CO/68/2025 of SRI SUBAL SAHA Vs SMT. SIMA MAJI(DEB ROY) on 22 September 2026

Court No. 6 (265719) 22.09.2026

(A 1513)

(S. Banerjee) CO 68 of 2025

Subal Saha Vs. Sima Maji (Deb Roy)

Mr. Siva Prasad Ghose Ms. Neha Roy

…for the petitioner Mr. Shibaji Kumar Das Mr. Dipendu Sarkar

…for the opposite-party

This application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is at the instance of the defendant and is directed against an order dated October 8, 2024 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Jr. Division) 2nd Court at Barrackpore in Ejectment Suit No. 101 of 2018. By the order impugned the application under Section 7(2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997, stood rejected. The opposite-party filed a suit for eviction on the ground contained under Section 6(1) of the 1997 Act. Petitioner took out an application under Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the 1997 Act. The applications under Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the 1997 Act were disposed of upon holding that the petition under Section 7(2) of the 1997 Act is not entertainable due to non-compliance of the mandatory provisions of Section 7(1)(c) of the 1997 Act. Mr. Ghose, learned advocate appearing for the petitioner submits that the petitioner has disputed the existence of landlord-tenant relationship between the parties in the application under Section 7(2) of the 1997 Act. He further submits that unless such issue is decided, the petitioner is not obliged to comply with the provisions of Section 7(1) or 7(2) of the 1997 Act. He, however, submits that the petitioner has deposited the rent for the month of June, 2019 and in support of such contention he draws the attention of the Court to the information slip issued by the office of the learned trial judge. He further submits that the delay on the part of the petitioner in depositing rents for the months of April, 2020 to May, 2021, was only due to imposition of lockdown on account of the onset of Covid-19 pandemic. He submits that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a Suo Motu writ petition extended the period of limitation under various statutes and the benefit of such order should be extended to the petitioner. Per contra, learned advocate appearing for the opposite party submits that the opposite-party has become the owner in respect of the property by virtue of a probate granted to the will executed by the erstwhile owner. He submits that the learned trial judge after considering the materials on record arrived at a factual finding that the deposit of rent for several months were made beyond the time limit stipulated under Section 7(1)(c) of the 1997 Act. He submits that such factual finding does not suffer from any infirmity. Heard the learned advocates for the parties and perused the materials placed. Though the learned advocate appearing for the petitioner in course of his argument has submitted that the opposite-party is not the landlady of the petitioner and such objection has been raised in the application under Section 7(2) of the 1997 Act, this Court finds that the petitioner has specifically stated as to how she became the owner of the suit property. Such acquisition of title by the plaintiff/opposite-party herein has not been disputed by the petitioner in the application under Section 7(2) of the 1997 Act. To the mind of this Court, the dispute as to the existence of the landlord-tenant relationship between the parties raised by the petitioner in the application under Section 7(2) of the 1997 Act, is not a bona fide dispute. For such reason this Court holds that the learned trial judge was right in not entering into that dispute. There is nothing on record to indicate that there is no landlord-tenant relationship between the parties. It further appears from the impugned order that the rent for the months of April, 2020 to May, 2021 was deposited beyond the period stipulated under Section 7(1)(c) of the 1997 Act but last of such deposit for the months of April, 2021 and May, 2021 was deposited on July 14, 2021. The deposits for the other months starting from April, 2020 till March, 2021 was deposited prior to July 14, 2021 as specifically recorded in the order impugned. At this stage it would be relevant to take note of the order dated January 10, 2022 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) No. 3 of 2020 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court clarified that the period from March 15, 2020 till February 28, 2022 shall stand excluded for the purposes of limitation as may be prescribed under any general or special law in respect of all judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. For better appreciation, paragraph 5.1 of the order dated January 10, 2022 passed in Suo Motu

Writ Petition (C) No. 3 of 2020 is extracted hereinafter: “The order dated 23.03.2020 is restored and in continuation of the subsequent orders dated 08.03.2021, 27.04.2021 and 23.09.2021, it is directed that the period from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 shall stand excluded for the purposes of limitation as may be prescribed under any general or special laws in respect of all judicial or quasi judicial proceedings.” In the light of the direction passed under paragraph 5.1 of the order dated January 10, 2022, this Court is of the considered view that the period from March 15, 2020 till February 28, 2022 shall stand excluded for the purpose of limitation as stipulated under Section 7(1)(c) of the 1997 Act. It prima facie appears to this Court that the deposits of rent for the months of April, 2020 till May, 2021 were made within the period of exclusion from the bar of limitation. On a reading of the impugned order this Court finds that the attention of the learned trial judge was not drawn to the aforesaid orders of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Ordinarily taking note of the decision passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court this Court could have disposed of the civil revision application instead of remanding the matter before the learned trial judge.

However, for the reasons as stated hereinafter, this Court feels that the matter should be remanded to the learned trial judge. It has been recorded in the order impugned that no civil deposit challan for the month of June, 2019 has been submitted by the defendant. Though an information slip was relied upon by the learned advocate appearing for the petitioner in support the contention that such civil deposit challan is available on record, this Court feels that the learned trial judge should consider whether the deposit for the month of June, 2019 was made within the stipulated timeframe and whether the petitioner is in default in complying with the provisions of Section 7(1)(c) subsequent to February 28, 2022. For all the reasons as aforesaid, the impugned order is set aside. The application under Section 7(2) of the 1997 Act stands restored to the file of the learned trial judge for the purpose of deciding as to whether the petitioner has complied with the provisions of Section 7(1)(c) of the 1997 Act in the light of the observations made hereinbefore. With the above observations this civil revision application stands disposed of.

(Hiranmay Bhattacharyya, J.)