CMPMO/208/2026 of RAJ KUMAR AND ANOTHER Vs GURBAX SINGH AND ANOTHER on 16 July 2026

2026:HHC:29299 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH SHIMLA

CMPMO No. 208/2026

Reserved on: 01.07.2026

Decided on: 16.07.2026

Raj Kumar & anr.

…..Petitioners

Versus

Gurbax Singh & anr.

…Respondents ________________________________________________________________

Coram:

The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Romesh Verma, Judge.

Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes For the Petitioners: Mr. Rajneesh K. Lal, Advocate.

For the Respondents: Mr. Brijeshwar Singh Kanwar, Mr. Namit Gautam & Mr. Gaurav Sharma, Advocates.

Romesh Verma, Judge

The instant petition arises out of order, dated 02.08.2025, as passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Amb, District Una, H.P., whereby an application filed by the defendants/petitioners under Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, has been rejected.

The facts, as emerge in the instant case, are that on 30.5.2014 the plaintiffs/respondents filed a suit before the learned trial court for permanent prohibitory injunction 1Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

restraining the defendants, through their family members and agents from raising any sort of construction, taking forcible possession, changing the nature, interfering in any manner and causing damage to the abadi of the plaintiffs and encroaching upon the land measuring 0-03-36 hects on the ground that the defendants have got no right, title or interest whatsoever in the suit land. The defendants, who are clever, quarrelsome and strong headed persons, started threatening the plaintiffs to raise construction, take forcible possession and change nature by causing damage to the suit land. The plaintiffs, who are old aged persons, requested the defendants to restrain from doing illegal acts, however they failed to accede to the request as made by the plaintiffs. Hence, the suit.

The suit was contested by the defendants by filing written statement, wherein preliminary objections with respect to maintainability, estoppel, suppression of material facts, cause of action, limitation etc. were raised. On merits, it was averred that the plaintiffs have got no right, title or interest over the suit land and false and frivolous suit has been instituted against the defendants. All the averments as made in the plaint were refuted and denied. The defendants prayed for dismissal of the suit, as filed by the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs filed replication to the written statement filed by the defendants by reiterating all the averments as made in the plaint.

The defendants filed amended written statement on 25.10.2019. During the pendency of the suit, the defendants/petitioners filed an application under Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act read with Section 151 CPC seeking permission to recall the witness and prove the execution of Khangi compromise, dated 23.03.2016, executed inter se the parties by way of secondary evidence. It was averred in the application that during the pendency of the suit, the plaintiffs/respondents filed an application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC for amendment of the of the plaint and alleged that in the month of June 2015, the defendants encroached upon some part of the suit land, but thereafter Local Commissioner/revenue expert was appointed by the learned trial court and the Local Commissioner, after visiting the spot and verifying actual position of the spot found that there was no encroachment at the spot on the part of the defendants. The Local Commissioner fixed the boundary in presence of the parties as well as the witnesses and Khangi compromise to this effect was executed, between the parties in the presence of the marginal witnesses in respect of the suit land, whereby the civil suit was agreed to be withdrawn by the plaintiffs/respondents from the Court. As per the case set up by the defendants/ petitioners, during evidence of the plaintiffs/respondents, they admitted the signature upon the Khangi compromise i.e. Mark B, but they did not admit the contents of the Khangi compromise and thus, the plaintiffs/respondents concealed the true facts from the Court.

It was further averred in the application that during cross-examination

of the plaintiffs/respondents, certain revelation was made on account of recent discoveries pertaining to Khangi compromise and the plaintiffs/respondents did not admit the contents of the Khangi compromise, dated 23.03.2016 and did not withdraw the civil suit. The defendants/petitioners advertently did not file an application earlier under the impression that during of the plaintiffs/respondents they would admit contents of Khangi Compromise. Therefore, it was prayed that the application may be allowed and the defendants/petitioners may be granted permission to recall the witness and prove the Khangi compromise dated 23.3.2016 executed between the parties by way of secondary evidence.

