WP(C)/969/2024 of M/S BRIHASPATI TECHNOLOGIES PRIVATE LIMITED Vs THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 5 ORS on 27 July 2026

GAHC010035562024

2026:GAU-AS:10479

THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : WP(C)/969/2024 M/S BRIHASPATI TECHNOLOGIES PRIVATE LIMITED A COMPANY REGISTERED UNDER THE COMPANIES ACT, 1956, HAVING ITS REGD. OFFICE AT 5TH FLOOR, SAHITI ARCADE, 7-1-621/259, S.R. NAGAR HYDERABAD, REPRESENTED BY ITS DIRECTOR, RAJASEKHAR PAPOLU, S/O- BRAHMARAO PAPOLU, R/O- VILL- 330 ASHOKA ALA MAISON, KOMPALLY HYDERABAD TS- 500100. VERSUS THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 5 ORS REPRESENTED BY THE PRINCIPAL CHIEF CONSERVATOR OF FORESTS AND HEAD OF FOREST FORCE, ASSAM, ARANYA BHAWAN, PANJABARI, GHY-37. 2:THE PRINCIPAL CHIEF CONSERVATOR OF FORESTS (WILDLIFE) ASSAM ARANYA BHAWAN PANJABARI GHY-37. 3:THE CHIEF CONSERVATOR OF FORESTS AND DIRECTOR KAZIRANGA NATIONAL PARK ARANYA BHAWAN PANJABARI GHY-37.

4:THE CHIEF WILDLIFE WARDEN ASSAM ARANYA BHAWAN PANJABARI GHY-37. 5:FIELD DIRECTOR KAZIRANGA NATIONAL PARK AND TIGER RESERVE BOKAKHAT ASSAM-785612. 6:DIVISIONAL FOREST OFFICER EASTERN ASSAM WILDLIFE DIVISION P.O. BOKAKHAT DIST. GOLAGHAT-785612 BEFORE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE DEVASHIS BARUAH

Advocate for the petitioner (s) : Mr. I. Choudhury, Sr. Advocate Mr. T. Das, Advocate Advocate for the respondent (s): Mr. I. Borthakur, SC, Forest Department Date on which judgment is reserved : NA

Date of pronouncement of judgment : 28.07.2026

Whether the pronouncement is of the Operative part of the judgment? : Yes

Whether the full judgment has been Pronounced? : No.

JUDGMENT AND ORDER (ORAL)

Heard Mr. I. Choudhury, the learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. T. Das, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner. Mr. I. Borthakur, the learned counsel appears on behalf of the Forest Department.

2. The present writ petition has been filed by the Petitioner being aggrieved by the order dated 21.02.2023 by which the Petitioner was put in the Negative List of Kaziranga National Park & Tiger Reserve, Assam for a period of 5 years from the date of issuance of the said letter. BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE

3. On 21.05.2018, the Director, Kaziranga National Park and Field Director, Kaziranga Tiger Reserve floated a tender for supply of “Automatic Sensor Based Vehicle Speed Regulatory System with requisite equipments at six specified animal corridor sections on NH-37 in National Park for management of vehicular traffic during wildlife crossings”. The Petitioner, being interested, submitted its bid and the Petitioner was evaluated as the L1 Bidder for supply of the requisite equipments and ancillary services vide the work order dated 09.01.2019. A Contract Agreement was also entered into by and between the Petitioner and the Respondent No.5 on 25.01.2019 and the contract value was Rs.15,98,13,576/- for installation of Automatic Sensor Based Vehicle Speed Regulatory System with requisite equipments at six specified animal corridor sections on NH-37 in Kaziranga National Park for management of the vehicular traffic during wildlife crossing.

4. Pursuant to the Contract Agreement, it is the case of the Petitioner that the Petitioner started execution of the work. On 23.03.2019, materials and equipments were delivered at the project site and as per the agreed payment terms envisaged in the contract, a bill dated 25.03.2019 for an amount of the 50% of the contract value, i.e. Rs.7,99,06,788/- was raised by the Petitioner Company. Against the bill dated 25.03.2019, a partial payment of Rs.4,28,14,200/- was received by the Petitioner vide the cheque bearing No.933988 dated 30.03.2019. Further to that, on 23.02.2020, a further amount of Rs.6,92,66,730/- was received by the Petitioner Company from the Treasury Office of Bokakhat.

5. It is the further case of the Petitioner that upon receipt of the amount of Rs.6,92,66,730/-, the Petitioner retained an amount of Rs.3,70,92,586/- and thereafter returned the excess amount of Rs.3,14,00,000/- by depositing the same in the Kaziranga Tiger Conservation Foundation on 06.04.2020 upon a request made by the Respondent No.5.

