GRIDCO Limited vs GMR Kamalanga Energy Limited & Ors on 3 July 2026

O R D E R

PER HON’BLE MR. VIRENDER BHAT, JUDICIAL MEMBER

1. The review petitioner GRIDCO Limited is seeking review of common judgment of this Tribunal dated 03.09.2025 rendered in appeal nos.254/2021 and 207/2022. Vide the said judgment, both these appeals were dismissed and the orders dated 04.02.2020 and 04.04.2022 passed by the Central Commission in petition nos.115/MP/2019 and 498/MP/2020 respectively were upheld. Accordingly, GRIDCO Limited has been directed to pay to

GMR Kamalanga Energy Ltd. the Fixed and Capacity Charges calculated in accordance with the declared capacity basis as provided under the CERC Tariff Regulations, 2014 for the disputed period 01.04.2015 to 31.03.2017. It has been further held that GRIDCO Ltd. shall also be liable to pay applicable Delayed Payment Surcharge in consonance with the terms of the Power Purchase Agreement executed between the parties.

2. According to the review petitioner: -

(a) This Tribunal has erred in giving primacy to Regulation 30 of CERC (Terms and Conditions of Tariff) Regulations, 2010 over Section 32 of the Electricity Act, 2003 without considering the submissions of GRIDCO Ltd. in this regard; (b) this Tribunal has failed to appreciate that definition of “Declared Capacity” under Regulation 3(15) of CERC Tariff Regulations, 2014, which refers to Grid Code (i.e. IEGC 2010) read with Regulation 6.4(a) of IEGC 2010 provides that the “Declared Capacity” is governed as per the contract i.e. the Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) and requisitions made by the buyers; and

(c) in terms of clause 2.2 of the PPA dated 04.01.2011 executed between respondent no.1 GMR Kamalanga Energy Ltd and GRIDCO Ltd., GRIDCO’s contracted capacity is 25% of the power

sent out from the project of 1st respondent and accordingly, the Plant Availability Factor i.e. monthly PAFM and the capacity charges have to be computed on the basis of energy scheduled by GRIDCO corresponding to 25% of total power sent out from the project of 1st respondent.

3. We have heard Shri R K Mehta, learned counsel for the review petitioner and Shri Vishrov Mukherjee, learned counsel for the 1st respondent. We have also perused written submissions filed by the learned counsels.

4. Learned counsel for the review petitioner argued that the view taken by this Tribunal in the judgment dated 03.09.2025 that computation of PAFM and payment of Fixed/Capacity Charges is governed only by provisions of CERC Tariff Regulations, 2014 and not by contractual arrangement under the PPA, is contrary to the Section 32 of the Electricity Act, 2003 as well as CERC Tariff Regulations, 2014. It is further argued that even though the submissions of GRIDCO in this regard have been noted in Paragraph nos.18 and 32 of the judgment under review, yet these have not been dealt with anywhere in the judgment. It is submitted that the finding of the Tribunal that GRIDCO is liable to make payment of Fixed Charges on the basis of availability declarations by the 1st respondent GMR Kamalanga Energy Ltd.

suffers from “error apparent” and is liable to be reviewed as the availability declaration by GMR Kamalanga Energy Ltd (GKEL) was contrary to the PPA being more than 25%. Reliance, in this regard, is placed upon judgment dated 18.11.2024 of this Tribunal in Review Petition No.3/2024, Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Limited v. CERC and Ors. in which it has been held that failure to note a statutory provision or failure to consider contentions of a party are valid grounds for seeking review.

5. The learned counsel also referred to the judgments of the hon’ble Supreme Court in S. Murali Sundaram v. Jothibai Kannan: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 185 and Lily Thomas v. Union of India (2000) 6 SCC 224 to buttress his submissions.

6. The review petition is vehemently resisted on behalf of the 1st respondent GKEL. It is argued that the review petitioner GRIDCO has failed to establish any “error apparent on the face of record” or “sufficient cause” justifying the exercise of power of review. It is submitted that GRIDCO is merely seeking re-adjudication/rehearing of the issues already adjudicated by this Tribunal, under the guise of this review petition, which is impermissible. It is further submitted that reference on behalf of GRIDCO to Section 32 of the Electricity Act, 2003 and the submissions made in relation thereto, are totally misplaced and devoid of any merit for the reason that

Section 32(2) of the Electricity Act, 2003 only provides for statutory functions of SLDC (with regards to scheduling of power) and is in no manner connected with computation of PAFM/Capacity Charges which is governed in terms of Regulation 30 of CERC Tariff Regulations, 2014. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel for GKEL relied upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi (1997) 8 SCC 715 (Para9), Lily Thomas v. Union of India (2000) 6 SCC 2241 (Para 56, 58), State of W.B. v. Kamal Sengupta (2008) 8 SCC 612 (Para 22,23, 35) and Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati (2013) 8 SCC 320 (Paras 16-20.2).

Our Analysis: -

7. At the outset, we may note that Section 114 of CPC is the substantive provision dealing with scope of review and is quoted below:

“114. Review. —Subject as aforesaid, any person considering himself aggrieved—

(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed by this Code, but from which no appeal has been preferred.

