RSA/132/2026 of KARNAIL SINGH Vs ASHOK KUMAR on 27 July 2026

1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for decree of possession by way of specific performance of agreement to sell, as prayed? OPP

2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the alternative relief of recovery of Rs.90,000/-, as principal including interest and damages? OPP

3. Whether the present suit is not maintainable, as alleged? OPD

4. Whether the plaintiff has no locus standi to file the present suit? OPD

5. Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action to file the present suit? OPD

6. Whether the plaintiff is estopped to file the present suit by his own act and conduct, as alleged? OPD

7. Whether the present suit is not properly valued for the purpose of Court fees and jurisdiction? OPD

8. Relief.

9. The learned Senior Civil Judge, Una, directed the respective parties to adduce evidence in support of their contentions and vide its impugned judgment and decree dated 15.12.2020, decreed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for specific performance of the agreement dated 10.12.2003 and the defendant was directed to execute the sale deed in respect of the land measuring 0.01.28 hectares, being 639/9590 share out of the land measuring 0.19.18 hectares, comprised in Khewat No. 207, Khatauni No. 305 and Khasra No. 222, as entered in the Jamabandi for the year 2005-06, situated in Village Malahat, Tehsil and District Una, in favour of the plaintiff after receiving the balance sale consideration of Rs.5,000/-. Further, the learned trial Court directed the plaintiff to deposit the balance sale consideration of Rs.5,000/- within 60 days from the passing of the judgment.

10. Feeling dissatisfied, the defendant filed an appeal under Section 96 of the CPC in the Court of the learned Additional District Judge-I, Una, on 27.01.2021.

11. The learned first appellate Court, vide its impugned judgment and decree dated 28.07.2023, dismissed the appeal filed by the defendant and affirmed the findings as returned by the learned trial Court.

12. Feeling aggrieved, the defendant has approached this Court by instituting the present regular second appeal, invoking the provisions of Section 100 of the CPC.

13. It is contended by Mr. Ashwani Kaundal, learned counsel for the appellant/defendant, that the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the learned Courts below are erroneous and liable to be quashed and set aside. He submits that the learned Courts below have erred in decreeing the suit filed by the plaintiff, as there is no material placed on record to establish and substantiate that any agreement to sell was entered into between the parties. He further submits that after allowing the present appeal, the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent deserves to be dismissed.

14. On the other hand, Mr. Divya Raj Singh, learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff, has defended the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the learned Courts below. He submits that the learned Courts below have passed well-reasoned judgments and decrees and this Court should not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact returned by the learned Courts below.

15. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record carefully.

16. With the consent of the parties, the appeal is finally heard at the admission stage on the following substantial question of law: Whether the impugned judgments and decrees of both the Courts below are vitiated on account of misconstruing and misinterpreting the oral as well as documentary evidence?

17. In the present case, the plaintiff-respondent has filed a suit for specific performance of the agreement and in the alternative, sought recovery of Rs.90,000/- as principal including interest etc. It is the case of the plaintiff that both parties entered into an agreement to sell dated 10.12.2003, which was reduced into writing and the terms and conditions were stipulated therein. It is the case of the plaintiff that the defendant received a sum of Rs.40,000/- in cash as earnest money, being part of the sale consideration, in the presence of witnesses.

18. As per the plaintiff, due to domestic problems, the defendant could not execute the sale deed, therefore, he received a sum of Rs.5,000/- in cash on 04.12.2006, acknowledged the same, and agreed to execute the sale deed on or before 31.03.2007 after the receipt of the balance sale consideration amount. Though the defendant was requested to execute the sale deed on various occasions, but on one pretext or the other, he failed to do so for reasons best known to him. Therefore, the plaintiff sought a decree for specific performance of the contract dated 10.12.2003 and 04.12.2006 in his favour and against the defendant.

19. The defendant has set up a case of total denial. The defendant has denied everything, including the execution of the agreement and the receipt of the sale consideration amount. A defence has been tried to be projected that the plaintiff and the defendant were running a business in the year 2003 in partnership, and for that purpose, a number of documents were signed by each other for establishing the business. It is the case of the defendant that the plaintiff had fabricated and manipulated the documents and signatures on blank papers were obtained by him. The defendant in his written statement has denied each and every averment of the plaint.

