its proper significance isto denote a departure from the standard ofevenhanded justice which the law requiresfrom those who occupy judicial office or thosewho are commonly regarded as holding aquasi-judicial office, such as an arbitrator. Thereason for this clearly is that having toadjudicate as between two or more parties, he

must come to his adjudication or bias towardsone side or the other in dispute". That beingthe true position in law about personal bias,there would be no difficulty in holding that theMinister would be disqualified from hearingobjections raised by the respective busoperators against the ten schemes if thematerial facts alleged by Ramakotaiah are heldproved. It cannot be disputed that if theMinister had asked Ramakotaiah to help him inhis election to the Election Committee of theAndhra Pradesh Congress Committee andwhen he was told that Ramakotaiah wasunable to help him, he threatened him with direconsequences, that clearly would introduce aserious infirmity in the impugned order whichthe Minister passed under S. 68D (2).”

18. In the case of A.K.Kraipak (6 supra), it was held bythe Hon’ble Supreme Court; “It is unfortunate that Naqishbund wasappointed as one of the members of theselection board. It is true that ordinarily theChief Conservator of Forests in a State shouldbe considered as the most appropriate personto be in the selection board. He must beexpected to know his officers thoroughly, theirweaknesses as well as their strength. Hisopinion as regards their suitability for selectionto the All India Service is entitled to greatweight. But then under the circumstances itwas improper to have included Naqishbund asa member of the selection board. He was oneof the persons to be considered for selection. Itis against all canons of justice to make a manjudge in his own cause. It is true that he did not participate in the deliberations of the committeewhen his name was considered. But then thevery fact that he was a member of theselection board must have had its own impacton the decision of the selection board. Furtheradmittedly he participated in the deliberationsof the selection board when the claims of hisrivals particularly that of Basu was considered.He was also party to the preparation of the listof selected candidates in order of preference.At every stage of his participation in thedeliberations of the selection board there wasa conflict between his interest and duty. Underthose circumstances it is difficult to believe thathe could have been impartial. The realquestion is not whether he was biased. It isdifficult to prove the state of mind of a person.Therefore, what we have to see is whetherthere is reasonable ground for believing thathe was likely to have been biased. We agreewith the learned Attorney-General that a meresuspicion of bias is not sufficient. There mustbe a reasonable likelihood of bias. In decidingthe question of bias we have to take intoconsideration human probabilities and ordinarycourse of human conduct. It was in the interestof Naqishbund to keep out his rivals in order tosecure his position from further challenge.Naturally he was also interested insafeguarding his position while preparing thelist of selected candidates”.

19. In paras 13 to 17 of the judgment in the case ofS.Parthasarathi (7 supra), relied upon by the learnedcounsel for petitioner, the Hon’ble Supreme Court hasobserved:

“13. The letter written by the Medical Officer(Ex. B-8) would indicate that Manvi wanted toget rid of the services of the appellant on theground of his mental imbalance and it was forthat purpose that he tried to get a certificate tothe effect that the appellant was mentallyunsound. We are of the opinion that thecumulative effect of the circumstances statedabove was sufficient to create in the mind of areasonable man the impression that there wasa real likelihood of bias in the inquiring officer.There must be a "real likelihood" of bias andthat means there must be a substantialpossibility of bias. The court will have to judgeof the matter as a reasonable man would judgeof any matter in the conduct of his ownbusiness (see R. v. Sunderland JJ.) (1901) 2KB 357 at p. 373.

14. The test of likelihood of bias which hasbeen applied in a number of cases is based onthe "reasonable apprehension" of areasonable man fully congnizant of the facts.The courts have quashed decisions on thestrength of the reasonable suspicion of theparty aggrieved without having made anyfinding that a real likelihood of bias in factexisted (see R. v. Huggins (1895) 1 QB 563; R.v. Sussex JJ.. ex p. McCarthy (1924) 1 KB256; Cottle v. Cottle (l939) 2 All ER 535, R. v.Abingdon JJ. ex. p. Cousins (1964) 108 SJ840. But in R. v. Camborne JJ. ex. p. Pearce,(1955) 1 QB 41 at p. 51 the Court after areview-of the relevant cases held that reallikelihood of bias was the proper test and that areal likelihood of bias had to be made toappear not only from the materials in factascertained by the party complaining, but fromsuch further facts as he might readily have ascertained and easily verified m the course ofhis inquiries.

