WP/27657/2005 of M/s Kumar Chemicals and Fertilisers (P) Ltd. rep by its Vs The Andhra Pradesh Industrial Development Corporation Ltd., on 24 December 2007

-ORDER:

This writ petition is filed for a writ of mandamus to set asidenotice dated 26.09.2005 issued by respondent No.2, whereunderthe respondents invoked the provisions of Section 29 of the StateFinancial Corporation Act, 1951 (for short, ‘the 1951 Act’) forrecovery of Rs.35,79,228/- from the petitioners.

Petitioner No.1 is a private limited company of whichpetitioner No.2, represented by two GPA holders, namely, SatishKumar Agarwal and Vimal Kumar Agarwal, is the ManagingDirector. The Andhra Pradesh Industrial Development CorporationLimited, respondent No.1 (for short, ‘the Corporation’) extendedequity of Rs.2.75 lakhs and invested preference share capital of0.75 lakhs in petitioner No.1 company. It also sanctioned a termloan of Rs.3.50 lakhs. The amounts towards the equity andpreference share capital were released during the years 1967-69and a sum of Rs.3,30,733=59 ps towards term loan was releasedduring the period from 19.04.1969 to 04.10.1971 (the respondents in the additional counter-affidavit stated that the averment in theircounter-affidavit that the term loan was released in April, 1978 wasa mistake). As per the terms governing the parties, therespondents are entitled to charge interest @ 9.5% per annum andin the event of default, they are entitled to charge interest @ 12%per annum.

It is the common case of the parties that the petitionersfailed to make repayment of any part of the loan amount till theyear 1992 and as on 31.08.1992 the total outstanding amount dueto the respondent – Corporation was Rs.12.50 lakhs(approximately). In the year 1992 the petitioners came to thenegotiating table with the respondents on which the latter extendedOne Time Settlement (OTS) Scheme to the petitioners and theyaccordingly arrived at an amount of Rs.6,16,867=60 ps to be paidby the petitioners. The General Manager of the Corporationaddressed letter dated 03.10.1992 to petitioner No.2, wherein it isinformed that the total due of the loan was Rs.6,16,867=60 ps andhe was requested to pay immediately 50% of the said amount andthe balance amount within three months thereafter. A perusal ofthe record reveals that the initial payment of Rs.3,08,433=80 pstowards 50% of the OTS amount was made on 10.11.1992 and it isnot in dispute that the petitioners failed to pay the balance 50% ofthe amount payable under the OTS scheme.

As the petitioners failed to clear the loan amount under theOTS scheme, the Corporation addressed letter dated 23.01.2001to the District Collector, Hyderabad, to initiate action for recoveryof Rs.15,63,005=80 ps found to be due as on 31.12.2001. TheTahsildar concerned issued demand notice dated 30.01.2003 to petitioner No.2 and on receipt of the said notice he addressedletter dated 29.01.2003, wherein he referred to his discussion heldwith the Tahsildar of the Corporation and stated that as far as hecould remember, he never borrowed any amount from theCorporation at any time and that the matter being four decadesold, he was unable to trace out any record and requested theCorporation to permit him to peruse the records and supply himcopies of notice and the relevant documents. Later, in reply to theCorporation’s letter dated 10.03.2004, petitioner No.2 addressedletter dated 05.08.2004 stating that he was enclosing demand draftfor Rs.3,09,000/- representing the outstanding balance under theOTS scheme. He made a request to revive the OTS package andclose the term loan and other dues by treating the payment of saidamount made in full and final settlement of the account of termloan and other dues to the Corporation. The demand draft for thesaid amount was enclosed, which was evidently encashed by theCorporation.

