CRMP/2307/2026 of DR. CHANDRAKISHOR KAUSHAL Vs STATE OF CHHATTISGARH on 6 September 2026

1. Petitioner has invoked inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 for short 'BNSS') seeking quashment of charge sheet No.184/2026 filed before the learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class Ambikapur, District Sarguja in connection with FIR No.160/2026 registered against the petitioner at Police BALRAM PRASAD DEWANGAN Digitally signed by BALRAM PRASAD DEWANGAN

Station Ambikapur for the offence punishable under Sections 75 (1) (ii), 78, 79, 309 (4) and 3 (5) of the Bharatiya Nyay Sanhita, 2023 (for short ‘BNS’) and Section 67 of the Information and Technology Act, 2000. Petitioner has also prayed for setting aside of the order dated 11.05.2026 by which learned Magistrate has taken cognizance on the final report submitted by the police as also for setting aside the order dated 01.08.2026 framing charges against petitioner.

2. The facts of the case, in brief, are that on 10.03.2026, respondent No. 2 (the complainant) submitted a written complaint before the concerned police station, alleging that she is a student pursuing B.Sc. at Government Rajmohani Devi Girls College, Ambikapur, where the petitioner is employed as an Assistant Professor in the History Department. They came into contact during the admission process in August 2025 and developed a mutual acquaintance; on a couple of occasions, complainant talked to him on his mobile phone for admission-related information. Thereafter petitioner used to send WhatsApp messages to her mobile number from time to time, and complainant used to reply as a matter of normal courtesy. However, from October–November 2025 onward, petitioner started talking to her in an obscene and indecent manner, which she opposed. Thereafter, the petitioner sent her obscene photographs of his genitals on WhatsApp and started writing extremely objectionable and filthy abusive messages to her. She informed her elder brother about the incident, and though her brother warned the petitioner, he continued to harass her. She also made an oral complaint to the Principal of the College and requested the Principal to warn the petitioner not to harass her. It is further alleged that that her marriage was cancelled due to false allegations made in this context. She further alleged that on 27.02.2026, when she was going towards Manas Palace, the petitioner arrived there along with two friends on a motorcycle, took her to an unknown place, snatched her new Samsung Ultra mobile phone and one old Vivo mobile phone, left her there, and from that place the complainant barely managed to return to her hostel. Based on aforesaid complaint, FIR bearing No.160/2026 was registered against petitioner for the offence under Sections 75 (1) (ii), 78, 79, 309 (4) and 3 (5) of the Bharatiya Nyay Sanhita, 2023 (for short ‘BNS’) and Section 67 of the Information and Technology Act, 2000. In the course of investigation, statement of victim/complainant was recorded under Section 183 of BNSS before the Magistrate and statement of other witnesses were also recorded under Section 180 of BNSS, and on completion of investigation, the police submitted charge sheet on which the concerned Court has taken cognizance against the petitioner and charges were framed on 01.08.2026 for offence punishable under Section 309 (4), 78, 79 of BNS and Section 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2000.

3. Learned counsel for petitioner would submit that petitioner has been falsely implicated in instant crime. Petitioner is a highly educated academician of unblemished character presently discharging his professional duties as Guest Lecturer in the History Department at Government Rajmohini Devi Girls P.G. College, Ambikapur. He submits that due to some personal disagreement and to put undue pressure on petitioner and seek financial gain, the complainant allegedly joined hands with local social media influencers and self- proclaimed social workers, and used them to threaten and harass the petitioner and totally false and concocted allegations of stalking, obscenity and snatching of mobile phones have been levelled, however no snatched mobile sets have been recovered from petitioner. He further submits that entire case of the prosecution is based on extracts of alleged WhatsApp chats. However, the said electronic material is not admissible in law as no certificate under Section 65-B(4) has been produced by a person responsible for the device or its management to prove the authenticity and manner of production of the electronic records. He placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Arjun Panditrao Khotkar Vs. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, reported in (2020) 7 SCC 1 and submits that Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that a certificate under Section 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is mandatory for the admissibility of electronic records. In the absence of such a certificate, the electronic evidence cannot be relied upon by the prosecution. He submits that, no prima facie case is made out against the petitioner. There is no sufficient and legally admissible evidence connecting petitioner with the alleged offence. Therefore, allowing the trial to continue on the basis of legally inadmissible evidence would cause serious prejudice to the petitioner and would amount to an abuse of the process of law. He further submits that the order taking cognizance against the petitioner is wholly illegal, arbitrary and contrary to the settled principles in this regard, inasmuch as the learned trial Court has failed to properly appreciate the material available on record and has mechanically taken cognizance on the report submitted by police without there being sufficient ground for proceeding. He next contended that the entire prosecution case, even if taken at its face value and accepted in its entirety, does not disclose the commission of any offence much less the offences for which final report is submitted. Hence, it is prayed that the charge sheet No.25/2025 submitted against the petitioner and all subsequent proceedings initiated thereon be quashed.

