Chamundeshwari Electricity Supply Corporation Limited vs Adani Green Energy (UP) Limited & Ors. on 15 July 2026

ORDER

PER HON’BLE MR. VIRENDER BHAT, JUDICIAL MEMBER

1. M/s. Chamundeshwari Electricity Supply Corporation Ltd. which is a Distribution Licensee in the State of Karnataka has sought review of common judgement dated 14th May, 2024 passed by this Tribunal in Appeal Nos. 181 of 2020, 235 of 2020, 247 of 2020, 1 of 2021, 125 of 2022, 130 of 2022, 166 of 2022 and 192 of 2022 whereby this Tribunal held that the delay on the part of the Appellant M/s Adgani Green Energy (UP) Limited (Respondent No. 1 in this Review Petition) in achieving Scheduled Commercial Operation Date (SCOD) of the solar power project was occasioned by the circumstances beyond its control constituting Force Majeure events entitling it for extension of timelines as per the Power Purchase Agreement executed by it with Discoms. Consequently, the Impugned orders of the Commission were set aside and Appellant was held entitled to tariff at the rate of Rs.4.79 per unit. At the same time, the Respondent -Discoms were directed to refund the entire

amount to the Appellants which had been deducted as liquidated damages from its invoices.

2. We may note here that the said judgement dated 14th May, 2024 had been assailed by the Review Petitioner before the Hon’ble Supreme Court by way of Civil Appeal Nos. 2722 of 2025, 2723 of 2025, 2724 of 2025, 2725 of 2025, 2726 of 2025, 2727 of 2025, 2728 of 2025, 2729 of 2025, 2730 of 2025, 2731 of 2025 and 2732 of 2025 which came to be dismissed vide order dated 17th February, 2025. However, while dismissing the civil appeals, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, at the request of Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Review Petitioner, granted it liberty to file a review on the factual errors apparent on the face of record as conveyed by the Learned Senior Counsel. We feel it apposite to reproduce the said order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as under :- “Delay condoned.

Heard the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants.

We are not inclined to interfere with the impugned judgment as in an earlier Civil Appeal being Gulbarga Electricity Supply Company Limited v. Adani Green Energy (U.P.) Limited & Ors. [Civil Appeal No. 8331 of 2024]

pertaining to the very same issues raised and involved before us in the present civil appeals, this Court has already refused interfere with the impugned judgment. In view of the above, we are inclined to dismiss the present civil appeals, being devoid of merits.

Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants would submit that there are few factual errors apparent on the face of record in the impugned judgment and, therefore, liberty may be given to the appellants to file a review only on those aspects.

We make it clear that the present civil appeals, are dismissed. However, limited liberty is given to the appellants to seek a review before the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity on the factual error, if any, that has occurred within the parameters of review for an error apparent on the face of the record.

For the aforesaid reason, a limited liberty is also given to the appellants to challenge the impugned judgment, in the event that the review applications filed by the appellants are dismissed, touching upon any factual error apparent on the face of the record.

Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.”

3. Thus, a limited liberty has been given to the Review Petitioner to seek review of the judgement in question, before this Tribunal on the factual errors, if any, that have occurred within the parameters of review or an error apparent on the face of record.

4. Accordingly, the instant Review Petition has been filed by the petitioner.

5. We have heard Learned Counsels appearing for the parties and have perused the record. Our Analysis:

6. At the outset, we may note that Section 114 of CPC is the substantive provision dealing with scope of review and is quoted below:- “114. Review. —Subject as aforesaid, any person considering himself aggrieved—

(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed by this Code, but from which no appeal has been preferred.

(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is

allowed by this Code, or

(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order, and the Court may make such order thereon as it thinks fit.”

7. The grounds on which review of a judgment / order can be sought, have been specified in Order XLVII of the CPC which are reproduced hereinbelow: - “1. Application for review of judgment. — (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved—

(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred, (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or

(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court

of Small Causes, and who, from the

discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order.

(2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can present to the Appellate Court the case on which he applied for the review.

