CGIT Jabalpur Order passed in C/03/2025 dated 13.10.2026 on 13 October 2026

ORDER

The Applicant-Union's case is that, being registered under the Trade Unions Act, 1926, it has filed this application on behalf of 152 employees under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, hereinafter referred to by the word ‘Act’. The application claims the difference in wages and allowances (differential wages) payable under the Cement Wage Board Award (14.12.1981) and subsequent settlements (11.02.2011, 29.07.2015, and 20.09.2019). It is alleged that the employees have been continuously engaged through contractors in packing, loading and related tasks at the Non-Applicant's establishment since approximately 2012, performing work identical to that of regular employees, yet they were not paid wages and allowances commensurate with that work. According to the Applicant, the Non-Applicant, being the Principal employer, was responsible for ensuring the payment of the prescribed wages. Consequently, the Applicant union claims differential wages amounting to Rs. 15,77,17,632, along with interest, for the period from 01.04.2018 to 31.03.2022. It is contended that this claim constitutes an existing and determined monetary right capable of computation under Section 33-

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C(2) of the Act. The main objection of the Non-Applicant No.1 is that, the Applicant-Union seeks to derive a monetary entitlement from the alleged settlements dated 11.02.2011, 29.07.2015 and 20.09.2019, though the applicability of those settlements to the concerned contract workmen itself is disputed. It is contended that the settlements do not, by themselves, establish any quantified or enforceable right in favor of the 152 workmen, particularly when their status as contract workmen and their entitlement to wages at par with regular employees are matters in dispute. Thus, according to the Non- Applicant, the Applicant is not merely seeking computation of an existing monetary benefit, but is seeking adjudication of the very basis and existence of the alleged entitlement, which falls beyond the limited scope of proceedings under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Non-Applicant No. 2 did not participate in the proceedings and did not file any reply to the application filed by the Applicant-Union.

I have heard learned counsel for the Applicant- Union Shri Uttam Maheswari, and learned counsel for Non-Applicant No. 1, Shri R.B. Tiwari and have carefully perused the record. The written arguments submitted on behalf of both the contesting parties have also been duly considered.

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Following issues arise for determination after perusal of record in the light of rival arguments.

1-Whether the application is maintainable under section 33 (C)-2 Of the Act?

2-Whether the said Cement Wage Board Arbitration R Award of 1983 is applicable in case of the applicants who are engaged by the Contractor to work with the company? Issue No.1 –

Learned Counsel for Management of Satna Cement Works has assailed the maintainability of the petition on the ground that it is not maintainable because there is not a pre adjudicated or settled right which is a sine qua non for the claim regarding difference of wages with respect to 152 Contract employees, made by the Applicant Union by way of this application under Section 33(C)(2) of the Act. Learned Counsel has referred to following judgments in this respect. Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ganesh Razak & Another (1994) 5 SLR referred Para 12 & 13 are reproduced as follows – “12. The High Court has referred to some of these decisions but missed the true import thereof. The ratio of these decisions clearly indicates that where the very basis of the claim or the entitlement of the workmen to a certain benefit is disputed, there being no earlier adjudication or recognition thereof by the employer, the dispute relating to entitlement is not incidental to the benefit claimed and is therefore clearly outside the scope of a proceed-ing under Section 33C(2)

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of the Act. The Labour Court has no jurisdiction to first decide the workmens' entitlement and then proceed to compute the benefit do adjudicated on that basis in exercise of its power under Section 33C(2) of the Act. It is only when the entitlement has been earlier adjudi-cated or recognised by the employer and thereafter for the purposes of implementation or enforcement thereof some ambiguity requires interpretation that the interpretation is treated as incidental to the Labour Court's power under Section 33C(2) like that of the Executing Court's power to interpret the decree for the purpose of it execution..

