CORPORATION BANK vs SUDHIR KUMAR on 28 January 2019

FINAL ORDER

(28.01.2019)

1. The present MA has been filed by the defendants for praying to transfer of the RC No.94/2015 to such other Tribunal having territorial jurisdiction over the said property, as provided under Section 19(23) of the Recovery of Debts & Bankruptcy Act, 1993.

2. Facts as succinctly set out in the MA are that the this Tribunal vide order dated 21.05.2015 allowed the OA No.53/2014 and had consequently issued a Recovery Certificate directing recovery, inter- alia from the sale of mortgaged property i.e. Building at Khasra No.476 & 477, Patel Marg, Ghaziabad. It is stated that as per provision under Section 19 of the RDDBFI Act, 1993, and of the Rule 6 of the DRT Rules, are merely proceedings for the recovery of ‘Debt’ and not for the enforcement of ‘Mortgage’, and the same culminate in the issuance of a Recovery Certificate, equivalent to a money decree of a civil court. It is stated that when the proceedings for the execution of the Recovery Certificate are commenced, the issue of Territorial Jurisdiction arises and it is under the said circumstances that the provisions of Section 19(23) of the RDDB&FI Act, 1993 are applicable and if the recoveries are to be made out of the properties situated outside the territorial jurisdiction of the concerned DRT then the subject Recovery Certificate is liable to be transferred to the DRT having jurisdiction over the said properties. It is stated that the defendants have raised the issue for transfer of the Recovery Certificate before the Ld. Recovery Officer in RC No.94/2015, that the Ld. Recovery Officer on dated 19.03.2018 has granted two week time to raise the issue of territorial jurisdiction before the appropriate forum. It is also stated that Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in the matter of Sikka Papers Ltd. Vs. Indian Overseas Bank has specifically held that the decree in favour of the bank shall for purposes of execution be transferred to DRT whereof the mortgaged properties are situated. It is stated that in the present matter the mortgaged property is situated in Ghaziabad, thereby the present RC No.94/2015 may kindly be transferred to DRT having territorial jurisdiction of the same.

3. Notice was issued to the applicant bank. The bank has filed the reply of this MA.

4. In the reply, the applicant bank vehemently objected in the present IA and stated that Section 19(23) of the RDDB&FI Act, 1993 gives discretion to this Tribunal to execute recovery certificate if the property is situated within the jurisdiction of two or more Tribunals and this Tribunal has jurisdiction over the secured assets and can sell the same in view of various provisions and scheme of Recovery Act particularly in view of amendments made in the year 2016. It is also stated that the defendants with an ulterior motive file the present application to delay and frustrate the recovery proceeding. It is stated that Recovery Officer can order taking over possession of the property in which security interest is created or any other property of the defendants anywhere in India and sell the same as envisaged under Section 25 of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act and no objection was ever raised by defendants in respect of the possession of the property in question. It is stated that property was put to auction and the auction purchaser has deposited entire auction amount with the Recovery Officer and the defendants did not raise any objection till the time the auction was completed and auction purchaser deposited entire sale consideration.

5. The defendants also filed the rejoinder of the reply filed by the bank and denied all the allegations made in the reply.

6. Heard rival submission and also I consider the record as well as provisions of DRT Act, 1993 and also the various judgment related to the issue involve in the present matter.

7. The core issue raised in the present MA is that:- Whether the Recovery Certificate be transferred for the purpose of execution to the DRT where the property is situated.

8. Before examine the issue raised in the present MA I would like to discuss two judgments i.e. Sikka Paper Mills and Amish Jain.

9. In the ICICI Vs. Amish Jain a question was arise regarding the jurisdiction for filing Securitization Application under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 wherein Hon’ble Delhi High Court has held that the SA can be file where the mortgaged property situated.

10. In the matter of Sikka Paper Mills (supra) Hon’ble Delhi High Court on the basis of Judgment of Amish Jain has held that the Recovery Certificate shall be transferred to the DRT where the mortgaged property is situated.

