CRLA/1274/2007 of BALU VENKATESWARLU Vs GOVINDU RAMANAIAH & 6 OTHERS, REP. BY P.P. on 17 March 2026

J U D G M E N T:

Heard Sri Shafath Ahmed Khan, learned counsel for the appellant/complainant and Sri C.P.Somayaji, learned Additional Public Prosecutor representing the 7th respondent/State.

2. The appeal is preferred U/s.374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 by the appellant/complainant in the case, challenging the order of acquittal recorded by the Assistant Sessions Judge, Kadapa Division at Rajampeta in S.C.No.46/2006. The learned Assistant Sessions Judge found the respondents/A-1 to A-6 not guilty for the offence U/secs.147, 323, 341, 342, 352, 390, 395 r/w.34 and 149 IPC.

3. The case of the complainant is that he is the tenant of a shop owned by A-1. The complainant has been running a cloth shop in the premises. Later, some disputes occurred between the complainant and A-1 regarding payment of rent. Therefore, A-1 and his family members demanded the complainant to vacate the shop. They also tried to evict the complainant without following due process of law. Hence, the complainant instituted a suit against the landlord for permanent injunction. The landlord also instituted a suit for eviction. Suits are pending before competent Civil Court.

4. While so, on 19.07.2001 at about 10.30 a.m. A-1 to A-6 formed into an unlawful assembly with a common object of using criminal force against the complainant. They trespassed into the shop, wrongfully confined the complainant, beat him, intimidated him to cause grievous injury. They took away cash of Rs.80,000/- available in the cash counter. They also damaged furniture and clothes worth of Rs.2,00,000/-.

5. The complainant immediately visited the office of Inspector of Police, Koduru, reported the incident. He refused to receive the report. He asked the complainant to go to Police Station, Koduru, and present a report to the Station House Officer. Accordingly, the complainant went to Police Station at Koduru, informed ASI of Police about the offence. ASI of Police abused the complainant and detained him in the police station without taking the report.

6. On the next day i.e., on 20.07.2001 wife of the complainant came to the Police Station at about 07.00 a.m., requested the police to release the complainant. The accused also came to Police Station, pressurized the complainant to give a statement in writing that he will vacate the shop. They obtained a letter from the complainant forcibly that he vacated the shop. The goods from the shop of the above complainant were shifted to the house of the Sarpanch of the village. Hence, the complainant approached the Magistrate, filing the complaint.

7. The learned Magistrate recorded the sworn statements of the complainant, his wife, and registered the complaint as P.R.C.45/2005, committed the case to the Court of Sessions at Kadapa. The case was made over to the Assistant Sessions Judge at Rajampeta vide S.C.No.46/2006.

8. The accused were charged for the offence U/secs.147, 452, 395 r/w.149 IPC. A-1 to A-6 pleaded not guilty and claims to be tried.

9. Three witnesses were examined as P.Ws-1 to 3 by the prosecution. Exs.P-1 to P-4 were marked for the prosecution. During cross-examination of P.Ws-1 and 2, Exs.D-1 to D-4 were marked for the defence.

10. The accused were examined U/s.313 Cr.P.C. regarding the incriminating circumstances appearing against them from the evidence for the prosecution. They denied the same. No oral evidence adduced for the defence.

11. The learned Assistant Sessions Judge considering the above evidence, found the accused not guilty of the above charge and accordingly, acquitted the accused U/s.235(1) Cr.P.C. Hence, the appeal came to be preferred by the complainant U/s.374(2) Cr.P.C.

12. Sri S.Ahmad Khan, learned counsel for the appellant/complainant would submit that the trial Court failed to consider the evidence of P.Ws-1 to 3 in proper perspective. Hence, came to an erroneous opinion finding that prosecution did not prove the case. The evidence of P.Ws-1 to 3 would establish that on 19.07.2001 A-1 to A-6 formed into an unlawful assembly, trespassed into the shop in the possession of P.W-1, robed Rs.80,000/- cash and also damaged the goods worth of Rs.2,00,000/-, and therefore, committed offence U/secs.147, 452, 395 IPC.

