WA/479/2024 of Dr. A. Sujatha Vs The Visakhapatnam Municipal Corporation, on 24 August 2026

(1) of the building permission, which stated that in case the documents submitted for securing permission, if at a later stage found to be false and fabricated, the permission so accorded shall be revoked under the provisions of Section 450 of the GHMC Act, 1955. Therefore, the 1st respondent cannot now take a stand that since third party rights are involved, it cannot rescind the building permission at this stage. He also contended that the constructions made since are unauthorised, no excuse can be made, much less, can be legitimised under the ruse of passage of time. In support, he relied on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex

Court reported in Rajendra Kumar Barjatya v. U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad1.

9. Conversely, both learned standing counsel for 1st respondent GVMC as well as learned counsel for unofficial respondent, tried to support the impugned order of the learned Single Judge. Learned standing counsel for 1st respondent submitted that the appellant neither in the complaint, dated 08.11.2019, nor in the writ petition, has pleaded anything about MoU, dated 25.02.2012, much less that it was forged and fabricated, therefore, such a plea cannot be allowed to be raised in appeal. He also submitted that after entering into MoU, the appellant, along with her mother, settled the civil litigation pending between the appellant and the second party to MoU, accordingly, on reporting the same, S.A.No.197 of 2011 was dismissed vide order, dated 13.07.2012.

10. Further, learned counsel for 3rd respondent, while drawing our attention to para.5 of the counter-affidavit filed in the writ petition, would submit that the subject matter of property in issue has been earmarked for formation of road, and that the appellant is signatory to the said MoU, thus, cannot retreat from the said agreement. It is only on account of internal disputes amongst the family members of appellant, knowing well that the project was completed in all respects way back in the year 1 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3767

2014 itself, chose to indulge in vexatious litigation for obvious reasons. Thus, pleaded for dismissal of the appeal.

11. We have given our anxious consideration to the contentions advanced and also gone through the record.

12. The appellant claims to be owner of an extent of 550 sq. yards in Survey No.156/1 of Chinagantyada revenue village, Gajuwaka Mandal, Visakhapatnam District. For first time, she made a complaint on 08.11.2019 and requested 1st respondent to cancel the building permission granted in favour of 3rd respondent. 1st respondent, in turn, issued show-cause notice, dated 06.12.2019, calling upon 3rd respondent to offer explanation. In the show-cause notice, it was alleged that the building permission was secured as if there existed approach road to the subject property connecting national highway, however, on examination of the available records, it was observed that no such approach road was specified in the link documents, except referring the same in the development agreement-cum-general power of attorney executed vide document No.2263 of 2011, dated 21.10.2011. The 3rd respondent submitted explanation on 09.12.2019, inter alia, stating that the parties who have executed development agreement, later entered into MoU, dated 25.02.2012, agreeing for providing an extent of 1160 sq. yards for formation of road, more particularly, shown as “C” block in the enclosed sketch therein, meant for exclusive use of both parties to the MoU and the portion of property claimed by appellant also forms part of the same. It was also stated that both appellant as well as her mother and sisters, being parties to the same, signed the said MoU. After considering the explanation, 1st respondent issued impugned endorsement, refusing to rescind the building permission and occupation certificate issued in favour of 3rd respondent.

13. It is the case of appellant that she never signed the MoU and even otherwise, 1st respondent ought to have cancelled the building permission as he, prima facie, recorded that 3rd respondent made false statement with regard to the road while obtaining building permission. Aforesaid contentions of appellant are unsustainable and fallacious. The appellant and her mother preferred O.S. No.96 of 2005 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge’s Court, Gajuwaka, against Mr.Kommareddy Rambabu and 5 others seeking injunction restraining them from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of their property and also restraining the defendants from entering into agreement of sale or lease of schedule-B property with the third parties. The said Suit was dismissed on 04.06.2009. They preferred appeal in A.S.No.20 of 2009, which was also dismissed vide judgment, dated 09.07.2010, against which, further appeal was preferred in Second Appeal No.197 of 2011. Respondents 2 to 6 in S.A.No.197 of 2011 entered into development agreement, dated 21.11.2011, with the 3rd respondent for construction of residential complex. It is the claim of appellant that in the development agreement, though a road was shown to be in existence, on ground it did not exist, rather the land belonging to appellant was earmarked and shown to be the road portion. The building permission was granted on 16.12.2011. Later, MoU, dated 25.02.2012, was entered into between mother of appellant and her daughters and son, as one party and respondents 2 to 5 in S.A.No.197 of 2011 as the other party. Under the MoU, both parties agreed that the earmarked portion shown as “C” block constituting an extent of 1160 sq. yards was agreed to be used for formation of the road. In pursuance to the same, appellant and her mother reported that the parties have settled the matter out of Court, thus, S.A.No.197 of 2011 was dismissed by order, dated 13.07.2012. In the conspectus of aforesaid background, it is very much clear that the appellant engaged with the neighbouring property owners in regard to the formation of road. Though the initial documents furnished to the 1st respondent at the time of granting of building permission did not conclusively establish the existence of road, eventually, by virtue of the MoU, the road was formed and thereafter, construction got completed, and further occupancy certificates were also issued.

14. In the aforesaid background, since now a specific stand has been taken that the appellant has not signed the MoU, rather it was created and brought into existence, such issues definitely can neither be gone into nor decided by the Commissioner, while exercising the powers under Section 450 of the GHMC Act. He rightly refused to rescind the building permission on account of aforesaid intervening circumstances, however, it was proposed to initiate criminal action against the 3rd respondent for giving false statements in the process of securing building permission, besides initiating disciplinary action against the concerned staff.

15. Though learned counsel for appellant sought to contend that the constructions as stand today are unauthorized and inasmuch as building permission was secured on false and mis-representation, the fact remains that by virtue of subsequent events, in particular MoU, the road as indicated in the development agreement, stood laid and only thereafter, occupancy certificates were issued. Thus, now, the issue boils down to whether the appellant parted with any rights over subject property in favour of 3rd respondent under the MoU, which issue can only be decided by competent Civil Court in appropriate proceedings, definitely not in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

16. We, therefore, see no justification to interfere with the well- considered order of the learned Single Judge.

17. Accordingly, writ appeal stands dismissed. No order as to costs.

As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed.

LISA GILL, CJ CHALLA GUNARANJAN, J cs