15. The question then is: whether a reellikelihood of bias existed is to be determinedon the probabilities to be inferred from thecircumstances by court objectively, or, uponthe basis of the impressions that mightreasonably be left on the minds of the partyaggrieved or the public at large.

16. The tests of "real likelihood" and"reasonable suspicion" are really inconsistentwith each other. We think that the reviewingauthority must mane a determination on thebasis of the whole evidence before it whether areasonable man would in the circumstancesinfer that there is real likelihood of bias. Thecourt must look at the impression which otherpeople have. This follows from the principlethat justice must not only be done but seem tobe done. If right minded persons would thinkthat there is real likelihood of bias on the part ofan inquiring officer, he must not conduct theenquiry; nevertheless there must be a reallikelihood of bias. Surmise or conjecture wouldnot be enough. There must existcircumstances from which reasonable menwould think it probable or likely that theinquiring officer will be prejudiced against thedelinquent. The court will not inquire whetherhe was really prejudiced. If a reasonable manwould think on the basis of the existingcircumstances that he is likely to beprejudiced, that is sufficient to quash thedecision (see per Lord Denning, M. R. inMetropolitan Properties Co. (F. G. C.) Ltd. v.Lannon (1968) 3 WLR 694 at p. 707-etc.) Weshould not, however, be understood to denythat the court might with greater propriety applythe "reasonable suspicion" test in criminal or inproceedings analogous to criminal proceedings.

17. As there was real likelihood of bias in thesense explained above, we think that theinquiry and the orders based on the inquirywere bad. The decision of this court in theState of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Nooh.1958 SCR 595 = (AIR 1953 SC 86) makes itclear that if an inquiring officer adopts aprocedure which is contrary to the rules ofnatural justice, the ultimate decision based onhis report of inquiry is liable to be quashed. Wesee no reason for not applying the sameprinciple here as we find that the inquiringofficer was biased.”

20. In the case of Dr.G.Sarana (8 supra), the SupremeCourt held,

“The real question is not whether a member ofan administrative Board while exercising quasi-judicial powers or discharging quasi-judicialfunctions was biased, for it is difficult to provethe mind of a person. What has to be seen iswhether there is a reasonable ground forbelieving that he was likely to have beenbiased. In deciding the question of bias,human probabilities and ordinary course ofhuman conduct have to be taken intoconsideration. In a group deliberation anddecision like that of a Selection Board, themembers do not function as computers. Eachmember of the group or board is bound toinfluence the others, more so if the memberconcerned is a person with special knowledge.His bias is likely to operate in a subtle manner.”

21. In the case of Ashok Kumar Yadav (9 supra), theHon’ble Supreme Court has observed; “We agree with the petitioners that it is one ofthe fundamental principles of our jurisprudencethat no man can be a judge in his own causeand that if there is a reasonable likelihood ofbias it is "in accordance with natural justiceand common-sense that the justice likely to beso biased should be incapacitated fromsitting". The question is not whether the judgeis actually biased or in fact decides partially,but whether there is a real likelihood of bias.What is objectionable in such a case is not thatthe decision is actually tainted with bias butthat the circumstances are such as to create areasonable apprehension in the mind of othersthat there is a likelihood of bias affecting thedecision. The basic principle underlying thisrule is that justice must not only be done butmust also appear to be done and this rule hasreceived wide recognition in several decisionsof this Court. It is also important to note thatthis rule is not confined to cases where judicialpower stricto sensu is exercised. It isappropriately extended to all cases where anindependent mind has to be applied to arrive ata fair and just decision between the rival claimsof parties. Justice is not the function of theCourts alone; it is also the duty of all those whoare expected to decide fairly betweencontending parties. The strict standardsapplied to authorities exercising judicial powerare being increasingly applied to administrativebodies, for it is vital to the maintenance of therule of law in a welfare State where thejurisdiction of administrative bodies isincreasing at a rapid pace that theinstrumentalities of the State should discharge their functions in a fair and justmanner”……….. “The likelihood of bias mayarise on account of proprietary interest or onaccount of personal reasons, such as, hostilityto one party or personal friendship or familyrelationship with the other. Where reasonablelikelihood of bias is alleged on the ground ofrelationship, the question would always be asto how close is the degree of relationship or inother words, is the nearness of relationship sogreat as to give rise to reasonableapprehension of bias on the part of theauthority making the selection”.