6. On 02.11.2020, the Petitioner sent a letter addressed to the Respondent No.5 requesting for the release of an amount of Rs.3,14,00,000/- most of the civil works were completed. In the said letter, the Petitioner also confirmed as requested by the Respondent No. 5 that the amount of Rs.3,14,00,000/- was deposited by the Petitioner in the Kaziranga Tiger Conservation Foundation on 06.04.2020.

7. On 24.05.2022, a letter was issued by the Respondent No.5 stating inter alia that an amount of Rs.3,14,00,000/- was released vide the cheque No.607499 dated 09.11.2020 as per the request of the Petitioner, but during the audit, it came to light that the Petitioner had erroneously deposited Rs.3,04,60,000/- instead of Rs.3,14,00,000/- and hence the Petitioner was demanded to refund the excess amount of Rs.9,40,000/- along with interest.

8. In response to the said letter dated 24.05.2018, the Petitioner sent an email on 06.06.2022 by attaching the RTGS customer acknowledgment copy from the IndusInd Bank dated 06.04.2020 for an amount of Rs.3,14,60,000/-. It was further mentioned that due to the negligence of the Bank, an amount of Rs.3,04,60,000/- was deposited instead of Rs.3,14,60,000/-. It was also mentioned that on account of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Petitioner could not notice the said aspect. The Petitioner further stated in the said email that the excess amount of Rs.9,40,000/- would be deposited and requested not to impose interest on the same.

9. Be that as it may, the Petitioner received another letter on 09.06.2022 directing the Petitioner to deposit the excess amount including interest at the rate of 18% amounting to the tune of Rs.11,93,800/- within 7 days. The Petitioner vide an email dated 03.09.2022 informed that the amount of Rs.9,40,000/- has already been paid on 23.06.2022 and 24.09.2022 in two installments of Rs.4,00,000/- and Rs.5,40,000/- respectively. The Petitioner also mentioned that the additional penalty charge of Rs.2,53,800/- was also deposited by the Petitioner on 07.10.2022.

10. The entire contract work as stated by the Petitioner was completed on 21.12.2020 with the delivery, installation of the requisite equipments to the satisfaction of the Respondent Authorities. The complete payment was made by the Respondent Authorities on 28.03.2022.

11. To the surprise of the Petitioner, a Show Cause Notice was issued by the Respondent No.5 on 27.12.2022 asking the

Petitioner to explain within 15 days as to why the Petitioner and the Original Equipment Manufacturer should not be placed in the Negative List of the Department of Environment and Forests, Government of Assam.

12. The Petitioner submitted a reply on 12.01.2023 dealing with each of the allegations. The impugned order was passed on 21.02.2023. The Petitioner being aggrieved had approached this Court by filing the present writ petition.

13. The records reveal that this Court vide the order dated 26.02.2024 issued notice. Subsequent thereto, on 12.06.2024, this Court stayed the impugned order. Two years thereafter, the Respondent No.5 filed an affidavit-in-opposition justifying the impugned order dated 21.02.2023.

14. The Petitioner has also filed an affidavit-in-reply on 27.07.2026 reiterating the stand in the writ petition and denying to the statements and allegations made in the affidavit-in- opposition. SUBMISSIONS MADE BY THE LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE PARTIES

15. I have heard Mr. I. Choudhury, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner who submitted that the contract in question was completed to the satisfaction of the

Authorities in the year 2020. Final Payment was made on 28.03.2022. Thereafter, most arbitrarily, proceedings were initiated for putting the Petitioner as well as the original manufacturer in the Negative List, that too on allegations which on the face of it do not exist. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that though the Authority has the jurisdiction to take steps for blacklisting in view of the settled principles of law, but such actions for blacklisting has to be exercised in a fair and a rational manner and it cannot be arbitrary. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the State can only initiate the process of blacklisting for a legitimate purpose and not in the manner as had been done by the Respondent Authorities in the present proceedings.

16. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that it is now well settled by the Supreme Court in the case of Blue Dreamz Advertising Private Limited vs. Kolkata Municipal Corporation & Others, reported in (2024) 15 SCC 264 as to under clear as to under what circumstances the extreme step of blacklisting can be taken, more particularly when blacklisting amounts to a civil death. The learned Senior Counsel also referred to a recent judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Techno Prints vs. Chhattisgarh Textbook Corporation & Another, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 343, wherein the Supreme Court went to the extent of observing that when the law is well settled as to when proceedings for blacklisting should be initiated, issuance of a Show Cause Notice when there arises no question of initiating a blacklisting proceeding amounts to an empty formality.