4. On the other hand, learned State Counsel opposing submissions of learned counsel for petitioner, would submit that present petition seeking quashment of FIR, charge-sheet and the order taking cognizance on final report as also the order framing charge, is wholly misconceived and not maintainable in law. It is next contended that FIR against petitioner has been registered on the basis of a written complaint lodged by complainant/victim, wherein serious allegations have been levelled against petitioner of sending obscene photographs of his private parts to the victim through WhatsApp and sending extremely objectionable, filthy and abusive messages. It is further submitted that the victim has also alleged that the petitioner took her to an unknown place and forcibly snatched her two mobile phones.

5. He further submits that the objection raised by the petitioner regarding the non-production of a certificate under Section 65-B(4) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, is untenable, as the original mobile phone from which the alleged lewd text messages were sent has been seized and is available in its original form. Therefore, the production of the original electronic device obviates the requirement of furnishing a certificate under Section 65-B(4) of Evidence Act.

6. After completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed before the competent Court and learned trial Court has rightly taken cognizance after due consideration of material available before it and after due application of mind. He also submits that factual controversy cannot be considered at this moment. FIR and the outcome of investigation, prima facie disclose the commission of cognizable offences. At this stage, meticulous appreciation of evidence or adjudication on disputed facts is impermissible. Hence, the petition is liable to be dismissed.

7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents filed along with petition.

8. Upon perusal of the FIR, and the other material available on record, this Court finds that there are clear, specific and prima facie allegations against petitioner of sending obscene photographs of his private parts to the victim through WhatsApp and also sending of highly objectionable, filthy and abusive messages to her. The allegations are specific in nature and directly attributable to the petitioner. It further appears from the material collected during the course of investigation that the investigating agency has seized the alleged WhatsApp chats from the mobile phone of the petitioner. The said material, at this stage, prima facie support to the allegations made by the victim and requires due consideration. It is also specifically mentioned in the FIR that, on 27.02.2026, while the victim was proceeding towards Manas Palace, petitioner arrived there along with his two friends on a motorcycle and thereafter took the victim to an unknown place, where he allegedly snatched her Samsung Ultra mobile phone and one old Vivo mobile phone, and thereafter left her alone at the said place. Statement of victim was recorded before the learned Magistrate under Section 183 of the BNSS. The statements of other witnesses were also recorded by the police under Section 180 of the BNSS. Thereafter, upon completion of the investigation, the police submitted the final report before the learned Magistrate. Thus, there is prima facie material against the petitioner.

9. This Court while hearing the matter under Section 528 BNSS at the initial stage of proceedings, cannot examine genuineness of statement, allegations made in FIR in question. In case of Teeja Devi vs. State of Rajasthan, reported in (2014) 15 SCC 221 Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under : “5. It has been rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that ordinarily power under Section 482 CrPC should not be used to quash an FIR because that amounts to interfering with the statutory power of the police to investigate a cognizable offence in accordance with the provisions of CrPC. As per law settled by a catena of judgments, if the allegations made in the FIR prima facie disclose a cognizable offence, interference with the investigation is not proper and it can be done only in the rarest of rare cases where

the court is satisfied that the prosecution is malicious and vexatious.”