22. In the case of G.N.Nayak (10 supra), the Hon’bleSupreme Court has held as under:

“Bias may be generally defined as partiality orpreference. It is true that any person orauthority required to act in a judicial or quasijudicial matter must act impartially. "If however,'bias' and 'partiality' be defined to mean thetotal absence of preconceptions in the mind ofthe judge, then no one has ever had a fair trialand no one ever will. The human mind, even atinfancy, is no blank piece of paper. We areborn with predispositions and the processes ofeducation, formal and informal, create attitudeswhich precede reasoning in particularinstances and which, therefore, by definition,are prejudices.

As we have noted, every preference does notvitiate an action. If it is rational andunaccompanied by considerations of personalinterest, pecuniary or otherwise, it would notvitiate a dicision . For example, if a seniorofficer expresses appreciation of the work of a junior in the Confidential Report, it would notamount to bias nor would it preclude thatsenior officer from being part of theDepartmental Promotion Committee toconsider such junior officer along with othersfor promotion.”

23. In the case of Dr.Triloki Nath Singh (11 supra), theHon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under :“…..The above courses of study show beyondany manner of doubt that Hindi Language andLiterature and, Linguistics are two different andseparate subjects. It is also important to notethat even graduates who have not passed theB.A. Examination with Hindi could be admittedand awarded the degree of M.A. in Linguistics. Merely because the Linguistics is also asubject of study in the paper of Hindi, it cannotbe said that Linguistics and Hindi Languageand Literature fall under the same subject ofstudy in the University. It is an admittedposition that separate panel of experts wasdrawn for the subjects of Hindi andLinguistics.”Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under :“…..The above courses of study show beyondany manner of doubt that Hindi Language andLiterature and, Linguistics are two different andseparate subjects. It is also important to notethat even graduates who have not passed theB.A. Examination with Hindi could be admittedand awarded the degree of M.A. in Linguistics. Merely because the Linguistics is also asubject of study in the paper of Hindi, it cannotbe said that Linguistics and Hindi Languageand Literature fall under the same subject ofstudy in the University. It is an admittedposition that separate panel of experts wasdrawn for the subjects of Hindi andLinguistics.”

24. Reliance is also placed on the judgment of thisCourt in the case of K.V.L.Kameswari (12 supra),wherein, this Court has held;Court in the case of K.V.L.Kameswari (12 supra),wherein, this Court has held; “The assessment should be made on thebasis of objective criteria, namely, educationalqualifications, experience and the performanceat the time of interview and other relevantfactors necessary having regard to the natureof the post to which theappointment/recruitment is made.”basis of objective criteria, namely, educationalqualifications, experience and the performanceat the time of interview and other relevantfactors necessary having regard to the natureof the post to which theappointment/recruitment is made.”

Another judgment upon which, the learned

counsel for petitioner has placed reliance is, in the case ofA.Periakaruppan (13 supra), wherein, the Supreme Courthas held that in the absence of specific provision in rules,the Committee must distribute total marks equally onvarious items by giving marks in lumpsum and not onitemised basis is illegal.

26. Another judgment relied upon by the learnedcounsel for petitioner is in the case of Lila Dhar (14supra), wherein, the Hon’ble Supreme Court hasobserved that the weightage to be given to interviewwould depend upon the particular service and variousconnected factors but no rigid test can be laid down. It isfurther held that considerations for determiningpercentage of marks to be allotted for interview in case ofadmissions in academic institutions cannot guiderecruitments to public services.

