STD I CD III Jagdish Prasad (Navy) vs UOI & Others on 31 July 2025

**ORDER**

**31.07.2025**

1. 1. By way of this Application, the Applicant has prayed as under:- "(a) It is therefore, most humbly prayed that the Tribunal may be pleased to allow this application and further be pleased to quash and set aside the approval granted by the competent authority which is Chief of Naval Staff vide letter number DL/1700/104/479 dated 4^th of August 2014 for discharge of the applicant as SNLR under regulation 279 of regulations of Navy Part III (Statutory) as being implemented by virtue of the fax message dated 01.01.2016 of the Commodore Bureau of Sailors. The Tribunal may be pleased to direct the respondent authorities to retain the applicant in service as per the terms of engagement along with the consequential benefits as applicable.

"(b) It is further prayed that as till the date of filing this Original Application the applicant has not been effectively discharged from the service by way of an administrative order as such it is humbly prayed that in case of implementation of *the approval of the Chief of Naval Staff vide letter number DL/1700/104/479 dated 4^th of August 2014 for discharge of the applicant as SNLR under regulation 279 of regulations of Navy Part III (Statutory) by an administrative order of discharging the applicant from service under the said regulation, the Tribunal may be pleased to quash and set aside the same also and the Tribunal may direct the respondents to reinstate the applicant in service with all consequential benefits."*

2. Brief facts of the case as enunciated by the Applicant are that, the Applicant was enrolled in the Navy on 05.04.2005 (Basic Date 09.04.2007, Authority BOE 01/2007) on the post of STD (Steward) and thereafter he was posted to INS Chilka. Presently, the Applicant is posted at INS, Shivalik for three years tenure in the rank of STD 1 CD III. The Applicant has challenged the approval letter dt 04.08.2014 issued by Chief of Naval Staff to discharge him from Service as "Service No Longer Required" (SNLR) under Regulation 279 of Regulations of Navy, Part III (Statutory). The Applicant submits that he was granted 19 days Balance of Annual Leave for the year 2012 wef 01.10.2012 and the Applicant proceeded on leave at his hometown in Churu (Rajasthan). Based on an FIR by his neighbour for forging of documents for enrolment in the Navy, he was arrested and placed in judicial custody by Bisau Police Station, Jhunjhunu on 05.10.2012 and the fact was communicated to his unit on 18.10.2012 by a Police Constable from Bisau Police Station. The Bail plea of the Applicant was rejected by Hon'ble Rajasthan High Court. The Naval authorities were not keen to take over the Applicant for trial, therefore, he was tried and convicted by Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate (ACJM), Jhunjhunu under Section 420, 467, 468 and 471 of IPC on 29.08.2013 and was awarded five years simple imprisonment alongwith a total fine of Rs. 2300/-. The Applicant appealed against the sentence which was reduced to one year simple imprisonment with a total fine of Rs. 2300/- by Sessions Court, Jhunjhunu on 21.09.2013. After serving one year sentence, the Applicant was released from judicial custody on 04.10.2013. Thereafter, the Applicant reported onboard ship on 18.11.2013 at Visakhapatnam. During interview, the Applicant conceded that he passed 10^th and 12^th class from Government School, Foga (Rajasthan) wherein name of his father was mentioned as Shri Bhaga Ram whereas in other documents his father's name was mentioned as Bhagvanta Ram due to which his enrolment in Navy in year 2003 was rejected. Therefore, on the advice of a teacher, he repeated his 9^th and 10^th from SK National Model Secondary School, Bisau to resolve the discrepancy in the name of his father and he also changed date of birth from 01.04.1985 to 23.01.1989 and with the certificate of changed date of birth and father's name he got enrolled in the Navy. The Applicant submits that during his service in Navy, he was never awarded any warrant punishment and has been assessed Very Good Superior. Further, the Applicant submits that as per Section 79 of Navy Act, 1957, he can be tried for the said offence of fraudulent entry even if such trial commences three years from the date of commission of the offence and since the Applicant served for three years in the Navy subsequent to the commission of the offence continuously in exemplary manner, trial for the said offence cannot be commenced at this stage. Rule 119 of Regulations for the Navy, Part-II provides for forfeiture of pay and allowances during trial and sentence period and no disgrace or discredit to the uniform, the service, or the position held by the Applicant has been brought in the case. Keeping in view the fact that he was observed to be dedicated, hardworking and sincere during his tenure in the unit and his past performance evaluations with special mention of his initiative and dedication, his unit (INS Shivalik) took up his matter with FOC-in-C, HQ Eastern Naval Command, Naval Base, Visakhapatnam on 22.11.2013 with recommendations to reinstate him in Service and grant of pay and allowance wef 05.10.2013 after regularization of his absence period of 44 days from 05.10.2013 to 18.11.2013 (ie, intervening period of release from the jail and reporting for duty onboard) by granting balance of annual leave of 2013 and seven days advance of annual leave of 2014. On turn, HQ Eastern Naval Command, Visakhapatnam took up the case to the Commodore, Bureau of Sailors, Mumbai with recommendations to retain the Applicant in Service in terms of Regulation 119 of Regulations of Navy Part II (Statutory) amend the date of birth of the Applicant as 01.04.1985 and regularization of 44 days of leave. However, the recommendations were not accepted by the Competent Authority at IHQ of MoD