11. It is pertinent to mention here that when the Judgment of Sikka Paper Mills (supra) was passed, law regarding the power of a Recovery

Officer for recovery of debt is provided under Section 25 of DRT Act, 1993 was as follows:-

25. Modes of recovery of debts.—The Recovery Officer shall, on receipt of the copy of the certificate under sub-section (7) of section 19, proceed to recover the amount of debt specified in the certificate by one or more of the following modes, namely:-- (a) attachment and sale of the movable or immovable property of the defendants; (b) arrest of the defendants and his detention in prison;

(c) appointing a receiver for the management of the movable or immovable properties of the defendants.

12. Whereas Section 25 was amended recently in the year 2016 and now legislature has amended Section 25 and “a new sub-section (aa) is inserted thereby empowering the Recovery Officer of the DRT to take possession of properties over which security interest is created or any other property of the defendants and appointing Receiver for such property and to sell the same.”

13. Further, the Powers of Recovery Officer have further been expanded to make recovery by any other mode, as may be prescribed by the Central Government.

14. From the bare reading of the earlier provision and amended provision of Section 25 of the DRT Act, 1993 demonstrate that now parliament has provided power to Recovery Officer to proceed for “any property” thus in my view, now the power of the Recovery Officer for the purpose of execution of recovery certificate has been extended beyond the jurisdiction of concerned DRT therefore, after the amendment of Section 25 of the DRT Act, 1993 the Recovery Officer may proceed for the purpose of Recovery for any property irrespective where it is situated.

15. Ld. Counsel for the applicant during the argument has stress on the provision and submitted that the amended provision is not applicable for the RCs which are pending before the date of the amendment.

16. I do not inspire from the said contention of the Ld. Counsel for applicant. In my opinion the amendment in Section 25 of the DRT Act, 1993 are having retrospective effect as the said provision is only for the procedure purposes and it do not affect any right of the parties concerned.

17. The Cardinal Principle of construction of a statute is that every statute is prima facie prospective “unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective operation”. However, when a procedural law is considered it is always retroactive i.e. came into effect from past date so the question of retrospective operation shall arise in substantive laws only.

18. In the matter of Landgraf Vs. USI Film Products 511 U.S. 244 (1994), Hon’ble Supreme Court of US while discussing the importance of retroactive effect of procedural rules has recorded that “Because rules of procedure regulate secondary rather than primary conduct, the fact that a new procedural rule was instituted after the conduct giving rise to the suit does not make application of the rule at trial retroactive.”

19. Similarly, Larger Bench of Hon’ble Orissa High Court in the matter of Sarthak Builders Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. Vs. Orissa Rural Development Corporation Limited and Ors. AIR 2014 ORI 83 has after discussing various Judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court has categorically held that presumption against retrospectively is not applicable to enactments which merely affect the procedure or declaratory. Relevant discussion is reproduce herein under:-

“Rafiquennessa v. Lal Bahadur Chetri, AIR 1964 SC 1511 9…. Mr. Chatterjee has relied upon the well-known observations made by Wright, J. in (Re Athlumney ex parte or Wilson (1898) 2 QBD 547) when the learned Judge said that it is a general rule that when the legislature alters the rights of parties by taking away or conferring any right of action, its enactments, unless in express terms they apply to pending actions, do not affect them. He added that there was one exception to that rule, namely that where enactments merely affect procedure and do not extend to rights of action, they have been held to apply to existing rights. In order to make the statement of the law relating to the relevant rule of construction which has to be adopted in dealing with the effect of statutory provisions in this connection, we ought to add that retrospective operation of a statutory provision can be inferred even in cases where such retroactive operation appears to be clearly implicit in the provision construed in the context where it occurs. In other words, a statutory provision is held to be retroactive either when it is so declared by express terms, or the intention to make it retroactive clearly follows from the relevant words and the context in which they occur. Memon Abdul Karim Haji Tayab Central Cutlery Stores v. Dy. Custodian-General, AIR 1964 SC 1256 4……..It is well settled that procedural amendments to a law apply, in the absence of anything to the contrary, retrospectively in the sense that they apply to all actions after the date they come into force even though the actions may have begun earlier or the claim on which the action may be based may be of an anterior date…. Boucher Pierre Andre v. Supdt., Central Jailt (1975) 1 SCC 192

