Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited vs Gujarat Electricity Regulatory Commission on 28 September 2026

ORDER

IA-274 of 2026 (For leave to file appeal)

1. The Applicants/Appellants are, by way of this application, seeking leave to file appeal against the order dated 10th November, 2025 passed by the 1st Respondent – Gujarat Electricity Regulatory Commission (hereinafter referred to as “the Commission”) in petition No. 2491 of 2025 filed by 3rd Respondent. It would be relevant to note here that the Appellants were not a party to the said petition before the Commission but are claiming to be “parties aggrieved” by the said impugned order of the Commission and accordingly have sought permission to challenge the said order of the Commission in this appeal.

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2. The Appellant No. 1 – Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. (in short GUVNL) is a company incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 and undertakes the functions of bulk purchase of Electricity from the generators as well as other sources and bulk supply of electricity to the distribution licensees in the State of Gujarat. The Appellant Nos. 2 to 5 are the Distribution Licensees within the State of Gujarat.

3. The 2nd Respondent – M/s Torrent Power Limited is also a Distribution Licensees in the State of Gujarat operating in the areas of Surat and Ahmedabad.

4. The 3rd Respondent- Gujarat Energy Transmission Corporation Limited (in short “GETCO”) is a transmission licensee as well as State Transmission Utility (STU) in the State of Gujarat. The State Load Despatch Centre (in short “SLDC”) is a separate devision of GETCO discharging independent functions enumerated in the Electricity Act, 2003.

5. It appears that the Respondent No. 3 – GETCO had filed a petition bearing No. 2419 of 2024 for true up for Financial Year 2023-24 and determination of ARR as well as tariff for Financial Year 2025-26 to Financial Year 2029-30. The 2nd Respondent had filed its objections to the said petition on the issue of levy of Short Term Open Access (STOA) charges. Upon following usual course in the said tariff petition which included conducting public hearing, the petition was disposed of by the

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Commission vide order dated 29th March, 2025. With regards to the issue No. 10 formulated in the said petition relating to determination of transmission charges, against which objections had been filed by 2nd Respondent, the Commission observed that the matter is important and needs to be examined in depth. Accordingly, it suggested 2nd Respondent to file separate petition on this aspect.

6. In terms of the suggestion made by the Commission in the above noted tariff order dated 29th March, 2025, the 2nd Respondent filed petition bearing No.2491 of 2025 before the Commission seeking direction to 3rd Respondent – GETCO to; (a) Refund past period STOA charges as recovered from it for the period Financial Year 2017-18 to Financial Year 2024-25 and;

(b) Treat all the Distribution Licensees including 2nd Respondent uniformally for recovery of STOA charges for future period.

7. This petition has been allowed by the Commission vide order dated 10th November, 2025 thereby directing as under :- “(a) GETCO shall adhere to Open Access mechanism for grant of Short Term Open access and levy of STOA charges without any discrimination in line with the provisions of GERC Open Access Regulations.

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(b) GETCO/SLDC is directed to implement the decision in Para No (a) above and file compliance affidavit within 2 months from the date of this Order.

(c) GETCO/SLDC shall verify the claims of the Petitioners and refund the STOA Charges recovered from TPL – Ahmedabad and Surat for Inter-State Short Term Bilateral and Power Exchange Open Access Transactions w.e.f. 01.04.2017 till the date of this Order to pass on to TPL Ahmedabad and Surat consumers.”

8. The Appellants seek to institute the instant appeal against the said order dated 10th November, 2025.

9. The grounds upon which the Appellants are seeking leave to file appeal against the said order dated 10th November, 2025 of the Commission have been stated in paragraph No. 5 of application which is extracted hereinbelow :- “5. In view of the above, Applicants have also filed an Appeal before the Hon'ble APTEL. (DFR No. 70 of 2026). It is the submission of the Applicants that the State Commission has ordered refund of STOA transmission charges to Torrent Power on the alleged ground that such charges were not being levied on Applicants, in complete ignorance of the fact that Applicants

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are the bulk procurer of power in the State and the holding company of the State Distribution Licensees, who bear the transmission charges of GETCO on a residual basis. Any refund of STOA charges to Torrent Power results in a corresponding increase in the transmission burden on Applicants, thereby causing financial prejudice to them. Further, the State Commission has recorded findings on the GUVNL's Transmission Service Agreement, nature of open access and alleged differential treatment, without impleading them, making it a necessary and affected party. Applicants are therefore seeking the leave to file the present appeal.”