20. In order to establish his case, the plaintiff examined PW-1 Vijay Puri, who is the scribe of agreement Ext. PW-1/A. In his deposition, he stated that he remained Vice President of the Municipal Council and in 2003, he was holding the charge of Vice President. He stated that the agreement to sell Ext. PW-1/A was written by him on the asking of Shri Karnail Singh. The agreement was written in favour of the plaintiff/respondent. He stated that at the time of the execution of the agreement, the parties as well as the witnesses were present. He stated that the said document was read over and explained to the parties and the witnesses and thereafter, each person appended their signatures on the same.

21. In his cross-examination, he stated that it is correct that whatever documents he prepares, the same are incorporated in his register. He stated that Ext.PW-1/A was not incorporated in his

register. He stated that he is not on talking terms with Karnail Singh. He denied that he was making a false statement.

22. The plaintiff/respondent Ashok Kumar filed his affidavit, whereby he reiterated all the averments as made in the plaint. He stated that the parties, including the plaintiff and the defendant, entered into an agreement to sell the land measuring 0.01.28 hectares and that the defendant is the owner of the suit land. He stated that the agreement was entered into between the parties on 10.12.2003 and was prepared in favour of the plaintiff. He stated that the agreement was prepared by the defendant through Shri Vijay Puri, the petition writer. At the time of preparation of agreement, the witnesses Jagdish Ram and Kehar Singh were also present on the spot. After writing the said document, it was read over and explained to the parties and the witnesses present. The parties, after hearing the same, found the agreement to be correct and thereafter, they appended their signatures. The plaintiff stated that the defendant received a sum of Rs.40,000/- in the presence of the witnesses and that the amount was paid to the defendant in cash.

23. As per the plaintiff, the defendant could not execute the sale deed, therefore, on 04.12.2006, he received an additional amount of Rs.5,000/- and appended his endorsement with his own hand in the presence of the parties as well as the witness, namely Shri Jagdish

Ram. He stated that he is ready and willing to execute the sale deed and pay the balance sale consideration to the defendant.

24. In cross-examination, the defendant could not extract anything favourable to his case.

25. PW-3 is Shri Jagdish Ram, who in his deposition stated that an agreement was entered into on 10.12.2003 and the same was prepared in favour of Ashok Kumar, plaintiff. The said agreement was scribed by Shri Vijay Puri, PW-1. He stated that the agreement to sell Ext. PW-1/A was prepared in the presence of the parties and the witnesses. After writing the same, Vijay Puri, petition writer, read over the contents of the agreement to the parties and the witnesses and after accepting the same to be true and correct, the parties appended their signatures. He stated that the defendant was paid a sum of Rs.40,000/- in the presence of the witnesses. Thereafter, on 04.12.2006, a sum of Rs.5,000/- was paid to the defendant, as a result of which old agreement Ext. PW-1/A was extended. He stated that his signatures are encircled on Ext. PW-2/A.

26. In order to rebut the evidence led by the plaintiff, defendant Karnail Singh filed his affidavit Ext. DW-1/A. In the affidavit, he stated that he never executed any agreement to sell on 10.12.2003 in favour of the plaintiff. He stated that he never received a sum of Rs.40,000/- as earnest money from the plaintiff to sell the suit land. He stated that he never received a further sum of Rs.5,000/- from the plaintiff. As per the defendant, in 2003, the parties were in partnership and in good faith, he had appended his signatures on the documents, which were meant only for business purposes. He stated that the plaintiff is a very clever person and in league with the witnesses and the petition writer, he obtained the agreement to sell dated 10.12.2003 and 04.12.2006 in his favour in order to grab the suit land owned by him. Finally, he stated that he has neither executed the agreement to sell dated 10.12.2003 and 04.12.2006 nor received any sale consideration amount from the plaintiff.

27. In cross-examination, he stated that he works with a contractor and has been working there for more than 9 years. Prior to that, he used to work at Village Malahat by preparing the trunks. He stated that the name of his firm was Mahadev Steel Industry. The other partner of the firm was Mahender Pal, who belonged to Village Hulka Raipur. He stated that they worked together for about 4 to 5 years and during this period, they never associated any third partner. He admitted that the signatures appended on the amended written statement Mark E were signed by him. He admitted that his signatures on agreement Ext. PW-1/A as Mark G and Mark H are in his hand. He further admitted that the endorsement Ext.PW-2/A also contains his signatures as Mark I. He denied that he executed the agreement to sell dated 10.12.2003, received a sum of Rs.5,000/- on 04.12.2006, and appended his signatures on Ext. PW-2/A. He admitted that on Ext.