2. The question which arises for determination in this petition is a narrow one and it rests on the true interpretation of Section 428. Is this section confined in its application only to cases where a person is convicted after the coming into force of the new Code of Criminal Procedure, or does it also embrace cases where a person has been convicted before but his sentence is still running at the date when the new Code of Criminal Procedure came into force? It is only if the latter interpretation is accepted that the petitioner would be entitled to claim the benefit of the section and hence it becomes necessary to arrive at its proper construction. Section 428 reads as follows: Where an accused person has, on conviction, been sentenced to imprisonment for a term, the period of detention, if any, undergone by him during the investigation, inquiry or trial of the same case and before the date of such conviction, shall be set off against the term of imprisonment imposed on him on such conviction, and the liability of such person to undergo imprisonment on such conviction shall be restricted to the reminder, if any, of the term of imprisonment imposed on him. This section, on a plain natural construction of its language, posits for its applicability a fact situation which is described by the clause “where an accused person has, on conviction, been sentenced to imprisonment for a term”. There is nothing in this clause which suggests, either expressly or by necessary implication that the conviction and sentence must be after the coming into force of the new Code of Criminal Procedure. The language of the clause is neutral. It does not refer to any particular point of time when the accused person should have been convicted and sentenced. It merely indicates a fact situation which must exist in order to attract the applicability of the section and this fact situation would be satisfied equally whether an accused person has been convicted and sentenced before or after the coming into force of the new Code of Criminal Procedure. Even where an accused person has been convicted prior to the coming into force of new Code of Criminal Procedure but his sentence is still running, it would not be inappropriate for a term”. Therefore, where an accused person has been convicted and he is still serving his sentence at the date when the new Code of Criminal Procedure came into force. Section 428 would apply and he would be entitled to claim that the period of detention undergone by him during the investigation, inquiry or trial of the case should be set off against the term of imprisonment imposed on him and he should be required to undergo only the reminder of the term. Of course, if the term of the sentence has already run out, no question of set off can arise. It is only where the sentence is still running that the section can operate to restrict the term. This construction of the section does not offend against the principle which requires that unless the legislative intent is clear and compulsive, no retrospective operation should be given to a statute. On this interpretation, the section is not given any retrospective effect. It does not seek to set at naught the conviction already recorded against the accused person. The conviction remains intact and unaffected and so does the sentence already undergone. It is only the sentence, insofar as it yet remains to be undergone, that is, reduced. The section operates prospectively on the sentence which yet remains to be served and curtails it be setting off the period of detention undergone by the accused person during the investigation, inquiry or trial of the case. Any argument based on the objection against giving retrospective operation is, therefore, irrelevant. New India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Shanti Misra, (1975) 2 SCC 840.

5. On the On the plain language of sections 110-A and 110-Fthere should be no difficulty in taking the view that the change in law was merely a change of forum i.e. a change of adjectival or procedural law and not of substantive law. It is well-established proposition that such a change of law operates retrospectively and the person has to go to the new forum even if his cause of action or right of action accrued prior to the change of forum. He will have a vested right of action but not a vested right of forum. If by express words the new forum is made available only to causes of action arising after the creation of the forum, then the retrospective operation of the law is taken away. Otherwise the general rule is to make it retrospective…. Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra, (1994) 4 SCC 602: 26…….From the law settled by this Court in various cases the illustrative though not exhaustive principles which emerge with regard to the ambit and scope of an Amending Act and its retrospective operation may be culled out as follows:

(i) A statute which affects substantive rights is presumed to be prospective in operation unless made retrospective, either expressly or by necessary intendment, whereas a statute which merely affects procedure, unless such a construction is textually impossible, is presumed to be retrospective in its application, should not be given an extended meaning and should be strictly confined to its clearly defined limits.

(ii) Law relating to forum and limitation is procedural in nature, whereas law relating to right of action and right of appeal even though remedial is substantive in nature.

(iii) Every litigant has a vested right in substantive law but no such right exists in procedural law.

(iv) A procedural statute should not generally speaking be applied retrospectively where the result would be to create new disabilities or obligations or to impose new duties in respect of transactions already accomplished.

