I.A.(Civil)/170/2025 of Sh. R.K. Vanlalliana Vs Sh. Lalramnghaka and 7 Ors. on 9 March 2026

ORDER

10.03.2026

Heard Mr. K. Khamthianmanga, learned counsel for the applicant. Also heard Mr. Benjamin Lalthlamuana, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and Mrs. Linda L. Fambawl, learned Government Advocate for the State respondents.

2. The present application is filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 seeking condonation of the delay of 90 days in filing the connected Regular First Appeal against the impugned Judgment & Order dated 19.03.2025 passed by the learned Civil Judge(Sr. Division)-VI, Aizawl in Damage Suit No. 3/2015.

3. The connected Regular First Appeal having not been filed within the stipulated period of limitation, the present application has been filed seeking condonation of the delay that has arisen thereof.

4. Mr. K. Khamthianmanga, learned counsel for the applicant submits that the delay is unintentional and has arisen purely for reasons beyond the control of the applicant. He further submits that the applicant came to know of the impugned Judgment & Order dated 19.03.2025 only on 20.05.2025, when the same was furnished to him by his previous counsel. Thereafter, he took all the requisite steps to file the appeal. However, while doing so, a delay occurred.

5. Per contra, Mr. Benjamin Lalthlamuana, learned counsel for the respondents vehemently opposes the prayer for condonation primarily on the ground that the applicant has not furnished any proof regarding the alleged belated knowledge of the Judgment and Order passed by the Trial Court and has not provided a proper explanation for the inordinate delay that has occurred in preferring the connected Regular First Appeal.

6. I have given my anxious consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsels appearing for the contending parties and have perused the materials available on record, including the grounds urged in support of the condonation prayer.

7. It is settled law that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court. It is not the length of the delay that matters; rather, the acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. It is worthwhile to note that the Apex Court has emphasized in a catena of decisions that acceptance of the explanation of delay is the rule and rejection thereof is the exception. In other words, the power to condone delay is a positive discretion which the Court ordinarily exercises, so as not to foreclose a litigant from putting forth his cause, unless the explanation put forward smacks of malafide or indicates that the delay has been deliberate as part of a dilatory strategy.

8. In the present case, the grounds of delay pleaded in paragraph 3 of the condonation of application reads as under:- “(i) That the applicant came to know about the impugned order dt. 19.03.2025 after the same has been furnished to the applicant by her previous counsel on dt. 20.05.2025.

(ii) That immediately thereafter, the applicant who is highly aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned order verbally informed the Local Council and the YMA of Maubawk, Aizawl on dt. 23.05.2025. Both the bodies held discussions and decided to attempt reconciliation. Accordingly, on or about dt. 19.06.2025, they visited the respondent's residence to find a mutually acceptable way forward on behalf of the appellant. However, the respondents refused to compromise and insisted that they would proceed strictly as per the Court's order.

(iii) That having no other alternative, the applicant approached his previous counsel on dt. 23.06.2025 to seek advice. He was informed that if dissatisfied with the judgment, the only remedy was to file an appeal before this Hon'ble Court. He was further advised to engage another counsel who regularly practices before this Hon'ble Court.

(iv) That the applicant is a man of modest means, living in poverty and with limited knowledge of legal proceedings. Owing to his financial hardship, he could not promptly engage another counsel and remained hesitant for about one week.

(v) That still anxious to seek redress, the applicant again approached his earlier counsel on dt.03.07.2025, but was categorically informed that they do not formally appear before this Hon'ble Court, and once again advised to approach another counsel.

(vi) That thereafter, the appellant spent considerable time nearly seven weeks searching for a counsel who would understand his financial condition and agree to represent him. During this period, the applicant also had to travel to Chhingchhip, Mizoram on or about dt.05.08.2025 due to the unfortunate demise of his Aunt namely, Biakzami, and could returned home only on dt.11.08.2025.

(vii) That ultimately, the applicant was able to engage the present counsel on dt. 19.08.2025. Immediately thereafter, the present counsel took immediate steps in studying the case and collecting documents.

(viii) That application for certified true copy of the impugned order dt. 19.03.2025 was submitted on dt. 20.08.2025 and the same was furnished to the present counsel on dt.27.08.2025 which is actually after 7 days from the date of application.

(ix) That as the certified impugned Judgment and Order dated 19.03.2025 runs into more than 125 pages, sufficient time for careful study and scrutiny is therefore required. Consequently, about 20 days were consumed in the process of study, scrutiny, drafting of the appeal petition and preparation of the present application from the date of obtaining the certified copy of the impugned order, i.e., on 27.08.2025.

Hence, reckoning from the last date of limitation for filing the appeal, i.e., 17.06.2025, up to the date of filing of the appeal petition along with this application, there has occurred a delay of 90 days.”

9. On a reading of the aforesaid explanation, it is apparent that the delay has primarily occurred due to the lack of knowledge of the impugned Judgment, which was communicated to the applicant by his previously engaged counsel after several days. It is further observed that after coming to know of the impugned Judgment, the applicant took necessary steps to challenge the same.

10. Undoubtedly, while doing so there may have been some lapse on the part of the applicant. However, it cannot be overlooked that in every case of delay, there may be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned, and that alone cannot be sufficient to reject his plea and shut the doors of justice against him.

11. Having perused the explanation, I am of the considered view that the delay is neither deliberate nor intentional. Instead, the explanation appears reasonable, sufficient and bonafide. That being so, the delay of 90 days in filing the connected Regular First Appeal stands condoned.

12. The

IA

stands

allowed

and

disposed

of.

JUDGE Comparing Assistant