ACME Solar Holdings Limited & Anr vs Central Electricity Regulatory Commission & Anr on 3 July 2026

O R D E R

PER HON’BLE MR. VIRENDER BHAT, JUDICIAL MEMBER

1. By way of this application, the appellants have sought condonation of delay of 368 days delay in filing the instant appeal.

2. Appellant No.1 is a public limited company and the successor in interest of erstwhile ACME Solar Holdings Limited. Appellant no.2 is a special purpose vehicle incorporated by appellant no.1 for developing and commissioning 300MW grid connected solar photovoltaic power project.

3. In pursuance to Request for Selection (RfS) dated 06.05.2021, the appellant no.1 submitted its bid and was declared successful for development of the said solar power project.

4. It appears that there was delay on the part of the appellants in completion and commissioning of the power project within the stipulated time. Accordingly, the appellants approached the Commission with petition no.326/MP/2024 seeking extension of time period for commissioning of the solar power project by three months with further direction to 2nd respondent CTUIL not to take any coercive action with regard to the connectivity granted to the appellants for the power project on 10.05.2022. The petition has been disposed of by the Commission vide order dated 25.11.2024 which has been impugned in this appeal. The Commission, while allowing extension of time for the completion of power project till 21.04.2025 has directed the appellant to pay compensation to the 2nd respondent CTUIL as condition for retention of the connectivity granted at Bikaner-II transmission line.

5. Being aggrieved by the direction to pay compensation to CTUIL for retaining the connectivity, the appellants have approached this Tribunal by way of the instant appeal. As already noted hereinabove, there is delay of 368 days in filing the appeal.

6. Before adverting to the rival contentions and submissions of the parties on the aspect of condonation of delay in filing the appeal, we find

it necessary to note following events which are very material for a decision on the application at hand.

7. Subsequent to the passing of the impugned order by the Commission on 25.11.2024, the appellant filed review petition bearing no.3/RP/2025 on 01.01.2025 seeking review of the impugned order. However, the review petition was withdrawn by the appellants on 20.02.2025. Thereafter, the appellants approached the Commission again by way of petition no.452/MP/2025 seeking extension of further 65 days i.e. till 25.06.2025 for commissioning of the power project. However, during the pendency of the said petition, CTUIL vide its letter dated 23.04.2025, revoked the connectivity granted to the appellants. When this fact was brought to the notice of the Commission, the Commission vide record of proceedings dated 24.04.2025 directed CTUIL to keep revocation in abeyance and permitted the appellants to proceed with the commissioning activities. Ultimately, the project was commissioned by the appellants on 25.06.2025. The said interim order dated 24.04.2025 remained in operation till the issuance of final order dated 12.12.2025 in the said petition no.452 of 2025.

8. It appears that the temporary connectivity granted to the appellants was not being fully operationalized and thus, the appellants filed a writ petition bearing no.13641 of 2025 before the Hon’ble Delhi High Court on

02.09.2025 seeking issuance of appropriate directions to the relevant government authorities for the timely operationalization of the connectivity/GNA granted to the appellants’ power project. It is relevant to note here that in the status report dated 22.09.2025 filed by CTUIL and PowerGrid Narela Transmission Limited (PNTL) in the said writ petition it was acknowledged that Khetri-Narela line was likely to be commissioned only by December, 2025.

9. PNTL declared commercial operation of Khetri-Narela Transmission Line on 10.12.2025. Accordingly, connectivity for all the projects connected to Bikaner-II except the appellants was made effective by CTUIL on the said dated i.e. 10.12.2025.

10. Thereafter, in pursuance to the final order passed by the Commission in petition no.452 of 2025 on 12.12.2025, CTUIL restored the connectivity of the appellants at Bikaner-II and made the GNA for appellants’ 300MW power project at Bikaner-II effective from 14.12.2025. Thus, the appellants were allowed to evacuate the entire 300MW power from the project.