Explanation.—The fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior Court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment.” (Emphasis supplied)

8. A bare reading of these relevant legal provisions would make it clear that an application for review of a judgment / order is maintainable upon (i) discovery of a new and important matter or evidence which, after exercise of due diligence, was not within the knowledge of the review applicant or could not be produced by him when the judgment / order was passed; or (ii) on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of record; or (iii) for any other sufficient reason.

9. The expression “error apparent on the face of record” used in Order XLVII Rule 1 indicates an error which is self-evident and staring in the eye. Any error or mistake which is not self-evident and has to be deducted from a process of reasoning cannot be said to be an error apparent on the face of record justifying exercise of

power of review. Power of review can be exercised only where a glaring omission or a patent mistake is found in the order under review. We may also note that the power of review can be exercised only for correction of a patent mistake but not to substitute a view for the reason that a review petition cannot be permitted to be an appeal in disguise.

10. In a recent judgment dated 08.09.2025 passed in Malleeswari v. K. Suguna and Anr. SLP (C) No. 12787 of 2025 (2025 INSC 1080) Hon'ble Supreme Court has reiterated that court’s power to review its own previous order is strictly limited to correcting errors apparent on the face of the record and not to rehear or substitute a different view as if it were an appeal. It has been held in the said judgment that the power of review is different from appellate power and is subject to the following limitations to maintain the finality of the judicial decisions:

“15.1 The review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC.

15.2 Review is not to be confused with appellate powers, which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court.

15.3 In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be reheard and corrected. A review petition, it must be remembered, has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be an appeal in disguise.

15.4 The power of review can be exercised for the correction of a mistake, but not to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits specified in the statute governing the exercise of power.

15.5 The review court does not sit in appeal over its own order. A rehearing of the matter is impermissible. It constitutes an exception to the general rule that once a judgment is signed or pronounced, it should not be altered. Hence, it is

invoked only to prevent a miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors.”

11. Further, after noticing the distinction between power of review and appellate power, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has succinctly summed up the grounds of review as under: - “17.1 The ground of discovery of new and important matter or evidence is a ground available if it is demonstrated that, despite the exercise of due diligence, this evidence was not within their knowledge or could not be produced by the party at the time, the original decree or order was passed.

17.2 Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record may be invoked if there is something more than a mere error, and it must be the one which is manifest on the face of the record. Such an error is a patent error and not a mere wrong decision. An error which has to be established by a long-drawn process of reasoning on points

where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record.

17.3 Lastly, the phrase 'for any other sufficient reason' means a reason that is sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the other two categories.”

12. We may also note that in the words of Justice Krishna Iyer (as his Lordship then was), “a plea of review, unless the first judicial view is manifestly distorted, is like asking for the Moon. A forensic defeat cannot be avenged by an invitation to have a second look, hopeful of discovery of flows and reversal of result. A review in the counsel’s mentation cannot repair the verdict once given. So, the law laid down must rest in peace.” (See Ghanshyam Mishra & Sons (P) Ltd v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd. (2021) 9 SCC 657).

13. Learned Senior Counsel for the Review Petitioner has drawn our attention to paragraph Nos. 45 & 49 of the judgement under review to argue that the observations contained therein are contradictory to each other. It is submitted that this Tribunal has held in paragraph No. 49 that in the absence of approval by the

Commission, the date of signing of the supplementary PPA could be taken as the “Effective Date” which is contrary to the observations made in paragraph No. 45 to the effect that supplementary PPA also requires approval from the Commission to come into effect. It is argued that these contradictory findings in the two paragraphs constitute error apparent on the fact of record which needs to be rectified in these review proceedings.

14. It is true that in paragraph No. 45, we have noted the legal position that when the law requires a PPA executed between a Power Developer and Discom to be approved by the concerned Regulatory Commission before its becoming effective, a supplementary PPA executed in pursuance to or dehors any directions/suggestions of the Commission shall also need approval of the Commission before coming into effect. However, in paragraph No. 49, we have noted that the supplementary PPA has remained to be approved by the Commission because of erroneous interpretation of the legal requirement by the Commission and since the rights & obligations of the parties are governed by the terms of the supplementary PPA, the same can be taken to have come into effect from the date of its execution.