(Navy) and directed to take action in accordance with Rule 279 of Regulations of Navy, Part III (Statutory). Accordingly, HQ ENC issued directions to INS Shivalik vide letter dt 02.09.2014 to initiate action for Discharge of the Applicant as Service No Longer Required (SNLR) in accordance with Regulation 279 of Regulations for Navy, Part III (Statutory). Finally, the Competent Authority at IHQ of MoD, New Delhi vide letter dt 29.12.2015 has accorded sanction for discharge of Applicant from Service as SNLR in accordance with Regulation 279 of Regulations for Navy, Part III. The Applicant submits that the provisions of Section 79 of Navy Act, 1957 and Regulation 279 of Navy Regulations have been grossly violated by the Respondents while granting approval for the SNLR discharge of the Applicant. Therefore, the aggrieved Applicant has filed present OA.

3. The Respondents have filed a detailed Reply Statement and raised preliminary objections on the ground that at the time of discharge, the Applicant was serving in INS Shivalik which is based at Visakhapatnam and, hence, this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain the Original Application. Further, the Applicant has not submitted a formal Redressal of Grievance (ROG) to the Central Government against the decision of the Chief of Naval Staff against his discharge as SNLR, therefore, the OA is not maintainable under Section 23 of Navy Act, 1957 and the provisions of AFR Act, 2007. On the facts of the case, the Respondents have not disputed the facts presented by the Applicant and submitted that on reporting of the Applicant to INS Shivalik after release from jail, a case was taken up with IHQ of MoD (Navy) for retention of the Applicant in service based on his good conduct, professional records/ performance onboard and regularization of the period spent in jail in term of Regulation 119 of Regulations Navy Part II (Statutory). Post detailed examination, the case was rejected by IHQ of MoD (Navy) vide letter dt 04.08.2014 with directions to initiate action for discharge of the Applicant from Service as "Service No Longer Required" in accordance with Regulation 279 of Regulations Navy Part III (Statutory). Prior to discharge of the Applicant from Service, a Show Cause Notice was issued to the Applicant on 12.09.2014 which he replied on 23.09.2014 and accepted that he changed his date of birth from 01.04.1985 to 23.01.1989 in his class X certificate and used the same to enroll in the Navy. In the instant case, the Applicant's involvement in such activities were considered undesirable and prejudicial to the interest of service and a matter of serious concern. He had knowingly resorted to unscrupulous practice of forging his date of birth for joining the Navy. Further, he had been in civil custody for one year and whilst in custody, his contact with undesirable elements could not be ruled out. Considering the sensitive and exceptional nature of the case, retention of the Applicant in service would have set a wrong example and would have been detrimental to the service interest. Considering above facts, the Competent Authority approved his discharge as Service No Longer Required in accordance with Regulation 279 of Regulations Navy Part III on 28.12.2015 and, accordingly, INS Shivalik initiated release formalities. In the meantime, during an interview which he had sought with Commanding Officer, INS Shivalik, he brought out that in Nov 2013, he had appealed against his conviction by the Session Court before the Hon'ble High Court, Jaipur but he never disclosed this fact to any one after reporting to INS Shivalik after serving sentence nor he mentioned in his reply to the Show Cause Notice. Therefore, it is apparent that no stay was granted by Hon'ble High Court on the order of District and Session Court. On emergence of the new facts in respect of pendency of appeal in High Court, the decision of discharge of the Applicant from Service as "Service No Longer Required" in accordance with Regulation 279 of Regulations Navy Part III vide IHQ of MoD (Navy) letter dt 29.12.2015 was again reviewed in Oct 2016 and the Competent Authority, i.e., the Chief of Naval Staff had approved the discharge of the Applicant from service as "Service No Longer Required" in accordance with Regulation 279 of Regulations Navy, Part III. Accordingly, the Applicant was discharged from Service as "Service No Longer Required" wef 16.12.2016 vide INS, Shivalik Gx No. 1602215/S dt 16.12.2016 (Annexure R/6). The Respondents have submitted that the discharge of the Applicant from service is very much commensurate with the provisions of Section 15(2)(b) of Navy Act, 1957 and Regulation 279 of Regulations