13. In the light of above submissions, the point that would arise for consideration in this Criminal Appeal is as under:

“Whether there are grounds to interfere with the judgment of the Assistant Sessions Court, Rajampeta”?

14. P O I N T: It is an appeal against acquittal filed by P.W.1 (complainant). The scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal was dealt with by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in N.Vijay Kumar Vs. State of Tamilnadu1 case (supra), wherein the Hon‟ble Apex Court observed at para Nos.20 to 23, which are extracted hereunder: “20. Mainly it is contended by Shri Nagamuthu, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant that the view taken by the trial court is a “possible view”, having regard to the evidence on record. It is submitted that the trial court has recorded cogent and valid reasons in support of its findings for acquittal. Under Section 378 Cr.P.C., no differentiation is made between an appeal against acquittal and the appeal against conviction. By considering the long line of earlier cases this court in the Judgment in Chandrappa Vs. State of Karnataka2 has laid down the general principles regarding the 1 (2021) 3 Supreme Court Cases 687. 2 (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325.

powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal. Para 42 of the Judgment which is relevant reads as under: (SCC p.432) “42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:

An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.

The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.

Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc., are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.

An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal

jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.

If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.”

21. Further in the judgment in the case of Murugesan Vs. State3 relied on by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, this Court has considered the powers of the High Court in an appeal against acquittal recorded by the trial court. In the said judgment, it is categorically held by this Court that only in cases where conclusion recorded by the trial court is not a possible view, then only the High Court can interfere and reverse the acquittal to that of conviction. In the said Judgment, distinction from that of „possible view‟ to „erroneous view‟ or „wrong view‟ is explained. In clear terms, this Court has held that if the view taken by the trial court is a „possible view‟, the High Court not to reverse the acquittal to that of the conviction.

22. The relevant paragraphs in this regard where meaning and implication of „possible view‟ distinguishing from „erroneous view‟ and „wrong view‟ is discussed are paras 32 to 35 of the judgment, which read as under: (Murugesan case, SCC pp.392-97) “32. In the above facts can it be said that the view taken by the trial court is not a possible view? If the answer is in the affirmative, the jurisdiction of the High Court to 3 (2012) 10 SCC 383: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 69.

interfere with the acquittal of the appellant- accused, on the principles of law referred to earlier, ought not to have been exercised. In other words, the reversal to earlier, ought not to have been exercised. In other words, the reversal of the acquittal could have been made by the High Court only if the conclusions recorded by the learned trial court did not reflect a possible view. It must be emphasized that the inhibition to interfere must be perceived only in a situation where the view taken by the trial court is not a possible view. The use of the expression „possible view‟ is conscious and not without good reasons. The said expression is in contradistinction to expressions such as „erroneous view‟ or „wrong view‟ which, at first blush, may seem to convey a similar meaning though a fine and subtle difference would be clearly discernible.

33. The expressions “erroneous”, “wrong” and “possible” are defined in Oxford English Dictionary in the following terms:

„erroneous. – wrong; incorrect.

Wrong. – (1) not correct or true, mistaken.

(2) unjust, dishonest, or immoral.

Possible. – (1) capable of existing, happening, or being achieved.

(2) that may exist or happen, but that is not certain or probable.

34. It will be necessary for us to emphasise that a possible view denotes an opinion which can exist or be formed irrespective of the correctness or otherwise of such an opinion. A view taken by a court lower in the hierarchical structure may be termed as erroneous or wrong by a superior court upon a mere disagreement. But such a conclusion of the higher court would not take the view rendered by the subordinate court outside the arena of a possible view. The correctness or otherwise of any conclusion reached by a court has to be tested on the basis of what the superior judicial authority perceives to be the correct conclusion. A possible view, on the other hand, denotes a conclusion which can reasonably be arrived at regardless of the fact where it is agreed upon or not by the higher court. The fundamental distinction between the two situations have to be kept in mind. So long as the view taken by the trial court can be reasonably formed, regardless of whether the High Court agrees with the same or not, the view taken by the trial court cannot be interdicted and that of the High Court supplanted over and above the view of the trial court.