10. We have heard Mr. Anand K. Ganesan, Learned Counsel for the Appellants/Applicants and Ms. Deepa Chawan, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of 2nd Respondent. We have also perused written submissions filed by the Learned Counsels.

11. Here it would be pertinent to note that Ms. Mandakini Ghosh, Learned Counsel for 3rd Respondent – GETCO submitted that she does not oppose the instant application.

12. Learned Counsel for the Appellants/applicants strenuously argued that Appellants were necessary party to the petition before the Commission in which the impugned order has been passed but were not made parties to the same despite specific objections having been raised by the 3rd

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Respondent – GETCO. He would submit that since Appellant No. 1 is the bulk procurer of power in the State of Gujarat on behalf of Appellant Nos. 2 to 5 which are Distribution Licensees in the State, the Appellants bear the aggregate revenue requirement of GETCO on a residual basis and any recovery from the other open access consumers reduced the burden of the Appellants. It is submitted that consequently, any reduction in the charges qua open access consumers increases the burden on the Appellants. Her submission is that any refund of STOA charges to 2nd Respondent and future non-payment of such charges by 2nd Respondent would result in corresponding increase in the financial burden on the Appellants thereby causing financial prejudice to them. She would further argue that the Commission, in the impugned order, has discussed the terms of Transmission Service Agreement (TSA) dated 1st April, 2005 to which the Appellants are signatories which could not have been done without impleading the Appellants as parties.

13. According to the Learned Counsel, the Appellants are “aggrieved persons” within ambit of the said term used in Section 111 of the Electricity Act, 2003 and thus, are entitled to file the instant appeal challenging the above noted order dated 10th November, 2025. She would place a reliance upon the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation for Greater Bombay vs. Lala Pancham and Ors. (1965) 1 SCR 542:AIR 1965 SC 1008 and judgement of this Tribunal in Emmar MGF Construction

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Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Delhi Electricity Regulatory Commission in Appeal No. 123 of 2008 decided on 8th September, 2009 to canvass that the phrase “Person Aggrieved” must be given widest amplitude.

14. Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the 2nd Respondent vehemently refuted the submissions of the Learned Counsel for the Appellants. She argued that the Appellants were neither proper nor necessary party to the petition before the Commission as no relief was sought against them. She further argued that the Appellants cannot claim to be parties aggrieved by the impugned order of the Commission as no directions have been issued to them and the directions have been issued only to the 3rd Respondent – GETCO. According to the Learned Senior Counsel, except a bald assertion that the Appellants bear the transmission charges of GETCO on residual basis, no material has been produced on behalf of the Appellants to substantiate the said claim. It is also her submission that the 2nd Respondent in its petition before the Commission, had not sought exemption from payment of STOA charges and on the contrary, prayer was for no discrimination amongst the consumers of private as well as State Discoms in payment of STOA charges and by the impugned order, the Commission has only directed GETCO to levy STOA charges without any discrimination in terms of GERC Open Access Regulations. She pointed out that the Commission found that the 2nd Respondent did not utilise the state network for STOA and accordingly

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directed GETCO to verify such claim and to refund STOA charges recovered from 2nd Respondent which were party for procurement of inter- state bilateral power exchange consumptions starting from 1st April, 2017 till the date of the impugned order. She argued that the claim of 2nd Respondent for refund was with regards to the charges recovered by the GETCO without utilization of GETCO network by the 2nd Respondent and therefore, Appellants cannot establish any co-relation to refund of any such charges by GETCO to 2nd Respondent.

15. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the Appellants had knowledge, even prior to the passing of the impugned order by the Commission, about the objection raised by GETCO with regards to the discriminatory methodology employed by GETCO for levy of STOA charges but the Appellants chose to remain silent and did not act thereby acquiescing in passing of the tariff order dated 29th March, 2025 on the tariff petition of GETCO as well as order dated 25th March, 2026 whereby ARR of 2nd Respondent was approved for Financial Year 2026-27. She also cited the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in H. Anjanappa and ors. Vs. A. Prabhakar and ors. 2025 SCC online SC 183 to canvass that only that person can prefer an appeal with the leave of the appellate court who is adversely affected by the judgement and decree sought to be appealed against and who was not a party to the original proceedings.

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16. We have considered the rival submissions of the Learned Counsels and have perused impugned order of the Commission as well as the relevant record.

17. Sub-Section (1) of the 111 of the Electricity Act, 2003 specifies who can approach this Tribunal by way of appeal against an order of the Commission and the same is extracted hereinbelow:- “Section 111. (Appeal to Appellate Tribunal): ---

(1) Any person aggrieved by an order made by an adjudicating officer under this Act (except under section 127) or an order made by the Appropriate Commission under this Act may prefer an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity:

Provided that any person appealing against the order of the adjudicating officer levying any penalty shall, while filing the appeal , deposit the amount of such penalty:

Provided further that wherein any particular case, the Appellate Tribunal is of the opinion that the deposit of such penalty would cause undue hardship to such person, it may dispense with such deposit subject to such conditions as it may deem fit to impose so as to safeguard the realisation of penalty.”

18. The plain reading of this legal provision reveals that a person who is aggrieved by the order of the Commission is competent to file appeal against that order before this Tribunal. Therefore, a person who was a party to the proceedings before the Commission and feels aggrieved by the order passed by the Commission, has a statutory right to approach this Tribunal by way of appeal under Section (1) of 111 of the Electricity Act, 2003. However, in case a person, who was not a party to the proceedings before the Commission but claims to be aggrieved by any order of the Commission

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can assail the said order of the Commission before this Tribunal by way of an appeal only after seeking leave of this Tribunal. What is important to bear in mind is that any such person seeking leave of this Tribunal to file an appeal against an order of the Commission, must satisfy this Tribunal, before such leave is granted to him that he is in any manner aggrieved by the said order. So, essentially, it is only that person who succeeds in demonstrating that he has been affected by the order of the Commission, who can seek leave of this Court to assail the said order. “Aggrieved” means “Wronged”, “Harmed”, “Affected”, “Injured” etc. Thus, the person seeking leave of this Tribunal to file an appeal against the Commission’s order must demonstrate as to in what manner he is harmed or injured by that order.

19. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in H. Anjanappa judgement (supra) has held that only where a judgement and decree prejudicially affected a person who is not a party to the proceedings, that person can prefer an appeal with the leave of that Appellate court. Further, upon referring to several previous decisions of the apex court, following principles governing the grant of leave to appeal have been succinctly evolved in the said judgement; “i. Sections 96 and 100 of the CPC respectively provide for preferring an appeal from an original decree or decree in appeal respectively;

ii. The said provisions do not enumerate the categories of persons who can file an appeal;

iii. However, it a settled legal proposition that a stranger cannot be permitted to file an appeal in any proceedings unless he satisfies the

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court that he falls within the category of an aggrieved person;

iv. It is only where a judgment and decree prejudicially affects a person who is not a party to the proceedings, he can prefer an appeal with the leave of the court; v. A person aggrieved, to file an appeal, must be one whose right is affected by reason of the judgment and decree sought to be impugned;

vi. The expression “person aggrieved” does not include a person who suffers from a psychological or an imaginary injury;

vii. It would be improper to grant leave to appeal to every person who may in some remote or indirect way be prejudicially affected by a decree or judgment; and viii. Ordinarily leave to appeal should be granted to persons who, though not parties to the proceedings, would be bound by the decree or judgment in that proceeding and who would be precluded from attacking its correctness in other proceedings.

20. Even though, the said judgement has been rendered by the Apex Court in the context of Sections 96 & 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, yet the above noted principles so evolved therein can profitably be applied to the appeals under Section 111 of the Electricity Act, 2003 before this Tribunal also for the reason that the power of the District Judge as well as High Court hearing first appeals against the original decree of a Civil Judge or a District Judge, as the case may be, are akin to the powers of this Tribunal under Section 111 of the Act.