PW-2/A, he had appended his signatures in Hindi as Mark J. Self- stated that the same was not written by him.

28. A perusal of document Ext. PW-1/A reveals that the parties entered into an agreement on 10.12.2003 for the sale of the suit land for a total sale consideration amount of Rs.50,000/-. The said agreement was signed by the plaintiff, the defendant and the witnesses, namely Shri Jagdish Ram and Shri Kehar Singh. On agreement Ext.PW-1/A, an endorsement was made by the parties whereby the time was extended for the execution of the sale deed and it was agreed inter se the parties that the sale deed shall be executed on or before 31.03.2007. In the said endorsement, the defendant agreed that earlier he had received a sum of Rs.40,000/- and that on 04.12.2006, he further received an additional amount of Rs.5,000/- from the plaintiff. The said endorsement was duly signed by the parties, i.e., the plaintiff and the defendant.

29. A perusal of the document, in conjunction with the oral evidence led by the parties, clearly establishes and proves the due execution of agreement Ext. PW-1/A and endorsement Ext.PW-2/A.

30. In the present case, though it has been tried to be projected by the defendant that neither an agreement to sell was entered into between the parties nor he received any amount from the plaintiff, but in the written statement there is a total denial with respect to the case filed by the plaintiff. However, in cross-examination while entering the witness box, the defendant admitted that he appended his signatures on documents Ext. PW-1/A and Ext.PW-2/A. The defendant admitted his signatures on the said documents; however, the contents of the same were denied by him.

31. The petition writer (PW-1) and the marginal witness of the document (Shri Jagdish Ram, PW-3) have duly proved execution and the contents of the document, specifically stating that the document was prepared in favour of the plaintiff and both parties appended their signatures after admitting the contents of the agreement to be true and correct. Ext. PW-2/A clearly demonstrates that the defendant had duly acknowledged that earlier he had received a sum of Rs.40,000/- from the plaintiff and on 04.12.2006, he received an additional amount of Rs.5,000/- from the plaintiff. The signatures duly prove the case of the plaintiff and the execution of agreement Ext.PW-1/A and Ext.PW-2/A.

32. The learned Courts below have returned findings of fact with respect to the execution of the agreement to sell after appreciating the oral as well as documentary evidence placed on record. The Courts below rightly came to the conclusion that the plaintiff has been able to establish his case for the grant of decree of specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 10.12.2003 and 04.12.2006.

33. The learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to convince this Court as to why the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below are erroneous or suffer from any perversity. The Courts below have returned findings of fact which, in the considered opinion of this Court, require no interference, especially while invoking the provisions of Section 100 of the CPC.

34. The Hon’ble Apex Court has repeatedly held that the scope of interference while exercising power under Section 100 of the CPC is very limited and narrow, unless the aggrieved party is able to establish that the judgments and decrees passed by the learned Courts below suffer from perversity, but that is not the case in hand.

35. Reference in this regard is made to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Navaneethammal vs. Arjuna Chetty AIR 1996 SC 3521, wherein it has been held as under: “10. This Court, time without number, pointed out that interference with the concurrent findings of the courts below by the High Court under Section 100 CPC must be avoided unless warranted by compelling reasons. In any case, the High Court is not expected to re-appreciating the evidence just to replace the findings for the lower courts.

20. In our considered view the lower Appellate Court has fairly appreciated the evidence in the above background and has reached the conclusion that the suit was not barred by Limitation. Even assuming that another view is possible on a re-appreciation of the same evidence, that should not have been done by the High Court as it cannot be said that the view taken by the First Appellate Court was based on no material.”

36. Similarly, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Kshitish Chandra Purkait vs. Santosh Kumar Purkait and others (1997) 5 SCC 438 has held as under: “10. We would only add that (a) it is the duty cast upon the High Court to formulate the substantial question of law involved in the case even at the initial stage; and (b) that in (exceptional) cases, at a later point of time, when the Court exercises its jurisdiction under the proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 100 C.P.C in formulating the substantial question of law, the opposite party should be put on notice thereon and should be given a fair or proper opportunity to meet the point. Proceeding to hear the appeal without formulating the substantial question of law involved in the appeal is illegal and is an abnegation or abdication of the duty cast on Court; and even after the formulation of the substantial question of law, if a fair or proper opportunity is not afforded to the opposite side, it will amount to denial of natural justice. The above parameters within which the High Court has to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC should always be borne in mind. We are sorry to state that the above aspects are seldom borne in mind in many cases and second appeals are entertained and/or disposed of, without conforming to the above discipline.