35. A consideration on the basis on which the learned trial court had founded its order of acquittal in the present case clearly reflects a possible view. There may, however, be disagreement on the correctness of the same. But that is not the test. So long as the view taken is not impossible to be arrived at and reasons therefore, relatable to the evidence and materials on record, are disclosed any further scrutiny in exercise of the power under Section 378 Cr.P.C., was not called for.”

23. Further, in Hakeem Khan v. State of M.P.4 this Court has considered the powers of the appellate court for interference in cases where acquittal is recorded by the trial court. In the said judgment it is held that if the “possible view” of the trial court is not agreeable for the High Court, even then such “possible view” recorded by the trial court cannot be interdicted. It is further held that so long as the view of the trial court can be reasonably formed, regardless of whether the High Court agrees with the same or not, verdict of the trial court cannot be interdicted and the High Court cannot supplant over the view of the trial court. Para 9 of the Judgment reads as under: (SCC pp. 722-23). “9. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the view that the trial court‟s judgment is more than just a possible view for arriving at the conclusion of acquittal, and that it would not be safe to convict seventeen persons accused of the crime of murder i.e., under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the Penal Code. The most important reason of the trial court, as has been stated above, was that, given the time of 6.30 p.m. to 7.00 p.m. of a winter evening, it would be dark, and, therefore, identification of seventeen persons would be extremely difficult. This reason, coupled with the fact that the only independent witness turned hostile, and two other eyewitnesses who were independent were not examined, would certainly create a large hole in the prosecution story. Apart from this, the very fact that there were injuries on three of the accused party, two of them being deep injuries in the skull, would lead to the conclusion that nothing was premeditated and there was, in all probability, a 4 (2017) 5 SCC 719 : (2017) 2 SCC (Cri) 653.

scuffle that led to injuries on both sides. While the learned counsel for the respondent may be right in stating that the trial court went overboard in stating that the complainant party was the aggressor, but the trial court‟s ultimate conclusion leading to an acquittal is certainly a possible view on the facts of this case. This is coupled with the fact that the presence of the kingpin Sarpanch is itself doubtful in view of the fact that he attended the Court at some distance and arrived by bus after the incident took place.”

15. In the case on hand, admittedly, civil disputes are pending between the complainant and A-1. In that view of the matter, the evidence placed before the trial Court has to be considered cautiously to rule out any false implication of the accused to settle the civil disputes.

16. The accused are innocent until proven guilty. If they are found not guilty after trial, they will have another line of protection. The Appellate Court shall not interfere with the judgment of the trial Court, unless the trial Court judgment is not based on evidence, or no evidence or material evidence is not considerded or it is a perverse judgment. If the material on record would show that the view taken by the trial Court is also a possible view, the Appellate Court shall not disturb the finding of the trial Court.

17. In the case on hand, the complainant was examined as P.W-1. In the chief-examination, he restated the facts mentioned in the complaint. During cross-examination, it is established that earlier, he presented a complaint registered at Koduru. It was referred to police vide Cr.No.116/2001. Police conducted investigation into the case and filed report referring the same as „false‟. It appears that the present complaint is filed by P.W-1 as protest petition. It is not known what orders were passed by the learned Magistrate on the report filed by the police referring the case as „false‟ i.e., whether the Magistrate accepted the report, or directed further investigation or deferred with the opinion of the police and took cognizance of the offence. But the learned Magistrate recorded sworn statements of P.W-1 and his wife (P.W-2) basing on this complaint, took cognizance for the offence mentioned above and committed the case to the Sessions Court.