13. In these matters, the claim of the respondent- workmen who were all daily-rated/casual workers, to be paid wages at the same rate as the regular workers, had not been earlier settled by adjudication or recognition by the employer without which the stage for computation or that benefit could not reach. The workmen's claim of doing the same kind of work and their entitle- ment to be paid wages at the same rate as the regular workmen on the principle of 'equal pay for equal work being disputed, without and adjudication of their dispute resulting in acceptance of their claim to this effect, there could be no occasion for computation of the benefit on that basis to attract Section 33C(2). The mere fact that some other workmen are alleged to have made a similar claim by filing writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution is indicative of the need for adjudication of the claim of entitlement to the benefit before computation of such a benefit could be sought. Respondents' claim is not based on a prior adjudication made in the writ petitions filed by ORDER SHEET

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some other workmen upholding a similar claim which could be relied on as an adjudication enuring to the benefit of these respondents as well. The writ petitions by some other workmen to which some reference was casually made, particulars of which are not available in these matters, have, therefore, no relevance for the present purpose. It must, therefore, be held that the Labour Court as well as the High Court were in error in treating as maintainable the applications made under Section 33C(2) of the Act by these respondents.”

M/s Bombay Chemical Industries v. Deputy LabourCommissioner, Civil Appeal No. 813/2022 decided by Hon’ble Supreme Court, Para 7 referred, is being reproduced as follows – “7. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions to the facts of the case on hand, when there was no prior adjudication on the issue whether respondent No.2 herein was in employment as a salesman as claimed by respondent No.2 herein and there was a serious dispute raised that respondent No.2 was never in employment as a salesman and the documents relied upon by respondent No.2 were seriously disputed by the appellant and it was the case on behalf of the appellant that those documents are forged and/or false, thereafter the Labour Court ought not to have proceeded further with the application under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Labour Court ought to have relegated respondent No.2 to initiate appropriate proceedings by way of reference and get his right crystalized and/or adjudicate upon. Therefore, the order passed by the Labour Court ORDER SHEET

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was beyond the jurisdiction conferred under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The High Court has not appreciated the aforesaid facts and has confirmed the same without adverting to the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act.”

On the other hand, Learned Counsel for the Union has submitted that the rights have already been settled in the Cement Board Award, hence there is no further adjudication of rights required. Union has claimed its right on the basis of the Award, which does not require further adjudication. Learned Counsel has further referred to following Judgments in this respect – Andhra Printers v. Industrial Tribunal (1992) Online (AP) Page 233 held (para 4 to 6 & 8 and

10) are being reproduced as follows – “4. To resolve this controversy, it is necessary to make reference to the relevant provisions of the Working Journalists Act. As the preamble says, it is an Act to regulate certain conditions of service of working journalists and other persons employed in newspaper establishments. "Newspaper employee" is defined to mean any working Journalist, and includes any other person employed to do any work in or in relation to any newspaper establishment (vide Cl. (c) of S.

2) ; working journalist is defined to mean a person whose principal avocation is that of a journalist and (who is employed as such, either whole-time or part-time, In, or in relation to, one or more newspaper establishments) and Includes an editor, reporter, etc. (vide Cl. (f) of S. 2). The bracketed words were substituted by Act 36 of

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198, with effect from 13 August, 1980 in the place of the words "who is employed as such in or in relation to any newspaper establishment." There is also an exclusionary clause to the definition, but it is not relevant for the purpose of this ca e. The Act empowers the Central Government to fix the rates of wages of working journalist and non- journalist newspaper employees and revise the same from time to time. For fixation or revision of rates of wages, the Central Government can constitute a Wage Board or Tribunal. On receipt of the recommendation of the Board or the Tribunal, the Central Government has to make an order in terms. of the recommendations or subject to such modifications that do not effect Important alteration in the character of recommendations. The powers and procedure to be followed by the Board and the Tribunal are set out in the Act. The Act also makes a provision for payment of gratuity on the termination, retirement, resignation or death of a working journalist without prejudice to any benefits or rights accruing under the Industrial Disputes Act. Restrictions on the hours of work of the working journalist are prescribed by the Act. The entitlement of earned leave on full wages and leave on medical certificate is also provided for by the Act. Section 3 of the Act enjoins that the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as in force for the time being, shall subject to the modification specified Sub-sec. (2) apply to, or in relation to, working journalist as they apply to, or in relation to, workmen within the meaning of that Act, Sub-section (2) provides for a larger period of notice to be given to the working journalist in a case of retrenchment. There no ORDER SHEET

