WA/324/2023 of O.N.G.C. CONTRACTUAL LABOUR UNION Vs OIL AND NATURAL GAS CORPORATION LIMITED AND ANR. on 3 June 2026

1. The present intra-court appeals arise from the judgment and order of the learned single Judge, dismissing the common judgment dated 08.06.2023 passed in WP(C) 6045/2016 and WP(C) 1794/2022 dismissing the writ petitions instituted by the appellants Union and similarly situated contractual workers respectively, seeking a direction upon Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited, (here in after referred to as ONGC) to accord the benefit of an industrial award dated 25.09.2014, in the event of their future engagement, who had been disengaged prior to 01.04.2012.

2. The dispute has its genesis in an industrial reference, raised before the Central Government Industrial Tribunal, concerning the wages and service conditions of contractual labourers engaged in the operations of ONGC.

3. During the pendency of the reference, a settlement was arrived at between the management and the representative Union in the course of conciliation proceedings. The settlement culminated in an award dated 25.09.2014, passed by the Tribunal.

4. The settlement/award specifically provided that the benefit of job security would be available to contract workers, who had been engaged on 24.06.2008 and continued in engagement till the relevant date, as well as those engaged on 01.01.2011, who had continued till the date of settlement. The settlement further contemplated that whenever a contractor was replaced, the list of eligible workers would be made available to the incoming contractor for their engagement.

5. The grievance of the appellants is that a class of workers who were initially engaged before 24.06.2008 but ceased to be engaged before 01.04.2012 have been excluded from the benefit of future engagement.

6. According to the appellants, notwithstanding the terms of settlement, such workers are entitled to preferential consideration whenever fresh contractual engagements are made.

7. The learned single Judge declined the relief sought. The court held that a settlement, having been reached during conciliation proceedings and subsequently forming part of the award, was binding upon all concerned.

8. Assailing the judgment, Mr. A Dasgupta, learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, has submitted that the settlement ought to be interpreted in a manner that advances the objective of job security.

9. It has been urged that the concept of ‘principal employer’ under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, the ONGC herein, must protect the rights of contractual labourers and that the principal underlying section 25H of the Industrial Dispute Act should be extended to workers who had earlier rendered service in ONGC establishment through contractors. Reliance has also been placed on the circumstance that the number of workers presently covered by the settlement has substantially diminished, thereby justifying an equitable direction in favour of the appellants. On the other hand, Mr. GN Sahewalla, learned Senior counsel and Mr. S. Chakraborty, learned counsel, appearing for the ONGC, have supported the judgment under appeal WA No 324/2023 and WA 275/2024 respectively.

10. It has been submitted that settlement represents a negotiated resolution of an industrial dispute; that the settlement was reached through a conciliation; that the award merely incorporated the agreed terms; and that no relief inconsistent with those terms can be granted unless the settlement or award itself is successfully challenged.

11. It is further contended that section 25H has no application to contractual labourers, who do not come within the definition of a retrenched workman within the meaning of the statute.

12. The rival submissions now fall for consideration.

13. Industrial jurisprudence in India places significant emphasis on collective bargaining and negotiated settlements. The statutory framework recognises that industrial peace is often best achieved not through adjudication but through consensus. It is for this reason that settlements arrived at in the closure of conciliation proceedings are accorded a special status under section 18(3) of the Industrial Dispute Act.

14. Such settlements are not confined to signatories alone; they bind all persons falling within the ambit of the industrial dispute.

15. The Honourable Apex Court has consistently recognised that a settlement reached in conciliation proceedings acquires an extended and binding operation.

16. Thus, the rationale is self-evident. Once the parties to an industrial dispute negotiate and reach a mutually acceptable resolution, the law attributes finality to the outcome to preserve industrial harmony and certainty in labour relations.

17. The binding nature of such settlements cannot be diluted merely because, over time, a section of workers perceives the negotiated terms as inadequate.

18. In the present case, the settlement expressly confined the benefit of job security to those workers identified in numbers who satisfied the stipulated conditions of engagement and continuity. The cut-off dates were neither accidental nor incidental. They constituted an essential component of the bargaining reached between the parties.

19. A writ Court, in exercise of its power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, cannot ignore those stipulations and create an additional category of beneficiaries which the settlement itself does not contemplate. To do so would be to rewrite the settlement rather than interpret it. Significantly, neither the validity of the settlement nor the legality of the award has been challenged.

20. The appellants seek to derive rights under the settlement while simultaneously inviting the Court to enlarge its scope. Such a course is impermissible. If the grievance lies in the settlement, the remedy must be directed against the settlement itself. So long as it stands, the Court must give it effect as negotiated.

21. Equally unpersuasive is the reliance placed upon Section 25 H of the Industrial Dispute Act by the learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants.

22. The provision embodies a statutory preference in favour of retrenched

workmen when an employer proposes to fill vacancies. The provision operates within a distinct legal context and is predicated upon retrenchment.

23. The present proceeding does not arise from a case of retrenchment. More importantly, the invocation of section 25 H cannot be used as a vehicle to override the express terms of a settlement that has attained statutory finality.

24. The learned Senior counsel for the appellants has laid particular emphasis on the clause in the award providing that, in future contracts, the Award shall be applicable. It has been urged that once the settlement was required to be incorporated in future contracts, the appellants acquired an enforceable right to be considered for engagement wherever fresh engagements were undertaken.

25. We are unable to accept such a submission. The clause requiring the incorporation of the settlement into future contracts cannot be read in isolation but must be construed as a whole. The obligation to incorporate the settlement in future contracts was intended to ensure implementation of the rights and benefits created under the settlement.

26. It was not intended to enlarge the class of beneficiaries beyond those specifically identified therein. Thus, incorporation of settlement into future contractual engagements cannot be interpreted as creating an independent source of entitlement in favour of a person who admittedly falls outside the eligibility criteria.

27. At the same time, such a clause cannot be rendered negatively. Once such conditions are incorporated into future notices inviting tenders and into contractual arrangements, every workman engaged pursuant thereto would be governed by the contractual and statutory regime arising from the settlement. Therefore, while the appellants cannot claim a right to be treated as continuing beneficiaries of the settlement for the period during which they admittedly remain disengaged and outside its protective ambit, it is clarified that in the event any of the appellants are engaged afresh under any future contract in which settlement conditions have been incorporated, they shall be entitled to all benefits available thereunder from the date of such engagement but shall not confer any claim to continuity of service, notional benefits, back wages, seniority or any other retrospective advantage for the period preceding such fresh engagement.

28. For the reasons aforesaid, we find no infirmity in the judgment of the learned Single Judge warranting interference in the appeals.

29. The appeals are accordingly dismissed. Parties to bear their own cost.

JUDGE CHIEF JUSTICE Comparing Assistant