Navy Part III (Statutory). The scrutiny of civil charges and case related documents reveals that the applicant had knowingly resorted to unscrupulous practice of changing date of birth and used the same for fraudulently joining the Navy, which cannot be termed as "Venial" under any circumstances and are considered serious in nature. The fact remains that he had intentionally fabricated his date of birth on the basis of which he gained entry in the Navy. The Applicant was afforded opportunity by way of Show Cause Notice to defend himself and after considering the facts brought in the reply to the Show Cause Notice and the fact of his case pending before Hon'ble Rajasthan High Court, he was approved for discharge as Service No Longer Required after following due procedure. Moreover, the Applicant had alternative remedy available in accordance with Regulations 234 to 239 of Regulations Navy Part III (Statutory) read with S.23 of the Navy Act, 1957. Therefore, the OA is premature and hence, is liable to be dismissed in accordance with Section 21 of AFT Act, 2007. In view of the aforesaid averments, the Respondents have reiterated that the OA is devoid of merit and deserves to be dismissed with costs.


सत्यमेव जयते

4. We have learned Counsel for both the parties and perused the material placed before us.

5. Regulation 234 to 239 and 279 of Regulations Navy Part III (Statutory) reads as under :- **"234. Authority of Officer of the Watch:** - Every officer or other person under the rank of Captain, not being either the Executive Officer or the Commanding Officer of the ship for the time being, shall be subordinate to the Officer of the Watch, whatever may be his rank, in regard to the performance of the duties with which he is charged.

**235. Officers borne additional:** - When it is desired that an officer borne additional for staff or special duties should practice or again experience in ship handling, and the like, authority for him to take charge of a watch at sea or in harbour may be given by the senior officer of the squadron or unit, provided that nothing in this regulation shall put him in the line of succession to command.

**236. Presiding Officer at Assemblages:** - At boards of inquiry, survey, and other similar assemblages of officers, the officer who, by virtue of his office, would under the foregoing regulations take the military command, shall normally preside irrespective of the relative rank of the other members, whose precedence amongst themselves on such occasions shall be determined by Regulation 208. The convening authority may, however, at his discretion appoint an officer not of the Executive Branch to preside.

**237. Officer Promoted.** – An officer who is promoted shall take rank and command accordingly only if he is re-appointed to his ship in the higher rank. If not so re-appointed, he shall continue to perform the duties of, and assume command in the rank from which he has been promoted, but he shall be senior to other officers to that rank, until relieved or until other instructions are issued by the Chief of the Naval Staff.

**238. In tenders or boats.** – An officer absent on service in a tender or boat attached to the ship in which he is borne, shall have the same command as he would have, were he actually on board the ship in which he is borne.