On 19.03.2005, a letter signed by one

Mr. Amarnath was addressed to the Managing Director of theCorporation, wherein it is informed that petitioner No.2 was notkeeping good health and that he asked him to represent on hisbehalf to consider his proposal for OTS at an early date withminimum levy of 6% interest as charged under original OTSscheme since 10.11.1992 on the balance outstanding amount ofRs.3,08,434/- on humanitarian grounds. The Deputy GeneralManager (RR & AMD) of the Corporation wrote letter dated26.09.2005 to the Managing Director of petitioner No.1, wherein itwas mentioned that an amount of Rs.35,79,228/- is due as on31.05.2005 towards loan instalments and interest and that while taking steps to invoke the provisions of Section 29 of the 1951Act, by using advertisement for sale of the factory and that if thesale does not materialize and the proceeds thereof are notsufficient, they will proceed against him jointly and severally forthe recovery of the outstanding amount or the shortfall as the casemay be under the provisions of the 1951 Act. It is also stated thatif the amounts are paid on or before 13.10.2005, the proposedaction will be dropped. On 21.11.2005, one Ramesh KumarAgarwal, claiming to be the authorized signatory, addressed letterto the Vice Chairman and Managing Director of the Corporationstating inter alia that as per the discussions held with theaddressee on 19.11.2005 to settle the loan account, they are readyto pay the amount of Rs.16 lakhs within six months after therespondents’ confirmation of the same in full and final settlement. It is also requested in the said letter to confirm the said request asfull and final settlement towards loan and buy back of shares andgive the bifurcation of Rs.16 lakhs towards loan and shares for theCorporation’s accounting purpose and to cancel the joint venturescheme and issue the respondents No Due Certificate after the fullpayment from their side. The Corporation was requested totransfer the shares held by it in the name of the relatives of theaddressor and return the original share certificates along with theshare transfer form. The Board of Directors of the Corporation didnot accept the said offer and it has decided to seize and sell theassets of petitioner No.1 company. It is specifically alleged in thecounter-affidavit that the petitioners suppressed the facts relatingto the abovementioned offer in the writ petition.

In the reply-affidavit filed by Sri Vimal Kumar Agarwal, the

In the reply-affidavit filed by Sri Vimal Kumar Agarwal, the alleged GPA holder of petitioner No.2, he pleaded that the fact thatthe petitioners have not made any payment from 1967 to 1992 i.e.,for a period of 25 years is admitted by the Corporation and thathaving slept over for nearly 33 years, the Corporation is notentitled to invoke either the provisions of A.P. Revenue RecoveryAct, 1864 (for short, ‘the 1864 Act’) or the 1951 Act. The deponentalso denied the allegation made by the Corporation in its counter-affidavit that petitioner No.2 is receiving a sum of Rs.60,000/-towards rent and that having agreed to pay the amounts underOTS scheme, the petitioners paid the entire amount by 05.08.2005and that therefore the payments made by them in the years 1992and 2005 under the OTS scheme are nothing but towards full andfinal settlement. It is also further pleaded that the said paymentsdo not extend the time for realization of their amount, since by thedate of the above payments it was not a debt. A plea was alsoraised that the Corporation cannot invoke the provisions of Section29 of the 1951 Act because the petitioners obtained the loan in theyear 1967 and the Corporation was brought within the purview ofthe provisions of the 1951 Act only in the year 1986.

At the hearing, Sri Kuruti Bhaskar Rao, learned counsel forthe petitioner submitted that as the entire term loan was disbursedon or before 04.10.1971, limitation for recovery of the loan amountexpired in the year 1983. He further submitted that since thepayments under the OTS scheme were made much after theexpiry of the period of limitation, such payments orcorrespondence relating thereto cannot be treated asacknowledgement of debt within the meaning of Section 19 of theLimitation Act, 1963 (for short, ‘the 1963 Act’). He further contended that the provisions of the 1963 Act apply not only inrespect of the proceedings before the Courts, but also to recovermonies by invoking the provisions of the statutory enactmentssuch as the 1864 Act. In support of his contention he relied uponthe judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Kerala and othersv. V.R. Kalliyanikutty and another[[1]].

Opposing the contentions of the learned counsel for thepetitioners, Sri S. Sriram Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for theCorporation submitted that the provisions of the 1963 Act applyonly to the proceedings to be initiated before the Court forrecovery of the amounts and he relied upon the judgments of theSupreme Court in The Kerala State Electricity Board,Trivandrum v. T.P. Kunhaliumma[[2]]and Government of Indiav. Citedal Fine Pharmaceuticals, Madras and others[[3]]. Hefurther contended that assuming that the 1963 Act apply, thepetitioners entered into a fresh contract in the year 2002 byaccepting OTS and paying 50% of the amount on 10.11.1992 andthat fresh period of limitation of 12 years commenced on that day. He further submitted that since the balance payment was made on05.08.2004, fresh period of limitation again commenced from thatdate under Section 19 of the 1963 Act. Since sale notification wasissued on 26.09.2005, contends the counsel, the same was withinthe period of 12 years from 05.08.2004.

