Maharashtra State Power Generating Company Limited vs Maharashtra State Power Generating Company Limited & Anr on 3 July 2026

O R D E R

PER HON’BLE MR. VIRENDER BHAT, JUDICIAL MEMBER

1. The review petitioner is seeking review of judgment of this Tribunal dated 26.05.2025 passed in appeal no.130 of 2019 whereby the said appeal was partly allowed. The grievance of the petitioner is with regards to the findings returned by this Tribunal on Issue No.(ii) in the said judgment which was with regards to “Consideration of the actual interest on working capital as ‘NIL’ in True-up for FY 2016-17”. The findings of the Commission on this issue have been affirmed in the judgment under review.

2. Upon consideration of the rival submissions of the parties in the light of the applicable Regulation 31.6 of MYT Regulations, 2015, this Tribunal has held that in view of the proviso to Regulation 31.6, contribution/impact of Delayed Payment Surcharge (DPS) to the actual interest on working capital ought to be deducted from the actual interest on working capital while computing the efficiency gain or efficiency loss.

3. We have heard Mr. P. Chidambaram and Mr. M G Ramachandran, learned senior counsels appearing on behalf of the review petitioner, Ms. Pratiti Rungta, learned counsel for the 1st respondent and Mr. S.K. Parmeshwar, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the 2nd respondent.

4. Learned senior counsels appearing for the review petitioner submitted that normative interest on working capital cannot be a subject matter of adjustment under the proviso to Regulation 31.6 and if the actual interest on working capital is less than normative interest on working capital, there would be efficiency gain on the part of the generator, the generator actually having incurred less interest on working capital. If, on the other hand, actual interest on working capital is more than the normative, there would be efficiency loss on the part of the generator. It is submitted that the main part of Regulation 31.6 targets such efficiency gain/loss, as the case may be, which is provided

for sharing and not any part of normative interest on working capital. This was sought to be explained by way of following illustration: - “To illustrate: If the normative Interest on working capital is Rs. 100, the actual interest on working capital incurred can be higher say Rs. 121 or lower say Rs. 79. In such cases:

(i) The variance of Rs. 21 in Rs. 121 is the efficiency loss; the Generator will not be allowed the entire Rs. 21 from MSEDCL but only restricted to 1/3rd as per Regulation 11 and the balance 2/3rd to be assumed by the Generator. This 1/3rd of Rs. 21 will be in addition to the Normative Interest on Working Capital; and

(ii) The variance of Rs. 21 in Rs. 79 is the efficiency gain; the Generator will be allowed to retain 1/3rd of Rs. 21, namely, Rs. 7 as per Regulation 11 in addition to the Normative Interest on Working Capital and the balance 2/3rd, namely, Rs. 14 will be accounted for the benefit of MSEDCL.

(iii) In the actual interest on working capital computation, such variance of Rs. 21, as per the main part of

Regulation 31.6 is, however subject to deduction of contribution of delay in receipt of payment to actual interest on working capital as per the proviso. The entire sharing to the benefit of the Review Petitioner, i.e., Rs. 7 may be wiped out by reason of the contribution of the delayed payment surcharge accrued but the adjustment cannot extend to the Normative Interest on Working Capital.

As per Regulation 31.6 the extent of sharing of Efficiency gain or Efficiency loss, as the case may be, will be restricted to Rs. 7. Whereas the State Commission's Order Impugned in the Appeal adjusts the entire Normative Interest on working capital of Rs. 100 in addition to Rs. 7 qua the delayed payment surcharge as efficiency loss adjustment, which is not as per Paras 22 and 23 of the decision of this Hon'ble Tribunal on the plain reading of Regulation 31.6. For example, if the Normative interest on working capital as also the accrual interest on working capital is exactly same namely Rs 484.41 crores then Regulation 31.6 will have no have any application, whereas if the difference is say only Rs.

10 then Regulation 31.6 will make the working capital requirement to be NIL as per State Commission. This would lead to anomalous and absurd result that the Review Petitioner has no working capital requirement.