15. Therefore, both these paragraphs relate to distinct aspects. Paragraph 45 records the legal position whereas paragraph 49 addresses the issue of determination of the “Effective Date” for computation of contractual timelines in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Hence, it can’t be said that any observation in these two paragraphs constitutes an error apparent on the face of record, as canvassed on behalf of the Review Petitioner. Moreover, it is to be noted that these observations/findings have already been approved by the Hon’ble Supreme Court while dismissing the civil appeals preferred by the Review Petitioner as noted hereinabove.

16. Next, it is argued by the Learned Senior Counsel for the Review Petitioner that this Tribunal has erred in holding KPTCL delayed grant of evacuation approval in favour of Respondent No. 1. It is argued that this Tribunal has failed to appreciate that the application for evacuation of power was submitted by Respondent No. 1 on 14th July, 2016 i.e. before the approval of PPA by the Commission which happened on 27th September, 2016 and the tentative evacuation was granted by KPTCL on 27th October, 2016 i.e. only one month after the approval of PPA. It is argued that thus KPTCL has issued the evacuation approval within reasonable time and before the date of achieving conditions precedent (i.e. 27th July, 2017). It is further

pointed out that KPTCL granted final evacuation approval on 5th December, 2016 and thus the Respondent No. 1 had to achieve the conditions precedent by 26th July, 2017 and, therefore, there has been no delay on the part of the KPTCL in granting such approval. It is submitted that findings in this regard that such delay constitutes Force Majeure event appear to be patently erroneous on the face of record and, therefore, cannot be sustained.

17. Further submission of the Learned Counsel for the Review Petitioner is that even if it is assumed for the sake of arguments that KPTCL had delayed granting the evacuation approval, then also the default is on the part of the KPTCL which is not even a party to the PPA and therefore, the Review Petitioner cannot be penalized for any such default on the part of KPTCL. It is submitted that the appropriate relief available to Respondent No. 1 in these circumstances was under Article 1.7 and not Article 1.4 of the PPA. On this aspect reliance is placed on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chamundeshwari Electricity Supply Company Ltd. v. Saisudhir Energy (Chitradurga) Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1816.

18. In this regard, it is to be noted that these very submissions have been considered and discussed by this Tribunal in paragraph Nos. 55 & 56 of the judgement. We have observed that even if it is accepted

that KPTCL had granted tentative evacuation scheme as well as regular evacuation scheme approvals in reasonable time still it was difficult for the developers i.e 1st Respondent to proceed further with the project before receipt of final approval of the evacuation scheme which happened only in December, 2016.

19. In para 61 of the judgement under review, we have referred to the letter dated 28th July, 2017 addressed in this regard by the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, Government of India to the State Governments stating that competent authority only can allow extension of time as per contractual agreements on account of delay in connectivity approvals as well as land conversion. In paragraph No. 62 of the judgement under review, while relying upon the earlier judgement of this Tribunal in Chennamangathihalli Solar Power Project LLP and Ors. Vs. BESCOM and Ors. 2020 SCC Online APTEL 75, this Tribunal has observed that delay in grant of approvals by the Government instrumentalities constitutes Force Majeure event entitling the developers for extension of SCOD.

20. Notably, these findings have been affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court while dismissing the civil appeals filed by the Review Petitioner.

21. Hence, we do not find any error in the judgement under review on this ground also as agitated on behalf of the review petitioner.

22. Next ground on which review of the judgement dated 14th May, 2024 is sought by the Review Petitioner is that this Tribunal has erred in holding that KREDL delayed grant of land conversion in favour of Respondent No. 1. Learned Counsel for Review Petitioner submitted that Respondent No. 1 applied to KREDL on 25th May, 2017 for land conversion i.e. just two months prior to achieving conditions precedent with incomplete documents which was highlighted for KREDL vide letters dated 7th June, 2017 and 23rd March, 2019, but Respondent No. 1 did not respond to the same. It is further submitted that after lapse of 14 months from the date of achieving the conditions precedent, Respondent No. 1 applied to Deputy Commissioner, Mysuru on 4th September, 2018 for deemed conversion which shows that Respondent No. 1 failed to hold title of the land within the stipulated time. It is argued that these facts indicate that Respondent No. 1 alone is at fault for having applied for land conversion belatedly and that too without requisite document. It is argued that evidently Respondent No. 1 failed to pursue the land acquisition and conversion in a timely manner for which KREDL cannot be held

responsible and therefore, the findings on this aspect in the judgment under review suffers from a patent error which needs to be rectified.