In the light of the respective pleadings of the parties, thefollowing points arise for consideration:

1. Whether the provisions of the 1963 Act operate as a bar on the respondents to invoke Section 29 of the 1951Act?

2. Whether the ratio of the judgment of the SupremeCourt in V.R. Kalliyanikutty (1 supra) is applicable tothe case on hand? and

3. If the answer to point Nos.1 and 2 supra are in theaffirmative whether the whole or any part of the loanamount due from the petitioners is barred by limitation?

Re-Point Nos.1 and 2:-

If the findings on these points are rendered against thepetitioners, it would not be necessary to give a finding on pointNo.3.

A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in BombayDyeing & Manufacturing Company Limited v. The State of

Ratio decidendi

Bombay and others[[4]]while interpreting Section 3(1) of theBombay Labour Welfare Fund Act, 1953, which provided fortransfer of various kinds of Funds stipulated in the said provisionwent into the question whether a debt, which is time barred can bethe subject matter of such transfer and realized by process oflaw. It held that it is the settled law of this Country that the statuteof limitation only bars the remedy, but does not extinguish the debtand that when the property is incapable of possession, as forexample, a debt, Section 28 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (Section 27of the 1963 Act) which provides that the period of limitation to aperson for instituting a suit for possession or any property has expired, his right to such property is extinguished, has noapplication. The Supreme Court further held that under Section25(3) of the Contract Act, a barred debt is good consideration for afresh promise to pay the amount. It is apposite to extract therelevant portion of the judgment hereunder:

“Now, it is the settled law of this country that the statute ofLimitation only bars the remedy but does not extinguishthe debt. Section 28 of the Limitation Act provides thatwhen the period limited to a person for instituting a suitfor possession of any property has expired, his right tosuch property is extinguished. And the authorities haveheld - and rightly, that when the property, is incapable ofpossession, as for example, a debt, the section has noapplication, and lapse of time does not extinguish theright of a person thereto. Under S. 25 (3) of the ContractAct, a barred debt is good consideration for a freshpromise to pay the amount. When a debtor makes apayment without any direction as to how it is to beappropriated, the creditor has the right to appropriate ittowards a barred debt. (Vide S. 60 of the Contract Act ). Ithas also been held that a creditor is entitled to recoverthe debt from the surety, even though a suit on it isbarred against the principal debtor. Vide Mahant Singh v.U Ba Yi, 66 Ind App 198: (AIR 1939 PC 110) (F);Subramania Aiyar v. Gopala Aiyar, ILR 33 Mad 30 (G)and Dil Muhammad v. Sain Das, AIR 1927 Lah 396 (H ).And when a creditor has a lien over goods by way ofsecurity for a loan, he can enforce the lien forobtaining satisfaction of the debt, even though anaction thereon would be time-barred. Vide NarendraLal Khan v. Tarubala Dasi, ILR 48 Cal 817 at p. 823:(AIR 1921 Cal 67 at p. 68 ). (I ). That is also the law inEngland. Vide Halsbury's Laws of England (Hailsham'sEdition), Vol. 20, page 602, para 756 and theobservations of Lindley L.J. in Carter v. White, (1883) 25Ch D 666 at p. 672 (J) and of Cotton L.J. in Curwen v.

Milburn, (1889) 42 Ch D 424 at p. 434 (K). In AmericanJurisprudence. Vol. 34, page 314, the law is thus stated.

"A majority of the Courts adhere to the viewthat a statute of limitations as distinguishedfrom a statute which prescribes conditionsprecedent to a right of action, does not go tothe substance of a right, but only to the remedy.It does not extinguish the debt or preclude itsenforcement, unless the debtor chooses toavail himself of the defence and speciallypleads it. An indebtedness does not lose itscharacter as such merely because it is barred;it still affords sufficient consideration to supporta promise to pay, and gives a creditor aninsurable interest.”

In Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 53, page 922, we havethe following statement of the law:

"The general rule, at least with respect to debtsor money demands, is that a statute oflimitation bars, or runs "against, the remedyand does not discharge the debt or extinguishor impair the right, obligation, or cause ofaction.”” (emphasis added)

In my considered opinion, this judgment is the authority forthe proposition that a time barred debt can be recovered by thecreditor by enforcing the lien for obtaining the satisfaction of thedebt even though an action thereon would be time barred.

A two Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Khadi GramUdyog Trust v. Ram Chandraji Virajman Mandir, SarasiyaGhat, Kanpur[[5]]held that the phrase “entire amount of rent” inSection 20 (4) of U.P. Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 would include even rent which cannot berecovered as having been time barred. It is held as under:

“There is ample authority for the proposition that thougha debt is time-barred, it will be a debt due though notrecoverable, the relief being barred by limitation. InHalsbury's Laws of England (Third Edn.) Vol. 24 at p.205, Article 369, it is stated "except in the casespreviously mentioned, the Limitation Act, 1939 only takesaway the remedies by action or by set-off; it leaves theright otherwise untouched and if a creditor whose debt itstatute-barred has any means of enforcing his claimother than by action or set-off, the Act does not preventhim from recovering by those means. The Court ofAppeal in Curwen v. Milburn (1889) 42 Ch D 424 Cotton,L.J. said:

Statute-barred debts are dues, though payment of themcannot be enforced by action.”

The sheet anchor of the petitioners’ case is that inV.R.Kalliyanikutty (1 supra) the Supreme Court held that debtswhich are barred by limitation cannot be recovered by invoking theprovisions of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968 (for short,‘the 1968 Act’) and therefore no coercive steps can be taken bythe respondents to recover the time barred debt from thepetitioners.

In order to appreciate this contention, it is necessary toclosely examine the said judgment. Section 71 of the 1968 Actempowered the State Government, by notification, to declare thatthe provisions of the said Act shall be applicable to the recovery ofamounts due from any person or class of persons to any specifiedinstitution or any class or classes of institutions and thereupon allthe provisions of the said Act shall be applicable to such

recovery. In exercise of the said power, the Kerala Governmentissued notification by which the provisions of the said Act weremade applicable to the recovery of the amounts due from anyperson to any bank on account of any loan advanced to suchperson by that bank for agriculture or non-agricultural purposes. Asimilar notification was also issued by the State Governmentmaking the provisions of the said Act applicable to the recovery ofamounts due from any person or class of persons to the KeralaFinancial Corporation. Out of the four civil appeals filed before theSupreme Court, three were related to the agricultural loans givenby a bank and one appeal pertained to loans given by the KeralaFinancial Corporation. A Division Bench of the Kerala High Courtwhile dealing with the three cases arising out of the agriculturalloans held that in the absence of any provision under the 1968 Act,creating a substantive right to recover time barred debts, the saidAct which provides for summary recovery cannot be availed ofonce the period prescribed for recovery under the 1963 Act hasexpired and another Division Bench followed the said judgment. However, the said two Division Bench judgments were overruledby a Full Bench of the Kerala High Court out of which two civilappeals were filed. Thus, the Supreme Court decided the civilappeals together. In the cases decided by the Supreme Court, thefact that the amount sought to be recovered by invoking theprovisions of the 1968 Act were barred by limitation, was not indispute. The Supreme Court interpreted the words “amounts due”mentioned in Section 71 of the 1968 Act and held that the saidexpression does not include the dues which are time barred andthat the person claiming recovery cannot claim such recovery, ifthe amounts are not legally recoverable. In so holding, the Supreme Court relied upon the judgment of the Privy Council inHansraj Gupta v. Dehra Dun-Mussoorie Electric TramwayCompany Limited[[6]], wherein the Privy Council interpreted thewords “money due” under Section 186 of the Companies Act, 1913and held that the said phrase would only refer to those claims,which are not time barred. The Supreme Court held that the samereasoning, which was given by the Privy Council in the said case,would apply to the cases decided by it.