The said application came to be contested by the plaintiffs/respondents by filing reply, wherein preliminary objection qua maintainability of the application was raised. It was specifically stated that the defendants have not given any notice under Section 66 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 prior to the filling of the present application, therefore, the application in hand deserves to be dismissed on this sole ground. It was further stated that since the defendants have alleged that the original Khangi compromise dated 23.03.2016 is in the possession of the plaintiffs, then the notice under Section 66 of the Indian Evidence Act was necessary when the original is shown to be in possession of the person against whom the document is sought to be proved.

It was also averred that it is settled proposition of law that no witness can be sought to be recalled, as it amounts to filling up the lacuna, which is not permissible under the law. Further cross-examination of the witnesses already cross- examined cannot be permitted to fill up the lacunae left in the case. The defendants in the application have admitted that the alleged document i.e. Khangi Compromise, dated 23.03.2016 was put to the witnesses during the cross-examination, therefore, the witnesses cannot be recalled for the purpose of proving the alleged Khangi Compromise.

In para 6 of the preliminary objections of the reply to the application, it has been specifically stated that the defendants while filing the amended written statement on

25.10.2019 have nowhere pleaded the factum of the alleged Khangi Compromise dated 23.03.2016 and therefore no evidence beyond the pleadings can be permitted to be led.

The learned trial court vide its order dated 02.08.2025 dismissed the application as filed by the defendants/petitioners.

Feeling dissatisfied, the defendants/petitioners have approached this Court challenging the impugned order by filing petition under article 227 of the Constitution of India.

It is contended by Mr. Rajneesh K. Lal, learned counsel for the petitioners/defendants that the impugned order, as passed by the learned trial court, is erroneous and liable to be quashed and set aside. He submits that the learned trial court has not appreciated the point in controversy and has wrongly dismissed the application filed by the defendants for leading secondary evidence.

On the other hand, Mr. Brijeshwar Singh Kanwar, learned counsel for the plaintiffs/respondents has defended the impugned order. He has stated that there is no illegality or perversity in the impugned order as passed by the learned trial court, therefore, the present petition deserves to be dismissed. He has submitted that this Court while exercising powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India will not interfere with the well reasoned order of the learned trial court. He has further submitted that no case is made out under Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act, therefore, application has rightly been rejected by the learned trial court.

I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the material available on record.

It is case of the defendants/petitioners that during the pendency of the suit, the plaintiffs/respondents filed an application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC for the amendment of the plaint and alleged that in the month of June 2015, the defendants encroached upon some part of the suit land, but thereafter Local Commissioner/Revenue Expert was appointed by the learned trial Court. The Local Commissioner after visiting the spot and verifying actual position of the spot found that there was no encroachment at the spot and fixed the boundary in the presence of the respective parties and Khangi compromise to this effect in respect of the suit land was executed inter se the parties in the presence of the marginal witnesses and as per the compromise, the civil suit was required to be withdrawn by the plaintiffs/respondents from the Court.

As per the case set up by the defendants/ petitioners, during evidence of the plaintiffs/respondents, they admitted signature over the Khangi compromise i.e. Mark B, but did not admit contents of the Khangi compromise. Thus, the plaintiffs/respondents concealed the true facts from the Court. During cross-examination of the plaintiffs/respondents, certain revelation was made on account of recent discoveries pertaining to Khangi compromise and the plaintiffs/respondents did not admit the contents of the Khangi compromise, dated 23.03.2016 and even did not withdraw the civil suit. It was further stated that earlier instant application was not filed as they were under the impression that during of the plaintiffs/respondents they will admit contents of Khangi compromise.