(iv) It is respectfully submitted that this Hon'ble Tribunal construing Regulation 31.6 proviso on the reasoning given in Paras 22 and 23 [Pages 45-47] could not have intended to deal with normative interest on working capital also (Rs. 100 in the above example) which would be going beyond the zone of consideration of 'variance'. The effect of para 24 of the Order dated 26.05.2025 [Page 47] upholding the decision of the State Commission will lead to the above.

(v) In the present case, admittedly the Normative Interest on Working Capital is Rs. 484.41 crores [Para 5.21.8, Page 555-556], and the actual interest on working capital is Rs. 602.78 Crores and the difference of Rs. 118.37 Crores is the Zone of consideration and not the entire Rs. 484.41 Crores or any part of Rs. 484.41 Crores.

(vi) It is settled law that the proviso cannot exceed the scope of the main provision and it only qualifies the circumstances dealt in the main provision.”

5. It is further argued that the term “receipt” in Regulation 31.6 refers to the loan from the bankers of the generating company and then it would relate to the delay in the payment of interest on working capital loan by the generating company. It is argued that there is no implication or impact of DPS which the 2nd respondent MSEDCL is obligated to pay for delay in the payment of monthly bills. The submission is that DPS is for the period after the due date for payment of monthly/supplementary bills and is dealt with in Regulation 36 whereas Regulation 31.6 including proviso, deals with an independent aspect of sharing of efficiency gain or efficiency loss or variance between normative or actual which is provided in Regulation 11.

6. The review petition is vehemently opposed on behalf of the respondents on the ground that none of the conditions as stipulated in Order XLVII Rule 1 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 are met in the review petition.

7. It is argued that no mistake or error apparent on the face of record in the judgment under review has been demonstrated by the review petitioner and no sufficient reason, that would justify the review of the judgment of this

Tribunal, has been made out. It is pointed out that the grounds in the present review petition are verbatim repetition of what was argued during the hearing of the appeal and rejected in the judgment under review, and therefore, the instant review petition, being an appeal in disguise, cannot be entertained.

Our Analysis:

8. At the outset, we may note that Section 114 of CPC is the substantive provision dealing with scope of review and is quoted below:

“114. Review. —Subject as aforesaid, any person considering himself aggrieved—

(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed by this Code, but from which no appeal has been preferred.

(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed by this Code, or

(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order, and the Court may make such order thereon

as it thinks fit.”

9. The grounds on which review of a judgment / order can be sought, have been specified in Order XLVII of the CPC which are reproduced hereinbelow: - “1. Application for review of judgment. — (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved—

(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred, (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or

(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on

the face of the record or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order.

(2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can present to the Appellate Court the case on which he applied for the review.

Explanation.—The fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior Court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment.” (Emphasis supplied)

10. A bare reading of these relevant legal provisions would make it clear that an application for review of a judgment / order is maintainable upon (i) discovery of a new and important matter or evidence which, after exercise of due diligence, was not within the knowledge of the review applicant or could not be produced by him when the judgment / order was passed; or (ii) on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of record; or (iii) for any other sufficient reason.

11. The expression “error apparent on the face of record” used in Order XLVII Rule 1 indicates an error which is self-evident and staring in the eye. Any error or mistake which is not self-evident and has to be deducted from a process of reasoning cannot be said to be an error apparent on the face of record justifying exercise of power of review. Power of review can be exercised only where a glaring omission or a patent mistake is found in the order under review. We may also note that the power of review can be exercised only for correction of a patent mistake but not to substitute a view for the reason that a review petition cannot be permitted to be an appeal in disguise.

12. In a recent judgment dated 08.09.2025 passed in Malleeswari v. K. Suguna and Anr. SLP (C) No. 12787 of 2025 (2025 INSC 1080) Hon'ble

Supreme Court has reiterated that court’s power to review its own previous order is strictly limited to correcting errors apparent on the face of the record and not to rehear or substitute a different view as if it were an appeal. It has been held in the said judgment that the power of review is different from appellate power and is subject to the following limitations to maintain the finality of the judicial decisions:

“15.1 The review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC.

