CRL.REV.P./1346/2023 of MOHD UMAR Vs STATE (GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI) (THROUGH SHO PS JAGAT PURI) on 21 September 2026

O R D E R

% 21.09.2026

1. This hearing has been conducted through hybrid mode.

2. The present revision petition has been filed under Section 397 read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [hereinafter referred to as ‘CrPC’], seeking setting aside of the order dated 07.11.2023 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, FTSC (RC), East District, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi, insofar as it directs framing of a charge against the revisionist under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 [hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC’] concerning the alleged incident of May 2013, and the consequential order dated 07.12.2023 framing the said charge [hereinafter collectively referred to as the ‘impugned orders’]. The revisionist seeks discharge in SC No. 2046/2016, arising out of FIR No. 446/2015 registered at Police Station

Jagat Puri, District East, Delhi, under Sections 376, 506, 313 and 328 IPC read with Section 34 IPC.

BRIEF FACTS

3. The prosecutrix in the present case was acquainted with the revisionist and his family and used to visit their residence to attend to the revisionist’s ailing mother. According to the prosecutrix, during one such visit in May 2013, the revisionist subjected her to sexual intercourse without her consent. She further alleged that the revisionist thereafter continued to establish physical relations with her on an assurance of marriage. She alleges that after she became pregnant, her pregnancy was terminated by administering medicine and that she and her mother were threatened when the revisionist allegedly refused to marry her.

4. On 16.09.2014, the prosecutrix approached the police, whereupon an enquiry was initiated. Subsequently, the revisionist and the prosecutrix solemnised their marriage according to Muslim rites on 26.10.2014. The prosecutrix alleged that she was sent back to her parental home shortly thereafter. Disputes subsequently arose between the parties and, on 04.03.2015, a compromise deed and talaqnama were executed in the connected civil proceedings wherein her statement was also recorded in those proceedings, wherein she affirmed the settlement and acknowledged receipt of ₹15,00,000/-.

5. The prosecutrix thereafter alleged that the settlement documents had been executed under a misrepresentation that the amount was being paid to enable the parties to establish a separate matrimonial home. She accordingly lodged a complaint dated 25.05.2015. Pursuant to an order passed on her application under Section 156(3) CrPC, the aforesaid FIR was registered on

22.07.2015. Her statement under Section 164 CrPC was recorded on 25.07.2015 and, upon completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against the revisionist and his parents. Proceedings against the revisionist’s mother were subsequently recorded as having been abated upon her death vide order dated 26.02.2021.

6. Vide the impugned order dated 07.11.2023, the Trial Court found no medical or scientific material supporting the allegations concerning the pregnancy and its termination and, accordingly, declined to frame charges under Sections 313 and 328 IPC. The allegation of criminal intimidation was also found insufficient to sustain a charge under Section 506 IPC. The revisionist’s father was consequently discharged. The Trial Court further held that no charge of rape on a false promise of marriage arose from the alleged subsequent physical relations, since the parties had in fact solemnised their marriage and subsequently dissolved their marriage by mutual consent, as recorded in the connected civil proceedings.

7. The Trial Court, however, treated the alleged incident of May 2013 as a distinct occurrence. Having regard to the allegations contained in the original complaint, the statement of the prosecutrix under Section 164 CrPC and the history recorded in her MLC, it found a prima facie case under Section 376 IPC against the revisionist in respect of that incident. A formal charge confined thereto was framed on 07.12.2023. Aggrieved thereby, the revisionist has preferred the present revision petition. SUBMISSIONS ADVANCED Revisionist

8. Learned counsel for the revisionist submits that the charge is vague, as it refers only to an unknown date in May 2013, without specifying the date or time of the alleged incident, thereby depriving the revisionist of an effective opportunity to defend himself, including by raising a plea of alibi.

9. It is further submitted that the Trial Court incorrectly treated the alleged first incident as distinct from the assurance of marriage. According to the prosecutrix’s own account, the assurance preceded the alleged incident and the parties subsequently solemnised their marriage. Learned counsel also contends that, having declined to proceed on the remaining allegations, the Trial Court could not have sustained the isolated charge under Section 376 IPC merely on the basis of its reiteration in the complaint and the statement under Section 164 CrPC. The allegedly inconsistent stands taken by the prosecutrix concerning her marriage and the settlement are also relied upon. State

10. Learned APP for the State submits that the prosecutrix consistently supported the allegation concerning the first incident in her initial complaint and in her statement under Section 164 CrPC. It is urged that the contentions raised by the revisionist constitute matters of defence which must be tested during trial and cross-examination. It is further submitted that the impugned orders warrant no interference. Prosecutrix

11. Learned counsel for the prosecutrix submits that the first incident was alleged to be independently forcible and was not founded upon a false promise of marriage. The subsequent marriage and settlement, therefore, do not efface that allegation. It is further submitted that the revisionist’s contentions concerning the prosecutrix’s alleged earlier marriage and the settlement are matters for trial.

DECISION

12. Heard the learned counsels for the parties as well as the learned APP for the State and also perused the material placed on record.

13. It is well settled that the scope of interference in revision with an order framing charge is limited. The Revisional Court is not required to undertake a meticulous evaluation of the evidence. Its enquiry is confined to determining whether the material before the learned Trial Court disclosed a prima facie case or grave suspicion warranting the framing of charge.

14. The revisionist contends that the absence of an exact date of occurrence impairs his ability to raise a plea of alibi. However, the charge, read with the complaint identifies the month, place and circumstances of the alleged incident, sufficiently informing him of the accusation. The absence of an exact date does not, in these circumstances, by itself warrant discharge.

15. The Trial Court confined the charge under Section 376 IPC to the alleged incident of May 2013, having regard to the complaint, the statement under Section 164 CrPC and the history recorded in the MLC. Although an assurance of marriage was allegedly made before that incident, the prosecutrix specifically alleged that she refused physical relations and that the revisionist nevertheless used force and subjected her to sexual intercourse. The learned Trial Court, therefore, distinguished this allegation from those concerning subsequent physical relations on an assurance of marriage and found sufficient grounds to proceed in respect of that occurrence.

16. The authorities relied upon by the revisionist require the Court to consider the material on record and its basic infirmities before framing a charge. They do not however, require discharge where the consideration discloses grave suspicion or a prima facie case.

17. Therefore, this Court finds no ground to interfere with the impugned orders in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction.

18. Accordingly, the present revision petition is dismissed and thereby, disposed of.

19. The pending application also stands disposed of.

20. Nothing hereinabove shall be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case.

21. A copy of this order be sent to the concerned learned Trial Court for necessary information and compliance.

22. The order be uploaded on the website forthwith. MADHU JAIN, J SEPTEMBER 21, 2026/prg/PG