Said fact has been vehemently denied by the plaintiffs/respondents on the ground that the present application has been filed to fill up lacunae, which is not permissible under the law. Since the defendants/petitioners have alleged that the original of Khangi compromise, dated 23.03.2016 was in the possession of the plaintiffs/respondents then notice under Section 66 of the Indian Evidence Act is necessary when the original is shown to be in possession of the person against whom the document is sought to be proved.

Provisions of Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act read as follows:-

65. Cases in which secondary evidence relating to documents may be given.

Secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition or contents of a document in the following cases:-- (a) when the original is shown or appears to be in the possession or power of the person against whom the document is sought to be proved, of any person out of reach of, or not subject to, the process of the Court, or of any person legally bound to produce it, and when, after the notice mentioned in section 66, such person does not produce it; (b) when the existence, condition or contents of the original have been proved to be admitted in writing by the person against whom it is proved or by his representative in interest;

(c) when the original has been destroyed or lost, or when the party offering evidence of its contents cannot, for any other reason not arising from his own default or neglect, produce it in reasonable time; (d) when the original is of such a nature as not to be easily movable; (e) when the original is a public document within the meaning of section 74; (f) when the original is a document of which a certified copy is permitted by this Act, or by any other law in force in 1[India] to be given in evidence; (g) when the originals consist of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot conveniently be examined in Court and the fact to be proved is the general result of the whole collection. In cases (a), (c) and (d), any secondary evidence of the contents of the document is admissible. In case (b), the written admission is admissible.

In case (e) or (f), a certified copy of the document, but no other kind of secondary evidence, is admissible. In case (g), evidence may be given as to the general result of the documents by any person who has examined them, and who is skilled in the examination of such documents.

Perusal of aforesaid Section clearly stipulates that secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition or contents of a document when the original is shown or appears to be in the possession or power of the person against whom the document is sought to be proved, of any person out of reach of, or not subject to, the process of the Court, or of any person legally bound to produce it, and when, after the notice mentioned in section 66, such person does not produce it.

The provisions of Section 66 of the Indian Evidence Act read as under:-

66. Rules as to notice to produce.— Secondary evidence of the contents of the documents referred to in section 65, clause (a), shall not be given unless the party proposing to give such secondary evidence has previously given to the party in whose possession or power the document is, 1 [or to his attorney or pleader,] such notice to produce it as is prescribed by law; and if no notice is prescribed by law, then such notice as the Court considers reasonable under the circumstances of the case: Provided that such notice shall not be required in order to render secondary evidence admissible in any of the following cases, or in any other case in which the Court thinks fit to dispense with it: –– (1) when the document to be proved is itself a notice;

(2) when, from the nature of the case, the adverse party must know that he will be required to produce it;

(3) when it appears or is proved that the adverse party has obtained possession of the original by fraud or force;

(4) when the adverse party or his agent has the original in Court;

(5) when the adverse party or his agent has admitted the loss of the document;

(6) when the person in possession of the document is out of reach of, or not subject to, the process of the Court.

The averments, as made in the application, especially para 3 thereof, indicates that a stand has been taken by the defendants/petitioners that in a routine manner the original Khangi compromise was in the possession of the plaintiff/respondents. The plaintiffs/respondents admitted signatures over the Khangi compromise, but they did not admit contents thereof.

The aforesaid provisions of Indian Evidence Act are very specific, unambiguous and clear that when document is in possession of a person against whom document is sought to be proved, then notice under Section 66 is required to be served upon the said person.

Learned trial court has rightly come to the conclusion that under the provisions of Indian Evidence Act, the defendants ought to have issued notice as prescribed under the Act to produce compromise before seeking permission to lead secondary evidence to prove Khangi compromise.

It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that such mandate is not required in the present case as there is admission on the part of the plaintiffs/respondents with respect to execution of the said document. He has referred to cross-examination of PW2 Gurubax Singh, in which he admitted his signature on compromise, Mark B. He also admitted that the demarcation was conducted on 23.6.2016 and they all were agreeable for the same and qua that compromise was effected inter se the parties.