A close reading of the said judgment indicates that theSupreme Court has come to the said conclusion on the basis ofinterpretation of Section 70, in particular sub-section (3), whichprovides that when the proceedings are taken under the 1968 Actagainst any person for recovery of any sum or money due fromhim, such person may pay the amount claimed to avoid coercivesteps under protest and he shall have the right to institute a suitfor refund of the whole or part of the sum paid by him underprotest. The Supreme Court held that in view of such a righthaving been conferred on him, the person, who paid the amountunder protest, can submit in the suit that the claim against whichthe recovery has been made is time barred and that hence noamount should have been recovered from him. It is apposite toextract the reasoning of the Supreme Court contained in para 11hereunder:

“When the right to file a suit under Section 70(3) isexpressly reserved, there is a necessary implication thatthe shield of limitation available to a debtor in a suit isalso preserved. He cannot, therefore, be deprived of thisright simply by making a recovery under the said actunless there is anything in the Act which expressly brings

about such a result. The provisions of the said Act,however, indicate to the contrary. Moreover, such wideinterpretation of “amount due” which destroys animportant defence available to a debtor in a suit againsthim by the creditor, may attract Article 14 against theAct………..”

The Supreme Court, while dealing with the contention of theState of Kerala that the statute of limitation merely bars theremedy without touching the right and therefore the right to recoverthe loan would remain even though the remedy by way of a suitwould be time barred, observed that though the right to enforce thedebt by judicial process is barred, that right can be exercised inany manner other than by means of a suit and for this, it gave anexample where a creditor’s right to make adjustment against timebarred debt exists. The Supreme Court, however, declined toapply the said principle of law by drawing the distinction on theground that the provisions in the cases decided by it are statutoryprovisions for coercive recovery of “amounts due” and againreiterated preservation of right of the debtor to file a suit for refundof the amounts paid under protest. After analyzing variousprovisions of the 1968 Act, the Supreme Court held as under:

“Looking to the scheme of recovery and refund underSections 70 and 71, “amounts due” under Section 71 arethose amounts which the creditor could have recoveredhad he filed a suit.”

The judgment of the Constitution Bench in Bombay Dyeing& Manufacturing Co., Ltd., (4 supra) was not brought to thenotice of the Supreme Court in Kalliyanikutty (1 supra), thoughthe judgment in Khadi Gram Udyog Trust (5 supra) which, as already, noted made a reference to the said Constitution Benchjudgment was relied upon by the State of Kerala.

On a close analysis of the judgment in Kalliyanikutty (1supra) the conclusion is irresistible that it turned on theinterpretation of the provisions of the 1968 Act, in particularSections 70 (3) and 71 of the said Act. Therefore, in myconsidered view, the said judgment cannot be understood aslaying down a different proposition from the one, which was laiddown in Bombay Dyeing & Manufacturing Co., Ltd., (4 supra).

In the instant case, it is necessary to notice that therespondents have not invoked the provisions of the 1864 Act. Thepetitioners have questioned notice dated 26.09.2005 issued by theCorporation, whereby it informed them that it is taking steps forrecovery of the amounts shown thereunder by sale of their unitunder Section 29 of the 1951 Act by way of advertisement in thenewspapers. There is thus a fundamental difference between thecases decided by the Supreme Court in V.R. Kalliyanikutty (1supra) and the present case. Section 29 of the 1951 Act is asunder:

“29. Rights of Financial Corporation in case ofdefault:- (1) Where any industrial concern, which isunder a liability to the Financial Corporation under anagreement, makes any default in repayment of any loanor advance or any instalment thereof (or in meeting itsobligations in relation to any guarantee given by theCorporation) or otherwise fails to comply with the terms ofits agreement with the Financial Corporation, theFinancial Corporation shall have the right to take over themanagement or possession or both of the industrialconcern, as well as the right to transfer by way of lease orsale and realize the property pledged, mortgaged, hypothecated or assigned to the Financial Corporation.

(2) Any transfer of property made by the FinancialCorporation, in exercise of its powers under sub-section(1), shall vest in the transferee all rights in or to theproperty transferred as if the transfer had been made bythe owner of the property.

(3) The Financial Corporation shall have the same rightsand powers with respect to goods manufactured orproduced wholly or partly from goods forming part of thesecurity held by it as it had with respect to the originalgoods.

(4) Where any action has been taken against anindustrial concern under the provisions of sub-section (1),all costs, charges and expenses which in the opinion ofthe Financial Cororation have been properly incurred byit as incidental thereto shall be recoverable from theindustrial concern and the money which is received by itshall, in the absence of any contract to the contrary, beheld by it in trust to be applied firstly, in payment of suchcosts, charges and expenses and, secondly, in dischargeof the debt due to the Financial Corporation, and theresidue of the money so received shall be paid to thepersons entitled thereto.