27. On the other hand, it is submitted by Sri Sumanth,learned Standing Counsel appearing for respondents 1and 2-Universities, and Sri K.V.N.Bhupal, learned counselappearing for respondents 3 to 5, that even in theinstructions issued to the candidates, it is amply madeclear that all the applications received will be scrutinizedbefore calling the candidates for interview. It is submittedthat the Committee constituted for screening of theapplications, has scrutinized all the applications of theapplicants, who have applied for the posts of Reader andLecturer in the Department of History, and those who arenot fit into the criteria notified by the respondents, were notcalled for interview. It is submitted that though the nameof the petitioner did not figure in the list of candidates

shortlisted by the Screening Committee, but hiscandidature was considered only in view of the interimdirections issued by this Court, although he was notqualified otherwise for interview. It is submitted that, inany event, as the petitioner was not even called forinterview for the post of Reader, he has no locus standi toquestion the selection of respondent No.3 as a Reader. Itis further submitted that even with regard to the post ofLecturer, the petitioner has applied only for 2[nd] post, forwhich, his name also did not figure in the list of candidatesshort-listed to be called for interview, by the SelectionCommittee. It is submitted that in view of the directionsissued by this Court by way of interim orders, though hewas not eligible for participation in the interview, he wasinterviewed by the Selection Committee, and even onmerits also, he did not come up for selection. Further, it issubmitted that as much as the members of the SelectionCommittee, consisting of subject experts andacademicians, have interviewed all the candidates andselected respondents 3 to 5, it is not open for thepetitioner having faced the interview, to turn back andquestion the proceedings of the Selection Committee, andthe authority of its members. It is submitted that thepetitioner cannot himself judge his own merit and questionthe appointment of respondents 3 to 5, made by the dulyconstituted Selection Committee. It is further submittedthat in the selections, one Ms.Supriya Verma is selectedfor the 2[nd] post of Lecturer in History, but as she did notjoin, the next meritorious candidate was appointed bygiving appointment to respondent No.5. In support of theirarguments, the learned counsel appearing forrespondents have relied on the judgments in the case of Dr. Keshav Ram Pal V. U.P. Higher Education ServicesCommission[[15]],Lila Dhar V. State of Rajasthan (14supra), National Institute of Mental Health and NeuroSciences V. Dr.K.Kalyana Raman[[16]]and in the case ofChandra Prakash Tiwari V. Shakuntala Shukla[[17]].

28. With regard to the above rival contentions advancedby the learned counsel appearing for the parties, I haveperused the material and the original proceedings ofselection process, produced by the learned StandingCounsel appearing for the respondents. Primarily, it is thecontention of the petitioner that the procedure adopted bythe respondents is illegal and arbitrary. Pursuant to thenotification issued by the respondents, written instructionswere issued to all the applicants and there were alsogeneral guidelines issued for screening the applicationsfor faculty posts, which were also approved by theExecutive Council. In the instructions issued to thecandidates, it is clearly stated that the University will makepreliminary selection of candidates on the basis ofinformation furnished by them in their applications andpossession of minimum qualifications prescribed will notautomatically entitle a candidate to be called for the test orinterview, if better candidates are available. In view of thenumber of applications received for the posts of Readerand Lecturers in the Department of History, from theperusal of the proceedings, it is clear that all theapplications were subjected to scrutiny as per the generalguidelines, which are approved by the Executive Council. Originally, the writ petition is filed alleging that thepetitioner was arbitrarily denied interview. In the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, general allegations aremade by merely stating that some vested interests in theUniversity are preventing entry of the petitioner into theservice of the University. Except such kind of allegations,there is no basis for filing of the writ petition. Upon aperusal of the Screening Committee proceedings, it isclear that as per the guidelines for screening of theapplications, which are approved by the ExecutiveCouncil, all the applications received for the posts ofReader and Lecturer were screened by the ScreeningCommittee, and the Screening Committee hasexhaustively went through the particulars like educationalqualifications, age restrictions etc., of all the applicantsand prepared the list containing the names of rejectedcandidates and the candidates, who are to be called forinterview in the ratio of 1:5. The said procedure isadopted uniformly for all the applicants. Having regard tothe norms fixed for screening of the applications, theapplication of the petitioner was rejected for both the postsof Reader and Lecturer. He was interviewed by theSelection Committee only in view of the interim directionsissued by this Court to consider his candidature for thepost of Lecturer. Though he has applied for the post ofReader also, but in view of rejection of his application atthe screening stage itself, he was not even called forinterview for appointment to the post of Reader. Though itis submitted that the applicants were kept in dark, andthere was no set procedure for selection, but suchcontention of the learned counsel for petitioner cannot beaccepted, for the reason that in the instructions to thecandidates, it was made clear at the very outset, that allthe applications will be screened at the first instance by