From the entire perusal of evidence of PW2 Gurbax Singh, there is no iota of evidence to substantiate and demonstrate that there is any admission on the part of the said witness.

The learned counsel for the petitioners has fairly conceded that he shall not press his claim qua grant of relief under Order 18 Rule 17 CPC and he has abandoned the claim qua said relief and he shall confine and press his claim with respect to claim under Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act.

It has been contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that from the perusal of the written statement, nowhere it can be gathered that while filing amended written statement on 25.10.2019, the defendants/petitioners have pleaded factum of Khangi compromise dated 23.3.2016. It is submitted that since the application, which has been filed under Section 65 of the Act, is beyond the pleadings of the parties, therefore, no evidence beyond the pleading can be permitted to be led.

There is no force in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners as perusal of the amended written statement clearly suggests that story of Khangi compromise has been projected for the first time while filing application under Section 65 of the Act.

There is no evidence or whisper qua Khangi compromise in the written statement, therefore, no reliance can be placed on the same as it is well settled that no evidence beyond the pleadings can be permitted to be led.

Learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon judgment as passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ravinder Singh vs. Janmeja Singh, (2000) 8 SCC 191, wherein it was held as under: “7. The election petition is singularly silent of any such averment that the returned candidate, even "if, it be assumed for the sake of the arguments, had published and distributed certain documents, (Annexures A-1 to A-7), as alleged in the election petition either himself or through any other persons with his consent, that those statements were false and that the returned., candidate either believed them to be false or did not believe them to be true, though in paragraph 9 of the election petition, which has been verified as correct on the basis of legal advice, this requirement emanating from Section 123(4) has been mentioned but without any assertion that the returned candidate in this case published the false statements knowing them to be false and/or not believing them to be true. The submission of Mr. Talwar, that at the trial, the petitioner could have said so in his evidence is futile. It is an established proposition that no evidence can be led on a plea not raised in the pleadings and that no amount of evidence can cure defect in the pleadings.”

Similarly, in Anathula Sudhakar vs. P. Buchi Reddy (dead) by LRs, (2008) 4 SCC 594, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while observing that in the absence of pleadings, no evidence beyond the domain and sweep of the pleadings can be permitted to be placed on record, has held as under:- “29. The High Court, in the absence of pleadings and issues, formulated in a second appeal arising from a suit for bare injunction, questions of law unrelated to the pleadings and issues, presumably because some evidence was led and some arguments were advanced on those aspects. The only averment in the plaint that plaintiffs were the owners of the suit property having purchased the same under sale deeds dated 9.12.1968, did not enable the court, much less a High Court in second appeal, to hold a roving enquiry into an oral gift and its validity or validation of ostensible title under section 41 of TP Act. No amount of evidence or arguments can be looked into or considered in the absence of pleadings and issues, is a proposition that is too well settled.”

Sum and substance of the aforesaid judgments is that no evidence can be permitted to be placed on record qua which there is no foundation in the pleadings. Therefore, the petitioners have tried to project totally a new story which is alien to the pleadings as stated by both the parties. The petitioner cannot be permitted to lead evidence in absence of any foundation in the pleadings.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court, while laying down law on the point of secondary evidence in Vijay vs. Union of India, (2023) 17 SCC 455 has held as under:-

32. Primary and Secondary Evidence stands explained by a Constitutional Bench of this Court in Cement Corpn. of India Ltd. v. Purya, (2004) 8 SCC 270 (five-Judge Bench) as the former being evidence that the law requires to be given first, the latter being evidence that may be given in the absence of that original evidence when a proper explanation of its absence has been given. The terms "primary and secondary evidence" apply to the kinds of proof that may be given to the contents of a document, irrespective of the purpose for which such contents, when proved, may be received.