11. Thereafter, the appellants filed the instant appeal on 12.01.2026.

12. We have heard Ms. Suparna Srivastava, learned counsel for the appellant/applicant and Ms. Poorva Saigal, learned counsel for the 2nd

respondent CTUIL. We have also perused the pleadings of the parties on the aspect of condonation of delay in filing the appeal.

13. Learned counsel for the appellants would argue that the issues arising from the impugned order were linked with the pending proceedings before the Commission concerning the commissioning of the project, revocation and restoration of connectivity as well as operationalization of the associated transmission system and the legal position became crystal clear only on passing of final order dated 12.12.2025 by the Commission in petition no.452 of 2025. It is submitted that the appellants found it appropriate to wait for the crystallization of the issues and the final resolution of interconnected proceedings before approaching this Tribunal by way of the instant appeal, in order to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and inconsistent adjudication.

14. It is argued that the delay in filing the appeal was occasioned due to circumstances wholly beyond the control of the appellants which included the delay in commissioning of associated ISTS, revocation of connectivity by CTUIL during the pendency of the proceedings of petition no.452 of 2025, restricted evacuation granted to the appellants under temporary GNA and the imminent risk of shutdown of the power project. It is argued that during this period the appellants were constrained to focus on safeguarding the commissioning of the project in order to ensure

uninterrupted supply of entire 300MW power from the project and utilization of the connectivity to avoid irreparable financial and operational harm. It is submitted that delay in filing the appeal was entirely attributable to the need for due diligence and careful preparation, rather than lack of bonafide intention or diligence on the part of the appellants. The learned counsel cited the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157 and Isha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy (2013) 12 SCC 649 in support of her submissions.

15. Per contra, the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent CTUIL would argue that pendency of parallel unconnected proceedings with separate cause of action/relief before other fora cannot be made a ground to suspend or extend the period of limitation for filing of the appeal before this Tribunal against the impugned order dated 25.11.2024. She submitted that the conduct of the appellants reflects not only lack of due diligence but also deliberate tactics to prolong litigation and admitting such a belated appeal would not only defeat the scheme of limitation but would also unsettle regulatory certainty and would cause grave prejudice to CTUIL as well as other connectivity grantees.

16. Citing the judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court in P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala (1997) 7 SCC 556 and Chhattisgarh

SEB v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (2010) 5 SCC 23, the learned counsel submitted that special limitation period prescribed under Section 111 and 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003 are to be strictly adhered to in order to preserve the legislative intent of expeditious adjudication by an expert body. According to the learned counsel, the appellants have failed to demonstrate any legally sustainable explanation constituting “sufficient cause” for not approaching this Tribunal within the prescribed period of limitation. Referring to another recent judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3612, the learned counsel would submit that a party seeking condonation of delay must explain the failure to file the appeal within the statutory period of limitation itself and the subsequent development cannot justify the delay.

17. The learned counsel further argued that the conduct of the appellants clearly demonstrates that they consciously chose to pursue unrelated proceedings before other foras rather than invoking the statutory appellate jurisdiction of this Tribunal within the prescribed period of limitation. According to her, the sequence of events that took place subsequent to the passing of impugned order by the Commission reveals a clear pattern on the part of the appellants to indulge in forum shopping. She submitted that the appellants have failed to demonstrate any circumstances which prevented them from approaching this Tribunal

within the statutory period of 45 days prescribed under Section 111 of the Electricity Act, 2003 and buttressed her submissions by relying upon another judgment of the Supreme Court in Shivamma (Dead) by LRs v. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors., 2025 INSC 1104. She also relied upon Basawaraj and Anr. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer (2013) 14 SCC 81 to argue that discretion to condone delay must be exercised judiciously and not on sympathetic grounds.

18. Thus, on the basis of these submissions, the learned counsel sought dismissal of the application.

19. We have considered the rival submissions of the learned counsels and have gone through the averments made by the appellants in the application and by the 2nd respondent in the reply filed to the application. We have also perused the judgments cited at bar by the learned counsels.

