Sh. Armax Health Pvt. Ltd vs APFC RPFC Faridabad on 24 September 2026

BEFORE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL CUM LABOUR COURT, DELHI

Appeal No. D-2/22/2026, D-2/23/2026

M/s. Armax Health Pvt. Ltd.

……Appellant Through:- Sh. Pranav Verma, Ld. counsel for the appellant. Vs. APFC/RPFC, Faridabad …..Respondent Through:- Sh. S.N. Mahanta, Ld. counsel for the respondent. Order Dated:- 24.09.2026 This order shall dispose of two applications for condonation of delay filed by the appellant in both its appeal arising out of the impugned orders passed by the RPFC under section 7A and 14B & 7Q of the EPF & MP Act (Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act), 1952 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) dated 19.11.2025 and 28.11.2024 respectively. It is the case of the appellant that the appellant company was undergoing insolvency proceedings and was facing severe financial distress during the relevant period, due to which the affairs and management of the company were substantially affected and disrupted. The Committee of Creditors came to be constituted in accordance with the provisions of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, and a lot of time has been consumed for collation of claims, verification of records, coordination with auditors, and collection of financial and statutory documents. In the circumstances stated above, the appellant, who was the Resolution Professional of the company, was not able to file the appeal in time. Accordingly, he prays that the delay in filing the appeal be condoned. Per contra, the respondent has opposed the prayer by filing a counter reply to the application. He took the preliminary objection stating that Section 25(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), 2016, specifically states that it shall be the duty of the Resolution Professional to preserve and protect the assets of the corporate debtor, including the continued business operations of the corporate debtor. For the purpose of Section 25(1) and Section 25(2) of the IBC, 2016, the Resolution Professional is authorized to take certain actions, including

challenging a quasi-judicial order on behalf of the corporate debtor through Section 25(2) (b) of the IBC, 2016. Here, admittedly, the appeal has been filed after expiry of the 60 days which has been prescribed by Rule 7(2) of the Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1997. Even another 60 days have been passed, which this Tribunal is empowered to condone if the circumstances justify such condonation. Here, the impugned orders under section 7A and 14B & 7Q of the Act were passed on 19.11.2025 and 28.11.2024 respectively. Therefore, the delay cannot be condoned. I have heard the arguments and perused the record. Before proceeding further, Rule 7(2) of the Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1997 is required to be reproduced herein: “(2) Any person aggrieved by a notification issued by the Central Government or an order passed by the Central Government or any other authority under the Act, may within 60 days from the date of issue of the notification/order, prefer an appeal to the Tribunal: Provided that the Tribunal may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the prescribed period, extend the said period by a further period of 60 days: Provided further that no appeal by the employer shall be entertained by the Tribunal unless he has deposited with the Tribunal a Demand Draft payable in the Fund and bearing 75% of the amount due from him as determined under Section 7-A: Provided also that the Tribunal may for reasons to be recorded in writing, waive or reduce the amount to be deposited under Section 7-O.” From the perusal of the said Rule, it is inferred that the appellant, aggrieved by the order, can file the appeal within 60 days of issuance of the order. Thereafter, wide discretion has been given to this Tribunal to condone a further delay of 60 days in filing the appeal if the circumstances shown by the appellant are sufficient and have justifiably prevented him from filing the appeal in time. There is no dispute that the appellant had already been admitted into insolvency proceedings under the provisions of the IBC Code and a moratorium dated 21.06.2024 under Section 14 of the IBC Code had come into operation against the company. There is no further dispute herein that the order was passed by the respondent after the enforcement of the moratorium dated 21.06.2024 against the appellant company. Further, it is not in dispute that the order passed by the respondent has been communicated to the appellant within time.

Further, it is not in dispute that the prescribed period of limitation for filing the appeal had already expired. Even the further 60 days period has been exhausted. Now the question arises as to what is the effect of the moratorium. In this respect, Sections 14 and 60 of the IBC Code are required to be reproduced herein: “14. Moratorium.—(1) Subject to provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3), on the insolvency commencement date, the Adjudicating Authority shall by order declare moratorium for prohibiting all of the following, namely:—

(a) the institution of suits or continuation of pending suits or proceedings against the corporate debtor including execution of any judgment, decree or order in any court of law, tribunal, arbitration panel or other authority; (b) transferring, encumbering, alienating or disposing of by the corporate debtor any of its assets or any legal right or beneficial interest therein;