21. In the instant case, the impugned order dated 10th November, 2025 has been rendered by the Commission on a petition filed by 2nd Respondent

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wherein the 2nd Respondent had prayed for refund of past period STOA charges recovered from it by GETCO for the period from Financial Year 2017-18 and Financial Year 2024-25 with further direction to GETCO to treat all Distribution Licensees including 2nd Respondent uniformally for recovery of STOA charges for future period. The petition has been allowed by the Commission and appropriate directions, as noted in paragraph No. 6 hereinabove, have been issued to GETCO. We were informed during the hearing of the application that the GETCO has already filed a compliance affidavit dated 8th January, 2026 to the effect that they would adhere to open access mechanism for grant of STOA and levy of STOA charges without any discrimination in line with the provisions of GERC Open Access Regulations. It has further been stated in the affidavit that modality for implementation of mechanism for grant of STOA and levy of STOA charges are being worked out. Importantly, the GETCO also has stated in its affidavit that claims submitted by 2nd Respondent have been verified and found to be in order.

22. It is, thus, manifest that neither was any relief sought by the 2nd Respondent in the petition before the Commission against the Appellants/Applicants nor was any direction issued by the Commission to the Appellants/Applicants in the impugned order. The issue before the Commission was whether there had been any discrimination between the State Discoms and private discoms with regards to the levy of STOA

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charges, as contended by the 2nd Respondent in its petition, which has been answered by the Commission in the impugned order. The directions to GETCO to refund the past period STOA charges recovered by it from 2nd Respondent was only a consequential one. In these circumstances, we are unable to comprehend as to how the Appellants claim to be affected or aggrieved by the impugned order of the Commission.

23. Learned Counsel for the Appellants/Applicants argued that since they are paying the state transmission charges on residual basis, they are an “affected party” as the reduction in charges for STOA qua the 2nd Respondent would increase the financial burden upon the Appellants. We do not see any force in this argument. The fallacy of this argument is evident from the fact that the Commission has directed the refund of STOA charges recovered by GETCO from the 2nd Respondent while observing that the 2nd Respondent was not utilising the state network which is indicated in the paragraph No. 26 of the impugned order:- “26. As regards refund of STOA Charges paid by TPI, for past period, we have noted that TPL has direct connectivity with ISTS Network. TPL has also claimed that it does not utilise State Network for short term Open Access and stated that the same can be verified by GETCO from the data available with GETCO. GETCO is the owner of Transmission Network and has details of imports/exports

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at various interconnection points with ISTS as well as TPL. In our view, the aspect of intelligible differentia also supports the prayer of the Petitioner for refund of STOA charges, particularly when the Petitioner has not been utilizing the Intra-state Network of GETCO for sourcing of power through STOA in addition to the ground to give uniform treatment to the consumers of State DISCOMs and TPL. Accordingly, we direct GETCO to verify the claim of TPL within 2 months from the date of this order. Upon verification of STOA charges recovered from TPL, GETCO should refund such STOA Charges paid for procurement of inter-state bilateral and Power Exchange Transactions starting from 01.04.2017 till the date of this Order for Inter-State Short Term Bilateral and Power Exchange Open Access Transmissions in six equal monthly instalments.”

24. Manifestly, the Commission did not grant blanket exemption to the 2nd Respondent and had directed the 3rd Respondent GETCO to verify such claim of 2nd Respondent. As already noted hereinabove, the 3rd Respondent – GETCO had verified the claim of 2nd Respondent for refund of STOA charges in terms of the impugned order of the Commission and has found

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the same to be in order. Under these circumstances also, it is difficult to say that the Appellants are “affected” or “aggrieved” by the impugned order .