17. Per contra, Mr. I. Borthakur, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Forest Department submitted that the issue involved in the present writ petition is factually different from the facts which were involved in the case of Blue Dreamz Advertising Private Limited (supra) as well as Techno Prints (supra). The learned counsel submitted that in the instant case, the Petitioner who had supplied and installed the machineries did not take follow up actions by providing the necessary inputs and facilities which were required though the Respondents had extended full cooperation, rendered all facilities and advances to the Petitioner liberally. The learned counsel for the Forest Department further submitted that although the Petitioner had informed the Respondent Authorities that an amount of Rs.3,14,60,000/- was deposited, but in fact, an amount of Rs.3,04,60,000/- was deposited. In addition to that, the learned counsel further submitted that the performance bank guarantee of Rs.1,59,81,357/- ought to have been extended during the period of the work, but the same was not done. He, therefore, submitted that the action taken on behalf of the Respondents of

putting the Petitioner as well as the Original Equipment Manufacturer in the Negative List vide the impugned order dated 21.02.2023 may not be interfered with. ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION

18. This Court has given an anxious consideration to the respective submissions made by the parties and had also perused the materials on record including the impugned order which was passed by the Respondent No.5.

19. The materials on records clearly show that though the Petitioner initially claimed that the amount of Rs.3,14,60,000/- was refunded to the Respondents, but actually on 06.04.2020, the amount of Rs.3,04,60,000/- was deposited. The Petitioner upon being informed submitted an apology with a prayer that the additional penalty by way of interest at the rate of 18% should not be imposed upon the Petitioner. The Respondent Authorities, however, did not agree to the same. Resultantly, the Petitioner not only paid the amount of Rs.9,40,000/-, but also the penalty of Rs.2,53,800/- and this aspect was duly informed to the Respondents on 07.10.2022. Under such circumstances, in the opinion of this Court, when the Respondents had duly accepted the amount of Rs.9,40,000/- along with the penalty, the question of initiating proceedings for blacklisting on that transgression cannot be said to be a reasonable exercise of powers by the Respondent Authorities.

20. This Court further takes note of that in the impugned order, it is mentioned that the Petitioner had not provided the follow up action. It is seen from the materials on record that the work in question was completed and handed over on 21.12.2020 and the complete payment was made only on 28.03.2022. There is no mention either in the Show Cause Notice or even in the impugned order that there were certain defects pursuant to the completion of the work and thereupon there was no follow-up action. There is no reference to any communication issued to the Petitioner in that regard that during the warranty, if any, the Petitioner did not provide the follow up action. Under such circumstances, the initiation of the blacklisting proceedings on the basis of the said ground cannot also be said to be reasonable and rational exercise of power by the Respondent Authorities.

21. The ground taken that the Petitioner did not extend the performance bank guarantee during the existence of the contract also cannot also be said to be a reasonable or rational exercise of power in as much as when the Respondents did not raise such issue at the time prior to the completion of the contract, which admittedly stood completed on 21.12.2020 and payments made in the year 2022, the raising of such issues at such a belated stage appear to be an act suffering from malice in law.

22. In the backdrop of the above, this Court finds it relevant to take note of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Blue Dreamz Advertising Private Limited (supra) wherein the Supreme Court categorically observed that blacklisting is a drastic remedy and therefore order passed imposing the penalty of blacklisting has to be subjected to rigorous scrutiny. The Supreme Court further observed that merely saying that the blacklisting order carries reasons is not good enough. There has to be reasons justifying for the invocation of the penalty of blacklisting, and if the penalty of blacklisting is not proportionate to the transgressions committed by the contractor, the said imposition of the penalty of blacklisting would be bad in law. At Paragraph Nos.24, 25 and 26 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court culled out the principles under what circumstances a blacklisting can be permitted. The said Paragraph Nos.24, 25 and 26 being relevant are reproduced herein under:- “24. What is significant is that while setting out the guidelines prescribed in USA, the Court noticed that comprehensive guidelines for debarment were issued there for protecting public interest from those contractors and recipients who are non-responsible, lack business integrity or engage in dishonest or illegal conduct or are otherwise unable to perform satisfactorily. The illustrative cases set out also demonstrate that debarment as a remedy is to be invoked in cases where there is harm or potential harm for public interest particularly in cases where the person's conduct has demonstrated that debarment as a penalty alone will protect public interest and deter the person from repeating his actions which have a tendency to put public interest in jeopardy. In fact, it is common knowledge that in notice inviting tenders, any person blacklisted is rendered ineligible. Hence, blacklisting will not only debar the person concerned from dealing with the employer concerned, but because of the disqualification, their dealings with other entities also is proscribed. Even in the terms and conditions of tender in the present case, one of the conditions of eligibility is that the agency should not be blacklisted from anywhere.