(v) A statute which not only changes the procedure but also creates new rights and liabilities shall be construed to be prospective in operation, unless otherwise provided, either expressly or by necessary implication. K.S. Paripoornan v. State of Kerala, (1994) 5 SCC 593:

64. A statute dealing with substantive rights differs from a statute which relates to procedure or evidence or is declaratory in nature inasmuch as while 25 (1980) 2 SCC 1 : 1980 SCC (Tax) 156 :(1980) 2 SCR 315 7 (1992) 1 SCC 673 a statute dealing with substantive rights is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective effect, a statute concerned mainly with matters of procedure or evidence or which is declaratory in nature has to be construed as retrospective unless there is a clear indication that such was not the intention of the legislature…… ESI Corpn. v. Dwarka Nath Bhargwa, (1997) 7 SCC 131:

The Employees State Insurance Corporation has brought in challenge the order passed by Allahabad High Court disposing of the first appeal from order No.362 of 1972. By the impugned judgment, the High Court has taken the view that provisions of Section 45B of the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") enabling recovery of contribution payable under the Act as arrears of land revenue cannot be pressed into service by the appellant-Corporation in the pressed into service by the appellant-Corporation in the present case. Reason given by the High court for the said conclusion is to the effect that the effect that the recoveries pertain to the period prior to the date on which Section 45B was inserted in the statute book. The said section was brought into force on 28.1.1968, while the amount sought to be recovered became payable on 27.1.1967 and 24.1.1968. It is of course true that these amounts were to be paid by the respondent employer on these relevant dates, but these contributions were not made by the respondent in time. Therefore, they remained in arrears. After section 45-B was brought on the statute book, notices were issued to the respondent on 24.4.1970 and 9.9.1970 for effecting recoveries of these unpaid amounts of contributions by resort to section 45B Question, therefore is as to whether for the aforesaid contributions which remained unpaid resort to Section 45B could be effected on any day after the said section came on the statute book? Now a mere look at the said section came on the statute book? Now a mere at the said section shows that in is of procedural nature. It provides that any contribution payable under these Act may be recovered as arrear of land revenue', Consequently, on the date on which the recovery by way of arrears of land revenue is to be effected, the contribution in question should have remained unpaid.

2. It is not in dispute and cannot be disputed that the contributions in question had remained payable all throughout and were paid by the respondent. The day on which recovery by way of land revenue was sought to be made, section had already come into force. As it was a procedural provision, it could obviously apply retrospectively to cover all contributions which had remained unpaid even prior to the date on which the section come into force. In support of this contention, learned counsel force. In support of this contention, learned counsel for the appellant rightly invited our attention to a decision of the Privy Council in Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd vs. Income Tax Commissioner, Delhi and Another reported in AIR 1927 PC 242 wherein it has been laid down that while provisions of a statute dealing merely with matters of procedure may properly, unless that construction be textually inadmissible, have retrospective effect attributed to them, provisions which touch a right in existence at the passing to the statute are not to be applied retrospectively in the absence of express enactment or necessary intendment.

3. As the aforesaid provision is purely procedural in nature, It cannot. be gainsaid that it could have retrospective effect. Consequently, the connection is well made out and must be accepted. We, therefore, hold that Section 45B can be pressed in service to effect recovery of unpaid contributions when the contributions nave remained unpaid since prior to the coming into force of Section 45B and have throughout also remained unpaid.” Hon’ble Orissa High Court further discussed others Judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court on the said point:- “Shyam Sunder v. Ram Kumar, (2001) 8 SCC 24.

22. In Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edn. the statement of law in this regard is stated thus: Perhaps no rule of construction is more firmly established than thus - that a retrospective operation is not to be given to a statute so as to impair an existing right or obligation, otherwise than as regards matters of procedure, unless that effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language of the enactment. If the enactment is expressed in language which is fairly capable of either interpretation, it ought to be construed as prospective only.' The rule has, in fact, two aspects, for it, "involves another and subordinate rule, to the effect that a statute is not to be construed so as to have a greater retrospective operation than its language renders necessary.

23. In Francis Bennion's Statutory Interpretation, 2nd Edn, the statement of law is stated as follows: The essential idea of a legal system is that current law should govern current activities. Elsewhere in this work a particular Act is likened to a floodlight switched on or off, and the general body of law to the circumambient air. Clumsy though these images are, they show the inappropriateness of retrospective laws. If we do something today, we feel that the law applying to it should be the law in force today, not tomorrow's backward adjustment of it. Such, we believe, is the nature of law. Dislike of ex post factor law is enshrined in the United States Constitution and in the Constitution of many American States, which forbid it. The true principle is that lex prospicit non respicit (law looks forward not back). As Willes, J. said retrospective legislation is 'contrary to the general principle that legislation by which the conduct of mankind is to be regulated ought, when introduced for the first time, to deal with future acts, and ought not to change the character of past transactions carried on upon the faith of the then existing law.