25. It is true that the 3rd Respondent – GETCO had objected to the maintainability of the petition before the Commission on account of non- impleadment of State Distribution Licensees i.e. the Appellants. In our opinion, the objection has been rightly over-ruled by the Commission in the impugned order upon observing that the 2nd Respondent has not sought any relief against the State Discoms and that the STOA charges recovered by SLDC are approved by the Commission in the tariff order in relation to GETCO. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the Appellants appear to have been aware about the proceedings of the petition before the Commission but instead of initiating steps for being impleaded in those proceedings, chose to maintain silence. Therefore, having chosen to avoid seeking implementation before the Commission, the Appellants cannot be heard to raise their non-impleadment as a ground for seeking leave to appeal.

26. Even if, for the sake of arguments, it is assumed that the Appellants are “aggrieved parties” with regards to the impugned order of the Commission, it is to be noted that they had three opportunities to participate in the proceedings before the Commission on the aspect on which they are seeking to assail the impugned order in this appeal. First such occasion was on 24th February, 2025 when public hearing was conducted by the

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Commission in the tariff petition filed by GETCO i.e. case No. 2419 of 2024. 2nd such occasion was when the Commission passed order dated 29th March, 2025 in the said tariff petition of GETCO suggesting the 2nd Respondent to file a separate petition with regards to its objection to the discriminatory levy of STOA charges. 3rd such occasion was when the 2nd Respondent filed petition No. 2491 of 2025 in which the impugned order has been passed. 4th such occasion was subsequent to the passing of the impugned order when the order dated 25th March, 2026 was passed by the Commission on the petition of 2nd Respondent for Financial Year 2026-27, duly factoring the refund as per the impugned order. Pertinently, the said order dated 25th March, 2026 has not been challenged by the Appellants. It is not the case of the Appellants that they were oblivious about all these proceedings or did not have any occasion to get knowledge about these proceedings. Undisputedly, public notices were issued in all these petitions and public hearings were held, as is a mandatory requirement.

27. The Appellants appear to have consciously decided not to participate any of these proceedings concerning the discriminatory levy of STOA charges, as contended by the 2nd Respondent, which indicates that they were not vigilant in exercising their legal rights and, therefore, are precluded from seeking leave of this Court to assail the impugned order of the Commission now when it has already been implemented.

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28. With regards to the contentions on behalf of the Appellants that they were signatories to the TSA dated 1st April, 2005 and, therefore, ought to have been impleaded as parties before the Commission, it would be suffice to note that the Commission has not passed any operative order with regards to the TSA and, therefore, non-impleadment of the Appellants does not affect the legality of the impugned order.

29. Reliance on behalf of the Appellants on the Emmar MGF case (supra) and Municipal Corporation of Bombay case (supra) is totally misplaced. In the Emmar case, the Appellant Emmar MGF Construction Pvt. Ltd. was an aggrieved person as it had to comply with the impugned order. At the same time, this Tribunal in that case held the Government of NCT of Delhi not to be a necessary party to the appeal as the interest of the Government was not adversely affected by the order appealed therein. Thus, in a way, this judgement supports the case of the 2nd Respondent and does not advance the case of the Appellants. In so far as the Municipal Corporation judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court is concerned, the apex court noted that the exercise of power by the Municipal Corporation would affect the interest of a class or classes of persons as the proceedings are not inter se, “parties ranged on opposite sides”, which is not the case herein.

30. In the light of the above discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the Appellants do not fall in the category of “aggrieved person” as neither has any direction been issued against them in the impugned order

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nor are they in any manner affected by the impugned order of the Commission. As held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in H. Anjanappa judgement, it would not be appropriate to grant leave to appeal to every person who may in some remote or indirect way be prejudicially affected by the orders sought to be appealed against. The Appellants would, at best, fall into such category and, therefore, are not entitled to leave to appeal.

31. Resultantly, we do not find any merit in the instant application. The same is hereby dismissed. However, we make it clear that our observations in this order are confined to the instant application alone whereby Appellants had sought leave to appeal and no such observations shall be construed as our opinion on the merits of the case. DFR No. 70 of 2026

32. In view of the dismissal of the IA No. 274 of 2026, whereby the Appellants had sought leave to appeal, the instant appeal also stands dismissed as not maintainable. Pronounced in the open court on this 28th day of September , 2026.

Virender Bhat Judicial Member

Seema Gupta Officiating Chairperson

✓ REPORTABLE / NON REPORTABLE js