**239. Authority when Wrecked or Lost.** – When one of Indian Naval ships is wrecked, or otherwise lost or destroyed or taken by the enemy, the command, power, and authority given to the Captain, and to the other officers and the crew with respect to each other, shall remain and be in full force, as effectually as if the ship were not lost.

**279. Discharge "S.N.L.R."** – (1) Discharge S.N.L.R. (service no longer required) shall not be considered as a punishment but only as the appropriate method of dispensing with the services of a man:

(a) who is surplus to requirements,

(b) whose retention would be to the detriment of the Service but who has not recently committed a specific offence for which dismissal would be an appropriate punishment in addition to any other sentence awarded,

(c) on whom an adverse report has been forwarded in the post-enrolment verification report.

(2) Subject to the provisions of sub-regulation (1), if the retention of any sailor is considered undesirable on grounds of conduct or character, a report, accompanied by his Service Documents, shall be forwarded to the Administrative Authority, with a recommendation that the man be discharged 'Service No Longer Required'.

(3) In all cases of recommendations for discharge of sailors as 'Service No Longer Required' except those who are to be discharged as being surplus to requirements, Captains shall establish clearly the fact that the sailor recommended for discharge has been given suitable warning and opportunity to improve. Evidence to this effect shall accompany the recommendation. In exceptional cases, when in the opinion of the Captain, the retention of a sailor is clearly undesirable, a recommendation may be forwarded and discharge may be approved although the sailor has not previously been warned.

(4) The Administrative Authority, if satisfied that discharge 'Service No Longer Required' is appropriate, shall forward the application to the Chief of the Naval Staff through Captain Naval Barracks with his recommendation. It is essential the man's Service Documents completed upto date shall accompany the application for discharge.

(5) Abroad, sailors recommended for discharge 'Service No Longer Required' shall not be sent home until the approval of the Chief of the Naval Staff for discharge has been received. If in the interim, the man is transferred to another ship, the Service Document sent with the man shall be annotated to the effect that an application for his discharge has been made and a copy of the application shall accompany his papers."

6. Regulation 119 of Regulations Navy Part II reads as under:- **"119. Forfeiture of pay and service :-**

(1) A sailor shall forfeit one day's pay and service for each day (or part of a day) during which he is detained by the civil authority as part of the sentence and shall also, as a general rule, forfeit pay and service on the same scale for time spent in custody while awaiting or attending his trial.

(2) The Chief of the Naval Staff may remit such penalties whenever the offence is venial and brings no discredit on the Service; and also in cases where there are special grounds for such remission.

(3) Where a sailor is on leave when arrested by the Civil authority, his time and pay shall not be stopped for that portion of his absence during which he was on leave.

(4) There may be three or more separate periods for which a sailor forfeits pay and time in respect of a single conviction:

(a) from the date of his arrest (unless he is on leave at the time) or from the expiration of his leave, (if he is arrested during leave and is still in custody when his leave expires); (b) from the date of surrender to bail (if he is allowed to return to his ship pending trial);

(c) from the date of a sentence of imprisonment. Any such periods shall be shown separately in the "Time forfeited" column of the service certificate, even if some of them are continued.

(5) Where the offence is one that has brought disgrace or discredit on the uniform, the service, or the position which the offender holds, he may be awarded the following Naval penalties with the prior approval of the Chief of the Naval Staff, namely:- (a) break in continuity of "V.G" conduct, (if this penalty is enforced, the date of conviction is to be noted in the conduct sheet as the date of commencement of "V,G" conduct); (b) award of an inferior character on the next occasion of assessment;

(c) deprivation of Good-Conduct-Badges;

(d) deprivation of L.S. & G.C., Meritorious Service Medal.

(6) When the offences are specially serious or repeated, the sailor may be reduced in rank or discharged D.M.L.R. but such penalties shall be authorised only by the Chief of the Naval Staff and along with the proposal of such penalties the offender's Service Certificate shall be forwarded with the prescribed form.