10. In the case at hand, although learned counsel for petitioner submits that petitioner has been falsely implicated. Upon perusal of the documents annexed with the petition, it appears that the police have seized the alleged objectionable WhatsApp chats from the mobile phone of the petitioner. Further, statements of other witnesses have also been recorded during investigation, which prima facie support the prosecution case. Upon going through the entire material at this stage, we are unable to accept the contention of learned counsel for petitioner that the report lodged against him is vexatious. It is subject-matter of evidence.

11. In case of State of Haryana and others vs Bhajanlal and others, reported in (1992) Supp (1) 335, Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down the guidelines for exercising inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC, corresponding to Section 528 of BNSS, which are as follows:- “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156 (1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155 (2) of the Code.

Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the Code.

Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6). Where there is an express legal bar en-grafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.

103. We also given a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice.”

12. In case of Mahendra K.C. v. State of Karnataka and another, reported in (2022) 2 SCC 129, Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that the High Court while exercising the powers under Section 482 of CrPC (corresponding to Section 528 of BNSS), does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is further observed that when no offence is disclosed by the report, the court may examine the question of fact. When a report is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the report has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto. The High Court, under Section 482 CrPC, should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy.

13. In case of Amish Devgan Vs. Union of India, reported in (2021) 1 SCC 1, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that quashing of FIR can only be in exceptional circumstances and some of the exceptional circumstances are held to be where manifestly there is some legal bar against institution or continuation of prosecution; where allegations made even if taken at face value do not constitute any offence; allegations made do not constitute cognizable offence and allegations made are so absurd and improbable that any prudent person can ever reach to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against accused. In case at hand, apart from raising above grounds, counsel for petitioner could not able to show at this stage that allegations are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against petitioner.

14. In case of Central Bureau of Investigation vs. Aryan Singh and others, reported in (2023) 18 SCC 399, Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that as per cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of criminal proceedings, while exercising the inherent powers, the Court is not required to conduct a mini trial. Relevant portion of the said decision is quoted herein below for ready reference:- "6. From the impugned common judgment and order [Aryan Singh v. CBI, 2022 SCC OnLine P&H 4158] passed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court has dealt with the proceedings before it, as if, the High Court was conducting a mini trial and/or the High Court was considering the applications against the judgment and order passed by the learned trial court on conclusion of trial. As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482 CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct the mini trial. The High Court in the common impugned judgment and order has observed that the charges against the accused are not proved. This

is

not

the

stage

where

the prosecution/investigating agency is/are required to prove the charges. The charges are required to be proved during the trial on the basis of the evidence led by the prosecution/investigating agency.

7. Therefore, the High Court has materially erred in going in detail in the allegations and the material collected during the course of the investigation against the accused, at this stage. At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has a very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider "whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not."

15. From the above quoted decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is clear that at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of criminal proceedings, it is not for the High Court to conduct mini trial and evaluate evidence. It is only for the trial Court to consider. The High Court has to only consider whether there is prima facie material or not. In the present case, the allegations made in the FIR; the material collected during investigation and submitted along with final report, do disclose prima facie commission of offences and the matter requires adjudication on evidence during trial.

16. So far as the submission of learned counsel for petitioner that, in the absence of a certificate under Section 65-B(4), the case of prosecution is liable to be failed is concerned, the same is not sustainable. This issue stands concluded by the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar (supra), wherein it was held that such certificate is not required where the original electronic record itself is produced. The relevant paragraph reads as under:- “73.2. The clarification referred to above is that the required certificate under Section 65-B(4) is unnecessary if the original document itself is produced. This can be done by the owner of a laptop computer, computer tablet or even a mobile phone, by stepping into the witness box and proving that the device concerned, on which the original information is first stored, is owned and/or operated by him. In cases where the “computer” happens to be a part of a “computer system” or “computer network” and it becomes impossible to physically bring such system or network to the court, then the only means of providing information contained in such electronic record can be in accordance with Section 65-B(1), together with the requisite certificate under Section 65-B(4). The last sentence in para 24 in Anvar P.V. [Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473 : (2015) 1 SCC (Civ) 27 : (2015) 1 SCC (Cri) 24 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 108] which reads as “… if an electronic record as such is used as primary evidence under Section 62 of the Evidence Act …” is thus clarified; it is to be read without the words “under Section 62 of the Evidence Act,…”. With this clarification, the law stated in para 24 of Anvar P.V. [Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473 : (2015) 1 SCC (Civ) 27 : (2015) 1 SCC (Cri) 24 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 108] does not need to be revisited.”