20. The judgment of the Apex Court in Shivamma case (supra) is relied upon by both the learned counsels. The learned counsel for the 2nd respondent CTUIL has drawn our attention to Paragraph No.23 and 40 of the judgment which are extracted hereinbelow: - “23. In Ramkumar Choudhary (supra), this very Bench had the occasion to examine the meaning of the expression

“within such period” used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Placing reliance on the decisions of this Court in Ajit Singh Thakur (supra) and Basawaraj (supra), it was held that for the purpose of Section 5, the party seeking condonation of delay has to explain why it was unable to institute the proceedings within the prescribed period of limitation. Events that occurred after the expiry of the period of limitation till the date of actual filing of the appeal or application, as the case may be, would be of no consequence insofar as condonation is concerned, if it is unable to explain what came in the way of the party that it was unable to file it. It reiterated that no event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause, where the party allowed the limitation to expiry unless it can trace such failure in allowing the limitation to expire to a cause arising within the period of limitation. The relevant observations read as under:- …..

40. As such, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, for the purpose of seeking condonation of delay in filing of an appeal or application, as the case may be, beyond the stipulated period of limitation, the delay in the filing has to be

explained by demonstrating the existence of a “sufficient cause” that resulted in such delay for both the prescribed period of limitation as-well as the period after the expiry of limitation, up to actual date of filing of such appeal or application, as the case may be, or to put it simply, explanation has to be given for the entire duration from the date when the clock of limitation began to tick, up until the date of actual filing, for seeking condonation of delay by recourse to Section 5 of the Limitation Act.”

21. Thus, in view of the legal principle enunciated in the above referred Paragraphs of the judgment, while citing with approval the earlier judgments in Ramkumar Choudhary’s case (supra) and Basawaraj (supra), the delay in filing has to be explained by demonstrating existence of “sufficient cause” that prevented the appellants from filing the appeal both within the prescribed period of limitation as well as the period after the expiry of limitation period up to the actual date of filing. However, Paragraphs 136 and 137 of the judgment are also material, which have been referred to by learned counsel for the appellants, and are extracted hereinbelow: - “136 When technical considerations of limitation conflict with the imperative of substantial justice, the latter should

ordinarily prevail. Rules of limitation are not designed to destroy the rights of parties but to prevent inordinate delay in seeking remedies. Thus, the interpretation of “sufficient cause” must be liberal and purposive, aimed at advancing the cause of justice rather than defeating it. This is why the courts, while construing applications for condonation of delay, emphasize the bona fides of the applicant over the sheer arithmetical length of the delay.

137. Where strict adherence to these rules results in injustice, the Court is dutybound to apply a liberal interpretation of “sufficient cause” so as to balance technical requirements with the demands of justice. A litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late, and therefore, a pragmatic and justice-oriented approach must inform the judicial discretion under Section 5. This decision continues to be the most frequently cited authority for the proposition that the judiciary should incline towards justice rather than technicality. Therefore, when courts interpret “sufficient cause,” they are expected to exercise discretion in a manner that fosters justice, fairness, and equity, keeping in mind the realities of litigation.”

22. Thus, while deciding an application for condonation of delay, the courts are duty bound to give a liberal interpretation to the term “sufficient cause” in order to balance the technical requirements with the demands of justice and are expected to exercise discretion in a manner that fosters justice, fairness and equity, while keeping in mind realities of litigation.

23. In Maniben’s case also, the Supreme Court has advocated liberal and justice oriented approach in exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statutes but has cautioned that courts cannot be oblivious of the fact that a successful litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time has been consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the costs. The judgment laid down the principle that if the courts find that there has been no negligence on the part of the appellant and the cause shown for delay does not lack bonafides, then it may condone the delay but on the other hand, if the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he has been thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his case, it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay.

24. In Isha Bhattacharjee case, the Apex Court has enunciated following principles to be kept in mind while deciding an application for condonation of delay: -

“i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.

ii) The terms sufficient cause should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation.

iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.

iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.

v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.

vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.

vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.

ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.

x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.

xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation.

xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.”

25. Now, coming to the instant case. Vide the impugned order dated 25.11.2024, the Commission allowed the prayer of the appellants for extension of time for commissioning of the power project up to 21.04.2025 but at the same time directed them to pay compensation to CTUIL as a condition for retaining the connectivity granted to them at Bikaner-II. As noted in the impugned order by the Commission, the appellant had given an undertaking vide affidavit dated 28.10.2024 to the Commission that the project would be commissioned before 24.04.2025. The appellants even paid a sum of Rs.9.5 crores to CTUIL as compensation for the period 20.10.2024 to 21.04.2025 as per the impugned order of the Commission between 06.12.2024 and 04.04.2025 notwithstanding the fact that they had filed a review petition before the Commission on 02.01.2025 seeking review of the impugned order. Such conduct of the appellants clearly indicates their commitment to commission the project by 21.04.2025.

Despite the fact that the appellants were not satisfied with the impugned order in so far as it directed to pay compensation to CTUIL for retaining the connectivity, they appear to have paid the sum of Rs.9.5 Crores to the CTUIL in order to avoid coercive action and to ensure that the work on the project proceeds without any impediment. However, for certain reasons, the appellants were not able to commission the project by 21.04.2025 and accordingly, they approached the Commission by way of petition no.452 of 2025 seeking extension of further 65 days i.e. till 25.06.2025. During the proceedings of this petition, the connectivity granted to the appellants came to be revoked by CTUIL vide letter dated 23.04.2025, which was subsequently put in abeyance by the Commission vide order dated 24.04.2025 passed in that petition.

26. It further appears that the full connectivity for the appellants power project was being delayed even after the commissioning of the project on 25.06.2025 and accordingly, the appellants had to approach the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi vide writ petition no.13641 of 2025 seeking direction for expeditious operationalization of connectivity/GNA. Concededly, in the status report dated 22.09.2025 filed by CTUIL and Power Grid Narela Transmission Limited (PNTL) in the said writ petition, it was acknowledged that Khetri-Narela line was incomplete and was likely to be commissioned only by December, 2025. Even after the commissioning of the said Khetri- Narela line on 10.12.2025, connectivity was not made effective for the

appellants power project by CTUIL even though the same was made effective for all other projects connected to Bikaner-II. It is after the passing of final order dated 12.12.2025 by the Commission in petition no.452 of 2025 that the connectivity to the appellants power project was restored fully by CTUIL at Bikaner-II and GNA was made effective for the power project of the appellants from 14.12.2025 thereby permitting the appellants to evacuate the entire 300MW power from the project.

27. The above noted sequence of events would manifestly demonstrate that the appellants were making all out efforts to commission their power project and to ensure seamless connectivity for it in order to evacuate the power generated in the project despite facing various impediments for which they had to file another petition before the Commission as well as had to approach the Delhi High Court by way of a writ petition. It cannot be said that all these proceedings were in no manner, connected to the issues raised in the instant appeal i.e. extension of commissioning date of the power project and the retention of the connectivity without payment of any compensation.

28. Since, the appellants had paid a sum of Rs.9.5 cores to CTUIL as compensation for the period 20.10.2024 to 21.04.2024 in terms of the impugned order, they appear to have shifted focus to completion of the power project and its commissioning within the extended time as allowed