the Screening Committee to make theirrecommendations. If the Screening Committee hasuniformly applied the guidelines approved by theExecutive Council for the purpose of screening theapplications, and applied the norms, it cannot be said thatsuch a procedure adopted by the Screening Committee iseither illegal or arbitrary. So far as Selection Committee isconcerned, each Selection Committee member hasgraded the performance of each candidate by adoptingthe scale of assessment as ‘outstanding’, ‘very good’,‘good’, ‘average’, ‘below average’, ‘poor’ and‘unsatisfactory’. In that view of the matter, it is not open forthe petitioner to plead that the selection procedure wasunguided. Even with regard to the allegation of bias, it isto be noted that the bias is alleged only with regard toappointment of respondent No.3 on the ground that SriAjay Mitra Sastry, who was the Research Supervisor ofrespondent No.3, was the member of the SelectionCommittee. With reference to the said plea, it is to benoted that in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition,there is no such contention raised, and no permission issought for raising such plea in additional grounds in thewrit petition by filing an additional affidavit. Such referenceis vaguely made only in the affidavit filed in support of theapplication filed for impleadment of respondents 3 to 5 asparty-respondents, after their selection. In any event, it isto be noted that the petitioner, whose application for thepost of Reader is rejected at the stage of screening itself,cannot question the appointment of respondent No.3. Though he has applied for the posts of Reader andLecturer, his application was rejected for both the posts,but his case was considered by interviewing him only to the post of Lecturer, pursuant to the interim orders of thisCourt. As much as this Court is of the opinion that noillegality is committed by the members of the ScreeningCommittee and that the said Committee has uniformlyapplied the norms which are approved by the ExecutiveCouncil for screening of applications, the application of thepetitioner was rightly rejected for both the posts of Readerand Lecturer. As the application of the petitioner wasrejected only at the stage of screening so far as the postof Reader is concerned, it is not open for the petitioner toquestion the appointment of respondent No.3, allegingbias. In any event, in the absence of any additionalaffidavit in support of the writ petition, it cannot be said thatthe selection of respondent No.3 is biased. It is also to benoted that the Selection Committee consists of variousmembers including number of experts from outside, apartfrom the members from the concerned Department,having academic expertise in the subject. All theindividuals have separately given grades to thecandidates, as such, there are no grounds made out bythe petitioner to set aside the appointment of respondentNo.3 as a Reader. Even with regard to the appointmentsmade to the post of Lecturer also, it is to be noted that thepetitioner has applied only for the 2[nd] post of Lecturer. The 2[nd] post is in any area of historical research, whereasthe 4[th] respondent herein is appointed to the 1[st] post,which is Medieval Indian History (Desirable: with researchinterest in Medieval Deccan). The petitioner, who has noteven applied to the 1[st] post of Lecturer, which is in thesubject of Medieval Indian History, questions theappointment of respondent No.4 also, stating that he is

not qualified to hold that post. As much as he has notapplied to the 1[st] post of Lecturer out of the two posts,there is no basis to question the appointment to a post, forwhich, he is not the applicant. In any event, from thedetailed counter affidavit filed by the respondents, it isclear that the Ph.D. theses of the 4[th] respondent is on‘Spread of Buddhism’ in certain parts of India, in theMedieval period, as such, it cannot be said that he is notqualified to hold the 1[st] post of Lecturer. In any event, it isfor the experts, who are the members of SelectionCommittee, to examine the qualifications, but thepetitioner, even without applying for the post, cannot seekfor setting aside the appointment of respondent No.4, onthe ground that he was not possessing the requisitequalifications. With regard to the appointment ofrespondent No.5 also, except stating that she is a freshPh.D., as such, is not eligible, no other ground is urged. With regard to respondent No.5, as evident from thecounter affidavit filed by the respondents, she did her M.A.M.Phil in History from Jawaharlal Nehru University, NewDelhi, and did her Ph.D. from London. During her M.Philstudy, she was awarded Junior Fellowship by the IndianCouncil of Historical Research, and in her Ph.D. programalso, she was awarded Commonwealth Fellowship. It isalso clear from the counter that respondent No.5 hasPost-Doctoral Research experience as a Visiting JuniorAssociate Fellow at the Centre for the Study ofDeveloping Societies (CSDS), New Delhi, from December1996 to February 1998, and in addition to the same, shehas undertaken three research projects. In view of thenecessary qualifications notified for appointment to the post of Lecturer, it cannot be said that respondent No.5 isnot qualified to hold the 2[nd] post of Lecturer. By statingrepeatedly that the petitioner is meritorious thanrespondents 4 and 5, the petitioner cannot judge himselfand seek to set aside the appointment of respondents 4and 5 on the said ground alone.