(c) any action to foreclose, recover or enforce any security interest created by the corporate debtor in respect of its property including any action under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (54 of 2002); (d) the recovery of any property by an owner or lessor where such property is occupied by or in the possession of the corporate debtor. [Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section, it is hereby clarified that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, a license, permit, registration, quota, concession, clearances or a similar grant or right given by the Central Government, State Government, local authority, sectoral regulator or any other authority constituted under any other law for the time being in force, shall not be suspended or terminated on the grounds of insolvency, subject to the condition that there is no default in payment of current dues arising for the use or continuation of the license, permit, registration, quota, concession, clearances or a similar grant or right during the moratorium period;]

(2) The supply of essential goods or services to the corporate debtor as may be specified shall not be terminated or suspended or interrupted during moratorium period. [(2A) Where the interim resolution professional or resolution professional, as the case may be, considers the supply of goods or services critical to protect and preserve the value of the corporate debtor and manage the operations of such corporate debtor as a going concern, then the supply of such goods or services shall not be terminated, suspended or interrupted during the period of moratorium, except where such corporate debtor has not paid dues arising from such supply during the moratorium period or in such circumstances as may be specified;]

[(3) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply to— [(a) such transactions, agreements or other arrangements as may be notified by the Central Government in consultation with any financial sector regulator or any other authority;]

(b) a surety in a contract of guarantee to a corporate debtor.].

(4) The order of moratorium shall have effect from the date of such order till the completion of the corporate insolvency resolution process: Provided that where at any time during the corporate insolvency resolution process period, if the Adjudicating Authority approves the resolution plan under sub-section (1) of section 31 or passes an order for liquidation of corporate debtor under section 33, the moratorium shall cease to have effect from the date of such approval or liquidation order, as the case may be.

Section 60. Adjudicating authority for corporate persons.-(1) The Adjudicating Authority, in relation to insolvency resolution and liquidation for corporate persons including corporate debtors and personal guarantors thereof shall be the National Company Law Tribunal having territorial jurisdiction over the place where the registered office of the corporate persons located.

(2) Without prejudice to sub-section (1) and notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Code, where a corporate insolvency resolution process or liquidation proceeding of a corporate debtor is pending before a National Company Law Tribunal, an application relating to the insolvency resolution or 1[liquidation or bankruptcy of a corporate guarantor or personal guarantor, as the case may be, of such corporate debtor] shall be filed before such National Company Law Tribunal.

(3) An insolvency resolution process or liquidation or bankruptcy proceeding of a corporate guarantor or personal guarantor, as the case may be, of the corporate debtor pending in any court or tribunal shall stand transferred to the Adjudicating Authority dealing with insolvency resolution process or liquidation proceeding of such corporate debtor.

(4) The National Company Law Tribunal shall be vested with all the powers of the Debt Recovery Tribunal as contemplated under Part III of this Code for the purpose of sub-section (2).

(5) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, the National Company Law Tribunal shall have jurisdictionJ1 to entertain or dispose of—

(a) any application or proceeding by or against the corporate debtor or corporate person;

(b) any claim made by or against the corporate debtor or corporate person, including claims by or against any of its subsidiaries situated in India; and

(c) any question of priorities or any question of law or facts, arising out of or in relation to the insolvency resolution or liquidation proceedings of the corporate debtor or corporate person under this Code.

(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963) or in any other law for the time being in force, in computing the period of limitation specified for any suit or application by or against a corporate debtor for which an order of moratorium has been made under this Part, the period during which such moratorium is in place shall be excluded.” The moot question is whether Section 60(6) of the IBC Code, 2016 is applicable to the present appeal. Section 60 of the IBC Code excludes the period of limitation during the enforcement of a moratorium in filing of any suit or application. It does not speak anything about the appeal. Section 14 prohibits the institution of a suit or continuation of pending suits or proceedings against the corporate debtor, including execution of any judgment/decree or order in any court of law, Tribunal, arbitration panel or other authority after commencement of the insolvency process. Another important question is whether the limitation period as set out in the Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1997 is excluded during the enforcement of the moratorium in regard to the appeal being filed by the corporate debtor. Though, the Limitation Act is not applicable to the EPF Act, there is no provision in the Act to set out the limitation. Only the rules made thereunder prescribe the limitation for filing the appeal. In this regard, reliance may be placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in New Delhi Municipal Council v. Minosha India Ltd., Civil Appeal No. 3470 of 2022, decided on 27.04.2022, (2022 SCC OnLine SC 4690). wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the effect of Section 60(6) of the IBC and held that the period of moratorium is liable to be excluded while computing limitation in respect of a suit or application by the corporate debtor. It was observed as under: These provisions do not in any manner appear to stand in the way of the corporate debtor instituting or proceeding with a suit or a proceeding against others. Section 60(6) on the other hand excludes the period during which the Moratorium under Section 14 is in place in computing the period of