24. In Garikapati Veeraya s. N.Subbiah Choudhry, AIR 1957 SC 540 this Court observed as thus: (AIR p.553, para 25)

The golden rule of construction is that, in the absence of anything in the enactment to show that it is to have retrospective operation, it cannot be so construed as to have the effect of altering the law applicable to a claim in litigation at the time when the Act was passed. In Dayawati v. Inderjit, AIR 1966 SC 1423, it is held thus: (AIR p. 1426, para 10)

10. Now as a general proposition, it may be admitted that ordinarily a court of appeal cannot take into account a new law, brought into existence after the judgment appealed from has been rendered, because the rights of the litigants in an appeal are determined under the law in force at the date of the suit.Even before the days of Coke whose maxim - a new law ought to be prospective, not retrospective in its operation - is off-quoted, courts have looked with dis-favour upon laws which take away vested rights or affect pending cases. Matters of procedure are, however, different and the law affecting procedure is always retrospective. But it does not mean that there is an absolute rule of inviolability of substantive rights. If the new law speaks in language, which, expressly or by clear intendment, takes in even pending matters, the court of trial as well as the court of appeal must have regard to an intention so expressed, and the court of appeal may give effect to such a law even after the judgment of the court of first instance. Dilip v. Mohd. Azizul Haq, (2000) 3 SCC 607: The problem concerning retrospectively concerning enactments depends on events occurring over a period. If the enactment comes into force during a period it only operates on those events occurring then. We must bear in mind that the presumption against retrospective legislation does not necessarily apply to an enactment merely because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from time antecedent to its passing. The fact that as from a future date tax is charged on a source of income which has been arranged or provided for before the date of the imposition of the tax does not mean that a tax is retrospectively imposed as held in Commissioners of Customs and Excise v. Thorn Electrical Industries Ltd., 1975 (1) WLR 1661. Zile Singh v. State of Haryana, (2004) 8 SCC 1.

13. It is a cardinal principle of construction that every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have a retrospective operation. But the rule in general is applicable where the object of the statute is to affect vested rights or to impose new burdens or to impair existing obligations. Unless there are words in the statute sufficient to show the intention of the Legislature to affect existing rights, it is deemed to be prospective only 'nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet non praeteritis' __ a new law ought to regulate what is to follow, not the past. (See :

Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, Ninth Edition, 2004 at p.438). It is not necessary that an express provision be made to make a statute retrospective and the presumption against retrospectively may be rebutted by necessary implication especially in a case where the new law is made to cure an acknowledged evil for the benefit of the community as a whole. (ibid, p.440).

15. Though retrospectively is not to be presumed and rather there is presumption against retrospectively, according to Craies (Statute Law, Seventh Edition), it is open for the legislature to enact laws having retrospective operation. This can be achieved by express enactment or by necessary implication from the language employed. If it is a necessary implication from the language employed that the legislature intended a particular section to have a retrospective operation, the Courts will give it such an operation. In the absence of a retrospective operation having been expressly given, the Courts may be called upon to construe the provisions and answer the question whether the legislature had sufficiently expressed that intention giving the Statute retrospectively. Four factors are suggested as relevant:

(i) general scope and purview of the statute;

(ii) the remedy sought to be applied;

(iii) the former state of the law; and

(iv) what it was the legislature contemplated (p.388). The rule against retrospectively does not extend to protect from the effect of a repeal, a privilege which did not amount to accrued right (p.392).

17. Maxwell states in his work on Interpretation of Statutes, (Twelfth Edition) that the rule against retrospective operation is a presumption only, and as such it "may be overcome, not only by express words in the Act but also by circumstances sufficiently strong to displace it." (p.225). If the dominant intention of the legislature can be clearly and doubtlessly spelt out, the inhibition contained in the rule against perpetuity becomes of doubtful applicability as the "inhibition of the rule" is a matter of degree which would "vary secundum materiam" (p.226). Sometimes, where the sense of the statute demands it or where there has been an obvious mistake in drafting, a court will be prepared to substitute another word or phrase for that which actually appears in the text of the Act (p.231).