(7) A decision by the Chief of the Naval Staff in the imposition of Naval penalties shall be obtained on the prescribed form as soon as possible after the sailor's conviction.

(8) Forfeitures of pay and time enforced under sub-regulation (4) shall take effect from the commencement of each separate period of absence.

(9) If any of the penalties specified in sub-regulation (5) and (6) are enforced, they shall take effect from the date of conviction, except in the case of discharge S.M.L.R. in which case the date shall be decided by the Chief of the Naval Staff and similarly, when a sailor appeals, and the appeal is quashed, the original date of conviction shall stand for the purpose of applying any Naval penalties awarded.

(10) The decision shall be noted with all necessary particulars on the Conduct Sheet and the service certificate, the prescribed from the being finally enclosed in the quarterly return of punishment.

(11) A warrant shall not be required for any Naval Penalty."

7. Sections 15, 73 and 29 of Navy Act, 1957 reads as under:- **"15. Tenure of service of officers and sailors.—**

(1) Every officer and sailor shall hold office during the pleasure of the President.

(2) Subject to the provisions of this Act and the regulations made thereunder,—

(a) the Central Government may dismiss or discharge or retire from the naval service any officer or sailor, (b) the Chief of the Naval Staff or any prescribed officer may dismiss or discharge from the naval service any sailor.

**23. Remedy of aggrieved persons.—**

(1) If an officer or sailor thinks that he has suffered any personal, oppression, injustice or other ill-treatment at the hands of any superior officer, he may make a complaint in accordance with the regulations made under this Act.

(2) The regulations referred to in sub-section (1) shall provide for the complaint to be forwarded to the Central Government for its consideration, if the complainant is not satisfied with the decision on his complaint.

**79. Jurisdiction as to time.—**No person unless he is an offender who has avoided apprehension or fled from justice or committed the offence of desertion or **fraudulent entry** or the offence of mutiny shall be tried or punished in pursuance of this Act for any offence committed by him unless such trial commences within three years from the commission of such offence.

Provided that in the computation of the said period of three years any time during which an offender was outside India or any time during which he was a prisoner of war shall be deducted.

Provided further that in computation of the said period of three years, any time during which,—

(a) the commission of the offence was not known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to the authority competent to initiate action, the first day on which such offence comes to the knowledge of such person or authority, whichever is earlier; (b) it was not known by whom the offence was committed, the first day on which the identity of the offender is known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to the authority investigating into the offence, whichever is earlier, shall be excluded:

Provided also that where the institution of the prosecution in respect of an offence has been stayed by an injunction or order, then, in computing the said period of three years, the period of the continuance of the injunction or order, the day on which it was issued or made and the day on which it was withdrawn shall be excluded:

Provided also that no trial for an offence of desertion other than desertion on active service or **fraudulent entry** shall be commenced if the person in question not being an officer has subsequently to the commission of the offence served continuously in an exemplary manner for not less than three years in the Indian Navy."

8. On the issue of judicial review, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in its judgment dt 21.09.2021 (Para 23) in Civil Appeal No 5848/2021 in the case of **UOI & Ors Vs Dalbir Singh** held as under:- "23. In another Judgment reported as **B.C Chaturvedi v. UOI & Ors, (1995) 6 SCC 749**, it was held that the power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. The judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. The Court is to examine as to whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. This Court held as under:- "12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceedings. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. **The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to re-appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on**

**the evidence.** The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case.

13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to re-appreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In *UOI Vs H.C. Goel [(1964) 4 SCR 718 : AIR 1964 SC 364 : (1964) 1 LLJ 38]*, this Court held at p. 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued."

9. In the case **State Bank of Patiala & Ors Vs S.K. Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC 364**, the Hon'ble Apex Court summarized the legal position relating to violation of procedural provisions in the disciplinary proceedings and orders of punishments as under:- "We may summarise the principles emerging from the above discussion. (These are by no means intended to be exhaustive and are evolved keeping in view the context of disciplinary enquiries and orders of punishment imposed by an employer upon the employee):

1. (1) An order passed imposing a punishment on an employee consequent upon a disciplinary/departmental enquiry in violation of the rules/regulations/statutory provisions governing such enquiries should not be set aside automatically. The Court or the Tribunal should enquire whether (a) the provision violated is of a substantive nature or (b) whether it is procedural in character.