18. During cross-examination of P.W-1, Exs.D-1 and D-2 were marked i.e., certain portion of Exs.P-1 and P-2 sworn statements of P.W-1 and complainant filed by P.W-1. Ex.D-1 show that the complainant did not mention the name of P.W-3 in the complaint. He mentioned P.W-2‟s name only as a witness to the incident. Therefore, basing on Ex.D-1, trial Court found that P.W-3 is pressed into the case at a later point as an eyewitness. Hence, it is not safe to consider the evidence of P.W-3 as an eyewitness.

19. Ex.D-2 would show that P.W-1 went to shop and asked the persons present there i.e., neighbor shop owners. They informed him that the goods were transported in a tractor to the house of sarpanch of Bayanapalli Village. It would show that P.W-1 did not witness the accused lifting the goods from the shop and taking them away as alleged by the complainant and his wife.

20. P.W-2 is wife of P.W-1. P.W-2 evidence would show that she was not present at the shop on 19.07.2001. She deposed that P.W-1 did not come to home on 19.07.2001. Therefore, on the next day i.e., on 20.07.2001 she went to the shop and came to know about the incident. Then she went to the Police Station and found her husband there. Later, her husband was released after 01.00 p.m. after taking a letter. She did not depose that the accused also came to the police Station at that time. During cross-examination, Exs.D-3 and D-4 were marked for the defence. Ex.D-3 shows that she asked her husband as to why he did not come to home on the previous night. She was informed that accused made galata and asked him to vacate the shop. She made a categorical admission that her husband did not say anything more. So, according to her version, when she asked her husband what happened at the shop, he did not say anything about the robbing of cash, got damaging goods worth of Rs.2,00,000/-, transporting into the shop. He only stated about the occurrence of some galata, asking P.W-1 to vacate the shop. Ex.D-4 would show that she went to the shop on 20.07.2001 and shop was under lock and key.

21. It is pertinent to note that both P.W-1 and P.W-2 when confronted with the above statements i.e., Exs.D-1 to D-4 from their sworn statements given to the Magistrate, they stated that they did not make such statements before the Magistrate. It would show that P.Ws-1 and 2 are making different statements at each point in time according to their convenience for the reasons known to them.

22. It is also pertinent to know down that civil suits are pending between P.W-1 and A-1 relating to the dispute of the shop. It probable that, to settle the account, criminal cases came into picture for the reasons known to P.Ws-1 and 2.

23. P.W-1 stated the accused robbed Rs.80,000/- from the cash counter, as sale proceeds of the cloth. No documentary evidence placed before the trial Court to show that he sold cloth worth of Rs.80,000/- on that day or earlier and therefore, cash of Rs.80,000/- available in the shop. He deposed that goods worth of Rs.2,00,000/- was damaged by the accused. But no documentary evidence placed before the trial Court to prove the value of stock available in the shop on the date of incident i.e., 19.07.2001. Except the self-serving statement of P.W-1 regarding availability of cash and goods, no other evidence is available on record. P.W-1 did not produce the best evidence to prove that cash of Rs.80,000/- and goods worth of Rs.2,00,000/- available in the shop on 19.07.2001.

24. In the light of foregoing circumstances, as no evidence forthcoming to prove the offence U/secs.149, 452, 395 IPC, the trial Court came to an opinion that the evidence on record is not leading the Court to conclude that the offence U/secs.149, 452, 395 IPC is proved. This Court do not find any grounds to interfere with the judgment of the trial Court.

25. In the light of foregoing discussion, the Criminal Appeal do not find any merits and be dismissed.

26. In the result, the Criminal Appeal is dismissed. This judgment be certified to the trial Court as per section 405 of Cr.P.C.

As a sequel, Interlocutory Applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.

_______________________ ___ JUSTICE B.V.L.N. CHAKRAVARTHI 18.03.2026

PSK

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE B.V.L.N. CHAKRAVARTHI

CRIMINAL APPEAL No: 1274 OF 2007

Date: 18.03.2026

W PSK