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need to refer to other provisions excepting the crucial provision contained in S. 17. Section 17 is in the following terms; "17. Recovery of money due from an employer.-

(1) Where any amount is due under this Act to newspaper employee from an employer, the newspaper employee himself, or any person authorised by him in writing in this behalf, or in the case of the death of the employee, any member of his family may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, make an application State Government for the recovery of the amount due to him, and if the State Government, or such authority, as the State Government may specify in this behalf, is satisfied that any amount so due, it shall issue certificate for that amount to the Collector, and the Collector shall proceed to recover that amount in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue. thority,

(2) If any question arises as to the amount due under this Act to newspaper employee from his employer, the State Government may, on its own motion or upon application made to it, refer the question. to any Labour Court constituted by it under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, or under any corresponding law relating to investigation and settlement of Industrial disputes in force in the State and the said Act or law shall have effect in relation to the Labour Court as if the question so referred were a matter referred to the Labour Court for adjudication under that Act or law.

(3) The decision of the Labour Court shall be forwarded by it to the State Government which ORDER SHEET

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made the reference and any amount found due by the Labour Court may be recovered in the same manner provided in Sub-see (1)." Even a cursory reading of S. 17 would show that it is only the amounts due to a newspaper employee under the Act (emphasis supplied) that could be recovered by resorting to the forum and machinery provided by that section. Of course, in the present case almost all the claims made by the second respondent are traceable to Justice Palekar award constituted by the Central Government under the Act, as accepted by the Central Government. Hence there can be no doubt that the remedy provided by S. 17 of the Act can as well resorted to by the second respondent for the purpose of enforcing his monetary claims against the newspaper establishment. He could have sought for a reference of the question as to the amounts due under the Working Journalists Act to the Labour Court and based upon the order of the Labour Court, he could have recovered the amount under S. 17(3) read with Sub-sec. (1) thereof. But the second respondent has not chosen that remedy. He being a workman within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, has chosen to invoke the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under S. 33-C of the Industrial Disputes Act. The question is whether the second respondent is barred in law by doing so.

5. At the outset I must say that it not uncommon in the history of labour legislation in our country to confer an industrial employee benefits and remedies under two more enactments. The ORDER SHEET

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apparent. Trend of the decided cases is to treat such remedies as concurrent supplementing or complementing each other but not excluding each other. The two Full Bench decisions of this Court referred to above are the classic examples of the application of this principle. If two remedies arc available under two special enactments dealing with the labour welfare, it is perfectly open to the employee to choose one of the remedies under either of the enactments. In my view, the situation in the present ease is no different from this legal proposition. However, there is one exception to this widely accepted principle and that exception is discernible from a solitary decision of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Labour Court, Jullundur, [1980 I L.L.N. 39] (vide supra). If the legislation conferring benefit on the employee or the workman with reference to a specified item or subject-matter is considered to be a self-contained, comprehensive and exhaustive legislation laying down a distinct procedure for the enforcement of rights, the remedy provided in general terms by another enactment which is more general in nature, cannot be availed of by the workman. He has to work out his remedies within the framework of the legislation providing for special remedy with respect to the specific subject-matter. In that case, the Supreme Court held that an application under S. 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be maintained for the purpose of recovering gratuity due under the Payment of Gratuity Act. The Supreme Court observed that the Payment of Gratuity Act enacts a complete Code containing detailed provisions covering all the essential features of a scheme for payment of gratuity.