by the Commission in the impugned order. Meanwhile, connectivity issue came up as CTUIL firstly revoked the connectivity granted to the appellants, on 23.04.2025 which was, however, kept in abeyance by the Commission vide order dated 24.04.2025 passed in subsequent petition no.452/2025 filed by the appellants. Even thereafter also the appellants were allowed only partial connectivity and full connectivity was being delayed on account of non-operationalization of Khetri-Narela Transmission Line. Full connectivity came to be granted to the appellants only on 14.12.2025 after passing of final order dated 12.12.2025 by the Commission in petition no.452/2025. Evidently, the appellants were embroiled in these issues and thought it prudent to wait for the outcome of petition no.452/2025 before filing the instant appeal before this Tribunal. We do not find any malafide or lack of due diligence in this regard on the part of the appellants. The appellants were justified in delaying the filing of the instant appeal till the power project was commissioned and full connectivity was made available to the same. Assuming that the appellants were unable to complete and commission the power project within the extended time granted by the Commission or the petition no.452/2025 was dismissed by the Commission thereby resulting in revocation of connectivity to the appellants’ power project, in that case, the appellants may not have been left with any cause or occasion for assailing the impugned order before this Tribunal. It is only when the

appellants commissioned the power project and were also successful in obtaining full connectivity for the same on 14.12.2025 that they turned their attention to the impugned order and commenced steps for filing the appeal against the same.

29. When we consider the delay in filing the instant appeal on the part of the appellants in the light of above referred circumstances, we are unable to impute any inaction or negligence or lack of bonafides to the appellants. The entire gamut of facts and circumstances that took place after the passing of impugned order by the Commission, when scrutinized in the light of legal principles enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in above referred judgments, leads to the only conclusion that the delay in filing of the appeal on the part of the appellants is not so inordinate or contumacious or deliberate as to warrant dismissal of the application under consideration.

30. Further, we may also note that the appellants had preferred a review petition before the Commission on 02.01.2025 seeking review of the impugned order, it cannot be said that the appellants did not take any steps to assail the impugned order within the period of 45 days stipulated under the Electricity Act, 2003 for filing appeal before this Tribunal. Probably, the appellants realized that they may not succeed in the review petition and accordingly withdrew the same on 03.03.2025. Normally, this

Tribunal, while computing the period of delay in filing the appeal, discounts the time period spent by the appellant while pursuing the review petition before the Commission. Therefore, if we take these 60 days, during which period the review petition was pending disposal before the Commission, out of consideration for computing the period of delay, the same is reduced to 308 days only. We may also note that this Tribunal has been liberal in condoning the delay of upto one year (365 days) in filing the appeal, albeit, on payment of costs ranging from Rs.20,000/- to Rs.2,00,000/- in order to do complete justice between the parties. Reference, in this regard, is made by the learned counsel for the appellants to order dated 30.01.2026 passed in DFR No.446/2025, order dated 05.08.2025 passed in DFR No.164/2025, order dated 04.07.2025 passed in DFR No.137/2025, order dated 25.04.2025 passed in DFR No.68/2025, order dated 06.01.2025 passed in DFR No.502/2024 etc.

31. Considering the above referred circumstances which, according to the appellants were responsible for delay in filing the instant appeal, it is difficult to accept the submissions of the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent CTUIL that the delay was deliberate or there is been any lack of bonafide on the part of the appellants. Adopting the liberal and purposive interpretation of the term “sufficient cause” as advocated by the Apex Court in Shivamma case, we are of the opinion that demands of

justice would be met in case the delay in filing the appeal is condoned subject to payment of costs.

32. Therefore, the instant application is hereby allowed and the delay in filing the appeal is condoned subject to the appellants paying costs of Rs.1,50,000/- (Rupees one lakh and fifty thousand only) to 2nd respondent CTUIL within four weeks from today and filing the proof of payment of costs in the Registry of this Tribunal within two weeks thereafter. Needless to add here that in case of failure to pay such costs within the stipulated period or failure to file proof of payment of costs within the stipulated period, the appeal shall stand dismissed as time barred. DFR NO.21 OF 2026

33. Let reply be filed by the respondents within six weeks from today. The appellants shall file rejoinder, if any, within four weeks thereafter.

34. Subject to verification by the Registry of the completion of pleadings, the appeal be included in the List of Finals of Court-1.

Pronounced in the open court on this the 3rd day of July, 2026.

(Virender Bhat) Judicial Member (Seema Gupta) Officiating Chairperson

✓ REPORTABLE / NON-REPORATBLE tp