11. The guidelines to determine as to what is a "substantial question of law" within the meaning of Section 100 CPC, have been laid down by this Court in a Constitution Bench decision in Chunilal V. Mehta and Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. and Mfg. Co. Ltd. There is also a later decision of this Court in Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India3. It is unnecessary to deal at length with that aspect any further.”

37. In Kondiba Dagadu Kadam vs. Savitribai Sopan Gujar and others, AIR 1999 SC 2213, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “5. It is not within the domain of the High court to investigate the grounds on which the findings were arrived at, by the last court of fact, being the first appellate Court. It is true that the lower appellate Court should not ordinarily reject witnesses accepted by the trial court, in respect of credibility but even where it has rejected the witnesses accepted by the trial Court, the same is no ground for interference in second appeal when it is found that the appellate Court has given satisfactory reasons for doing so. In a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences are possible, one drawn by the lower appellate court is binding on the High Court in second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not permissible. The High Court cannot substitute its opinion for the opinion of the first appellate Court unless it is found that the conclusions drawn by the lower appellate Court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable or its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by the apex Court, or was based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence.”

38. In Naresh and others vs. Hemant and others, (2022) 18 SCC 802, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:

“10. The High Court invoked the presumption without proper consideration and appreciation of the facts considered and dealt with by two courts holding by reasoned conclusions why the presumption stood rebutted on the facts. The High Court also committed an error of record by holding that there was no evidence that Trimbakrao Ingole alone had constructed the house, a finding patently contrary to the admission of PW-1 in his evidence. The fact that mutation also was done in the name of Trimbakrao Ingole alone which remain unchallenged at any time was also not noticed. The conclusion of the High Court that improper appreciation of evidence amounted to perversity is completely unsustainable. No finding has been arrived at that any evidence had been admitted contrary to the law or that a finding was based on no evidence only in which circumstance the High Court could have interfered in the second appeal.

2. The High Court therefore manifestly erred by interfering with the concurrent findings on facts by two courts below in exercise of powers under Section 100, Civil Procedure Code, a jurisdiction confined to substantial questions of law only. Merely because the High Court may have been of the opinion that the inferences and conclusions on the evidence were erroneous, and that another conclusion to its satisfaction could be drawn, cannot be justification for the High Court to have interfered.

12. In Madamanchi Ramappa v. Muthaluru Bojappa, (1964) 2 SCR 673, this court with regard to the scope for interference in a second appeal with facts under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code observed as follows: “12. ….The admissibility of evidence is no doubt a point of law, but once it is shown that the evidence on which courts of fact have acted was admissible and relevant, it is not open to a party feeling aggrieved by the findings recorded by the courts of fact to contend before the High Court in second appeal that the said evidence is not sufficient to justify the findings of fact in question. It has been always recognised that the sufficiency or adequacy of evidence to support a finding of fact is a matter for decision of the court of facts and cannot be agitated in a second appeal. Sometimes, this position is expressed by saying that like all questions of fact, sufficiency or adequacy of evidence in support of a case is also left to the jury for its verdict. This position has always been accepted without dissent and it can be stated without any doubt that it enunciates what can be properly characterised as an elementary proposition. Therefore, whenever this Court is satisfied that in dealing with a second appeal, the High Court has, either unwittingly and in a casual manner, or deliberately as in this case, contravened the limits prescribed by s. 100, it becomes the duty of this Court to intervene and give effect to the said provisions. It may be that in some cases, the High Court dealing with the second appeal is inclined to take the view that what it regards to be justice or equity of the case has not been served by the findings of fact recorded by courts of fact; but on such occasions it is necessary to remember that what is administered in courts is justice according to law and considerations of fair play and equity however important they may be, must yield to clear and express provisions of the law. If in reaching its decisions in second appeals, the High Court contravenes the express provisions of section 100, it would inevitably introduce in such decisions an element of disconcerting unpredictability which is usually associated with gambling; and that is a reproach which judicial process must constantly and scrupulously endeavour to avoid.”