29. Asmuch as this Court has already found thatscreening of the applications and further proceedings ofthe Selection Committee are in accordance with thenorms notified to the applicants, the judgments reliedupon by the learned counsel for petitioner would notrender any assistance in support of his arguments, havingregard to the facts and circumstances of this case. It isalso to be noted that the petitioner’s application wasrejected at the stage of screening itself, but for the interimorders granted by this Court, he would not have called forinterview at all. As such, this Court is of the view that theScreening Committee has applied the norms notified bythe University, which are approved by the ExecutiveCouncil, uniformly to all the applicants, and therefore,there is no illegality or any irregularity in rejecting theapplication of the petitioner. Having regard to the criteriaadopted for the purpose of screening the applications, itwas done basing on the qualifications, experience, age,etc. In that view of the matter, the judgments relied uponby the learned counsel for petitioner on the plea of biasand arbitrariness, would not render any assistance insupport of his plea, so as to annul the appointments madepursuant to the recommendations made by the dulyconstituted Selection Committee.

30. Further, as rightly relied upon by the learnedcounsel for respondents in the case of Chandra PrakashTiwari (17 supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has heldthat when a candidate appears at the examination withoutprotest, and subsequently found to be not successful inthe examination, question of entertaining a petitionchallenging the said examination, would not arise. In thecase on hand also, the petitioner, having faced theSelection Committee pursuant to the interim directionsissued by this Court, when he has not come up forselection, cannot question the competency, authority orthe procedure adopted by the Selection Committee. Theabove said ratio decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Courtsupports the case of respondents.

31. Further, in the case of National Institute ofMental Health and Neuro Sciences (16 supra), theHon’ble Supreme Court has held that the function of theSelection Committee is neither judicial nor adjudicatory,but it is purely administrative. In the aforesaid judgment,the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while referring to a judgmentof High Court of Karnataka, has held in para 7 as under :

“We will first consider the second point. In thefirst place, it must be noted that the function ofthe Selection Committee is neither judicial noradjudicatory. It is purely administrative. TheHigh Court seems to be in error in stating thatthe Selection Committee ought to have givensome reasons for preferring Dr. Gauri Devi asagainst the other candidate. The selection hasbeen made by the assessment of relativemerits of rival candidates determined in thecourse of the interview of candidatespossessing the required eligibility. There is norule or regulation brought to our notice requiring the Selection Committee to recordreasons. In the absence of any such legalrequirement the selection made withoutrecording reasons cannot be found fault with. The High Court in support of its reasoning hashowever, referred to the decision of this Courtin Union of India v. Mohan Lal Capoor [(1973)2 SCC 836]. That decision proceeded on astatutory requirement. Regulation 5(5), whichwas considered in that case required theSelection Committee to record its reasons forsuperseding a senior member in the State CivilService. The decision in Capoor case wasrendered on September 26, 1973. In June1977, Regulation 5(5) was amended deletingthe requirement of recording reasons for thesupersession of senior officers of the StateCivil Services. T h e Capoor case cannot,therefore, be construed as an authority for theproposition that there should be reasonformulation for administrative decision. Administrative authority is under no legalobligation to record reasons in support of itsdecision. Indeed, even the principles ofnatural justice do not require an administrativeauthority or a Selection Committee or anexaminer to record reasons for the selection ornon-selection of a person in the absence ofstatutory requirement. This principle has beenstated by this Court in R.S.Dass v. Union ofIndia 1986 Supp SCC 617, in which, Capoorcase was also distinguished.”