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After a brief reference to the provisions of the Act, the Supreme Court concluded that the Parliament intended that proceedings for payment of gratuity must be taken under that Act and not under any other law. The Supreme Court, therefore, held that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to deal with the application under S. 33-C. The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed strong reliance on this judgment, but I do not think that this judgment has any relevance in the context of the Working Journalists Act. Section 3 of the Working Journalists Act brings into its fold by reference the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, for the time being in force subject to the modification contained in Sub-sec. (2). Sub-section (1) of S. 3 enjoins:

"The provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as in force for the time being, shall, subject to the modifications specified in Sub-sec. (2), apply to, or in relation to, working journalists as they apply to, or in relation to, workmen within the meaning of that Act.

6. Section 3(2) provides for a longer period of notice before retrenching an editor or any other working journalist. Thus, S. 3(1) of the Working Journalists Act plainly manifests an intention to preserve and apply the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act amended from time to time to the working journalists as well. If so, S. 33-C of the Industrial Disputes Act which is a remedial provision as far as the workman is concerned, ought to be imported and read into the provisions of the Working Journalists Act. When so read, there will be no inconsistency between S.

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33-C and the provisions of the Working Journalists Act. Section 33-C can operate as an additional remedy to the working journalist. He can choose a convenient remedy either by moving the Labour Court under S. 33-C or by moving the State Government to refer the disputed question to the Labour Court for determination under S. 17(2) of the Working Journalists Act. The absence of the provision like S. 3 in the Payment of Gratuity Act makes all the difference for the applicability of the ratio of the Supreme Court's judgment referred to supra.

8. The issue can be viewed from another angle. Section 17(1) employs the expression "without prejudice to any other mode of recovery." These words emphasize and reinforce the idea that the remedy available to the newspaper employee under the Indus trial Disputes Act or under common law, is not meant to be excluded by S.

17. The learned counsel submits that the ambit of the aforesaid expression shall be confined only to Sub-sec. (1) of S. 17 and cannot be projected Into Sub-sec. (2). In other words, he says that if there is no dispute with regard to the entitlement to get the amount from the employer, then only he can move either the State Government for recovery of the amount due to him or resort to any other mode of recovery. But, according to the learned counsel, when once the liability is disputed by the employer, the question has got to be decided under S. 17(2) by the Labour Court at the instance of the State Government. and this latter remedy provided by S. 17(2) is the exclusive remedy. and no other mode of recovery is permissible in such a case. I am unable to agree with this contention. The phraseology "without

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prejudice to any other mode of recovery" occurring in Sub-sec. (1) of S. 17 cannot be read in isolation. Sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of S. 17 are integral part of one scheme and all these sub- sections are closely interlinked. Hence there is no reason why the phrase "without prejudice to any other mode of recovery" shall not be equally applied to Sub-sec. (2).

10. There is one more argument which has to be dealt with not because it is strictly necessary to deal with but out of deference to the contention strenuously urged by the learned counsel for the petitions. The learned counsel seems to think that there is a real and qualitative distinction between S. 33-C of the Industrial Disputes Act and S. 17(2) of the Working Journalists Act. The learned counsel while recalling that the provisions of S. 33-C are analogous to execution proceedings, contends that S. 33-C is more limited in scope than S. 17(2). It is only after a determination of the disputed question under S. 17(2) a working journalist can move the Labour Court under S. 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act or the State Government under S. 17(1) of Working Journalists Act for the recovery of the amount due to him on the strength of the order of the Labour Court passed under S. 17(2). This argument is advanced with a view to counter the opinion expressed by the learned Presiding Officer of the Labour Court that it does not make real difference whether the workman approaches the Labour Court under S. 33-C(2) directly or under S. 17(2) through the media of the State Government. Even here, It appears that the argument of the learned counsel is not well- founded. If a newspaper employee claims certain ORDER SHEET