23. In this regard, we note that in view of the circular dated 22nd February, 2016 issued by the Government of Karnataka, KREDL was to obtain agricultural land from the agriculturists and to make the same available to the developers for sub-lease. We have noted this fact in paragraph No. 59 of the judgement under review and have observed that on account of delay on the part of the KREDL in completing the said process to make agricultural land available to the 1st Respondent on sub-lease, the 1st Respondent was constrained to approach KREDL on 25th May, 2017 for such approval/sub-lease. In paragraph No. 60, we have noted that nothing has been brought to our notice from the record to show that KREDL had obtained the agricultural land from the land owners on lease basis more than 60 days before the date on which conditions precedent had to be achieved by 1st Respondent. We have noted that before holding the 1st Respondent responsible, it was necessary for KREDL and KPTCL to specify the dates on which the land had been obtained on lease from the agriculturists and the 1st Respondent was asked to take on sub-lease. In the absence of any such evidence of record, we did not find it appropriate to hold the 1st Respondent responsible for delay in

taking necessary approvals from the concerned authorities for taking the land required for the power project on sub-lease and obtaining conversion of the land use from agricultural to non-agricultural. Even nothing in this regard has been pointed out from the record by the Learned Counsel for the Review Petitioner during the course of arguments on this Review Petition also.

24. Therefore, the argument that the judgement under review suffers from any error apparent on the face of record on this aspect is absolutely baseless and devoid of any merit.

25. Another ground urged on behalf of the Review Petitioner by the Learned Senior Counsel is that this Tribunal in the judgement under review, while holding Respondent No. 1 entitled to refund of entire amount that has been deducted as liquidated damages, has erred in granting carrying cost on such amount for the reason that the 1st Respondent had not claimed carrying cost either before the Commission or before this Tribunal in the appeal. It is argued that any relief not sought by a party in the appeal ought not to have been granted by this Tribunal.

26. In this regard, we may note that direction given to the Review Petitioner to refund the entire amount to the Appellants along with carrying cost was a conscious decision of this Tribunal considering

the principle of time value of money as elucidated by this Tribunal as well as by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the catena of judgements. This direction cannot be considered as an error apparent on the face of record and could have only been assailed by way of the statutory appeal. We may note that the right of statutory appeal has already been availed by the Review Petitioner by filing of civil appeals before the Hon’ble Supreme Court against the judgement under review, as already noted herein above, which have been dismissed and, therefore, the Review Petitioner is precluded from agitating this aspect again before this Tribunal in this Review Petition.

27. Thus, it is evident that there is elaborate discussion in the judgement under review on each of the issues which have been agitated by the Review Petitioner in this petition. In the judgement under review, this Tribunal has come to a particular finding upon consideration of the relevant contractual provisions as well as the rival submissions of the Learned Counsel for the parties which has been affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and therefore, those findings cannot be altered in the review proceedings. Well reasoned and well considered judgement, even though erroneous, does not fall within the ambit of review. There is a clear distinction between a judgement suffering from error patent on the face of record and erroneous

judgement. Review Petition is maintainable only on the former case whereas in the latter case the remedy available to the aggrieved party is to assail the order/judgement by way of appeal in the higher forum/Court.

28. By way of the instant review petition, the petitioner is actually seeking a relook of the judgment under review in the hope to discover any flaw or fault in the same, which is not permissible in law. The review petition manifestly appears to be appeal in disguise and thus, does not fall within the scope and ambit of Order XLVII Rule 1 of the CPC.

29. Hence, we are of the considered opinion that the petitioner has failed to make out any mistake or error apparent on the face of record in the judgment under review dated 14.05.2024 and has failed to bring the case within the parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in various decisions referred to hereinabove. The review petition is sans any merit and is accordingly dismissed. Pronounced in the open court on this 15th day of July, 2026.

(Virender Bhat)

(Seema Gupta)

Judicial Member

Officiating Chairperson

✓ REPORTABLE / NON REPORTABLE js