2. (2) A substantive provision has normally to be complied with as explained hereinbefore and the theory of substantial compliance or the test of prejudice would not be applicable in such a case.

3. (3) In the case of violation of a procedural provision, the position is this: procedural provisions are generally meant for affording a reasonable and adequate opportunity to the delinquent officer/employee. They are, generally speaking, conceived in his interest. Violation of any and every procedural provision cannot be said to automatically vitiate the enquiry held or order passed. Except cases falling under 'no notice', 'no opportunity' and 'no hearing' categories, the complaint of violation of procedural provision should be examined from the point of view of prejudice viz., whether such violation has prejudiced the delinquent officer/employee in defending himself properly and effectively. If it is found that he has been so prejudiced, appropriate orders have to be made to repair and remedy the prejudice, including setting aside the enquiry and/or the order of punishment. If no prejudice is established to have resulted therefrom, it is obvious, no interference is called for. In this connection, it may be remembered that there may be certain procedural provisions which are of a fundamental character, whose violation is by itself proof of prejudice. The Court may not insist on proof of prejudice in such cases. As explained in the body of the judgment, take a case where there is a provision expressly providing that after the evidence of the employer/ government is over, the employee shall be given an opportunity to lead defence in his evidence, and in a given case, the enquiry officer does not give that opportunity in spite of the delinquent officer/employee asking for it. The prejudice is self-evident. No proof of prejudice as such need be called for in such a case. To repeat, the test is one of prejudice, i.e., whether the person has received a fair hearing considering all things. Now, this very aspect can also be looked at from the point of view of directory and mandatory provisions, if one is so inclined. The principle stated under (4) hereinbelow is only another way of looking at the same aspect as is dealt with herein and not a different or distinct principle.

(4) (a) In the case of a procedural provision which is not of a mandatory characters the complaint of violation has to be examined from the standpoint of substantial compliance. Be that as it may the order passed in violation of such a provision can be set aside only where such violation has occasioned prejudice to the delinquent employee.

(b) In the case of violation of a procedural provisions which is of a mandatory character, it has to be ascertained whether the provision is conceived in the interest of the person proceeded against or in public interest. If it is found to be the former, then it must be seen whether the delinquent officer has waived the said requirements either expressly or by his conduct. If he is found to have waived it, then the order of punishment cannot be set aside on the ground of said violation. If, on the other hand, it is found that the delinquent officer/ employee has not (or that the provision could not be waived by him, then the Court or Tribunal should make appropriate directions (include the setting aside of the order of punishment), keeping in mind the approach adopted by the Constitution Bench in B. Karunakar, (1993) 4 SCC 227. The ultimate test is always the same viz., test of prejudice or the test of fair hearing as it may be called.

(5) Where the enquiry is not governed by any rules/regulations/statutory provisions and the only obligation is to observe the principles of natural justice - or, for that matter, wherever such principles are held to be implied by the very nature and impact of the order/action the Court or the Tribunal should make a distinction between a total violation of natural justice (rule of audi alteram) and violation of a facet of the said rule, as explained in the body of the judgment. In other words, a distinction must be made between "no opportunity" and no adequate opportunity, i.e., between "no notice"/"no hearing"/"no fair hearing".

(a) In the case of former, the order passed would undoubtedly be invalid (one may call it "void" or a nullity if one chooses to). In such cases, normally, liberty will be reserved for the Authority to take proceedings afresh according to law, i.e., in accordance with the said rule (audi alteram partem).

(b) But in the latter case, the effect of violation (of a facet of the rule of audi alteram) has to be examined from the standpoint of prejudice; in other words, what the Court or Tribunal has to see is whether in the totality of the circumstances, the delinquent officer/ employee did or did not have a fair hearing and the orders to be made shall depend upon the answer to the said query. (It is made clear that this principle [No.5] does not apply in the case of rule against bias, the test in which behalf are laid down elsewhere.)