Similarly, this Court in Raj Kumar vs. Milap Chand, Latest HLJ 2025 (HP) (2) 929, has held as under:-

7. Coming back to the facts of the present case, a perusal of the application filed by the petitioners under Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act demonstrates that the prayer therein was that the petitioners/plaintiffs may be allowed to lead secondary evidence by placing on record a Photostat copy of the agreement executed between the plaintiffs and the defendant dated 07.09.1992. It was averred in the application, which is appended with the petition as Annexure P-5 that at the time of the execution of agreement between the plaintiffs and the defendant on 07.09.1992, in respect of the sale of the suit land vis-à-vis which the suit for specific performance was filed by the plaintiffs, one photocopy of the agreement was made from the judicial paper i.e., carbon copy of the agreement as well as from the stamp paper copy. The photocopies were prepared for the petitioners and non-applicant was in possession of the original copy of agreement. The original copy of agreement dated 07.09.1992 was handed over to the defendant in the presence of the witnesses. Subsequently, defendant manipulated and with an intention to defraud the plaintiffs, he took possession of the carbon copy of the agreement by handing over the photocopy of the agreement to the plaintiffs. It was in this backdrop, that a prayer was made to lead additional evidence.

8. Thus, it is evident from the averments made in the application itself that the payer therein was to place a photocopy of the carbon copy on record and, as nothing was on record to suggest that the ‘Copy’ of which Mark-AX itself was a photocopy was compared with the original document at any time, therefore, no perversity can be attributed to the order under challenge and the learned Court below rightly dismissed the application. Learned Court rightly held that in the given circumstances, permission as was being prayed by the petitioners to lead secondary evidence, could not have been granted, as grant of permission would have been in violation of the permission of Section 65 of the Evidence Act.

The plaintiffs instituted the suit in the year 2014 now after elapse of more than 10 years, present application has been filed for leading secondary evidence. Provisions of the Indian Evidence Act mandate issuance of the notice under Section 66, therefore, in absence of doing so, no relief can be granted to the defendants/petitioners, which is in conflict with the provisions of the Act.

Similarly, the pleadings as led by defendants are vague and cryptic and no case pertaining to the Khangi compromise has been made out by the defendants/petitioners in their pleadings. Learned trial court has rightly exercised jurisdiction and the application has been decided on the basis of the material as placed on record by the respective parties.

In Civil Appeal No(s).13801 of 2025, titled as Shri Digant vs M/s P.D.T. Trading Co. & others, the Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with petition under Article 227 of Constitution of India has laid down parameters. The relevant paragraph thereof reads as under:-

22. The scope of High Court’s jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 fell for consideration before a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Radhey Shyam & another v. Chhabi Nath & Ors. 1 This Court held that judicial orders of civil courts are not amenable to a writ of certiorari under Article 226, though they may be questioned in the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. The power under Article 227 is intended to be used sparingly and only in appropriate cases for the purpose of keeping the subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. The power may be exercised in cases occasioning grave injustice or failure of justice such as when (i) the court or tribunal has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have, (ii) has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have, such failure occasioning a failure of justice, and (iii) the jurisdiction though available is being exercised in a manner which tantamounts to overstepping the limits of jurisdiction.”