15.2 Review is not to be confused with appellate powers, which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court.

15.3 In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be reheard and corrected. A review petition, it must be remembered, has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be an appeal in disguise.

15.4 The power of review can be exercised for the correction of a mistake, but not to substitute a view. Such powers

can be exercised within the limits specified in the statute governing the exercise of power.

15.5 The review court does not sit in appeal over its own order. A rehearing of the matter is impermissible. It constitutes an exception to the general rule that once a judgment is signed or pronounced, it should not be altered. Hence, it is invoked only to prevent a miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors.”

13. Further, after noticing the distinction between power of review and appellate power, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has succinctly summed up the grounds of review as under: - “17.1 The ground of discovery of new and important matter or evidence is a ground available if it is demonstrated that, despite the exercise of due diligence, this evidence was not within their knowledge or could not be produced by the party at the time, the original decree or order was passed.

17.2 Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record may be invoked if there is something more than a mere error, and it must be the one which is manifest on the face of the

record. Such an error is a patent error and not a mere wrong decision. An error which has to be established by a long-drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record.

17.3 Lastly, the phrase 'for any other sufficient reason' means a reason that is sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the other two categories.”

14. We may also note that in the words of Justice Krishna Iyer (as his Lordship then was), “a plea of review, unless the first judicial view is manifestly distorted, is like asking for the Moon. A forensic defeat cannot be avenged by an invitation to have a second look, hopeful of discovery of flows and reversal of result. A review in the counsel’s mentation cannot repair the verdict once given. So, the law laid down must rest in peace.” (See Ghanshyam Mishra & Sons (P) Ltd v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd. (2021) 9 SCC 657).

15. We now turn to the instant review petition while keeping in mind the above noted salutary legal principles enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court governing the power of a court to review its own decision.

16. A perusal of the judgment under review would reveal that there has been elaborate discussion on the issue which is agitated in the review petition by the petitioner. All the arguments advanced in this regard on behalf of the review petitioner during the course of hearing of appeal have been noted and dealt with. The discussion on this issue alone spans over seven pages of the judgment i.e. from Paragraph nos.17 to 24. We have noted Regulation 31.6 of MYT Regulations, 2015 in Paragraph no.21 and have interpreted it in Paragraph no.22. The submissions in this regard made on behalf of the review petitioner have been noted and discussed in Paragraph no.23. It is not the case of the review petitioner that any argument advanced on its behalf has not been noted and considered in the judgment. Thus, it is evident that this Tribunal, in the judgment under review, has come to a particular finding on the issue under consideration upon consideration of the relevant regulations as well as the rival submissions of the learned counsels for the parties, which cannot be altered in the review proceedings. Well- reasoned and well considered judgment, even though erroneous, does not fall within the scope and ambit of review. There is a clear distinction between a judgment suffering from error apparent on the fact of record and erroneous judgment. Review petition is maintainable only in the former case whereas in the latter case, the remedy available to the aggrieved party is to assail the order/judgment by way of appeal in the higher forum/court.

17. By way of the instant review petition, the petitioner is actually seeking a relook of the judgment under review in the hope to discover any flaw or fault in the same, which is not permissible in law. The review petition manifestly appears to be appeal in disguise and thus, does not fall within the scope and ambit of Order XLVII Rule 1 of the CPC.

18. Hence, we are of the considered opinion that the petitioner has failed to make out any mistake or error apparent on the face of record in the judgment under review dated 26.05.2025 and has failed to bring the case within the parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in various decisions referred to hereinabove. The review petition is sans any merit and is accordingly dismissed.

Pronounced in the open court on this the 03rd day of July, 2026.

(Virender Bhat) Judicial Member (Seema Gupta) Officiating Chairperson

√

REPORTABLE / NON-REPORTABLE

tp