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monetary benefits as flowing from the provisions of the Working Journalists Act, there is no reason why the same cannot be recovered under S. 33-C even though the liability is denied by the employer. I would only restate the scope of S. 33- C(2) by referring to a Full Bench judgment of this Court in M. Radhakrishna Reddy v. Sri B.V. Bus Service, [A.I.R. 1986 A.P. 102] (vide supra). Lakshmana Rao, J. (as he then was), speaking for the Full Bench, after referring to various Judgments of the Supreme Court and of this Court, summarized the principles in the following terms:

"In the above referred decisions, the Supreme Court laid down the following principles:

(1) The proceeding under S. 33-C(2) is analogous to an execution proceeding.

(2) Section 33-C(2) is wider than S. 33-C(1).

(3) For a claim to be maintainable under S. 33- C(2) the workman should have an existing right in his favour to claim the money or the benefit.

(4) If the workman has a right under a settlement, award, a scheme or a statute to claim any money or benefit, mere denial of that right by the employer will not be sufficient to negative his claim under S. 33-C(2)..."

In that case, in answer to the workman's claim for wages for the relevant period, a defence was set up by the employer that the workman abandoned the service and did not report for duty ORDER SHEET

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after a particular date. The Labour Court rejected this plea and awarded wages to the workman, treating him as having been in employment during that period. This award was upheld by the Full Bench. It was observed: "if there was denial by the employer of the right of an employee to receive wages which he was entitled to under a statute, by such mere denial, the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to enquire into the matter will not be excluded. What all the Labour Court had to do in such a situation was to enquire into the question whether the workman had an existing right to wages or not. In the instant case the Labour Court did only that and it rightly enquired into the jurisdictional fact as to the existence of the workman's right to claim wages." By parity of reasoning, the mere fact that the management has denied the right of the journalist to the wages claimed by him on the strength of Palekar Tribunal's award is not a consideration which would come in the way of the Labour Court interpreting and applying the award to the extent it applies to the case of the second respondent. Thus, I find no substance in the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner.”

Patrakar Prakashan v. Smt. VanadanaAwasthy passed in W.P. No. 2476/2007(s). Cement Corporation of India v. CGIT, Chandigarh (2002) 3 LLN 514 held that “Labour Court has jurisdiction to pronounce upon the question as to whether the relationship of employee and employer existed between the Management and workman in proceedings under ORDER SHEET

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Section 33(C)(2) of the Act.” For the sake of convenience, Section 33(C)(2) is being reproduced as follows – Section 33-C(2)- Recovery of Money Due from an Employer –

“(2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, (3) then the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government within a period not exceeding three months.] 2[Provided that where the presiding officer of a Labour Court considers it necessary or expedient so to do, he may, for reasons to be recorded in writing extend such period by such further period as he may think fit.”

As has been stated earlier, the claim of the workman Union in this petition is based on a Cement Board Award, which provides the benefits of the Award to the contract workers also, engaged in activities as mentioned in the Award. Since, the Award is final between the parties, hence the fact that Contract workers engaged in activities mentioned in the Award are entitled to certain benefits as provided in the Award is also settled and there is no requirement of further adjudication on this point. Hence, in the light of this discussion, the argument from the side of the Management has no ORDER SHEET

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leg to stand. The petition is held maintainable before this Tribunal. Issue No.1 is answered accordingly.

Issue No.2

The case of the petitioner Union is that the claimants were engaged through the Contractor with the Company and discharged similar nature of work being discharged by the regular employees. Learned Counsel for Management has submitted in the reply to the petition filed by the Management that the claimants were daily rated casual workers, they cannot be paid same wages on the same rate as regular workers. The workmen claim of doing the same nature of work as done by regular workers and their entitlement to be paid wages at same rate as regular workman on the principle of equal pay for equal work has been disputed, hence till adjudication of this dispute, there could be no occasion for computation of benefit under Section 33(C)(2) of the Act. Learned Counsel for Management has further submitted that the Union had filed earlier a Writ Petition before the Hon’ble High Court of MP, seeking implement of Award, which was registered as W.P. No. 11103/2022 and was decided vide order dated 08.07.2026. A photocopy of the Award is attached by OP Management with their written submissions. It comes out from perusal of record that the Union filed petition against the Management seeking implement of the settlement dated 20.02.2019, to which the Management had no objection and it was directed by Hon’ble High Court that this settlement be implemented within period of 90 days, if there is no other legal impediment.