32. Further, in the case of Lila Dhar (14 supra), theHon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 8 as under :

“The second ground of attack must fail for thesame reason as the first ground of attack. TheRules themselves do not provide for theallocation of marks under different heads at theinterview-test. The criteria for the interview-testhas been laid down by the Rules. It is for the

interviewing body to take general decisionwhether to allocate marks under differentheads or to award marks in a single lot. Theaward of marks under different heads maylead to a distorted picture of the candidate onoccasions. On the other hand the totality ofthe impression created by the candidate on theinterviewing body may give a more accuratepicture of the candidate’s personality. It is forthe interviewing body to choose theappropriate method of marking at the selectionto each service. There cannot be any magicformulae in these matters and courts cannot sitin judgment over the methods of markingemployed by interviewing bodies unless, aswe said, it is proven or obvious that the methodof marking was chosen with oblique motive.”

33. Reliance is also placed by the learned counselfor respondents in the case of Dr.Keshav Ram Pal (15supra), wherein, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held :

“Thus, the written examination assesses theman’s intellect and the interview test the manhimself and “the twain shall meet” for a properselection. If both written examination andinterview test are to be essential features ofproper selection, the question may arise as tothe weight to be attached respectively to them. In the case of admission to a college, forinstance, where the candidate’s personality isyet to develop and it is too early to identify thepersonal qualities for which greater importancemay have to be attached on later life, greaterweight has perforce to be given toperformance in the written examination. Theimportance to be attached to the interview testmust be minimal. That was what was decidedby this Court in Periakaruppan v. State of T.N.[(1971) 1 SCC 38, Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi and other cases. On the otherhand, in the case of services to whichrecruitment has necessarily to be made frompersons of mature personality, interview testmay be the only way, subject to basic andessential academic and professionalrequirements being satisfied. To subject suchpersons to a written examination may yieldunfruitful and negative results, apart from itsbeing an act of cruelty to those persons. There are, of course, many services to whichrecruitment is made from younger candidateswhose personalities are on the threshold ofdevelopment and who show signs of greatpromise, and the discerning may in aninterview test, catch a glimpse of the futurepersonality. In the case of such services,where sound selection must combineacademic ability with personality promise,some weight has to be given, though not muchtoo great a weight, to the interview test. Therecannot be any rule of thumb regarding theprecise weight to be given.”

34. In view of the aforesaid judgments relied upon bythe learned counsel for respondents, which would fullysupport their case, it is not open for the petitioner to assailthe appointments made by the duly constituted SelectionCommittee, on the ground that the criteria adopted bysuch Selection Committee is either arbitrary or illegal. Thecriteria, which is adopted by classifying into seven gradesto be given by each member of the Selection Committeeand assessing the merit of the candidates based on suchgrading, cannot be said to be either illegal ordiscriminatory. Such a procedure is adopted for all thecandidates, and in that view of the matter, in view of the

opinion and performance recorded by the expertmembers of the Selection Committee along with themembers of the University, who are also in the Committee,having academic expertise, it is not open for the petitionerto question such appointments on the ground that he ishaving superior merit over the selected candidates, byassessing on his own. In any event, it is also to be notedthat pursuant to the selections made, and appointingorders being issued, appointing respondent No.3 asReader and respondents 4 and 5 as Lecturers, they havejoined in the service of the University and completedabout 9 years of service, and in the absence of any validground raised by the petitioner to annul the appointmentsat this stage, I do not find any merit in this writ petition,warranting interference with the selections made, and theappointment orders issued to respondents 3 to 5.

35. For the aforesaid reasons, the writ petition is devoidof merit and it is accordingly dismissed. No order as tocosts.

_____________________

R.SUBHASH REDDY, J

30[th] December 2009

ajr

[1]AIR 1987 SC 2386

[2]AIR 1989 SC 2218

[3]2002 (4) ALD 12002 (4) ALD 1

[4]AIR 1959 SC 1376

[5]AIR 1965 SC 1303

[6]AIR 1970 SC 150

[7]AIR 1973 SC 2701

[8]AIR 1976 SC 2428[9]AIR 1987 SC 454[10]AIR 2002 SC 790[11]AIR 1990 SC 2063[12]1994 (1) ALT 123[13]AIR 1971 SC 2303[14](1981) 4 SCC 159[15](1986) 1 SCC 671[16]1992 Supp (2) SCC 481[17](2002) 6 SCC 127