23. In the case on hand, the appellate court had considered whether the proceeding in detail the issue as to court was justified in trial with the case, without further notice to the defendants, after submission of pursis (Exh.42) by defendants’ counsel, claiming no instructions. After a threadbare analysis and taking into consideration surrounding circumstances, the appellate court held that the trial court had committed no wrong proceeding with the matter court representing with noticed the the that defendants matter. The appellate Court noticed that the advocate representing the defendants had claimed no instructions but not sought withdrawal of his Vakalatnama and the matter thereafter remained pending for over three months till it was decided in March 2015. In between no effort was made by the defendants to engage another lawyer. Moreover, the defendants did not come up with a case that their lawyer’s notice was not served on them therefore, they could not engage another counsel Besides that, the record also indicated that the intention of the defendants was to delay the proceedings because earlier also the suit had proceeded ex parte against them though, later, those orders were recalled. Therefore, in our view, once the appellate court took into consideration all relevant aspects including the fact that pursis (Exh.42) did not seek withdrawal of the Vakalatnama, and withdrawal was not even permitted, there was no such jurisdictional error which warranted exercise of powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court without any justification procedure went consider the procedure prescribed for withdrawal Vakalatnama when neither withdrawal of Vakalatnama was permitted by the Trial Court nor the pursis prayed for its withdrawal. In such circumstances, the entire exercise of the High Court was misconceived. More so, when the view taken by the appellate Court that defendant cannot take advantage of his own wrong was a plausible view based on materials available on record. Hence, in our view, appellate court’s order was not amenable to interference in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court clearly exceeded its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution in interfering with well reasoned order of the appellate Court.”

Similar exposition of law has been laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case titled as Garment Craft vs. Prakash Chand Goel, (2022) 4 SCC 181, wherein in paras 15 and 16, it has been held as under:

“15. Having heard the counsel for the parties, we are clearly of the view that the impugned order is contrary to law and cannot be sustained for several reasons, but primarily for deviation from the limited jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to re- appreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior court or tribunal. The jurisdiction exercised is in the nature of correctional jurisdiction to set right grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse, violation of fundamental principles of law or justice. The power under Article 227 is exercised sparingly in appropriate cases, like when there is no evidence at all to justify, or the finding is so perverse that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion that the court or tribunal has come to. It is axiomatic that such discretionary relief must be exercised to ensure there is no miscarriage of justice.

16. Explaining the scope of jurisdiction under Article 227, this Court in Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd. has observed:- "6. The scope and ambit of exercise of power and jurisdiction by a High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is examined and explained in a number of decisions of this Court. The exercise of power under this article involves a duty on the High Court to keep inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do the duty expected or required of them in a legal manner. The High Court is not vested with any unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the subordinate courts or tribunals. Exercise of this power and interfering with the orders of the courts or tribunals is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where if the High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected. It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the face of the record. The High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of facts of an inferior court or tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion, which the court or tribunal has come to.

19. The factum that the counsel for the appellant had applied for the certified copy would show that the counsel for the appellant was aware that the ex-parte decree had been passed on the account of failure to lead defence evidence. This would not, however, be a good ground and reason to set aside and substitute the opinion formed by the trial court that the appellant being incarcerated was unable to lead evidence and another chance should be given to the appellant to lead defence evidence. The discretion exercised by the trial court in granting relief, did not suffer from an error apparent on the face of the record or was not a finding so perverse that it was unsupported by evidence to justify it. There could be some justification for the respondent to argue that the appellant was possibly aware of the ex-parte decree and therefore the submission that the appellant came to know of the ex-parte decree only on release from jail on 6th May, 2017 is incorrect, but this would not affect the factually correct explanation of the appellant that he was incarcerated and could not attend the civil suit proceedings from 6th October 2015 to 6th May 2017. If it was felt 30 that the application for setting aside the ex-parte decree was filed belatedly, the court could have given an opportunity to the appellant to file an application for condonation of delay and costs could have been imposed. The facts as known, equally apply as grounds for condonation of delay. It is always important to take a holistic and overall view and not get influenced by aspects which can be explained. Thus, the reasoned decision of the trial court on elaborate consideration of the relevant facts did not warrant interference in exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction under Article of the Constitution.”

Taking into consideration the aforesaid exposition of law, as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, this Court is of the considered opinion that there is no perversity or jurisdictional error in the same.

Consequently, the present petition being devoid of any merit is dismissed, so also the pending application(s), if any, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.

Any expression of opinion, hereinabove, shall have no bearing on the merits of the case and shall be deemed to have been made only for the purpose of disposal of instant petition.

(Romesh Verma) 16th July, 2026

Judge (pankaj)