20. In Bengal Immunity Company Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1955, Heydon case 76 ER 637 was cited with approval. Their Lordships have said: (SCR pp.632-33)

"It is a sound rule of construction of a statute firmly established in England as far back as 1584 when Heydon's case was decided that- ‘…..for the sure and true interpretation of all Statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law) four things are to be discerned and considered- 1st. What was the common law before the making of the Act. 2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide. 3rd. What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the Commonwealth, and 4th. The true reason of the remedy; and then the office of all the judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro privato commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico"."

Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2005) 3 SCC 551

105. A remedial statute applied in a pending proceeding would not mean that thereby a retrospective effect and retroactive operation is being given thereto. T. Kaliamurthi v. Five Gori Thaikkal Wakf, (2008) 9 SCC 306 40…..It is well settled that no statute shall be construed to have a retrospective operation until its language is such that would require such conclusion. The exception to this rule is enactments dealing with procedure. This would mean that the law of limitation, being a procedural law, is retrospective in operation in the sense that it will also apply to proceedings pending at the time of the enactment as also to proceedings commenced thereafter, notwithstanding that the cause of action may have arisen before the new provisions came into force. However, it must be noted that there is an important exception to this rule also. Where the right of suit is barred under the law of limitation in force before the new provision came into operation and a vested right has accrued to another, the new provision cannot revive the barred right or take away the accrued vested right…. Purbanchal Cables & Conductors (P) Ltd. v. Assam SEB, (2012) 7 SCC 462.

45. In Govind Das Vs. ITO - (1976) 1 SCC 906, this Court speaking through P.N. Bhagwati. J., (as he then was) held: (SCC p. 914, para 11)

11. Now it is a well settled rule of interpretation hallowed by time and sanctified by judicial decisions that, unless the terms of a statute expressly so provide or necessarily require it, retrospective operation should not be given to a statute so as to take away or impair an existing right or create a new obligation or impose a new liability otherwise than as regards matters of procedure. The general rule as stated by Halsbury in Vol. 36 of the Laws of England (3rd Edn.) and reiterated in several decisions of this Court as well as English courts is that "all statutes other than those which are merely declaratory or which relate only to matters of procedure or of evidence are prima facie prospective" and retrospective operation should not be given to a statute so as to affect, alter or destroy an existing right or create a new liability or obligation unless that effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language of the enactment. If the enactment is expressed in language which is fairly capable of either interpretation, it ought to be construed as prospective only. Gurbachan Singh v. Satpal Singh (1990) 1 SCC 445.

37. The provisions of the said Section do not create any new offence and as such it does not create any substantial right but it is merely a matter of procedure of evidence and as such it is retrospective and will be applicable to this case. It is profitable to refer in this connection to Hals- bury's Laws of England, (Fourth Edition), Volume 44 Page 570 wherein it has been stated that: The general rule as mat all statutes, other than those which are merely declaratory or which relate only to matters of procedure or of evidence, are prima facie prospective, and retrospective effect is not to be given to them unless, by express words or necessary implication, it appears that this was the intention of the legislature…..

38. It has also been stated in the said volume of Halsbury's Law of England at page 574 that: The presumption against retrospection does not apply to legislation concerned merely with matters of procedure or of evidence; on the contrary, provisions of that nature are to be construed as retrospective unless there is a clear indication that such was not the intention of Parliament.”

20. Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in the matter of Anil Kumar Banerjee Vs. Indiabulls Housing Finance Ltd. 2011 SCC Online Cal

2857, (2011) 5 CHN 30 (DB) has also emphasis on the retroactive effect of the procedural law. Similarly, Allahabad High Court in Pradeep Gupta and Anr. Vs. State of U.P. and Ors. AIR 2010 ALL 3 has also recognized the importance of retrospective effect of procedural law.

21. In the light of the above discussion, after the amendment in Section 25 of the DRT Act, 1993, I do not find any reason to transfer the Recovery Certificate therefore, present MA is hereby dismissed accordingly.

22. Copy of the order be sent to both the parties as per procedure. File be closed and consigned to records.

(Dr. REKHA G. DHAKAR) PRESIDING OFFICER DRT-I, DELHI Pronouncement in open court January 28, 2019