WP(C)/363/2025 of M/S GLOMAX INTERIOR Vs THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 6 ORS. on 1 September 2026

ORDER

Date : 02.09.2026 Heard Mr. A. Buragohain, the learned counsel for the petitioner. Mr. S.R. Baruah, the learned Government Advocate appears on behalf of respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 4.

2. The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner claiming an amount of Rs. 1,84,250/- payable to the petitioner in respect of the contract work completed by the petitioner on 15.08.2011.

3. This Court has duly taken note of the materials on record, more particularly the documents which have been placed.

4. From a perusal of the documents, it is seen that on 11.07.2011, a work order was issued to the petitioner for an amount of Rs. 1,84,000/- for renovation works of AMTRON, Bamunimaidam. There is no Completion Certificate placed before this Court. Eleven years thereafter, the petitioner submitted an application under the Right to Information Act, 2005. However, the petitioner did not receive any information. The petitioner thereupon approached this Court by filing the present writ petition in the year 2025.

5. The petitioner has approached this Court after 14 years from the date on which the petitioner had a claim for the amount. Directing the respondents at this stage to verify the claim would result in a futile exercise, taking into account the passage of time.

6. In this regard, this Court finds it appropriate at this stage to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and Others v. T.T Murali Babu reported in (2014) 4 SCC 108, wherein the Supreme Court clearly observed that a litigant cannot be permitted to behave like “Kumbhakarna”. Paragraph Nos. 16 and 17 of the said judgment are reproduced hereinbelow:

“16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant — a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.

17. In the case at hand, though there has been four years' delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinise whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others' ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons — who compete with “Kumbhakarna” or for that matter “Rip Van Winkle”. In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold.”

7. Considering the above, this Court is not inclined to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.

8. Accordingly, the writ petition stands dismissed.

9. Be that as it may, the petitioner herein is given the liberty to approach the competent Civil Court, if so permissible under the law and the period during which the instant writ petition has been pending i.e. w.e.f. 21.01.2025 till date be excluded while computing the period of limitation.

JUDGE Comparing Assistant