(6) While applying the rule of audi alteram partem (the primary principle of natural justice) the Court/ Tribunal/ Authority must always bear in mind the ultimate and over- *riding objective underlying the said rule, viz., to ensure a fair hearing and to ensure that there is no failure of justice. It is this objective which should guide them in applying the rule to varying situations that arise before them.*

*(7) There may be situations where the interests of state or public interest may call for a curtailing of the rule of audi alteram partem. In such situations, the Court may have to balance public/ State interest with the requirement of natural justice and arrive at an appropriate decision."*

10. It is not in dispute that initially the Applicant passed 10^th and 12^th class from Government Senior Secondary School, Foga (Rajasthan) in the years 2000 and 2002 respectively with date of birth as 01.04.1985 and due to issue in the name of his father in metric certificate as Bhaga Ram, he could not appear in open enrolment in the Navy in year 2003. Based on the advice of a teacher, he got admission in a private school in Bisau and passed class 10^th class with forged date of birth as 23.01.1989 because with his actual date of birth, he would have been over-age for joining the Navy by approximately one year. Thereafter, based on the fresh 10^th mark-sheet with forged date of birth as 23.01.1989, he got entry into Navy on 25.04.2005. Based on an FIR filed by his neighbour, he was arrested by Civil Police while he was on annual-leave at his home town and placed under judicial custody on 05.10.2012. His bail plea was rejected and the Applicant was convicted by Hon'ble Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jhunjhunu vide Order dt 29.08.2013 and was awarded five years of simple imprisonment with fine of Rs. 2300/-. Based on an Appeal filed by the Applicant against the said Order, the Hon'ble Sessions Court, Jhunjhunu vide Order dt 21.09.2013 reduced the imprisonment term to one year and after undergoing the sentence, the Applicant was released from custody on 04.10.2013. Then after a gap of 44 days, the Applicant reported onboard INS Shivalik on 18.11.2013. The unit of the Applicant took up the case for reinstatement of the Applicant in service under Rule 119 of Regulations Navy Part II (Statutory) and regularization of absence period. The Competent Authority, ie., the Chief of Naval Staff, after considering the case in its entirety rejected the same and approved his discharge from Service as Service No Longer Required in terms of Section 15(2) (b) of Navy Act, 1957. After approval of discharge of the Applicant, he did not avail the remedy of representation before the Central Government in terms of Section 23 of Navy Act, 1957. The jurisdiction of Respondents as to the limitation of three years in terms of Section 79 of Navy Act, 1957 is not applicable in this case as the matter was not taken over by the Respondents and the Applicant was tried and awarded punishment by Hon'ble Sessions Court, Jhunjhunu vide Order dt 21.09.2013. It is a fact that the Applicant had knowingly resorted to unscrupulous practice of forging his date of birth for fraudulently joining the Navy which he succeeded for which he was ordered to be imprisoned by Hon'ble Sessions Court, Jhunjhunu. The discipline and proper conduct is the backbone of the Armed Forces which has to be maintained at all costs to safeguard our motherland against the adversaries as mandated by the Constitution of India. Considering the sensitive and exceptional nature of the case, retention of the Applicant in service would have set a wrong example and would have been detrimental to the service interest. Therefore, considering the overall facts and circumstances, the Competent Authority after following due process discharged the Applicant from Service as Service No Longer Required in terms of Rule 279 of Regulations Navy Part-III-(Statutory) and we find no infirmity or illegality in discharging the Applicant from Service. Since the Applicant is a bonafide resident of Rajasthan, the objection raised by the Respondents with regard to territorial jurisdiction of this Tribunal is rejected.

11. In fine we find that this Application is bereft of strength and, hence, is dismissed. Pending Miscellaneous Application(s), if any, also stand disposed off.

12. No order on costs.

(SANJIV MITTAL) MEMBER (A)

Sdy/-

(GOVERDHAN BARDHAR) MEMBER (J)