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In the case in hand, the claimant Union bases its claim on the Cement Board Arbitral Award dated 24.12.1981, published in Official Gazette on 20.07.1983. Further, as claimed by Applicant Union, in compliance of the aforesaid arbitral Award of 1981, settlements dated 11.02.2011 and 29.07.2015 were reached at. Another settlement dated 20.09.2019 reached at between the parties but all these settlements were under the Arbitral Award of 1981, which is the main source of rights and other settlements with respect to amounts of benefits to be paid within the different time periods mentioned in the said settlements.

This argument from the side of the Workman Union is substantiated from record.

Clause 225 and 226 of the Arbitral Award, which is being reproduced as follows.

“225. In our earlier award dealing with the subject of abolition of contract labour, the CMA took the same stand saying that we have no jurisdiction to direct abolition of contract labour after the Contract Labour Abolition and Regulation Act had come into force. The matter was argued before us at great length and finally we gave our award which, read as under :- “164. The aforesaid unanimous recommendations of the First Wage Board to which labour and management in the Industry are parties have been accepted by the Government and implemented by the industry by and large from 1960. Therefore, contract labour stands abolished to the unanimous recommendations of the Wage Board as far back as 1960 in occupations, except unloading, loading and packing. It has also been settle finally by the Wage Board and accepted by the Government and

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the Industry that contract labour wherever employee should get the same rates of wages, allowances and other benefits and amenities as the departmental labour. The on exception is those employed in construction work or work of a purely temporary nature, not connected with the manufacturing process. Thus all the issues are settled issues.

165. If after the recommendations of the First Wage Board, which has been accepted by the Central Government and implemented by the industry, any employee in the industry has resorted to employment of contract labour in any occupation other than those permitted by First Wage Board, it would amount to an aberration and an unfair labour practice by the employer concerned. Therefore, to correct such aberration and direct the employers not to persist in such unfair practice but to employ such labour as regular department workers is well within our jurisdiction.

166. We therefore, direct accordingly that no contract labour shall be employed in the industry by the employer, except in loading (including packaging) and unloading operations as stated by the First Wage Board and where an employer employs contract in any other occupations, such labour shall be made regular departmental employees under the employers and made eligible to the same wages, D.A., bonus and other allowances under our Award as other regular employees under the employer, provided they give corresponding, workload obtaining for similar occupations in units near about, where their compeers are getting Wage Board Rates. We further direct that all workers employed in the ORDER SHEET

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permitted occupations of loading (including packaging) and unloading shall be given the same wages, D.A., bonus and other benefits as are given to the regular employees of the Company.

226. The employment of the Contract labour already stands abolished except in the case of the loading of cement, which includes packing, and unloading of coal etc. It is therefore an agreed position that contract labour will not be employed in any other occupation and that the contract labour (Abolition and Regulation Act) will not come in the way if we direct that the agreement in respect of Contract Labour from the days of the First Wage Board should be adhered to by the employers. We, therefore, direct that the unanimous recommendations of the First Wage Board in this regard should be strictly adhered to.”

Hence, the objection from the side of Management that the Cement wage Board arbitration Award of 1981, published in 1983 is not applicable in the case of Contract workers engaged and worked with the company cannot be accepted .

Hence, holding that the Contract workers are also entitled to the benefits of the Cement wage Board arbitral Award, Issue No.2 is answered accordingly.

List on _____________for further hearing on the point of computation .

Presiding Officer