13. Though precedents abound on this settled principle of law, we do not consider it necessary to burden our discussion unnecessarily except to rely further on Gurdev Kaur v. Kaki, (2007) 1 SCC 546, holding as follows: “71. The fact that, in a series of cases, this Court was compelled to interfere was because the true legislative intendment and scope of Section 100 CPC have neither been appreciated nor applied. A class of judges while administering law honestly believe that, if they are satisfied that, in any second appeal brought before them evidence has been grossly misappreciated either by the lower appellate court or by both the courts below, it is their duty to interfere, because they seem to feel that a decree following upon a gross misappreciation of evidence involves injustice and it is the duty of the High Court to redress such injustice. We would like to reiterate that the justice has to be administered in accordance with law. xxxx

73. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as early as in 1890 stated that there is no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of an erroneous finding of fact, however gross or inexcusable the error may seem to be, and they added a note of warning that no court in India has power to add to, or enlarge, the grounds specified in Section

100. xxxx

81. Despite repeated declarations of law by the judgments of this Court and the Privy Council for over a century, still the scope of Section 100 has not been correctly appreciated and applied by the High Courts in a large number of cases. In the facts and circumstances of this case the High Court interfered with the pure findings of fact even after the amendment of Section 100 CPC in 1976. The High Court would not have been justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact in this case even prior to the amendment of Section 100 CPC. The judgment of the High Court is clearly against the provisions of Section 100 and in no uncertain terms clearly violates the legislative intention.

82. In view of the clear legislative mandate crystallised by a series of judgments of the Privy Council and this Court ranging from 1890 to 2006, the High Court in law could not have interfered with pure findings of facts arrived at by the courts below. Consequently, the impugned judgment is set aside and this appeal is allowed with costs.”

14. The order of the High Court interfering with concurrent findings of facts by two courts is, therefore, held to be unsustainable in exercise of the powers under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. The order of the High Court is consequently set aside. The orders dated 06.03.1998 and 13.06.2002 of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court are restored. The suit of the plaintiffs is dismissed. The present appeal is allowed.”

39..

In Brij Narayan Shukla (dead) through legal representatives vs. Sudesh Kumar Alias Suresh Kumar (dead) through Legal Representatives and others, (2024) 2 SCC 590, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “10.2 The High Court was hearing the Second Appeal under section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and it having reappreciated the findings to disturb findings of fact, committed an error.”

40. In Civil Appeal No.5131 of 2025, titled as R. Nagaraj (dead) through LRs and another vs. Rajmani and others, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “7. By the impugned judgment and order and without answering anything on the substantial questions of law framed/formulated, absolutely in a casual manner, the High Court has allowed the Second Appeal and has set aside the concurrent findings recorded by both the courts below and thereafter has remanded the matter to the learned trial Court permitting the original plaintiff to amend the plaint and pray for fixation of the boundary.

9. Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties and having gone through the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court, we are constrained to observe that the manner in which the High Court has dealt with the Second Appeal under Section 100 of the CPC is not appreciable at all. From the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court has exercised the powers as if the High Court was deciding the Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The High Court has not appreciated at all that the High Court was deciding the Second Appeal under Section 100 of the CPC and that too against the concurrent findings of fact by both the courts below, which were, as such, on appreciation of evidence on record. Under the circumstances, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is unsustainable.11. At the cost of repetition, it is observed that the High Court was dealing with the Second Appeal under Section 100 CPC and the concurrent findings recorded by both the courts below which were on appreciation of evidence on record. Neither at the stage of deciding the suit nor even before the first Appellate Court even such a prayer was made to amend the plaint, which is now permitted by the High Court, despite the fact that earlier in the suit during the course of trial, the plaint was amended. Under the circumstances also, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is unsustainable.”

41. No other point urged by the learned counsel for the parties.

42. The substantial question of law is answered accordingly.

43. In view of the concurrent, specific findings returned by the learned courts below, which were arrived at after appreciating the entire oral as well as documentary evidence placed on record, the suit filed by the plaintiff was rightly decreed and subsequently the said

findings were affirmed by the learned first appellate Court. This Court finds no illegality, perversity, or jurisdictional error in the same.

44. Consequently, in view of the observations made hereinabove, the present appeal deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed along with any pending application(s).

(Romesh Verma)

Judge 27th July, 2026

(vt)