Delhi High Court
W.P.(C)/11830/2026 of EMPLOYEES STATE INSURANCE CORPORATION Vs SUDHANSHU SHEKHAR & ORS. on 17 August 2026
11830/2026 Page 1 of 4 $~62 * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI # CNR No. DLHC010380002026 + W.P.(C) 11830/2026 & CM APPL. 54657/2026, CM APPL. 54658/2026 EMPLOYEES STATE INSURANCE CORPORATION .....Petitioner Through: Mr. Rishabh Kapur and Mr. Tanmay Gupta, Advs. versus SUDHANSHU
$~62
*
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
CNR No. DLHC010380002026
+
W.P.(C) 11830/2026 & CM APPL. 54657/2026, CM APPL.
54658/2026
EMPLOYEES STATE INSURANCE CORPORATION
.....Petitioner
Through:
Mr. Rishabh Kapur and Mr.
Tanmay Gupta, Advs.
versus
SUDHANSHU SHEKHAR & ORS.
.....Respondents
Through:
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VINOD KUMAR
JUDGMENT (ORAL)
%
17.08.2026
C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
Citations and Judicial Treatment
Cited by
0
Decisions in the index citing it
Cites
2
Decisions referred to
In this index
0
Of the decisions it cites
Overruled / Questioned
0
No negative treatment found
Loading the citing and cited decisions…
This judgment in the centre: on the left the decisions it cites, on the right the decisions citing it. Colour is the treatment; choose a decision to open it.
1. This is a classic case in which we are constrained to apply the law declared by the Supreme Court in Mrinmoy Maity v. Chhanda Koley1, in which the Supreme Court has clearly held that, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court has to keep in mind considerations of delay and laches.
2. This writ petition, at the instance of the ESIC, has been filed on 20 July 2026, challenging the order passed by the Central 1 (2024) 15 SCC 215
KUMAR
Administrative Tribunal2 on 20 March 2023, i.e. more than three years prior even to the drafting of the writ petition. The only explanation for this delay, as forthcoming from the writ petition and as articulated by Mr. Rishabh Kapur, learned Counsel for the petitioners, is that, in the interregnum, there was some confusion as to the office of the petitioner which would be competent to decide whether a writ petition could, or could not, be filed. He submits that there was a litigation to that effect which was pending before the Tribunal, which was decided on 7 August 2025, whereafter the ESIC Headquarters took a decision to file this writ petition.
3. Given the explanation which has been proffered, we specifically queried of Mr. Rishabh Kapur as to whether it is his contention that, during the period from 20 March 2023 till 20 July 2026, there was no authority in the ESIC who was competent to take a decision as to whether a writ petition was, or was not, to be filed.
4. Mr. Kapur candidly acknowledges that he is not in a position to make such a statement.
5. This, therefore, is a clear case of administrative lethargy.
6. The Supreme Court has, in several decisions, castigated such indolence on the part of the executive and has cautioned courts not to exercise any leniency in that regard. We may refer, in this context, to Shivamma v. Karnataka Housing Board3. We may reproduce the 2 “the Tribunal” hereinafter 3 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969
KUMAR
following paragraph from the said judgment:
“261. Thus, for the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order of the High Court deserves to be set aside. Before we proceed to close this judgment, we deem it appropriate to make it abundantly clear that administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, and we want to convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude.”
7. On the significance of delay and laches while entertaining a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Supreme Court, in Mrinmoy Maity, ruled thus:
“9. Having heard rival contentions raised and on perusal of the facts obtained in the present case, we are of the considered view that the writ petitioner ought to have been non-suited or in other words the writ petition ought to have been dismissed on the ground of delay and laches itself. An applicant who approaches the court belatedly or in other words sleeps over his rights for a considerable period of time, wakes up from his deep slumber ought not to be granted the extraordinary relief by the writ courts. This Court time and again has held that delay defeats equity. Delay or laches is one of the factors which should be borne in mind by the High Court while exercising discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a given case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if laxity on the part of the applicant to assert his right has allowed the cause of action to drift away and attempts are made subsequently to rekindle the lapsed cause of action.”
8. Applying the law declared in the above decisions, we decline to exercise our discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
KUMAR
9. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed on the ground of delay, without going into merits.
C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
VINOD KUMAR, J.
AUGUST 17, 2026
dsn Digitally Signed By:AJIT KUMAR