(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is

allowed by this Code, or

(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order, and the Court may make such order thereon as it thinks fit.”

8. The grounds on which review of a judgment / order can be sought, have been specified in Order XLVII of the CPC which are reproduced hereinbelow: - “1. Application for review of judgment. — (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved—

(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred, (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or

(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of

Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order.

(2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can present to the Appellate Court the case on which he applied for the review.

Explanation.—The fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior Court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment.” (Emphasis supplied)

9. A bare reading of these relevant legal provisions would make it clear that an application for review of a judgment / order is maintainable upon (i) discovery of a new and important matter or evidence which, after exercise of due diligence, was not within the knowledge of the review applicant or could not be produced by him when the judgment / order was passed; or (ii) on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of record; or (iii) for any other sufficient reason.

10. The expression “error apparent on the face of record” used in Order XLVII Rule 1 indicates an error which is self-evident and staring in the eye. Any error or mistake which is not self-evident and has to be deducted from a process of reasoning cannot be said to be an error apparent on the face of record justifying exercise of power of review. Power of review can be

exercised only where a glaring omission or a patent mistake is found in the order under review. We may also note that the power of review can be exercised only for correction of a patent mistake but not to substitute a view for the reason that a review petition cannot be permitted to be an appeal in disguise.

11. In Chhajju Ram v. Neki Ram AIR 1922 PC 112, it was held that the words “any other sufficient reason” appearing in Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC must mean “a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule”. This interpretation was approved by the Supreme Court in later judgment in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasium 1955 1 SCR 520. In Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati & Ors. (2013) 8 SCC 320, Hon’ble Supreme Court has succinctly summarized the principles for exercising review jurisdiction as under: - “20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by the stature: 20.1 When the review will be maintainable:

(i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence,

was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him;

(ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record;

(iii) Any other sufficient reason.

The words “any other sufficient reason” have been interpreted in Chhajju Ram v. Neki and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius to mean “a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule”. The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India v. Sandur manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. 20.2 When the review will not be maintainable:

(i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications.

(ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import.

(iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case.

(iv) Review is not maintainable unless the

material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice.

(v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected but lies only for patent error.

(vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review.

(vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched.

(viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition.

(ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived.”

12. We also find advantageous to quote here following Paragraphs of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S. Madhusudhan Reddy v. V. Narayana Reddy & Ors. (2022) SCC OnLine SC 1034:- “31. As can be seen from the above exposition of law, it has been consistently held by this Court in several judicial pronouncements that the Court’s jurisdiction of review, is not the same as that of an appeal. A judgment can be open to review if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record, but an error that has to be detected by a process of reasoning, cannot be described as an error apparent on the face of the record for the Court to exercise its powers of review under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. In the guise of exercising powers of review, the Court can correct a mistake but not substitute the view taken earlier merely because there is a possibility of taking two views in a matter. A judgment may also be open to review when any new or important matter of evidence has emerged after passing of

thejudgment, subject to the condition that such evidence was not within the knowledge of the party seeking review or could not be produced by it when the order was made despite undertaking an exercise of due diligence. There is a clear distinction between an erroneous decision as against an error apparent on the face of the record. An erroneous decision can be corrected by the Superior Court, however an error apparent on the face of the record can only be corrected by exercising review jurisdiction. Yet another circumstance referred to in Order XLVII Rule 1 for reviewing a judgment has been described as “for any other sufficient reason”. The said phrase has been explained to mean “a reason sufficient on grounds, at least analogous to those specified in the rule” (Refer: Chajju Ram v. Neki Ram and Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius).”

13. In a recent judgment dated 08.09.2025 passed in Malleeswari v. K. Suguna and Anr. SLP (C) No. 12787 of 2025 (2025 INSC 1080) Hon'ble Supreme Court has again reiterated that court’s power to review its own previous order is strictly limited to correcting errors apparent on the face of the record and not to rehear or substitute a different view as if it were an appeal. It has been held in the said judgment that the power of review is different from appellate power and is subject to the following limitations to maintain the finality of the judicial decisions:

“15.1 The review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC.

15.2 Review is not to be confused with appellate powers, which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court.

15.3 In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be reheard and corrected. A review petition, it must be

remembered, has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be an appeal in disguise.

15.4 The power of review can be exercised for the correction of a mistake, but not to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits specified in the statute governing the exercise of power.

15.5 The review court does not sit in appeal over its own order. A rehearing of the matter is impermissible. It constitutes an exception to the general rule that once a judgment is signed or pronounced, it should not be altered. Hence, it is invoked only to prevent a miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors.”

14. Further, after noticing the distinction between power of review and appellate power, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has succinctly summed up the grounds of review as under: - “17.1 The ground of discovery of new and important matter or evidence is a ground available if it is demonstrated that,

despite the exercise of due diligence, this evidence was not within their knowledge or could not be produced by the party at the time, the original decree or order was passed.

