CRR/2099/2023 of CHINMOY KUNDU Vs STATE OF WEST BENGAL on 18 August 2026

1. Parties are represented by their respective learned counsel.

2. By this revisional application, the petitioner seeks the quashing of the proceeding arising out of Nadanghat Police Station NCR Case No. 222 of 2023 dated 06.05.2023 under Sections 107/116(C) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as well as the setting aside of the order dated 19.05.2023 passed by the learned Executive Magistrate, Kalna Court, Purba Bardhaman. By the said impugned order, the learned Executive Magistrate directed the petitioner to submit a PR Bond of Rs. 1,000/- upon a report submitted by an Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police, Nadanghat Police Station, dated 06.05.2023.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner strongly contends that the entire proceeding is vitiated by patent illegality and procedural impropriety. It is submitted that the impugned order was passed in absolute disregard of Section 111 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which mandates that when a Magistrate acts under Section 107, 108, 109, or 110, they shall make an order in writing, setting forth the substance of the information received, the amount of the bond to be executed, the term for which it is to be in force, and the number, character, and class of sureties (if any). Furthermore, learned counsel submits that the mandatory inquiry regarding the truth of the information, as contemplated under Section 116 of the Cr.P.C., was never conducted. Lastly, placing reliance upon Section 116(6) of the Cr.P.C., it is urged that time is of the essence in such preventive proceedings, and the life of the order cannot be extended indefinitely beyond the statutory outer limit.

4. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the State fairly submits that the instant proceeding has been rendered entirely infructuous, as the foundational order impugned herein does not survive in the eye of law.

5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and have meticulously perused the materials available on record.

6. To appreciate the controversy in its proper perspective, it is apposite to reproduce the statutory mandate of Section 116(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which governs the lifespan of such inquiries:

“116(6). The inquiry under this section shall be completed within a period of six months from the date of its commencement, and if such inquiry is not so completed, the proceedings under this Chapter shall, on the expiry of the said period, stand terminated unless, for special reasons to be recorded in writing, the Magistrate otherwise directs: Provided that where any person has been kept in detention pending such inquiry, the proceeding against that person, unless terminated earlier, shall stand terminated on the expiry of a period of six months of such detention.”

7. Upon a plain reading of the aforesaid provision, it is abundantly clear that the law sets a strict time limit for the completion of an inquiry under Chapter VIII to prevent unending restraints on personal liberty. In the facts of the present case, the impugned order was passed on 19.05.2023. Even stretching the statutory computation to its absolute maximum limit, the force of the order could not have extended beyond 19.05.2024.

8. More than two years having elapsed since the inception of the proceeding, and keeping in view the mandatory termination clauses enshrined under Section 116(6), I find that the impugned order has lost all its legal efficacy and relevance. Consequently, the continuation of the proceeding would be an abuse of the process of law.

9. In the result, the instant revisional application being 2099 of 2023, is dismissed as having become infructuous.

10. Consequently, connected application CRAN 1 of 2023 stands dismissed.

11. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.

12. Urgent photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties upon compliance of all necessary formalities.

(UDAY KUMAR, J.)