25. In other words, where the case is of an ordinary breach of contract and the explanation offered by the person concerned raises a bona fide dispute, blacklisting/debarment as a penalty ought not to be resorted to. Debarring a person albeit for a certain number of years taints amounts to civil death inasmuch as the said person is commercially ostracised resulting in serious consequences for the person and those who are employed by him.

26. Too readily invoking the debarment for ordinary cases of breach of contract where there is a bona fide dispute, is not permissible. Each case, no doubt, would turn on the facts and circumstances thereto.”

23. This Court further takes note of the judgment in the case of Techno Prints (supra) wherein the Supreme Court relying upon the judgment in the case of Blue Dreamz Advertising Private Limited

(supra) observed that when the guiding principles have been explained by the Supreme Court in various judgments as to when and in what circumstances the blacklisting order can be passed, the Authority concerned is required to considerate to those principles before initiating a Show Cause Notice. It was categorically observed that if these principles are not kept in mind at the time of initiation of the blacklisting proceedings, the said exercise would be an empty formality. Paragraph Nos.27, 28, 29 and 30 being relevant are reproduced herein under:- “27. This Court in The Blue Dreamz Advertising Pvt. Ltd. v. Kolkata Municipal Corp., 2024 INSC 589 while quashing and set asiding the blacklisting order as affirmed by the High Court in almost identical facts observed as under:

1. In case there exists a genuine dispute between the parties based on the terms of the contract, blacklisting as a penalty cannot be imposed.

2. The penalty of blacklisting may only be imposed when it is necessary to safeguard the public interest from irresponsible or dishonest contractors, and

3. The Corporation being a statutory body, have a higher threshold to satisfy before passing such blacklisting order and therefore, the measures undertaken by it should be reasonable.

28. Again, the aforesaid decision of this Court was rendered in a case where the blacklisting order was already passed.

29. However, what is important for us to say is that when there are guiding principles explained by this Court as to when & in what circumstances a blacklisting order can be passed then, in our opinion such principles should also be borne in mind by the Authority at the time of issuing a show cause notice. We say so because in the facts of a given case like the one on hand, on the face of which it could be said that there was no good reason for the Authority to issue a show cause notice calling upon the contractor why he should not be blacklisted. Why ask the contractor to face the proceedings when applying the aforesaid principles, the issue of show cause notice would be an empty formality. We are saying all this keeping in mind the peculiar facts of this case.”

24. The proposition of law as settled by the Supreme Court if applied to the facts of the present case would show that there was no justification for the Respondent Authorities to even initiate the process of blacklisting not to speak of passing an order of blacklisting. The grounds on which the proceedings were initiated could not have been grounds for initiation of the process for blacklisting in as much as the contract in question stood concluded after completion of the supply and installation of the equipments and all payments were made. There was no justification of raking up the issue of non extension of the performance guarantee after the successful completion of the contract. In so far as deposit of a lesser amount of Rs.9,40,000/-, the issue stood settled upon the payment by the

Petitioner and acceptance of the Respondents of not only the amount but also the interest @ 18% as a penalty. The ground that follow up action was not taken by the Petitioner, in the opinion of this Court not only is beyond the contractual terms but also appears to be too belated in the facts and circumstances of the present case.

CONCLUSION

25. Accordingly the writ petition stands disposed of with the following observations and directions:-

(i) The impugned order dated 21.02.2023 issued by the Respondent No.5 is set aside and quashed.

(ii) During the course of the arguments, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondents had submitted that as the Petitioner alone had approached this Court, the blacklisting order dated 21.02.2023 should not be set aside qua the Original Equipment Manufacturer. The said submission, in the opinion of this Court, is completely misconceived, more particularly, when the Original Equipment Manufacturer was never put to notice and the allegations so made in the Show Cause Notice as well as in the impugned order do not relate to the Original Equipment Manufacturer. Under such circumstances, it is, therefore, the opinion of this Court that the impugned order dated 21.02.2023 qua the Original Equipment Manufacturer cannot also withstand the scrutiny of law for which the same also stands set aside qua the Original Equipment Manufacturer.

(iii) Interim order stands vacated.

(iv) No costs.

JUDGE Comparing Assistant Pradip Kumar Kalita Digitally signed by Pradip Kumar Kalita Date: 2026.08.01 15:21:29 +05'30'