I.A.(Civil)/1525/2026 of THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS. Vs KIRAN BHUYAN AND 11 ORS. on 30 September 2026

ORDER

01.10.2026 (K. Goswami, J)

Heard Mr. B. Choudhury, learned Advocate for the applicants and Mr. I. Choudhury, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. N. J. Khataniar, learned Advocate for the respondents.

2. This application has been filed for condoning the delay of 679 days in preferring the connected writ appeal against the impugned common judgment and order dated 19.10.2023 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in WP(C) No.4133/2012 and other analogous matters.

3. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment, the applicants preferred the connected writ appeal. However, as the appeal could not be instituted within the prescribed period of limitation, there is a delay of 679 days in filing the same, for which the present application has been preferred.

4. The explanations furnished in the application are that following the passing of the impugned common judgment and order dated 19.10.2023, the matter underwent administrative deliberations and examination at various levels in the Agriculture Department, Government of Assam. Having regard to the financial implications arising from the consequential benefits and payment of back wages directed by this Court, the matter was considered in consultation with the Director of Agriculture, the Judicial Department and the Finance Department and their respective views were obtained. It is further stated that upon receipt and consideration of the requisite opinions and approval of the competent authorities and following further deliberations with the learned Standing Counsel, the applicant vide letter dated 03.09.2024 requested the learned Advocate General, Assam, to prefer an appeal against the impugned judgment and order. The matter was thereafter entrusted by the learned Advocate General to one of the engaged counsel of the applicant. However, owing to the illness of the mother of the said counsel, the preparation of the appeal was delayed, necessitating its reassignment to another counsel. The newly assigned counsel is stated to have required further time to obtain the relevant pleadings and records and to prepare the appeal. Upon finalization and vetting, the appeal was ultimately filed on

06.01.2026.

5. The learned Advocate appearing for the applicants submits that the delay was beyond the control of the applicants and there is no negligence and/or laches and hence, warrants a liberal consideration from this Court.

6. Per contra, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondents submits that the explanations furnished for the delay merely narrates movement of files from one office to another and routine departmental correspondence. Such stereotype explanations neither constitute sufficient cause nor justify condonation of an enormous delay of 679 days.

7. We have given our due consideration to the submissions advanced by the learned advocates appearing for the parties and have perused the materials available on record.

8. It appears from the materials placed before us that the judgment under appeal was delivered on 19.10.2023 and that the certified copy thereof was communicated to the Agriculture Department on 08.12.2023. Thereafter, according to the applicants, the matter was processed at different departmental levels and the views of the concerned departments were obtained. Ultimately, on 03.09.2024, the applicant addressed a communication to the learned Advocate General, Assam, requesting that an appeal be preferred against the judgment under appeal. The aforesaid explanation, however, does not satisfactorily account for the time consumed, more particularly, as to why after the matter had reached the Judicial Department and its views had been sought regarding the proposal to prefer an appeal, the matter remained pending for a considerable period before the request dated 03.09.2024 was made to the learned Advocate General. A general reference to administrative deliberations, consultations and movement of the file, without accounting for the intervening periods of inactivity, does not adequately explain the delay.

9. In Postmaster General and Ors. -Vs- Living Media India Limited and Anr. :: (2012) 3 SCC 563, the Apex Court has held that the theory of governmental lethargy cannot, by itself, constitute a ground for condonation of delay. The relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment read as under: “28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government.

29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.

30. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay. Accordingly, the appeals are liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay.”

10. Likewise, in State of Bihar & Ors. -Vs- Deo Kumar Singh & Ors. :: (2022) 16 SCC 483, the Apex Court has reiterated that the State cannot claim condonation of delay as a matter of right merely because the delay is attributable to departmental processes. The Apex Court has emphasized that the law of limitation does not operate differently in the case of the State and that the conduct of the State, including the manner in which a matter is processed at the departmental level, remains relevant while considering whether sufficient cause has been shown for condonation of delay.

11. We are conscious of the fact that refusal to condone the delay may result in the applicants losing an opportunity to pursue the proposed appeal on merits. However, the present application does not fail merely on account of the length of the delay, but due to non-furnishing of any satisfactory and cogent explanation for the time consumed. The explanation furnished, though setting out the various stages through which the matter is stated to have passed, leaves material intervals of time unaccounted for. Consequently, the reasons stated in the application do not, in our considered view, constitute sufficient cause for condoning the delay.

12. Accordingly, the application seeking condonation of delay stands dismissed and, resultantly, the connected writ appeal, which is yet to be registered, also stands dismissed.

13. Pending application(s), if any, accordingly stands disposed off.

JUDGE CHIEF JUSTICE Comparing Assistant