17. Even otherwise, it is not incumbent upon the prosecution to produce the 65-B(4) certificate at the time of filing the charge sheet. Section 65-B does not prescribe the stage at which such certificate required to be furnished. This issue was also considered in the Arjun Panditrao (supra) and it was held as under- “52. We may hasten to add that Section 65-B does not speak of the stage at which such certificate must be furnished to the Court. In Anvar P.V. [Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473 : (2015) 1 SCC (Civ) 27 : (2015) 1 SCC (Cri) 24 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 108] , this Court did observe that such certificate must accompany the electronic record when the same is produced in evidence. We may only add that this is so in cases where such certificate could be procured by the person seeking to rely upon an electronic record. However, in cases where either a defective certificate is given, or in cases where such certificate has been demanded and is not given by the person concerned, the Judge conducting the trial must summon the person/persons referred to in Section 65-B(4) of the Evidence Act, and require that such certificate be

given by such person/persons. This, the trial Judge ought to do when the electronic record is produced in evidence before him without the requisite certificate in the circumstances aforementioned. This is, of course, subject to discretion being exercised in civil cases in accordance with law, and in accordance with the requirements of justice on the facts of each case. When it comes to criminal trials, it is important to keep in mind the general principle that the accused must be supplied all documents that the prosecution seeks to rely upon before commencement of the trial, under the relevant sections of the CrPC.

53. In a recent judgment, a Division Bench of this Court in State of Karnataka v. M.R. Hiremath [State of Karnataka v. M.R. Hiremath, (2019) 7 SCC 515 : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 109 , after referring to Anvar P.V. [Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473 held : “16. The same view has been reiterated by a two-Judge Bench of this Court in Union of India v. Ravindra V. Desai [Union of India v. Ravindra V. Desai, (2018) 16 SCC 273 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 669 : (2019) 1 SCC (L&S) 225] . The Court emphasised that non-production of a certificate under Section 65-B on an earlier occasion is a curable defect. The Court relied upon the earlier decision in Sonu v. State of Haryana [Sonu v. State of Haryana, (2017) 8 SCC 570 : (2017) 3 SCC (Cri) 663] , in which it was held : (Sonu case [Sonu v. State of Haryana,

(2017) 8 SCC 570 : (2017) 3 SCC (Cri) 663] , SCC p. 584, para 32) ‘32. … The crucial test, as affirmed by this Court, is whether the defect could have been cured at the stage of marking the document. Applying this test to the present case, if an objection was taken to the CDRs being marked without a certificate, the court could have given the prosecution an opportunity to rectify the deficiency.’

17. Having regard to the above principle of law, the High Court [M.R. Hiremath v. State, 2017 SCC OnLine Kar 4970] erred in coming to the conclusion that the failure to produce a certificate under Section 65-B(4) of the Evidence Act at the stage when the charge-sheet was filed was fatal to the prosecution. The need for production of such a certificate would arise when the electronic record is sought to be produced in evidence at the trial. It is at that stage that the necessity of the production of the certificate would arise.” (emphasis in original)

18. Thus in view of facts and circumstances of present case, material available in record and in light of above decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court, we do not find any good ground to quash FIR, charge sheet and order framing charge dated 01.08.2026 against petitioner.

19. For the foregoing discussion, we do not find any merit in this petition, the same is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- Sd/- (Parth Prateem Sahu) (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge Judge Balram/-