W.P.(C)/2314/2003 of D.T.C. Vs RAM PAL SINGH on 17 August 2026

1. The chief dispute in the present petitions pertain to the order dated 18.07.2001 (hereafter ‘impugned order’) passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Delhi in O.P. No. 11/1990 whereby the learned Tribunal dismissed the application preferred by the DTC under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (‘ID Act’) seeking approval of its action to remove the workman from service noting that DTC had failed to establish misconduct on part of the workman.

2. While W.P.(C) 2314/2003 has been preferred by DTC challenging the impugned order, W.P.(C) 2027/2003 has been filed by the workman seeking implementation of the impugned order.

3. This Court vide order dated 01.04.2003 had stayed the operation of the impugned award.

4. Succinctly put, as averred, the workman was employed with DTC as a conductor in the year 1985. It is the case against the workman that on 15.01.1989, while performing his duty on Bus No. 3979, when the checking staff stopped the bus at Red Fort, it was found that the workman had taken a fare of ₹7.50 from a group of five passengers who were travelling from Kalka More to Railway Station but had issued tickets of ₹5 only (₹1 for each passenger). It is the case of the corporation that on confrontation, the workman admitted his mistake and also issued five unpunched tickets of fifty paise each for the difference in amount.

5. On such a conspectus, it was alleged that the workman acted dishonestly for which the workman was chargesheeted on 27.01.1989. In the enquiry proceedings, the workman was found guilty based on the evidence given by the Traffic Inspector. The enquiry officer further noted that the statement of the passenger as well as the unpunched tickets contained the signatures of the workman and that the workman had also himself admitted his mistake in writing at the time of issuance of challan. Based on the aforesaid factors, the workman was found guilty of misconduct and was removed from service vide order dated 16.03.1990.

6. Thereafter, the corporation preferred an application under Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act which was dismissed by the impugned order. While doing so, the learned Tribunal noted that the enquiry proceedings were marred and were violative of the principles of natural justice. It was noted that the witnesses of the corporation could not establish the allegation against the workman before the enquiry officer yet the workman was found guilty.

7. The learned Tribunal noted that even during the course of the proceedings under Section 33(2)(b), the corporation failed to cross examine the workman on the aspect of the statement given by the passenger against the workman or that the workman had signed on the statement given by the passenger or had admitted his fault before the checking staff. It was further noted that the corporation had failed to produce the original documents pertaining to the statement of the passenger and workman and in the absence of any cross examination on these aspects, the said documents could not be relied upon by the corporation to claim that the workman had admitted his guilt before the checking staff. Consequently, by the impugned order, the learned Tribunal refused to approve the action of the corporation in removing the workman from service.

8. Before this Court, it has been urged on behalf of the corporation that the workman had already admitted his guilt before the checking staff and had also given five unpunched tickets. It has further been urged that the checking staff had specifically confirmed the contents of the chargesheet before the learned Tribunal. It has consequently been urged that the learned Tribunal erroneously found that the enquiry was vitiated.

9. Contrarily, the learned counsel for the workman urged that the learned Tribunal duly appreciated the evidence on record and concluded that the misconduct was not proved. He consequently urged that the workman is liable to receive consequential benefits since the termination was not approved by the learned Tribunal under Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act.

10. Having taken note of the contentions raised by the parties and perused the material on record, this Court finds itself unconvinced by the arguments advanced on behalf of the corporation.

11. At the outset, it is pertinent to note that the proceedings under Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act are summary in nature and the purpose of the same is to safeguard workman against alteration of terms of service and punitive measures during pendency of an industrial dispute. The Tribunal/ Labour Court is only required to oversee as to whether the domestic enquiry was conducted in a fair and proper manner in accordance with principles of natural justice, and if a prima facie case for dismissal is made out. For the said purpose, the Tribunal/ Labour Court has to appraise the record of enquiry, though it can permit the parties to adduce their respective evidence before it in case the domestic enquiry suffers from any defect. Such proceedings are however not on par with the jurisdiction to adjudicate an industrial dispute qua termination under Sections 10 read with Sections 11(3) and 11-A of the ID Act [Ref. John D’Souza v. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation : (2019) 18 SCC 47].

