I.A.(Civil)/719/2026 of THE STATE OF ASSAM Vs SMTI RUPJOUTEY DAS ALIAS RUPJYOTI DAS BHUYAN on 28 April 2026

1. Heard Mr. R Borpujari, learned counsel for the applicant. Also heard Mr. I.H Saikia, learned counsel for the opposite party/respondent No. 1.

2. The present Interlocutory Application is filed seeking condonation of the delay of 844 days in filing the connected writ appeal against the judgment and order dated 05.10.2023 passed by a learned Single Judge in WP(C) No. 7131/2021.

3. The grounds of delay are explained in paragraph Nos. 3 to 11 of the instant application.

4. Canvassing for the applicants, Mr. Borpujari, learned counsel, contends that it is evident from the paragraph Nos. 3 to 11 that the delay in filing the connected appeal was result of necessary and unavoidable official procedure. It is further contended by Mr. Borpujari, learned counsel, that there was no deliberate and/or intentional lapse on the part of the officers, rather, the State was prevented by sufficient cause in filing the appeal within the prescribed period of limitation. Mr.

Borpujari, learned counsel also contends that a liberal approach may be adopted while condoning the delay, and this Court may not take too strict and pedantic stand which may result in injustice.

5. In support of his contentions, Mr. Borpujari, learned counsel for the applicant, places reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Collector of Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr –Vs- Mst. Katiji & Ors reported in [(1987) 2 SCC 107].

6. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the opposite parties/respondents relying on the determination made by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the Chief Post Master General & Ors –Vs- Living Media India Ltd and Anr., reported in [AIR 2012 SC 1506] contends that there is gross negligence on the part of the State authorities in approaching this Court within time and the causes shown at paragraph Nos. 3 to 11 cannot be termed as “sufficient cause” and therefore, such delay may not be condoned, inasmuch as, by now it is well settled that bureaucratic delay cannot be termed as “sufficient cause.”

7. We have given anxious consideration to the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties.

8. It is true that a certain amount of latitude, considering impersonal machinery and

inherited

bureaucratic methodology, is not impermissible; however, sufficient cause should be considered with pragmatism in a justice-oriented approach. It is by now well settled that Government may not be treated as any other private litigant, so far as it relates to condonation of delay, for the reason that the Government’s decision to present and prosecute appeal is not an individual but an institutional decision, which necessarily goes by the proverb “red-tape”, however, there are limits to the same.

9. From the materials available on record including the pleadings, it is clear that the applicants admittedly received a copy of the aforenoted judgment and order in due course. It is further clear on receipt of the aforesaid judgment and order, the appellants proceeded to comply with the order by initiating a proposal dated 28.11.2023. Such process continued till 19.03.2024. However, certain objections were raised by the Finance Department as regards implementation of the order and at this stage the respondents has decided to prefer the present appeal. It is on record that the finance department finally returned the file on 05.04.2024. Thereafter there were certain deliberation and the standing counsel was requested to prefer an appeal on 27.11.2025 and appeal was filed on 26.02.2026.

10. We will not hasten to record that the respondents has not been able to explain the delay from 19.03.2024, the date of resubmission of proposal pursuant to return of first proposal dated 28.11.2023 for implementation of the judgment and order in question. Further to that, there is no sufficient explanation as to what prevented the respondents from

05.04.2024 i.e., the date of the return of the proposal by the Finance Department till 27.11.2025 to hand over the file to the standing counsel for preferring an appeal. It is apposite to record here that the appeal was ultimately filed almost 2 months from such request.

11. In the case in hand, the approach of the State and its officers, in our considered opinion is nothing but stereotype explanation. The explanations given at paragraph Nos. 3 to 11 do not disclose any unavoidable circumstance and/or genuine difficulties, rather the person/persons of concerned Department have not evinced diligence in prosecuting the matter.

12. In the aforesaid backdrop, we conclude that, such conduct is nothing but administrative lethargy and laxity, which can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, especially when the State machinery is involved, as held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Shivamma (DEAD) by LRS Vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 11794/2025).

13. In our opinion, the Constitutional Court, in the given facts of the present case, should not bypass the procedure for State agencies that are lackadaisical in their approach.

14. In the backdrop of the explanation given, the argument on behalf of the State that the delay was due to unavoidable circumstances and for genuine difficulties does not find favour of this Court.

15. The facts detailed at paragraph Nos. 3 to 11, are nothing but a lack of diligence in prosecuting the matter and are lackadaisical in their approach. We also take note of the fact that the officers in the Department are well aware and/or conversant with the issues involved, including the prescribed period of limitation for filing a writ appeal.

16. The State cannot be allowed to take advantage of the leeway granted to the Government while condoning delay, only for the reason of bureaucratic delays, more particularly, in a case like the present one, where plausible and acceptable explanation is absent, inasmuch as, delay cannot be condoned mechanically, merely because the government or a wing of government is a party before us.

17. Accordingly, the present interlocutory application stands dismissed.

JUDGE CHIEF JUSTICE Comparing Assistant