(5) Where the Financial Corporation has taken any actionagainst an industrial concern under the provisions of sub-section (1), the Financial Corporation shall be deemed tobe the owner of such concern, for the purposes of suits byor against the concern, and shall sue and be sued in thename of the concern.”

Section 71 of the 1968 Act, which fell for the interpretationof the judgment of the Supreme Court in V.R.Kalliyanikutty (1supra) reads as under:

“71. Power of Government to declare the Actapplicable to any institution:- The Government may, bynotification in the Gazette, declare, if they are satisfiedthat it is necessary to do so in public interest, that theprovisions of this Act shall be applicable to the recoveryof amounts due from any person or class of persons toany specified institution or any class or classes ofinstitutions, and thereupon all the provisions of this Actshall be applicable to such recovery.”

Section 29 of the 1951 Act does not contain the words“amounts due” nor the said Act envisaged a provision such asSection 70(3) of the 1968 Act enabling the debtor to file a suit forrecovery of the amounts paid by him under protest. In this contextit is worth noticeable that the 1951 Act provides for various modesof recovery of money besides Section 29. One such mode ofrecovery is provided for under Section 32-G, which reads asunder:

“32-G Recovery of amounts due to the FinancialCorporation as an arrear of land revenue:- Where anyamount is due to the Financial Corporation in respect ofany accommodation granted by it to any industrialconcern, the Financial Corporation or any personauthorized by it in writing in this behalf, may, withoutprejudice to any other mode of recovery, make anapplication to the State Government for the recovery ofthe amount due to it, and if the State Government orsuch authority, as that Government may specify in thisbehalf, is satisfied, after following such procedure as maybe prescribed, that any amount is so due, it may issue acertificate for that amount to the Collector, and theCollector shall proceed to recover that amount in thesame manner as an arrear of land revenue.” (emphasisadded)

Under 52-A of the 1864 Act, on the notification being issuedby the State Government all loans granted and all advances madeto any person by the Corporation established by or under a Centralor Provincial or State Act, or Government Company etc., may berecovered in the same manner as arrears of land revenue underthe provisions of the said Act.

It is obviously in such situations where Section 32-G isinvoked that the judgment in Kalliyanikutty (1 supra) may getattracted because a similar expression “amounts due” is alsocontained in the said Section.

Conclusion

Indeed, in N.A. Radha and others v. State of AndhraPradesh, Revenue Department and others[[7]]the learned SingleJudge of this Court followed the judgment in Kalliyanikutty (1supra). In that case the A.P. State Financial Corporation soughtto recover the time barred loan under Section 52-A of the 1864Act. Though the learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon thesaid judgment, for the reasons that the respondents have notinitiated any proceedings under the 1864 Act in the instant caseand that action is sought to be taken under Section 29 of the 1951Act, the said judgment has no application to the present case.

The judgments in The Kerala State Electricity Board,Trivandrum v. T.P. Kunhaliumma (2 supra) and Government ofIndia v. Citedal Fine Pharmaceuticals, Madras and others (3supra) cited by the learned Standing Counsel for the Corporationhave not much relevance and hence they are not discussed.

On the analysis above-made, I hold that the provisions of the 1963 Act do not bar the respondents from invoking theprovisions of Section 29 of the 1951 Act to recover a time barredloan and the judgment in Kalliyanikutty (1 supra) has noapplication to the facts of the present case. Point Nos.1 and 2 areanswered accordingly.

In view of the findings on point Nos.1 and 2, it is notnecessary to deal with point No.3. The learned counsel for thepetitioner has not argued any other point.

In the result, the writ petition is dismissed.

As a sequel to dismissal of the writ petition,WPMP.No.35504 of 2005 filed by the petitioners for interim relief isalso dismissed.

C.V. NAGARJUNA REDDY, J

Date: 24.12.2007.ES

LR copies to be marked.

[1]1999 (3) SCC 657[2]AIR 1977 SC 282[3]1989 (3) SCC 483[4]AIR 1958 SC 328[5](1978) 1 SCC 44[6]AIR 1933 PC 63[7]2000 (2) ALT 484