17.2 Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record may be invoked if there is something more than a mere error, and it must be the one which is manifest on the face of the record. Such an error is a patent error and not a mere wrong decision. An error which has to be established by a long-drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record.

17.3 Lastly, the phrase 'for any other sufficient reason' means a reason that is sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the other two categories.”

15. We may also note that in the words of Justice Krishna Iyer (as his Lordship then was), “a plea of review, unless the first judicial view is manifestly distorted, is like asking for the Moon. A forensic defeat cannot be avenged by an invitation to have a second look, hopeful of discovery of flows and reversal of result. A review in the counsel’s mentation cannot repair the

verdict once given. So, the law laid down must rest in peace.” (See Ghanshyam Mishra & Sons (P) Ltd v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd. (2021) 9 SCC 657).

16. Bearing in mind these salutary legal principles governing the power of a court to review its own decision, let’s now turn to the judgment under review and the grounds of review raised in these petitions.

17. We may note that in the judgment under review, this Tribunal had formulated following four issues for its consideration: - Issue No. 1: Whether the methodology for computation of Plant Availability Factor (Monthly) (PAFM) and payment of fixed/ capacity charges for the period 01.04.2015 to 31.03.2017 ought to be governed by the provisions of the CERC Tariff Regulations, 2014 or by the Power Purchase Agreement (PPA)?

Issue No. 2: Whether CERC erred in relying upon the Minutes of Meetings governing the parties' conduct during the relevant period?

Issue No. 3: Whether CERC incorrectly held that SLDC did not compute the PAFM for the FY 2015-16 based on the original

availability declaration by GKEL vis-à-vis the subsequent revision in the availability declaration by GKEL?

Issue No. 4: Whether GRIDCO can be made liable to pay fixed/ capacity charges (and Delayed Payment Surcharge) during 01.04.2015 to 31.03.2017?

18. Issue Nos.1&2 were taken together for adjudications. The discussion of these two issues is found in Paragraph nos.32 to 69 of the judgment under review.

19. In Paragraph no.54 we have referred to Regulation 30 of CERC Tariff Regulations, 2014 and have explained how and why this regulation has an overriding effect over inconsistent provision of contract between the regulated entities. In Paragraph no.59, we have stated that the Tariff Regulations, 2014 clearly require computation of PAFM and payment of Fixed and Capacity Charges on the basis of declared availability in respect of energy scheduled or withdrawal. In Paragraph no.60 we have noted that the parties admit both (i) the regulatory requirement and (ii) that the prior practice was inconsistent with the statutory norms. We have further held

that given the error in methodology which has been mutually recognized and corrected w.e.f. 01.04.2017, equity demands that the same correction be applied to the disputed period unless compelling contractual or legal constraints dictate otherwise.

20. Even though, we have not specifically referred to Section 32 of the Electricity Act, 2003, yet it is axiomatic that this legal provision is primarily concerned with the statutory functions of State Load Dispatch Centre, as the heading of the section denotes. It is in no manner connected with the computation of PAFM/Capacity Charges which is governed by Regulation 30 of CERC Tariff Regulations, 2014. We have also based our findings on these two issues on the said Regulation 30 of CERC Tariff Regulations, 2014, which are in no way contrary to or inconsistent with Section 32 of the Electricity Act, 2003.

21. The discussion on Issue No.4, which relates to liability of GRIDCO to pay fixed/capacity charges, (and delayed payment surcharge) spans from Paragraph no.79 to 98 of the judgment under review. The contention on behalf of GRIDCO that it cannot be made liable to pay capacity charges for the power it did not avail, have been discussed and dealt with in Paragraph no.87 to 90 and 96 to 98 of the judgment under review. Further, the

contention on behalf of the review petitioner that it had not raised revised bill on the basis of PAFM % certified by SLDC as mandated under Article 7.1.1 of the PPA have been considered and rejected in Paragraph nos.92 to 94 of the judgment under review.

22. In nutshell, we may note that upon consideration of all the relevant statutory provisions as well as regulations, this Tribunal has, in the judgment under review, come to a particular finding on the issue under consideration which cannot be altered in the review proceedings. A well-reasoned and well considered judgment, even though erroneous, does not fall within the scope and ambit of review. There is a clear distinction between a judgment suffering from error apparent on the face of record and an erroneous judgment. Review petition is maintainable only in the former case whereas in the latter case, the remedy available to the aggrieved party is to assail the order/judgment by way of appeal in the higher forum/court.

23. By way of the instant review petition, the petitioner is actually seeking a relook of the judgment under review in the hope to discover any flaw or fault in the same, which is not permissible in law. The review petition manifestly appears to be appeal in disguise and thus, does not fall within the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 of the CPC.

24. Hence, we are of the considered opinion that the petitioner has failed to make out any mistake or error apparent on the face of record in the judgment under review dated 03.09.2025 and has failed to bring the case within the parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in various decisions referred to hereinabove. The review petition is sans any merit and is accordingly dismissed.

Pronounced in the open court on this the 03rd day of July, 2026.

(Virender Bhat) Judicial Member (Seema Gupta) Officiating Chairperson

√

REPORTABLE / NON-REPORTABLE

tp