limitation. An ambiguity is introduced, namely the need to exclude the period of limitation for a suit or an application, at the instance of the corporate debtor when a Moratorium ushered in by an order under Section 14 does not pose any bar against a suit or an application at the instance of the corporate debtor. The words for which an order of Moratorium has been made under this part is intended to be the point of reference or the premise for the exclusion of the time for the purpose of computing the period of limitation. Besides being the point of reference and being the sine qua non for applying Section 60(6), it also specifies the period of time which will be excluded in computing of the period of limitation. In other words, present an order of Moratorium under Section 14, the entire period of the Moratorium is liable to be excluded in computing the period of limitation even in a suit or an application by a corporate debtor. This Tribunal also noticed that during the insolvency proceedings, the management of the corporate debtor is taken over by the Resolution Professional, who may not always be in a position to effectively conduct all the proceedings on behalf of the corporate debtor. Though the present case relates to an appeal under Section 7-I of the EPF Act, and not a suit or application under Section 60(6) of the IBC, the primary principle of the said judgment is relevant. The present appeal has also been filed by the corporate debtor through the Resolution Professional during the period when the moratorium is in operation. Therefore, considering the object and spirit of Section 60(6) of the IBC and the circumstances in which the Resolution Professional was required to conduct the affairs of the corporate debtor, the period of moratorium deserves to be taken into consideration while examining the delay in filing the present appeal. It is also pertinent to note that in Regional Provident Fund Commissioner-II v. Mamta Binani & Ors., 2026 INSC 1003, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while considering an appeal arising from proceedings under the IBC involving EPF claims, condoned the delay in filing the appeal upon finding that reasons for delay were satisfactory. Though the facts of the said case are different from the present case, the said judgment reiterates that the circumstances that caused the delay are required to be considered while examining an application for condonation of delay. In the present case, the delay has been explained in the backdrop of the insolvency proceedings, moratorium and the Resolution Professional taking over the affairs of the corporate debtor. Therefore, the said circumstances cannot be ignored while considering the prayer for condonation of delay.

The IBC Code has been enacted in 2016 by the Parliament for facilitating the restructuring of sick companies which are unable to pay any debt. And for this, a detailed procedure has been prescribed. First, an Interim Resolution Professional is to be appointed by the adjudicatory authority, then the RP shall take charge of the corporate debtor, the Committee of Creditors shall be formed, and the RP shall make public announcements inviting claims in regard to the debts, and then prepare the chart for restructuring the company and invite applicants to buy or infuse the money for running the corporate debtor, which has suffered a huge loss. Normally, the Resolution Professional is not in possession of any documents since the staff and directors of the company may not cooperate in providing books and ledgers of the accounts, rendering him unable to defend any action against the corporate debtor. If the RP fails to defend any action, then he might not be in a position to restructure the company. EPF & MP Act and IBC Code, both are special enactments enacted by the Parliament. Both enactments are complete codes in themselves, and the general law of limitation is not applicable to them. If there is a conflict between the general law and the special law, then the object of that enactment is to be taken into consideration. The purpose of the EPF & MP Act is to provide social security to the workers employed in any notified establishment. Minimum thresholds have been notified by the Government, both in number and amount. There is no maximum threshold, either in the number of employees for obtaining the PF code or in the wages on which the deduction has been made. However, if contribution has to be taken at the maximum wages, then the consent of both the employer and the employee has to be taken. On the other hand, the purpose of the IBC Code is to save a sick industry, which is not able to pay debts of Rs. 1,00,00,000/- (Rs. One Crore Only) or more. If technicalities like limitation prevail, then the purpose of both the IBC Code as well as the EPF & MP Act would fail. If the company goes into liquidation in respect of the claims lodged against it, then the workers would become unemployed, so the just claim has to be assessed. For this, appropriate action, like filing an appeal, has to be allowed irrespective of limitation. Considering the spirit of Section 60(6) of the IBC Code, which excludes the period of limitation for filing of any suit or application by or against the corporate debtor during the enforcement of the moratorium,

this Tribunal is of the opinion that the delay in filing the appeal can be condoned. In view of the discussion above, the applications of the appellant seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal stand allowed. Ordered accordingly. A copy of this order shall be sent to both parties via email. A copy of this order is also placed in each of the connected files.

Atul Kumar Garg

(Presiding Officer)