Debts Recovery Tribunals and Appellate Tribunals
HIMANSHU AGARWAL vs STATE BANK OF INDIA on 21 June 2025
**Debts Recovery Tribunal-III, Delhi**
**NDN (Appeal) 83/2025**
**In TA No. 291/2022**
**Himanshu Agarwal vs State Bank of India**
21.06.2025
Item no. 05
Present: Mr. Shekhar Garg for appellant
Mr. Bheem Sain Jain for respondent
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1. 1. Matter taken up by this tribunal through hybrid mode.
2. 2. I heard Ld. counsel for both the parties on the point of maintainability of present appeal.
3. 3. The Appellant has preferred the present appeal challenging the order dated 09.05.2025 passed by the Learned Recovery Officer in relation to the auction sale of the property belonging to the Appellant. The notice for auction was issued on 13.05.2025, fixing the auction date as 20.06.2025.
4. 4. The Appellant, through its learned counsel, has submitted that the impugned order and notice have been issued without jurisdiction. It is further contended that the Appellant had already fulfilled its obligations under the loan transaction by making ECGC premium payments on behalf of the Bank, and therefore the present action of the Respondent amounts to double recovery. The Appellant has also asserted that its liability had already been extinguished upon approval of a resolution plan, and therefore, the proceedings initiated by the Recovery Officer are without authority. Further, it is contended that the principles of natural justice were violated, as the Appellant was not granted an opportunity of hearing before the sale proceedings were initiated.
5. 5. On the other hand, the Learned Counsel for the Respondent Bank has raised a preliminary objection on the ground of maintainability of the present appeal. It is submitted that:
1. a) The impugned order was passed on 09.05.2025, whereas the present appeal has been filed on 18.06.2025, clearly beyond the statutory period of 30 days prescribed under Section 30(1) of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993;
2. b) There is no provision under the Act empowering the Tribunal to condone delay in filing an appeal against the order of the Recovery Officer; Sd- Sd-
- c) The Appellant has also failed to deposit 50% of the amount of debt due, as mandated by the Proviso to Section 30A of the RDDDBFI Act 1993, which is a mandatory pre-condition for the entertainment of such appeal;
- d) The plea of discharge under the resolution plan is not substantiated with any implementation proof or discharge certificate;
- e) The Recovery Officer has acted well within his jurisdiction, and the auction has been conducted in accordance with the due process prescribed under the Recovery Procedure Rules.
6. Having considered the submissions made on behalf of Ld. counsel for both the parties and perusal of records, the primary question before this Tribunal is whether the present appeal is maintainable in law, particularly in view of the statutory time limitation and the absence of condonation powers with the Tribunal under Section 30 of the RDB Act, 1993.
7. So far as, section 30(1) of the RDDDBFI Act, 1993 permits an aggrieved person to file an appeal against the order of the Recovery Officer within 30 days from the date of such order. The statute does not confer any power on the Tribunal to condone delay beyond the said period. Unlike certain other provisions under procedural laws, no enabling provision or discretion is available under Section 30 to extend the limitation period. In the present case, the impugned order was passed on 09.05.2025, and the appeal has been filed only on 18.06.2025, i.e., after a delay of 40 days. Judicial precedents have consistently held that in the absence of express legislative mandate, no authority can assume jurisdiction to condone delay where the statute is silent.
8. Further, the Appellant has also failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of depositing 50% of the debt due, as mandated by Section 30A. The appeal, therefore, is liable to be rejected on this ground as well. Although not necessary to examine the merits in light of the above findings, it is nevertheless observed that the Appellant's contention regarding ECGC payments or discharge under resolution plan remains unsubstantiated by any conclusive documentation. The Recovery Officer is statutorily empowered under the Second Schedule of the Income Tax Act, as made applicable, to initiate recovery and sale of secured assets, and there is no prima facie illegality or lack of jurisdiction reflected in the impugned order.
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9. In light of above discussion, this Tribunal, having carefully considered the submissions of both sides and the record, is of the considered view that the present appeal is barred by limitation and no power exists under Section 30 of the RDDBFI Act to condone the same, the appeal is also not maintainable for failure to deposit 50% of the debt due, as required by the statute under section 30A of the RDDBFI Act. No jurisdictional error is shown to have been committed by the Recovery Officer in issuing the impugned auction order. Accordingly, the appeal stands dismissed as **not maintainable**.
10. File consigned into record room.
21.06.2025
(SD- (SHIV KUMAR - I) PRESIDING OFFICER, DRT-III, DELHI
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