12. Without delving into a detailed examination of the factual findings arrived at by the learned Tribunal given the limited scope of interference permissible in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, it is pertinent to note that the learned Tribunal found the enquiry to be vitiated for want of evidence to highlight the misconduct of the workman. The learned Tribunal, in fact, noted that the witnesses brought by the corporation itself failed to prove the factum of misconduct yet the workman was found guilty in the enquiry proceedings.

13. Much emphasis, however, has been laid by the corporation on the fact that the workman had himself admitted his guilt before the checking staff and had issued unpunched tickets. It has further been stressed that the signatures of the workman were present in the statement of the passenger. As is apparent from a perusal of the impugned order, the corporation was anyway denied to take the benefit of these documents (including the statement of the passenger attributing guilt as well as that of the workman admitting guilt) because the corporation had failed to produce the original documents before the learned Tribunal. Further, as rightly noted by the learned Tribunal, the corporation also did not cross examine the workman during the course of the proceedings under Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act on the aspect of his admission of guilt or the presence of the workman’s signature on the statement of one Sh. Jang Bahadur who had stated that the workman had taken extra fare and had issued tickets of lesser denomination. In such circumstances, as rightly appreciated by the learned Tribunal, the corporation could not have plainly been allowed to merely use the said documents to establish that the workman was guilty.

14. Even otherwise if this Court were to give a cursory glance to the statement of workman so heavily relied upon by the corporation to attribute guilt to the workman and contest the impugned order, it is apparent that the workman, in his statement before the checking staff, merely stated that at Kalka More, about 25-30 passengers had climbed the bus out of which a group of 5 passengers gave him a note of ₹10 and asked for 5 tickets to railway station and that the workman, due to heavy rush, had mistakenly given five tickets of ₹1/- each. The said factum of mistake, in the opinion of this Court, also cannot be ruled out.

15. Furthermore, even if this Court were to briefly take note of the initial statement of the passenger – Jang Bahadur relied upon by the corporation to attribute guilt to the workman, it is pertinent to note that the said passenger Jang Bahadur was also produced as a prosecution witness during the course of the domestic enquiry where he failed to support the case of the corporation. While it is well settled that the non-examination of passenger as a witness is not fatal to termination proceedings, it is peculiar how the prosecution first produced the said witness, and later when the said witness did not support the case of the corporation, it sought to impeach the witness. The benefit of complainant witness not supporting the allegations cannot be denied to the workman in the absence of any corroborative evidence worthy of reliance.

16. In such circumstances, as rightly appreciated by the learned Tribunal, the misconduct of the workman could not have been sought to be proved by merely relying on the testimony of the checking staff who only narrated the facts stated to them by the said passengers.

17. In view of the aforesaid, this Court does not find any infirmity in the impugned order passed by the learned Tribunal so as to warrant interference by this Court.

18. Insofar as the question of relief to be granted to the workman is concerned, although refusal of approval under Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act undisputedly renders the termination order to be non-est with consequential benefits, this Court considers it apposite to award a lumpsum monetary compensation to the workman in the facts of the present case. Pertinently, the workman only worked with the corporation for three years and the impugned order was passed way back in the year 2001.

19. Evidently, pursuant to the order dated 29.10.2007 passed by this Court, the workman received allowance in accordance with Section 17B of the ID Act with effect from 18.07.2001 till the time that he superannuated on 31.01.2023 which aggregates to a sum of ₹21,11,074/-. Considering the totality of circumstances including the length of service rendered by the workman and his clean past record, this Court finds that a lumpsum compensation would suffice the ends of justice.

20. Consequently, the corporation is directed to pay a lumpsum compensation of ₹2,00,000/- to the workman within a period of eight weeks from the date of the order.

21. The present petitions are disposed of in the aforesaid terms.

22. A copy of this order be placed in both the matters. AMIT MAHAJAN, J AUGUST 17, 2026 DU