I.A.(Civil)/212/2026 of THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS Vs DIGANTA KALITA on 12 May 2026

ORDER

13.05.2026 (A.D. Choudhury, J)

1. We have heard Mr. P. Nayak, learned Additional Advocate General, Assam, assisted by Ms. P. Barua, learned Advocate for the applicants/appellants. Also heard Mr. J. Patowary, learned Advocate for the sole opposite party/respondent.

2. The present Interlocutory Application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is filed seeking condonation of the delay of 370 days in preferring the connected appeal against the Judgment and Order dated 22.08.2024 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in WP(C) No. 6827/2023.

3. The original writ petition arose out of an order of suspension dated 18.03.2023 issued against the respondent, who was serving as an Assistant Engineer under the Public Works Department (Roads).

4. The respondent had assailed the continuation of his suspension principally on the ground that, though the order of suspension had been issued on 18.03.2023 in contemplation of departmental and vigilance proceedings, the same was neither reviewed nor extended within the period prescribed in law.

5. The learned Single Judge, upon consideration of the materials placed on record, set aside the suspension order dated 18.03.2023 and directed reinstatement of the respondent in service.

6. The appellant State now seeks to challenge the aforesaid judgment after a delay of 370 days.

7. The explanation furnished in the application reveals that a copy of the judgment was admittedly received by the departmental authorities on 28.08.2024. Thereafter, on 24.09.2024, views of Judicial Departments were sought, and a response was received on 04.12.2024. Significantly, the Judicial Department, while advising compliance with the judgment and order dated 22.08.2024, merely kept open the option of filing an appeal.

8. The record further discloses that no substantive decision was taken thereafter. On the contrary, the matter appears to have remained dormant without compliance until notice was received in Contempt Case(C) No. 105/2025, arising out of the judgment under appeal.

9. It is only thereafter that, on 14.05.2025, according to the appellant, the Hon’ble Chief Minister opined for filing a writ appeal. Ultimately, on 14.05.2025, instructions were issued to approach the departmental counsel for filing the writ appeal.

10. The respondent/writ petitioner, in the affidavit-in-opposition, has specifically contended that the conduct of the applicants reflects gross negligence, deliberate inaction and conscious disregard of judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge. It has further been asserted that the applicants woke up from “deep slumber” only after the initiation of the contempt proceeding.

11. We find considerable substance in the said objection.

12. The fact remains that the order of the learned Single Judge has not yet been complied with.

13. The law governing condonation of delay is well settled. The expression “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be construed in a manner that defeats the discipline of limitation itself. Though some latitude may be permissible in matters of governmental decision-making, such indulgence cannot condone prolonged lethargy, unexplained inactivity, or bureaucratic indifference.

14. The explanation furnished by the applicant is conspicuously deficient in material particulars. There is virtually no explanation whatsoever regarding the steps taken between 04.12.2024, when the opinion of the Judicial Department was received and 10.03.2025, when notice in the contempt proceeding was served. Equally absent is any explanation as to why the matter was not processed with reasonable diligence within the prescribed period of limitation.

15. The applicants have not produced any contemporaneous materials demonstrating a continuous pursuit of the appellate remedy. What has been pleaded is merely a broad administrative narrative unsupported by particulars capable of constituting sufficient cause in law.

16. In the Supreme Court in The Chief Post Master General & Ors – Vs- Living Media India Ltd. and Anr., reported in (2012) 3 SCC 569, held in clear terms that the government does not enjoy a separate period of limitation and condonation cannot be claimed as an anticipated benefit merely because the applicant is the state.

17. In Maniben Devraj Shah –Vs- Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai reported in (2012) 5 SCC 157, it is reiterated that though some latitude may be shown to the state authorities, no premium can be granted for total lethargy or inaction.

18. Likewise, Shivamma (DEAD) by LRS – Vs - Karnataka Housing Board & Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 11794/2025), the Supreme Court emphasised that the liberal interpretation of “sufficient cause” cannot justify mechanical condonation, where negligence and absence of bona fide are apparent from the records.

19. Mr P. Nayak, learned Additional Advocate General, Assam, representing the applicants, has placed heavy reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Inder Singh – Vs- The State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in 2025 INSC 382.

20. We are unable to accept the contention that the said decision advances the applicants' case.

21. In Inder Singh (supra), the Supreme Court was dealing with a dispute involving government land and substantial public interest. The Court noticed that a part of the delay overlapped with proceedings in review.

22. Even while condoning the delay in Inder Singh, the Supreme Court cautioned that the State cannot seek condonation as a matter of right and further cautioned the State to exhibit promptitude in like matters in the future, failing which the Court may not be as liberal.

23. It is important to record that it cannot be presumed that the respondent officials were unaware of the principle of law as regards condonation of delay when the State is the appellant, and that they are unaware of the prescribed period of limitation. Despite that, they continued to be infected by administrative lethargy and laxity, which can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay.

24. Now coming back to reliance placed on Inder Singh (supra), the factual matrix in the present case stands on an entirely different footing.

25. Here, the Judicial Department itself had advised compliance with the judgment under appeal. The applicants remained inactive until contempt proceedings were initiated for implementation of the judgment. The decision to file an appeal was admittedly triggered only thereafter, and the order has still not been complied with.

26. Unlike Inder Singh (supra), the present case does not involve adjudication upon competing public claims over government interest or any issue of comparable public importance warranting relaxation of limitation principles in the larger public interest.

27. In the case in hand, the approach of the State and its officers, in our considered opinion, is nothing but a stereotypical explanation. The explanation given does not disclose any unavoidable circumstances or genuine difficulties; the concerned Department has not evinced diligence in prosecuting the matter.

28. In the aforesaid backdrop, we conclude that such conduct is nothing but administrative lethargy and laxity, which can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, especially when the State machinery is involved, as held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Shivamma

(DEAD) (supra).

29. Accordingly, the present interlocutory application stands dismissed.

JUDGE CHIEF JUSTICE Comparing Assistant